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“Casella mio, per tornar altra volta 
  là dov’ io son, fo io questo vïaggo;” 
  diss’ io, “ma a te com’è tanta ora tolta?” 
Ed elli a me: “Nessun m’è fatto oltraggio, 
  se quei che leva quando e cui li piace, 
  più volte m’ ha negato esto passaggio; 
chè di giusto voler lo suo si face: 
  veramente da tre mesi elli ha tolto 
  chi ha voluto intrar, con tutta pace. 
Ond’ io, ch’era ora alla marina volto 
  dove l’acqua di Tevero s’insala, 
  benignamente fu’ da lui ricolto. 
A quella foce ha elli or dritta l’ala, 
  però che semre quivi si ricoglie 
  quale verso Acheronte non si cala.” 
E io: “Se nuova legge non ti toglie 
  memoria o uso all’ amoroso canto 
  che mi solea quetar tutte mie voglie, 
di ciò ti piaccia consolare alquanto 
  l’anima mia, che, con la mia persona 
  venendo qui, è affannata tanto!” 
“Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona” 
  cominciò elli allor sì dolcemente, 
  che la dolcezza ancor dentro mi sona. 
Lo mio maestro e io e quella gente 
  ch’eran con lui parevan sì contenti 
  come a nessun toccasse altro la mente. 
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Introduction:  
With and Without Dictionaries:   
Explaining Spenser’s Motives for his Idiosyncratic Ideas of Language 
 
Yet every attempt to cross the gulf of language remains so partial, even illusory, a task 
always to be recommenced.  The reality of language difference to me means so much that 
I occasionally think I have remained addicted to the English Renaissance so as not to lose 
sight of that fact.  In the early modern period, languages keep their sharp edges, their 
strangeness to one another, in a way that seems less defined in this century of cribs and 
instant guides to alien cultures. (572) 
—Eiléan Ní Chuilleanáin, Acts and Monuments of an Unelected Nation: The Cailleach 
Writes about the Renaissance 
 
Everyone teaching English, and every English-language writer whom I know, 
depends almost unthinkingly on the authority of dictionaries.  I say “almost” because the 
dependency does not itself stop writers and teachers from recognizing the cultural and 
historical context upon which defining words and accepting the authority of definitions 
depends. I speak an American dialect with a variety of differences from what I might find 
in a dictionary’s English, even a dictionary for Americans. Though the dictionary’s 
authority is rarely worth disputing when I write, ignoring its authority is crucial to my 
day-to-day identity in speaking with some Americans—especially those with whom I 
share bonds to which the scholarly world is alien.  My present stance, being perhaps a 
little reflective of the sensibility expressed by Eiléan Ní Chuilleanáin above, raises a 
natural question about a past to which I have a scholarly attachment: What was it like for 
Renaissance authors to compose without the authority of English dictionaries or 
grammars and, instead, with the presence of Latin and Greek grammars, lexicons, and 
education?  In the present, my Latin, French, Greek, and Italian language education 
informs my own sense of grammar, but not profoundly.  I may in my general thinking 
compare and thus transfer ideas about foreign word meaning and foreign-language 
grammar to my English, but I ultimately turn to English dictionaries and usage guides for 
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decisions.  Such guides may in fact bear the influence of patterns of thought that originate 
in the study of classical languages, but little that I can immediately sense.  Edmund 
Spenser, however, would have had to assert the meaning of words in English in 
anticipation of the arrival of fully English grammars and lexicons whose rules were being 
shaped, during the sixteenth century, by the example of Latin and Latin-English lexicons. 
What would this have meant? 
Spenser’s use of the verb “perform” in one stanza from The Fowre Hymnes  
illustrates one way in which writing without an English dictionary and with the presence 
of Latin lexicography would have influenced him and his approach to his readership. The 
Fowre Hymnes, as I will show in my first chapter, dramatizes the problem that language 
itself cannot accommodate understanding adequately.  The failure of language, Spenser 
reveals, is related to its materiality, the physical “tongue” that infects the purity of mind.   
In the passage below, we find Spenser trying to explain how the immaterial mind is 
comparable to earthly matter in the way it may be mis-shaped. A revealing quality to 
Spenser’s use of the verb “perform” appears along the way: 
Yet oft it falles, that many a gentle mynd  
Dwels in a deformed tabernacle drownd, 
Either by chaunce, against the course of kynd, 
Or through unaptnesse in the substance fownd, 
Which it assumed of some stubborne grownd, 
That will not yield unto her formes direction, 
But is perform’d with some foule imperfection.  
(An Hymne in Honour of Beautie, ll. 141-7) 
 
As the O.E.D. makes plain in its entry on “perform,” the English use of the word to mean 
“to carry out an action” was quite old and common by Spenser’s time, while the meaning 
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of “to make, construct, or build” was rarer.1 The word “perform” in either case was an old 
and clear English word in Spenser’s time, not an obscure loan-word from Latin. The 
Latin equivalent of the word “perform” appears in Thomas Thomas’ Latin lexicon from 
1589, though, and Thomas observes the less common of the two meanings: “Performo, 
[…] to fashion out a thing.”  Both Thomas Thomas and  Robert Estienne (in a 1536 Latin 
dictionary) define “performo” based on one participial instance in Quintilian.  Thus, the 
word has only the slimmest basis in Latin, as there is no “formo” verb. From English 
usage, Spenser’s readers likely knew the commoner English meaning of “perform.” 
Spenser clearly chooses a rarer meaning, though, and it is worth thinking about why.  For 
Spenser to say the ground is “performed” with imperfection is to say it is “completed” or 
“made” with imperfection. “Imperfect” means unfinished in roughly the same way as 
“unperformed” might—especially if we are thinking in terms of the Latin root of the 
common Latin word, “perficio.” After all, “perficio” in Latin means what “perform” does 
in English, encompassing both the commoner and rarer meanings that I just pointed out. 
Seen in these limited terms, then, Spenser’s choice to draw out the rarer meaning of the 
word “performed” by the word “imperfection” seems dubiously opaque or tediously 
paradoxical. That is, he seems to mean the ground is completed with incompletion, 
perfected with imperfection, as if both perform and perfect were only to be read darkly 
through a Latin mirroring they enact. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The O.E.D. online notes that the word perform’s meaning of “To carry out in action, execute, or fulfill” 
originates from the French “parfourmer” and has English uses dating from 1300. This is, then, the first 
meaning of the word in English, which is quite distinct from the Latin meanings that might have prompted 
its French origins. The O.E.D. cites 16th-century instances of this first meaning of “perform” from the 
Coverdale bible in 1535 and Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice in 1600. Less common, but dating from as 
early as 1395 is the English meaning “To make, construct, or build (an object); to create (an artistic work).” 
This meaning (and a variety of others close to it) certainly existed into the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, though it disappears afterward.   
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Several further linked ideas from Latin, English, and philosophy make what 
Spenser is doing with the word “performed” playfully ironic rather than dully opaque, 
though.  The philosophical context is essential: Spenser wishes his readers to see that 
Platonic “form” in the mind is imposing its “formes” on matter. As William Oram and his 
fellow editors comment in the notes, Spenser’s “reasoning has extended the logic of 
Platonism” in finding that the “inherent recalcitrance of matter” corrupts the beauty that 
exists in the world (713n).  That context clarified, ironies embedded in parts of the word 
“perform” emerge. Mainly, Spenser suggests that to complete beauty in the world undoes 
what is form in the mind. This irony is clearer from the Latin rather than any meaning 
associated with the English: “forma” in Latin is a common word for beauty.  Ironically, 
the beauty of the mind’s form has been “performed” out of place by coming to a material 
home.  Yet another possibility appears: the “ground” (or the mind itself, depending on 
how you read) is “perform’d” in the sense that it is corrupted throughout, overformed.  In 
the latter reading, “per” acts as a Latinate intensifier to the English verb “form” in a 
manner that will be more apparent to those who know Latin.  “Performing” in this sense 
implies excess rather than exact completion, and as such it bends the meaning of 
“perform” well outside of what we find in any dictionary meaning even in the present. It 
changes even the kind of meaning that might be available to a word like “perfect” in 
English or a word like “perficio” in Latin.  Altogether, then, Spenser adapts Latinate and 
Latin meanings to the end of his English imagery, calling on a reader’s awareness of the 
parts of the verb “perform” to see several possibilities.  The possibilities are larger than a 
simple transfer of meanings from Latin to English. 
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 The case of “perform” in the Fowre Hymnes illustrates how Spenser was using 
English in a way that acknowledges differences with Latin, then harnesses such 
difference for English.  This is precisely how Spenser writes in anticipation of English 
lexicography and with an awareness of existing Latin lexicons.  Spenser’s readers might 
readily consult the meaning of “per” and “forma” in Latin, and even “performo” in the 
sense of “fashion.”  However, they would not find an entry for a Latin “perform” in the 
sense of “act” that had come into existence in English unless they looked under 
“perficio.”  Spenser’s readers had to imagine an English word with whose meaning he 
plays using Latin tools.  My argument here is that such complex circumstance, one 
requiring the anticipation and deduction of meanings in English with tools and ideas from 
well outside of English, frames Spenser’s compositional authority as an English poet in 
the late sixteenth century.  His choices in diction must be strategic in part for being 
directed to audiences that would need to deduce meaning in the absence of English 
dictionaries. They would know bonds of native speech on which no academy had laid 
firm claim, and yet they could move toward very academic thinking about their language 
through ideas about Latin and Greek grammar and word definition.  That said, I do not 
want to begin an argument that uses a form of Other/Or reasoning to discuss the 
disturbing presence of the alien or foreign or ancient within the native. Long before his 
contemporary readers would have arrived at an understanding of Spenser’s language at 
any level, they must have figured out the in-woven meanings that Spenser produced with 
his words. We may term such meanings literal or metaphorical, old or new, foreign or 
native in a comfortable retrospect, but we must recognize greater semantic complexity for 
past audiences and for the author.  That is, for words like “perform” we must recognize 
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an uncomfortable continuum of simple, complex, playful, obscure, foreign, familiar, and 
so forth. Spenser’s process of managing his readership’s sense of lexis in this 
circumstance is thus bound to equally complex ideas about language itself that had 
proliferated before and during his time. Monumental humanists like Lorenzo Valla, 
Desiderius Erasmus, Ambrogio Calepino, Robert and Henri Estienne and others saw 
deeply into the history and culture of words and set themselves forth as pedagogues on 
just such matters. 
Even though Spenser likely shared some reverence for the words that classical-
language humanists defined with their influential notions of meaning and culture, Spenser 
and such humanists did not necessarily see the action of language or the authority of 
lexicographers in the same way. In this thesis, I will explain how the evidence in 
Spenser’s poetry suggests that he did not in fact conceive of linguistic meaning in the 
same way as many other humanists, especially lexicographers. Spenser’s poetry itself 
offers a view different from theirs of the relationship between language and knowledge 
(or even more broadly understood: language, society, and the individual mind) that was 
central to some humanist classical-language lexicography and to some broader ideals of 
humanism.  The difference is most palpable in Spenser’s ideas about an individual’s 
sense of language as we find it depicted in the idealistic and Platonic imagery of The 
Fowre Hymnes and in The Legend of Courtesy, Book 6 of The Faerie Queene—works 
from late in Spenser’s career.  Yet the difference radiates through all of Spenser’s work, 
especially the management of diction in The Shepheardes Calender, and in my thesis as a 
whole I argue that understanding this difference should change our view of the ambitions 
of his poetry. 
!   
! 8!
The importance of Latin and Greek lexicons in defining the fifteenth- and 
sixteenth-century views of humanist Latin diction, in presenting an encyclopedic 
understanding of ancient culture, and in developing structured ideas about the relation 
between language and mind has already been recognized.  Ann Moss, in Renaissance 
Truth and the Latin Language Turn, has explored the influence of figures like Valla and 
Erasmus and the nuanced difference between their ideas and those present in the lexicons 
of Ambrogio Calepino and Dominico Nanni Mirabellio—works which I will examine in 
detail in the second chapter. John Considine, in Dictionaries in Early Modern Europe: 
Lexicography and the Making of Heritage, has provided detailed assessments of the 
influence of works by key figures like Robert and Henri Estienne, as I will consider in 
my third chapter. Furthermore, scholars have already provided evidence of Spenser’s 
dependence on lexicons as sources for the material of his poetry. In Classical Myth and 
Legend in Renaissance Dictionaries, DeWitt Starnes and Ernest Talbert have shown that 
lexicons were key sources about classical culture for Spenser.  My own argument 
develops a more complicated understanding Spenser’s feeling about the lexical sources 
themselves and the humanist arguments about meaning in language that lay with them.  
Naturally, my most basic interest is to find out Spenser’s feeling about such lexicons in a 
way that answers to the depth of their cultural importance as Moss and Considine, among 
others, have revealed it.  However, I am also answering to scholars who have 
characterized Spenser’s reaction to various sixteenth-century manners of conceiving of 
linguistic meaning, including that of lexicography—finding each scholar insightful and 
yet problematic in specific ways that contribute to the development of my arguments.  As 
my reader, you will not be able to overlook my concern with the compounded faults and 
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insights I notice in these scholars, as my disputes with them frequently occupy much 
space in my chapters.  In order to summarize the basic arguments of each of my chapters, 
then, let me address the kind of approaches that Richard Waswo, Judith Anderson, Daniel 
Fried, Paula Blank, and Andrew Hadfield provide for analyzing Spenser’s view of 
linguistic meaning.  My assessment of the limitations of each of these thinkers is, after 
all, instrumental in the progress of my thesis as a whole and precisely what is new about 
my sense of Spenser’s poetry. 
1. Richard Waswo 
In her survey of the opinions about Spenser’s linguistic choices, Dorothy Stevens 
writes that “Spenser’s idiosyncratic modifications of Elizabethan English diction 
demonstrate that he followed neither Continental linguists nor the English linguists 
slavishly, instead formulating his own blend of practices” (376).  This idiosyncrasy, she 
stresses, makes it difficult to assess Spenser’s motivations as responses to the very 
authorities he appears to neither follow nor reject.  Not surprisingly, then, Richard 
Waswo’s Language and Meaning in the Renaissance draws upon philosophical ideas that 
promise yet fail to place Spenser’s reaction to lexicons in proper historical and 
intellectual context. Waswo, in his own words, uses “a composite version of some present 
theories [of language and meaning] in order to disinter the competing semantic 
assumptions of the Renaissance” (ix).  As should be evident, my project is narrower yet 
related to Waswo’s in that I hope to understand Spenser’s theories of language partly by 
comparison to Renaissance as well as later and earlier theories relevant to Spenser’s 
practices and interests. However, my project diverges from Waswo’s in an important 
respect.  Waswo depends heavily upon the idea that Saussurean linguistics presented a 
!   
! 10!
revolution in which “relational meaning” became distinct from “referential” meaning, a 
fact he stresses in his introduction to “notions of meaning” (6).  Using this basic 
dichotomy—whose limitations for his own interests and alternative versions in other 
disciplinary “domains” he acknowledges—he comes to argue that versions of this 
Saussurean division existed in the Renaissance: 
By thus divorcing meaning from reference and regarding it as a function of the 
manifold relations of words with each other, Saussure proposed in his domain 
(independently developed in other domains, as well) what has become one of the 
major revolutions in twentieth-century thought: the shift from referential to 
relational semantics, from regarding the meaning of language as a given object of 
reference to regarding it as a dynamic function of use.  This revolution did not 
begin with Saussure—I shall be arguing that it is a definitive feature of the 
Renaissance—and it is by no means complete. (13) 
 
Waswo is right that Saussure did not initiate the idea or distinction.  Even so, Waswo 
himself depends on a radically reductive notion of “reference” whose exponents could 
only be extremely naïve empiricists.  This failure is important because it effectively 
creates part of the historical context with which we need to see Spenser’s possible 
disputes with other humanists.  On the one hand, Waswo is right, as I will consider in a 
little more detail presently, that Spenser, like other humanists, is more concerned with 
relational meaning—a sense of the way a word’s meaning fits into a web of syntax and 
the contrasting and comparative elements of other words.  On the other, Waswo does not 
go far enough in his acknowledgment of the limitations of a specifically Saussurean 
method of analyzing the formerly-existing debates about or struggles over the nature of 
meaning, its relation to knowledge, mind, language, material, spirit, learning, and a 
variety of other factors—all things useful to assessing the degree of difference or 
similarity between Spenser and his contemporaries.  Thus what Waswo overlooks about 
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Spenser specifically reveals some things we should focus upon to deepen our 
appreciation of the nature of Spenser’s idiosyncrasy.  
Waswo situates Spenser within the intellectual history which, as explained, is 
even now shaped by the shift from a view of linguistic meaning dominated by referential 
elements to one dominated by relational elements. In the chapter on the “Challenge of 
Eloquence,” Waswo cites Erasmus as the figure spearheading a change in the view of 
linguistic meaning—a change that manifests itself, Waswo argues, in Spenser’s choices 
and the humanistic appeal of Spenser’s choices as an allegorist.  For Waswo—as indeed 
for other scholars like Ann Moss—Erasmus follows and extends the arguments and ideas 
of Lorenzo Valla which were crucial to a redefinition of how ancient Latin was to be 
taught and understood, how its meaning was to be seen as functioning: “Erasmus, by 
defending Valla,” Waswo writes, “is articulating the motives and the principles of what 
will become a large part of his own life’s work” (214). Waswo examines Erasmus’s De 
Ratione Studii for the proof,  concluding that for Erasmus and his follower humanists 
“the whole humanistic focus on language as a socio-historical product implied what Valla 
sporadically inferred from it: that semantics is epistemology, that language does not 
reveal or reflect reality but constitutes it” (219). Regardless of how accurate this 
comment about humanism may or may not be,2 it sets up Waswo to consider examples of 
literature that shift from stiff scholastic ideas of reference to fluid, flexible humanist ones 
of relation.3 But were poet and humanist simply and wholly aligned in acceptance of this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See my later comments on John Leonard’s analysis of the reception and use of the Cratylus for a sense of 
why Waswo’s view is faulty. 
3 To be sure, Waswo’s depiction of Erasmus’s attempt to change how poet, rhetorician, philosopher, and 
theologian operate is just, for we find many scholars remarking upon the concomitance in Erasmus’s 
change of the hermeneutic process and the blending of the roles of poet and rhetorician in particular. Arthur 
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shift? To bridge the difference between the scholar Erasmus’s vision and the poet 
Spenser’s choices, Waswo imagines that the courtier-poet Philip Sidney, himself so 
clearly influential on Spenser, was responsive principally to the Erasmian influence in his 
defense of poetry.  That is, Waswo reasons that Sidney’s sanctification of the poet’s 
interpretive role is consistent with what Erasmus demands (226).  He concludes: “The 
particular new way employed by Erasmian exegesis and advocated by Sidneian criticism, 
arrived at by unifying the text’s emotional power and its instructive value, ultimately 
postulates what might be called an ‘affective semantics’” (229). Waswo’s observations 
come at the expense of seeing a key difference between Sidney’s and Erasmus’s attitudes 
toward what constitute model languages.  As my reading and notes on Sidney’s Defence 
of Poesie will show in my third chapter, Sidney’s advocacy of a powerful use of language 
in poetry comes with championing English as particularly available to his 
recommendations for the sanctified poetic activity of an English person. Erasmus, as was 
generally acknowledged, did not like the European vernaculars.  Indeed, Erasmus’s view 
of language depends upon a systematic discovery of ideal modes of thinking implicated 
in classical texts that in many ways stand above the modes assumed to be part of 
vernaculars. Setting that complex matter aside, though, we still cannot join Sidney’s and 
an Erasmian exegetical process because Sidney’s plans for poetry are not simply a 
reflection of humanism and not indistinct from what we might find in Spenser. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Kinney remarks specifically on the origin of Erasmus’s desire to see a close relation between the roles of 
poet and orator in Cicero’s inestimably popular De Oratore (29). Waswo sees it similarly, arguing that 
Erasmus transferred the “rhetorical techniques” to general tasks of interpretive analysis “in the… 
Ciceronian/Horatian tradition” (225). 
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Just as Waswo sees Sidney’s ideas about language as harmonious with those of 
Erasmus, he forces Spenser’s entire allegorical method away from the complex 
philosophical influences of Platonism and Christianity and into the historical shift that he 
has argued into dominance. The approaches to language that figures like Erasmus and 
Luther propose, he argues, shift the nature of allegory itself away from medieval or 
scholastic patterns, and Spenser follows that pattern: 
Spenser himself speaks of allegory, in the letter to Raleigh, as a “method” for 
achieving the Sidneian delight that is instruction.  The method, however, is 
subordinate (and hence can vary, as the twelvefold ‘Aristotelian’ scheme in the 
letter does not appear in the poem) to the purpose. The meanings pointed at 
through the story are inscribed within the meaning enacted in the story. (230) 
 
Unfortunately, Waswo’s description of the specific actions of Spenser’s allegory does not 
distinguish it from the action of normal language. What Waswo finds to be “relational” 
here is the way meaning can be contained within and distributed among the units of the 
language—that is, amid the syntax of its parts and within the function of each part—as 
part of the process of thought circumscribing language.  All languages are more than 
simply referential by nature, and Spenser’s awareness of some idea of relational meaning 
in his use of allegory is not inevitable.  Figures like Gottlob Frege, among others, have 
observed that relational meaning (what Frege calls a word’s “sense” as opposed to its 
“reference”) is a common property of language and/or thinking generally, not a special 
property of a given linguistic example.4  Even if this property may become more evident 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Though I use the reference/relation distinction to help build a basic argument, I do not consider it entirely 
adequate to describing the symbolic action of words. See Terrence Deacon’s summary of the relevance of 
Gottlob Frege’s ideas to thinking about meaning in language, and his ensuing discussion of C.S. Peirce and 
interpretants, in The Symbolic Species (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997): 61-68.  Deacon’s ideas are 
foundational to my own realization that words do not necessarily function like definitions (or according to 
definitions), and thus to my realization that Spenser or any writer, unlike a lexicographer, need not have 
thought so as he manipulated word meanings for his readers.  However, Deacon’s ideas are only part of a 
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in allegory, this alone is not sufficient to make any kind of reasonable argument that 
Spenser designed the poem to register this effect in, as it were, unconscious compliance 
with the trends of humanist theory.   
 Further important reasons why Waswo’s approach is ineffective for Spenser in 
particular become clear in the work of two writers who have made more precise studies 
of intellectual history for Spenser, Martha Craig and John Leonard. Early on in his 
argument about meaning, Waswo rules out the significance of Platonic philosophy. He 
acknowledges that the Cratylus and the Phaedrus explore fundamental questions about 
language, but he dismisses the explorations as just a way for Plato to discredit “mere 
‘jugglers’ of words” (30) and to privilege a rational discourse beyond language.  My 
analysis of the Phaedrus (in my first chapter) will present reasons why this is an 
untenable position about the influence of Platonism itself, but fuller rejections of 
Waswo’s approach come from two scholars whose works straddle Waswo’s in time.  In 
1967 Martha Craig pointed out that Plato’s Cratylus provides an abstract understanding 
of Spenser’s strategies of archaism and name-crafting in his later work, his very manner 
of negotiating what his allegorical figures “point” to within and outside of his work 
(451). She notes that the relevance of the Cratylus to lexical definition had been ably 
indicated by none other than Spenser’s former headmaster, Richard Mulcaster (449). 
Craig’s work was cited, in 1990, by John Leonard, in the long introduction to his Naming 
in Paradise, to show how and why scholarship had proved inept in its estimation of what 
the Cratylus had to offer theorists of meaning in Spenser’s and Milton’s time: “Literary 
critics and even historians of linguistics too frequently assume that the debate initiated in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
range of ideas from linguistics that I have not brought into my thesis with the degree of precision I would 
prefer. Further discussion is here omitted, simply to shorten what is already a lengthy argument. 
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the Cratylus has long been resolved,” he explains.  Leonard shows clearly that this 
mistaken assumption simplistically reduces the Platonic debate within the Cratylus, 
making it seem as though the dialogue granted final victory to Cratylus or Hermogenes, 
rather than Socrates or Plato (5). Leonard goes on to show that the essential issue of the 
Cratylus addresses the question of how naming was a key part of the systematic and 
productively rational arrangement of language.  The latter concern is evident in both 
Spenser and Milton, and indeed it could easily play a part in any humanist discourse 
about how to craft a vernacular literary language in relation to classical languages.  What 
Craig and Leonard show, therefore, is that humanist and Renaissance thinkers about 
language, presumably including Spenser, were by virtue of their familiarity with the 
Cratylus often well beyond the shift away from simple referential thinking about 
language that Waswo makes central to his argument.   
2. Judith Anderson and Daniel Fried 
 It is helpful at this point, for my concern with how intellectual histories are 
constructed, to consider a remark by Raymond Williams.  Speaking of dichotomies in the 
use of the term “history,” Raymond Williams observes that it can slip unstably from 
meaning simply a “knowledge of events” into denoting a “systematic array of trends.”5 In 
my own experience, I have found that the latter is a deeply tempting proposition for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
5 In Keywords, Raymond Williams points out that the early sense of the word history that involves a 
“narrative account of events,” which is considered to perform a knowledge-seeking task, may be 
distinguished from a sense of the word history that traces a “continuous and connected process” of events 
that is directed and universal (146).  In the former sense, there is an effort to find the causes and effects; in 
the latter, the historical causes and effects are sometimes abstracted into “historical forces—products of the 
past which are active and present and which will shape the future in knowable ways” (147). 
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scholars.  It allows us to show off a mastery of a period, to claim that we can predict the 
development of one person’s ideas according to the influence of particular trends.  I have 
just shown why Spenser does not fit into Waswo’s intellectual history; throughout this 
thesis I must go on to show the limitations of other much-respected scholars by clarifying 
Spenser’s complicated relationship with intellectual and historical patterns—whether in 
the first chapter’s description of Spenser’s problematic play with Platonic and 
Neoplatonic ideals or the second chapter’s analysis of the faults with Daniel Fried’s 
theory of the Calepino lexicon and the character of Calepine. My necessary task is to 
show why I have come to doubt that the trends to which scholars fitted Spenser’s choices 
actually matched some plausible motivation—one specific enough to be Spenser’s and 
thus more than the political or intellectual ambition that might be generalized to any 
colonial administrator or humanist in the period.   
The most flexible exploration of the ways in which Spenser’s thinking about 
language fits into the period’s view of defining words and language comes from Judith 
Anderson’s 1996 Words that Matter. In a long chapter on the status of lexicons in the 
period, she notes a potent irony in the difference between present and past lexicography. 
While the “summary and analytic” form of lexical definition was in a fluid “early stage of 
codification” (92) in the sixteenth century, she explains, lexicons then often offered more 
robust faith in the materiality of words as constituent determiners of reality: 
“Paradoxically, while modern words may more clearly constitute meaning, they also may 
be less substantial than Renaissance ones” (96).  Anderson notes that literary figures 
participate in some of these paradoxes and ironies as they find different means of 
conceiving of the substance of language. She says of Spenser and Ben Jonson: 
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Characteristically, if variously, both poets give distinctive weight to the word, 
even though both also typically compose a poetry that represents a distinctive 
content—res, or subject matter—Spenser favoring Neoplatonized ideals, and 
Jonson favoring the Baconian “nature of things,” a rationally perceived reality. 
(102) 
 
Anderson’s reference to the “early stage of codification” and then to two figures who 
seem to represent a backward-looking, Platonic view of language (Spenser) and a 
forward-looking view of language (Jonson) shows that she too is constructing a trend-
line.  Her conception of Spenser’s place in this trend-line is the reverse of  Waswo’s.  
Waswo, as noted, tracks a change from referential to relational conceptions of language 
in which Spenser’s allegory casts us forward from the Erasmian ideas towards the 
Saussurean revolution.  Anderson comes to argue that Spenser represents a Platonist 
holdout against the coming “codification” of language by lexicographic powers.  
I am skeptical of Anderson’s view of the historical trend-line, and presently I will 
highlight a point of dispute, but in truth my own argument about Spenser takes its 
soundest beginnings from her observations. For example, Anderson sees deeply into 
Spenser’s choice of the word scrine (127-132).  As she points out, Spenser first uses the 
word to describe the history, the “everlasting scryne” (1.pr.2.3) that the Muse embodies 
and keeps for the sake of his entire epic project in The Faerie Queene. Later Spenser uses 
the term to describe the materials in Alma’s library in Book 2, where Eumnestes 
infallibly keeps the history itself “laid up in his immortal scrine” (2.9.56.6).  Reviewing 
the information about the word scrine available from period lexicons, Anderson 
concludes: 
From the ancient Roman past through the Middle Ages to the early modern 
period, the fortunes of the word scrine suggest, in addition to its association with 
books and archives, equally persistent associations with memory or with things 
worth remembering—things worth keeping in mind and things of value. 
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Repeatedly and specifically scrine is associated with secrecy or seclusion 
(secerno, secretum), with a need to guard or preserve, and with the word and idea 
of a thesaurus, a treasure or treasury of writing and, more fundamentally, of 
words.  One moves easily, induced by the context of Spenser’s usage, from these 
associations to Sidney’s commonplace observation that, “memory being the only 
treasure[r] of knowledge, those words… fittest for memory are likewise most 
convenient for knowledge”; and then back in time to Plato’s more mystically 
oriented idea that all knowledge is memorial, a kind of remembering, an idea 
reflected variously in turn by Aristotle, by the Neoplatonists, and by Saint 
Augustine. (129) 
 
 With this, Anderson strikes felicitously upon a description of Spenser’s linguistic 
idealism that resonates fully with Martha Craig’s 1967 insistence that Spenser’s work 
must be read as an embodiment of the Cratylus’ ideas about language. Anderson goes on 
to suggest that the “network of ideas latent in words like scrine” (132) is the essence of 
Spenser’s approach to defining the word itself, and that in Spenser’s later books of The 
Faerie Queene he continues to envision language by such idealistic terms without using 
the word scrine itself (131-2).  
From my point of view, Anderson and Craig are right about Spenser’s 
Platonically-colored idealism, and Anderson all the more right that Spenser’s use of the 
term “scrine” evokes the notions evident in lexicons and roughly parallel to his idealistic 
priorities for the preservation of culture and knowledge in language.  However, Anderson 
leaves much to explore.  It is not clear from Anderson’s or Craig’s approach just where 
Spenser differs from such a general Platonic idea of meaning and language—especially 
one that seems so nebulously harmonious with ideas synthesized from a host of period 
lexicons. To identify Spenser’s conception of language fully, we need to be able to 
consider what he embraced from humanism, lexicography, and philosophy as well as 
what he rejected.  My exploration will thus begin by considering Spenser’s priorities as a 
poet and rhetorician relative to his expressions of linguistic idealism.  In my first chapter, 
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I examine Spenser’s persistent dichotomy between imagery of the tongue and imagery of 
the mind.  This examination is fruitful first because it reveals, in The Fowre Hymnes, how 
Spenser envisioned the relationship of an individual author’s mind to both language as 
writing and language as speech.  It details, in other words, Spenser’s conception of the 
very memorial site of the cultural “scrine” that Anderson discovers. As I will show, 
however, this relationship and its site bear relevance not to the ideas about naming and 
language in the Cratylus, but to the far more specific notions about rhetoric, persuasion, 
poetic inspiration, and the technology of writing available from the Phaedrus—the 
philosophical backbone of The Fowre Hymnes and a text openly referred to at the 
opening of the fourth book of The Faerie Queene. Spenser’s nomination of the Phaedrus 
rather than the Cratylus evokes Spenser’s ideas about language as a poet in ways 
unnoticed by Craig, Anderson, or other commentators.  This is perhaps unsurprising if we 
consider the fitness of the Phaedrus as it addresses the spiritual and vatic connection of 
poets to language as well as the larger question of how to craft language in ways that help 
it obtain or reflect a truer, deeper knowledge.  Where the Cratylus concerns a scientific 
sort of knowing, the Phaedrus concerns methods of persuasion with which Spenser often 
found himself concerned as a poet dealing with the erotic and chivalric themes normal to 
his epic work and related to the Phaedrus’s discourse on the influence of eros.  Even 
more saliently, through its discourse on the growth and development of the soul in 
exactly such erotic circumstances, the Phaedrus addresses the questions of artistic and 
intellectual growth in a manner harmonious with the thematic concern with marital, filial, 
and devotional love that concern Spenser from the beginning to the end of his career as a 
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poet—matters that, as I will then show in my third chapter, relate to Spenser’s concern 
with Greek influences in The Shepheardes Calender. 
My philosophical critiques offer nuanced ways to break from while making good 
use of the studies of Craig and Anderson, and my critique of the recent historical 
investigation of Daniel Fried allows me develop a better historical account of a specific 
thread of humanist intellectual history to which Spenser’s work in Book 6 of The Faerie 
Queene arguably responds in greater detail than Fried allows.  Fried, in “Defining 
Courtesy: Spenser, Calepine, and Renaissance Lexicography,” considers how the 
character of Calepine forges a commentary on the Latin-language Calepino lexicon. He 
argues that the lexicon by Spenser’s time was mainly known for helping people achieve 
“the more worldly goals of humanistic education” (234). Fried seems right: the lexicon 
was indeed a pedagogical guide for a young man going from basic Latin to courtly 
civility in a cosmopolitan Neo-Latin-mediated world—and, without doubt, Spenser’s 
Calepine is a young man abroad struggling to understand.  Yet Fried also claims that 
Spenser is using the character of Calepine to mock the limitations of a humanist 
education represented by the Calepino lexicon, particularly the dependency of that 
education on an “exclusively linguistic competency” (242).  From my point of view, 
Fried’s argument is useful for pointing out the ways in which Spenser’s work was 
potentially at odds with humanism.  To the degree that Spenser’s Calepine character is an 
example of haplessness itself, I think that Fried is right that the allegory presents a 
criticism of humanism.  However, in my second chapter I sharpen Fried’s argument by 
examining a fuller version of the Calepino lexicon’s history as well as Spenser’s implicit 
comparison of Calepine to the troubled figure of Mirabella, who in part arguably 
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represents the Polyanthea lexicon of Dominico Nanni Mirabellio. Fried argues that the 
original version of the Calepino in 1502, though “meant as a fairly advanced reference 
tool for scholars and students” (230), had degenerated in late-century polyglot editions.  
Such editions, Fried notes, were full of mythology, geography, and history and “served 
partly in the role of what we could call an encyclopaedia” rather than a dictionary.  
However, this is a problematic distinction in the period: as Judith Anderson points out in 
Words that Matter, the “tradition of lexical definition” that culminates in the modern 
analytics of the dictionary and its contrast with encyclopedias had not truly developed in 
this century. Spenser’s objections to the lexicon did not therefore likely derive from such 
a distinction. In his haste to explain how in later editions the Calepino became a messy 
encyclopedia of linguistic competency, Fried neglects the Calepino’s messy beginnings. 
The Calepino was from the start embedded in humanist debates about how to find and 
use the best forms of Latin, as Ann Moss and John Considine both point out.  It is in this 
same humanist history at the beginning of the sixteenth century that we find the 
Polyanthea—a lexicon that Ann Moss in Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language 
Turn points out was originally designed by its author, Mirabellio, in 1503 to compete 
specifically against the Calepino lexicon (24-5). In putting a character named Calepine 
and a character named Mirabella near one another in Book 6, Spenser has echoed an early 
humanist debate about authority over language in his epic.  Evidence for this appears in 
the parallels between Spenser’s two characters and the character of the ideas and 
arguments advanced by Ambrogio Calepino and Dominico Mirabellio in their respective 
introductions to their works.  Especially in the terms of their contrast, I argue, these 
Book-People characters of Calepine and Mirabella reveal that Spenser in his late life 
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crafted a complaint against lexicography in which he effectively argues that poetry plays 
a more crucial role than lexicons in the shaping of cultural knowledge. 
 
3.  Paula Blank and Andrew Hadfield 
In constructing poetry to provide model language, surely Spenser did not wish his 
work to be a passive container of linguistic samples to be manipulated at will by scholars. 
Spenser’s nomination of the Phaedrus and his play with ideas about tongues and mind in 
Book 6 of The Faerie Queene, as I show in my first chapter, present ideas about the 
relation of language and mind that offer poetry’s method of thought as part of its 
example.  Unfortunately, this method of thought, if aligned with the notion of relational 
meaning identified by Waswo, seems indistinguishable from allegory’s didacticism—
especially in its manipulation of name and etymology.  Thus, in my third chapter, my 
attention turns to Spenser’s earlier work, The Shepheardes Calender, to consider what it 
might tell us of Spenser’s notions of meaning.  Examining The Shepheardes Calender in 
the context of a long line of Renaissance works that address the very idea of linguistic 
dialects, Paula Blank in Broken English argues, “Spenser estranged his language from 
more traditional forms of courtly discourse in an effort to solicit the very attention that 
his diction immediately received” (124).  Blank places this contrarian Spenser outside the 
tradition of writers that sought to craft a central prestige dialect itself as a source of a kind 
of proto-nationalistic distinction.  Figures like Dante, she argues, sought to craft a 
language that would lead readers and Italians toward an “illustrious vernacular” central to 
but different from the various regional dialects (9-10).  In contrast, Spenser’s early vision 
of the vernacular in The Shepheardes Calender does not propose a central, elite dialect as 
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the point of reference by which all others are to be judged, but instead complexly 
foregrounds regionalisms, foreign terms, neologisms, and archaisms for an indeterminate 
purpose. Blank notes that Spenser’s vision of the pastoral vocabulary retains its 
distinctiveness especially by comparison to Shakespeare and Jonson, but not for any 
special method so much as a defiance of method. In other words, while scholars like 
Waswo, Anderson, Craig, and even Fried choose to find out how Spenser’s system of 
managing diction complements humanist ideas about language in their focus on his later 
work, Blank finds him unassimilable in such an intellectual history, even declaring that 
Spenser’s use of dialect is not comparable to the use of composite literary dialects among 
Greek and Latin predecessors (116-7).   
What Blank presents is a worthwhile quandary for me to emphasize here because, 
as before, we can see that the historical trend-line has in this case dominated again and 
even excluded Spenser as though, as a poet, he were striving to place himself outside of 
an intellectual history.  Yet it is precisely the seemingly non-methodical approach that 
Blank identifies which in fact reveals that Spenser’s diction is crafted to force readers to 
see a relational notion of meaning rather than a denotative one. Relational meaning 
essentially is the poet’s method. Andrew Zurcher, in his analysis of Spenser’s 
Shepheardes Calender and its annotations (in his recent Spenser’s Legal Language), 
finds that this work affords us a rich argument for a view of linguistic meaning as 
precisely so relational instead of simply denotative or referential (37-40).  Zurcher 
assimilates Spenser to his period for the purpose of showing how Spenser’s work 
interrogates the construction of legal language so essential to the English culture at the 
end of the sixteenth century.  It is a compelling argument with wider implications, but I 
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must differ slightly from Zurcher in order to address the larger frame of argument about 
language (and not just law) that plays a key part in Blank’s treatment of Spenser’s poetics 
and management of dialect.  As explained in my third chapter, I stress general ideas from 
philosophy and more specific ideas from lexicography.  Spenser’s management of diction 
of all sorts—not just dialect—depends upon his own relational notion of meaning 
strategically expressed throughout the Shepheardes Calender. The shared intentions of 
Spenser and his glossator E.K. in the revelation of that relational idea of meaning are, in 
my view, not coincidental, but rather reflect a motivated crafting of an authority 
strategically above that of lexicography.  In his prefatory materials, E.K. demonstrates an 
anti-definitional and hence anti-lexicographic sentiment regarding the spelling and 
meaning of a key title term “æglog”; thereafter Spenser’s poetic treatment of words in 
The Shepheardes Calender shows that he shares the same sentiment, even enacts its 
linguistic consequences in a way that E.K. does not comment upon.  Put another way, in 
the Shepheardes Calender, Spenser develops usages of words that combine archaism and 
neologism in productive ways that demand a readership figure out word meanings 
relationally rather than through gloss or lexicological interpretive actions.  Sixteen years 
later, Spenser’s complex stand against different kinds of lexicons in Book 6 of The Fairie 
Queene announces the same priorities that E.K. and the poet of the Shepheardes 
Calender evince in a different and broader context that is Spenser’s alone.  Even so, E.K. 
in the earlier work conspires so closely with Spenser in revealing an authorial power and 
responsibility so reminiscent of Sidney’s view of the poet from The Defence of Poesie 
that it is hard to believe E.K.’s views of language are separate from Spenser’s.  Spenser 
appears to position E.K. as a persona announcing loudly the Sidneian incantation that the 
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poet is a better teacher than the mere historian-scholar-rhetorician.  Add to this the basic 
evidence cited by Thomas Cain in his introduction to the Shepheardes Calender: 
The suggestion that E.K. is a Spenser persona has at least two bits of evidence in 
its favor: the translation of Cicero in the Maye glosse on “Tho with them” is the 
same as in the first of Spenser’s Three Proper Letters to Gabriel Harvey (1580); 
and the obvious mistake of “Persephone” for Tisiphone in the November gloss on 
“Furies” is repeated in Teares of the Muses.  (9) 
 
My examination of Spenser’s and E.K.’s management of diction therefore suggests that 
they were either cooperating closely or the same person—the latter seeming the stronger 
likelihood.  I find in this examination an intention that gives Spenser motive and place in 
the intellectual history: Spenser’s advocacy for a relational idea of meaning appears in his 
management of diction in the Shepheardes Calender, and such a relational idea of 
meaning depends upon the different view of dialect which Paula Blank herself shows that 
he supplies. Indeed, the Calender’s approach to dialect contrasts with the famed French 
lexicographer Henri Estienne’s ideas about how to enlist dialect for the French people, 
showing an example of precisely the sort of foreign figure against whom Spenser might 
have been competing in his attempt to define a freer idea of the English language’s use of 
dialect and its poetic example.  With that in mind, it is clear that Spenser’s later linguistic 
didacticism in allegory is an outgrowth of an earlier and more anomalous form. 
Blank’s historical displacement of Spenser into an isolated poetics implodes in 
such a way that it furnishes a more complex picture of Spenser’s resistance to some 
forms of hermeneutics as a political and social act incidentally revelatory of his ideas 
about language.  My effort with Blank, in other words, is of a piece with my effort to 
supplement the work of Waswo, Craig, Anderson, and Fried.  It is an effort that, in the 
third chapter, elevates the importance of lexicography, making it seem the bogey feared 
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and countered by Spenser’s ideal poet-teacher-rhetorician.  But this fear is overstated to 
some extent, for it certainly pales by comparison to what we know of Spenser’s fear 
regarding issues of language related to his long tenure in the environment of colonial 
Ireland.  So, as I turn in my final chapter to confront arguments made about how to 
interpret Spenser’s intentions in thinking about language and education in Book 6, I 
encounter problematic questions.  To what degree are Spenser’s political motivations 
regarding language consistent with his intellectual motivations regarding language?  Is 
there a conflict or difference between Spenser’s place in an intellectual history and his 
place in the political history? 
In characterizing Spenser’s manner of dealing with Irish words in A View of the 
Present State of Ireland and in the negatively-charged picture of the Irish implicit in 
Books 5 and 6 of The Faerie Queene, Andrew Hadfield makes broad assertions about 
history, language and Spenser. His arguments are relevant to the problematic questions I 
have framed above.  In an introduction to a recent edition of Book 6, he argues that 
“Spenser is making a neat link between criticism of the hard-line policies of his erstwhile 
patron, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Arthur, Lord Grey de Wilton—who argued for and 
practiced the suppression of the Irish—and the abuse of language itself” (viii, 
Introduction, my italics). Such an argument obviously narrows the focus of Spenser’s 
criticism of ideas about language far more than my investigation of Calepine and 
Mirabella suggests is legitimate.  Yet Hadfield strongly supports his assertion that 
Spenser’s conception of language is hopelessly embroiled in the politics. In Edmund 
Spenser’s Irish Experience, he argues, based on a careful reading of A View of the 
Present State of Ireland, that Spenser participates in a propagandistic set of meanings 
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available to him to such an extent that he yields his individual agency on such matters of 
language in all his works: that is, Hadfield argues that Spenser’s use of the terms “Briton” 
and “Scythian” are strategic to a racist ideology that itself produces the certainty Spenser 
exhibits about the language of the Irish and the nature of their language as an expression 
of physical identity inferior to the that of the British in both The Faerie Queene and in his 
treatise on Ireland (108).   
Is Spenser’s view of the nature of language entirely subordinate to his political 
views? Is it even sufficiently subordinate that we should give the vision of language and 
identity we find in A View of A Present State of Ireland wholesale precedence over the 
complicated vision of language and identity that, I have argued, Spenser displays in Book 
6 and in such works as The Fowre Hymnes?  My answer, bluntly, is no.  Hadfield stalls in 
the face of the quandaries posed by Spenser’s body of work. In my fourth chapter, I study 
Spenser’s imagery of learning at the opening of Book 6, establishing its relation both to 
the attack on Irish culture and language in A View of the Present State of Ireland and to 
the politics of Book 5, The Legend of Justice, in such a way as to explain the balance we 
must strike in acknowledging the racist and propagandistic elements of Spenser’s work 
while seeing the nuances of his view of language within and outside such elements. 
Spenser uses Book 5 to illustrate its hero Artegall’s successful but slandered effort to 
achieve justice.  The slander against Artegall crucially situates language-use in political 
practice. Yet when it comes to Spenser’s ideas about language, this effort to situate 
language-use in political practice does not lead simply to the uncontrolled tongue of the 
Blatant Beast in Book 6.  The dog-like beast is indeed a condemnatory association of 
colonial disorder with Irish culture and language—a speech imagined to be as base as the 
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critics of policies that Spenser advocated in Ireland.  However, Artegall’s difficulties first 
emerge from quandaries that explore the relations of power both to the will and to 
popular support while exposing the rhetorical functions of law.  Book 5’s diplomat-
messenger Samient, figure of the good dog, anticipates Spenser’s idealistic sense of 
speech, identity, and learning in Book 6.   
The character of Samient is a messenger-maiden whom Spenser associates with 
positive dog imagery in Book 5.  She brings the characters of Artegall and Arthur 
together while exhibiting a harmonious relationship between power, individual will, and 
communication—a harmonious relationship conspicuously lacking earlier in the book.  
She is, in effect, a poetic rhetoric that guides law in ways that slight or force cannot.  The 
idealism she sustains is necessary to understanding Spenser’s criticism of the mechanical 
elements of humanist educators’ ideas about speech that we find alongside the case 
against the Irish in Book 6.  There Spenser adopts imagery of planting and growth (a 
“nursery” of virtue) in Book 6 not only to advance his political interests as a colonist, but 
also to respond to and adjust humanist ideas of education. As I show, figures like Francis 
Clement, Roger Ascham, and Richard Mulcaster use similar imagery even as they reserve 
powers to the scholars in guiding language development.  In contrast, Spenser is careful 
to reserve the powerful guiding force of poetry as an instigator of personal growth to “the 
muses,” while his depictions of Calidore and Calepine show that he is questioning 
simplistic ideas about the interrelations of identity, language, and education.  Spenser’s 
view thus differs not only from that of humanist educators but even from his own 
arguments about the material basis of language in A View of the Present State of Ireland.  
Exploring Spenser’s motivations for this inconsistency returns us to the motivations 
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behind Spenser’s ideas about language in the previous chapter—ideas deeply influenced 
by the dedicatee of The Shepheardes Calender, Sir Philip Sidney. By understanding the 
type of courtier-poet Spenser felt compelled to defend, we can understand his logical 
importance in Spenser’s serious questioning of ideas about lexicography. Spenser’s view 
of language both in his epic and his political tract defends the didactic orator-poet 
imagined in Sir Philip Sidney’s Defense of Poetry, yet in the political tract it distinctively 
bows to the interests and imagery of humanist educators with a vested interest in a more 
mechanical set of notions about language tied up with lexicography.  The debased ideas 
about language (debased from the point of view of a writer of The Fowre Hymnes) most 
instrumental in the arguments of A View cannot be taken to be the full substance of 
Spenser’s thinking about the interpenetrations of language, knowledge, identity, and 
culture—and in fact should be understood to run counter to some of his thought on the 
subject. 
 Spenser’s allegory about language, particularly its representation of Samient, does 
nothing to change the political case advocating the use of greater force in Ireland that is 
implicit in his work. Thus my effort toward revision of the view of Spenser’s ideas about 
language is not an attempt to isolate Spenser’s aesthetics at all.  Instead, it is an attack on 
an historical mode in which an utterly harmonious view of Spenser’s ideas about 
language emerges from the suppression of his intentions.   To cede a full sense of 
Spenser’s psychological freedom on the matter of thinking about language in order to 
produce an understanding of the roots of Spenser’s political ideology as a member of a 
colonizing group proves misleading. For me, this is the most interesting part of trying to 
develop an intellectual history that accommodates the capacious thought associated with 
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epic: here the intellectual and theoretical elements of defining language play a role in 
how we should place praise and blame in estimating what Spenser’s work has to offer us 
now and what any artistic work has to offer as a view of history.  In this respect, I see 
quarrels with each of the scholars as essential to a larger moral sense of literature’s place 
in history, especially one that acknowledges the evolution of the vital relationship 
between poetry and scholarship in which, for one key example, lexicographic authority is 
not simply a neutral tool. 
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Chapter 1:  
“Menaging the mouthes of stubborn steedes”:   
Spenser’s Conceptualizations of Writing, Speech, and Mind 
 
1. Finding Buried “Threasure”: Historical Context for An Intellectual Dispute 
Edmund Spenser’s 1596 continuation of The Faerie Queene (Books 4-6) begins 
with an address to William Cecil, Lord Burghley.  In the first stanza of the proem of 
Book 4, Spenser responds to Burghley’s reported disapproval of his themes of love from 
the first three books of The Faerie Queene. As Spenser puts it, Burghley’s disapproval 
arises from seeing the “vaine poemes” (4.Pr.1.9) as clothed in “false allurements” 
(4.Pr.1.7) “that better were in vertues discipled” (4.Pr.1.8).  Spenser counters the charge 
in the stanzas that follow, suggesting that his themes of love and friendship are in keeping 
with the philosophical history of learning.  His reference there to Socrates (and to the 
Phaedrus in particular) apparently shows that Spenser means to justify his dispute, and 
conciliate Burghley, with the classical arguments about the relations between poetry, 
rhetoric, and philosophy familiar to scholars of the period.6  
Spenser’s conciliatory pose disguises what we know about the difference between 
Spenser’s intellectual circles and Burghley’s even as it reveals the seriousness of his 
underlying intellectual dispute. Among Burghley’s teachers in his first year at 
Cambridge, Stephen Alford reports, were Roger Ascham, the renowned author of The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 In the lines in question, Spenser strangely refers to “the father of Philosophie” speaking to one “Critias” 
(4.Pr.3.6-7). As A.C. Hamilton is quick to point out, “there is no simple explanation for why he should 
name Critias” in this context (426n).  (There is no Critias in the Phaedrus.) However, as Hamilton also 
notes, the contextual clues make clear that Spenser can only be thinking about the Phaedrus, where a 
conversation in the “shade of a plane tree” about the links between erotic love and rhetoric takes place. 
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Scholemaster7 and tutor to the future Queen Elizabeth, and John Cheke, famous reformer 
of Greek and tutor to Edward Tudor (17).  They were “mentors and friends” to Burghley. 
Burghley’s first wife was Cheke’s sister.  Burghley was schooled by authorities on 
learning and culture from this earlier period, one which defined and put Queen Elizabeth 
on the throne.  For well over thirty years, after Elizabeth gained that throne, Burghley 
was effectively in control of state propaganda even as he was in control of courtly 
patronage: B.W. Beckingsale notes that he “wrote and published propagandist works” in 
1559, 1560, 1563, 1583, and even as late as 1596 (225). Towards the end of Elizabeth’s 
reign, Burghley had increased influence over court patronage “as other trusted courtiers 
died”—a power that did not ebb “until Essex began ruthless competition” (227, 229). 
Spenser clearly has all these things in mind as he describes how Burghley’s “rugged 
forhead that with grave foresight” manages the “affaires of state” (4.Pr.1.1-2).  But the 
intellectual difference between Spenser and Burghley is inextricably bound to a 
generational, political, and cultural divide emergent under Elizabeth’s reign.  Beckingsale 
comments: 
Burghley did belong to that group of Protestants and humanists who rejected the 
chivalric and romantic strain in literature as “open manslaughter and bold 
bawdry.” He was apt to see with the censor’s eye.  But at the age of fifty, a 
statesman who had been brought up in “the Drab Age” of English writing could 
hardly be expected to have much confidence in the vernacular and to be 
enthusiastic about new movements among young poets.  Burghley was not alone 
in his indifference to the new poetry for as late as 1595 Philip Sidney’s Apologie 
for Poetrie was first published.  The patronage of creative writers was not 
sustained or lavish in Elizabeth’s reign. They did less well than the utilitarian 
authors and translators. (253) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Ascham’s widow dedicated The Scholemaster to Burghley. 
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Spenser’s increasingly vivid criticism of Elizabeth, as for example in Book 5’s depiction 
of Mercilla, targets the advisors who defined her finesse, her calculated delay and 
deferral, as much if not more than her.  (In fact, Beckingsale points out, Burghley was the 
principal developer of the propaganda surrounding the execution of Mary Queen of Scots 
[226].) At Cambridge Spenser associated himself with the provocative Gabriel Harvey, 
and the court figures with whom he allied himself from the start were such as the fiery Sir 
Philip Sidney.  His readership did not come from Burghley or his stolid contacts, and 
neither did his intellectual inspiration. By around 1580, Burghley styled himself, as 
Alford puts it, as an agent of “moderation, probity, age, wisdom, experience, the values 
of the philosophers and politicians of ancient Rome” (238).  Spenser, in crafting an epic 
that is designed to use allegory to teach young nobles, was bringing himself into 
intellectual contest with those who were the authorities on teaching, their most powerful 
court ally, and the queen who had been taught by them.  It would have been vexingly 
petty for Spenser to target scholars like Cheke or Ascham.  It would have been dangerous 
to his life to overtly attack Elizabeth for her education or intellect. However, Burghley, 
who occupied the post of Chancellor of Cambridge from 1559 until his death, was a rich 
target for his control of propaganda and patronage since his delaying, deferring methods 
there could be linked to his preferences for classical languages and their methodical 
forms of study and learning. Again, as Beckingsale points out, Burghley “was 
numerically and mechanically minded” (261); he “did not endorse the linguistic jingoism 
which vaunted the supremacy of the native tongue” (253).  Because “he rarely read in 
English” and his “preference was for works in Latin, Greek, French, Spanish and Italian,” 
he was associated with foreign lexicography: “John Baret and Thomas Thomas 
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recognised his linguistic skill by dedicating to him their French and Latin dictionaries” 
(250).   
The deep political and cultural difference between Burghley and Spenser puts 
Spenser’s glib citation of the Phaedrus into sharp relief. This citation is a tactical 
departure from the sort of texts we see cited in Spenser’s prefatory Letter to Raleigh 
about The Faerie Queene.  It is for this reason an all the more vivid attempt to contrast 
his thinking with Burghley’s.  In that earlier letter, he sketched out an intellectual position 
on literary and moral authorities that is quite in keeping with Burghley’s likely 
preferences. He cited Homer, Vergil, Ariosto, and Tasso as models for epic, but when it 
came to the question of moral arguments about civic order he named Xenophon over 
Plato:  
… and nothing esteemed of, that is not delightfull and pleasing to commune 
sence. For this cause is Xenophon preferred before Plato, for that the one, in the 
exquisite depth of his iudgement, formed a commune welth such as it should be, 
but the other in the person of Cyrus and the Persians fashioned a governement, 
such as might best be: so much more profitable and gratious is doctrine by 
ensample, then by rule. (737) 
 
So when Spenser later cites the Phaedrus, with its witty and clever banter about love 
serving as a preface to serious questions about rhetoric, it is risky text to cite in response 
to a powerful government minister’s preference for the “common sense” Spenser has 
previously professed as the political and rhetorical ground of his work.   We have, then, 
in Spenser’s basic reference to the Phaedrus in Book 4, particular cause to investigate 
precisely what value he saw in that text for defining his position on rhetoric and placing 
himself in contrast to Burghley and associates from his earlier generation.  (It is a point 
we will return to in considering just what sort of a Platonist Spenser was.) 
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 If we had missed the charged nature of Spenser’s reference to the Phaedrus in 
Book 4, Spenser’s acid treatment of Burghley at the close of Book 6, whose thematic 
focus is courtesy itself, would sharply remind us that the intellectual and didactic 
concerns of his epic poem are tied to a contentious courtly environment, Spenser’s 
reputation as a satirist of Burghley himself, and Burghley’s crucial position in the 
government.  “Ne may this homely verse […]/,” Spenser complains as he closes Book 6, 
“hope to escape [the Blatant Beast’s] venomous despite […]/ more then my former 
writs…” (6.12.40.1-3).  Spenser then quite disingenuously reminds us how such “former 
writs” had raised “a mighty Peres displeasure”—namely, Burghley’s. Spenser slyly 
implies here that only by the slander of others has he been brought into Burghley’s 
“displeasure” (6.12.40.6).  But he knows full well that what provoked Burghley was in 
his Prosopopeia: or Mother Hubberds Tale.  As Rachel Hile reminds us in her essay 
showing how that satire influenced Shakespeare’s depiction of Polonius in Hamlet, 
Mother Hubberds Tale had been recalled for its satire on Burghley, but this only led to 
“the wide popularity of the poem in manuscript in the two decades between printings of 
the poem” (188-9). In other words, Spenser understood that referring to Burghley in his 
additions to his epic in 1596 might supply continued and equal interest from his 
readership. 
 Spenser’s frustration with Burghley was rooted in worries about his dependency 
on state patronage, but the popularity of his satirical complaint also relied upon the 
broader consciousness of Burghley as a monitor over patronized artistic careers. Michael 
Graves’ historical work on Burghley notes that “Burghley was accused of securing his 
own position for personal gain by favouring unsuitable men and blocking the promotion 
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of talented careerists” (119).  Graves stresses that this complaint is largely without 
foundation.  However, as Beckingsale’s nuanced earlier portrait of Burghley indicates, 
certain “careerists”—those who were not, like Thomas Thomas, Latin lexicographers—
might have felt more threatened, given the kind of thinking Burghley embodied about 
language and art generally. What position among these careerists did Spenser himself 
take?  If we turn back to Spenser’s characterization of Burghley in Mother Hubberds 
Tale, we find that Spenser has a complicated satirical attack. In controlling access to the 
crown, the fox who represents Burghley dislikes other nobles, men of arms, common 
men, and learned men all equally.  He is equally unfair. Yet for learned men in particular, 
Spenser indicates that the fox saw his “wisdome” as a source of superiority: “For men of 
learning little he esteemed;/ His wisdome he above their learning deemed” (1191-2).  
Spenser clearly tells us that he prizes a form of learning that he thinks Burghley does not.  
In light of this, it is at least easier to see why Spenser turns so quickly in Book 4 to 
sketching out his defense based upon Platonic philosophical ideas about poetry and 
rhetoric.  He has a specific intellectual fight in mind based partly in what that classical 
text makes available to him in quarreling with an authority on classical learning. 
 Mother Hubberds Tale does not entirely leave us in the dark about its prized 
forms of learning and Platonism in particular. The fox and the ape are parodies of the 
good versions of many power-holders, and so it is predictably difficult to pin down what 
Spenser might truly be criticizing in the image of Lord Burghley.  Yet it seems clear that 
the fox is a parody of the elder statesman—the courtier of highest rank, who would have 
been Lord Burghley.  Logically, then, the ape must be a parody of the kinds of courtiers 
that a figure like Burghley patronizes.  In order to construct parodic versions of bad 
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courtiers and the statesmen who patronize them, Spenser has to show his readers the right 
version.  For this reason, in Mother Hubberds Tale Spenser offers us a more precise 
account of why he objects to Burghley on intellectual grounds linked to the political ones. 
When he describes the ideal courtier and court, he shows us the very forms of “learning” 
that are being falsified and despised—and how such things are to be distinguished as false 
or true.  For the most part, the description of the typical bad courtier is one in which he is 
a “good bold face” (645) without any substance.  He can perform tricks, woo ladies, use 
complicated words, follow the latest style, dance, sing, all while poisoning the court 
environment with lies and flatteries.  The true courtier, while likewise a master of such 
outwardly beautiful performances, possesses and uses them with inward truth: 
Yet the brave Courtier, in whose beauteous thought 
Regard of honour harbours more than ought, 
Doth loath such base condition, to backbite 
Anies good name for envie or despite: 
He stands on tearmes of honourable minde, 
Ne will be carried with the common winde 
Of Courts inconstant mutabilitie… (717-723) 
 
The emphasis upon the sound mind of the good courtier, his beautiful thought, depends 
upon a systematic contrast with the wild speech and physicality of the bad courtier.  The 
good courtier is busy “menaging the mouthes of stubborn steedes” (739) as part of his 
good physical exercise.  The “gentle minde” of a good courtier would even “bite his lip” 
rather than “gybe and fleare” as bad courtiers do (711-714).  For the good courtier, art is 
a mental retreat: “His minde unto the Muses he withdrawes” (760) so that he has “wise 
discourse” (763) because “all his minde on honour fixed is” (771).  In summing up the 
Ape’s resistance to the possibility of becoming a good courtier, Spenser again refers to 
mind: “Such is the rightfull courtier in his kinde: / But unto such the Ape lent not his 
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minde” (793-4).  Thus we have four careful repetitions of “minde” among many other 
references to thought or spirit within less than a hundred lines, most of them meant to 
contrast with the tongue, the lip, the “open eare” (713) of a disordered being and state.   
Spenser is at pains to link court, education, rhetoric, and his poetry in his opening 
response to Burghley in Book 4 of The Faerie Queene.  It is the same in Mother 
Hubberd’s Tale.  The lengthy systematic contrast between a spiritual and mental 
steadfastness (as a source of the ordered courtly life) and speech-related and mouth-
related physical mutability (as the root of evil in courtly dissembling) is immediately 
extended to an effort to define the role of the good and bad poet.  The ape could “play the 
Poet oft” (810).  Indeed, as a bad poet, he does precisely the thing that Spenser, in Book 
4, suggests that Burghley has charged him with:  
Yet he [the ape] the name [of poet] on him[self] would rashly take, 
Maugre the sacred Muses, and it make 
A servant to the vile affection 
Of such, as he depended most upon, 
And with the sugrie sweete thereof allure 
Chast Ladies eares to fantasies impure. (815-20) 
 
Bad poetry is reduced to physical taste (sugary taste!) and to an appeal to the physical 
ears.  Good poetry, we are immediately told hereafter, would not drive away from “noble 
sprights/ Desire of honor, or brave thought of armes” (824-5).  That is, good poetry is 
related to the spirit and thoughts even as good courtiers are concerned with the mind and 
thought rather than the speech and tongue.   
 So, in Mother Hubberds Tale Spenser crafts ideas about rhetoric, learning, and 
poetry relevant to court and to his critique of Burghley.  Though his attacks upon 
Burghley are political, they depend upon intellectual positions—they are meant for a man 
whose beliefs about learning, while probably not representing the sort of blatant 
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falsehood we find in the personified fox and ape, nonetheless seem to Spenser 
repositories of error.  Spenser considers his manner of valuing and understanding the 
links between good governance, good rhetoric and good poetry so important as to weave 
them into court satire, even extending their role in the popular work of satire to his final 
efforts toward three new books of his epic. However, in Mother Hubberds Tale he had 
not clarified the philosophical foundations of these attacks. Discovering those will give 
us a far deeper appreciation of the politics which they complement.   
For this discovery, we must look to others of his works—and ones that prove to 
have similar sets of contrasts between “mind” and “speech.” Spenser’s manner of 
concluding Book 6 provides a powerful hint about these matters.  Here, in a parting shot 
at Burghley, Spenser advises his own rhymes “to keep better measure/ And seeke to 
please, that now is counted wisemens threasure” (6.12.41.8-9).  The line suggests that 
appeasement is one way to keep out of trouble as a poet and receive patronage.  This 
alone is an insult to Burghley.  However, if the “treasure” here is simply the avoidance of 
displeasing powerful authorities, Spenser’s advice to himself to avoid trouble in the 
future is a clear indication that he has not really avoided that in the past or in the work he 
just completed.  Earlier in the stanza he has said that his “former writs, all were they 
clearest/ From blameful blot” (6.12.41.3-4) nonetheless had been labeled spiteful attacks.  
They in fact were attacks, but he means us to understand that they were justified rather 
than spiteful or libelous. Bearing in mind that “treasury” is a term long associated with 
great literary and lexicographic works by and before Spenser’s time,8 we should 
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8 I am thinking broadly, of course, of such great works as Brunetto Latini’s Li Livres dou Tresor, 
instrumental in the establishment of valuing the vernacular for Dante and part of a long chain of works 
constructing the metaphorical understanding of languages as a treasuries.  However, in Spenser’s century 
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recognize that Spenser has asked us to wonder what real literary treasuries we should see 
at this late stage of the epic.  Remember, the object of his censure, Burghley, is associated 
with a methodical classical learning that has made him a dedicatee of lexicons 
themselves.  (He is also, of course, the “Lord High Threasurer of England,” as Spenser’s 
dedicatory sonnet recognizes.)  Part of Spenser’s “treasure” at the close of Book 6 is 
simply speaking truth to power, as he illustrates.  However, there is much more that 
teaches us about Spenser’s conceptions of the relations between language, mind, and 
reality, and particularly Spenser’s sense of how an individual relates to language. 
For the remainder of this chapter, I hope to explain just what Spenser hoped to 
prove about the relation of an individual to language in Book 6 of The Faerie Queene and 
in his late work, the Fowre Hymnes.  Without doubt, his attack on Lord Burghley and 
reference to Plato’s Phaedrus at the opening of Book 4 of his epic sets him and his 
conception of vernacular poetry in contention with the scholarly ideas of an earlier 
generation of humanists represented by the powerful lord.  I have so far shown that 
Spenser drew upon essentially similar Platonic ideas about rhetoric to suggest good 
versions of poetic work in contrast to the bad habits of courtly rhetoric emblematized by 
Burghley.  Yet Spenser’s considerations in Book 4 and in Mother Hubberds Tale address 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the term had become linked fast to language that provides a more specific context. The great thesauruses of 
the 16th century like Robert Estienne’s Thesaurus linguae latinae and Henri Estienne’s Thesaurus linguae 
graecae were not idly named treasuries.  “Treasure” is a term that has come to be associated with cultural 
collections for particular languages by Spenser’s time because it was a matter of political and social 
urgency.  The English vernacular had just begun to lay claim to being a treasure in the sixteenth century, 
but already in 1599 Samuel Daniel, as Stephen Greenblatt was quick to point out in Learning To Curse, 
referred to “the treasure of our tongue” (qtd. in Greenblatt 16).  Eighteen years earlier Spenser’s former 
headmaster Richard Mulcaster put it bluntly in Positions that “the tongues […] are the ways to wisdom, the 
lodges of learning, the harbors of humanity, the deliverers of divinity, the treasuries of all store […]” (33, 
emphasis mine).  A phrase like “wisemens threasure” in the context of a reference to a minister as 
important as Lord Burghley draws the reader to understand that Spenser is contemplating the literary 
enrichment of his nation with great energy and deliberation. 
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rhetoric generally and not language formally.  To understand the details of Spenser’s 
conception of the relationship between speech and his own poetic identity that are part of 
the attacks on Burghley, we may turn to the Fowre Hymnes, his fullest expression of 
Platonic ideas related to the Phaedrus.  There Spenser conceives of writing, in contrast to 
speech, as part of an individual’s fixed identity as a poet.  This work in the Fowre 
Hymnes, like similar work to be found in the Amoretti, adjusts Platonic principles, 
undoing the original mistrust for the technology of writing that is a contingent part of the 
Phaedrus.  Thus Spenser suggests a novel view of the relationship between mind and 
language with a novel form of Platonism.  Ultimately, Spenser’s allegorical work in Book 
6 of The Faerie Queene with the figures of the Salvage man, Calepine (a somewhat 
deficient courtier named after the Calepino lexicon), Calidore, Colin, and Pastorella relies 
upon the same ideas about language presented in the Fowre Hymnes, which was 
published in 1596, shortly after the publication of Books 4-6 of The Faerie Queene.  
Unlike the later work, though, Spenser’s epic plays out the significance of questions 
about language not just with regard to the individual, but also with regard to larger social 
questions.  The Salvage man’s wordlessness and Calepine’s wordiness provide a means 
of asserting the essential value of interpretive mental acts to language in social situations.  
Calidore’s interaction with the poet Colin and attachment to Pastorella allow Spenser to 
redefine the relationship between mind and language in a way that accounts for the 
meaningfulness of an individual’s use of language as a necessary self-recognition in 
social contexts.  Having employed these means to explore concepts of language and 
society thoroughly, Spenser concludes Book 6 (as above noted) with a pointed reminder 
of his feud with Lord Burghley.  His final gesture is as impudent as it is confident in its 
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assertion of a sense of the value of his manner of understanding court and courtly 
language.  It is my starting point for a course of inquiry into the treasury Spenser 
envisioned as language and the investment he felt himself to be making with his own 
poetry—as further chapters will show more fully. 
 
2. The Writing on the Soul 
Some wisely skeptical part of my audience has questioned my insistence that we 
study the philosophical patterns at the root of Spenser’s reference to the Phaedrus: “Isn’t 
Spenser’s pattern just basic Platonism?  And isn’t the reference to mind/body valuations 
and distinctions in Mother Hubberds Tale purely reflective of the same basic Platonism?”  
The short answer to that challenge runs thus: “No, it is a modified version of Platonism 
with its own distinctive values.”  To justify the short answer requires a long study of just 
how Spenser modifies Platonism to his own ends in the Fowre Hymnes, a work with 
complicated ties to the Phaedrus and thus to issues of love and friendship that Spenser is 
so concerned to mention in the proem to Book 4. The Hymnes not coincidentally were 
published shortly after Spenser’s 1596 continuation of The Faerie Queene.  Spenser’s 
modifications of Platonism in them change basic conceptions of language and rhetoric 
themselves, and thus the place of such things in the larger social schemes that attend his 
arguments.  With knowledge of such changes, we may examine with greater ease and 
precision how he defines writing and speech by resuming our examination of Book 6 of 
The Faerie Queene in a later segment. 
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Spenser’s persistent attention to conceptualizing the mind is an enormous part of 
his work in the Fowre Hymnes.  Even so, his early references to mind seem innocuous.  
For example: 
Great god of might, that reignest in the mynd 
And all the bodie to thy hest doest frame  
[…]  
Who can expresse the glorie of thy might? (“Hymn to Love,” 43-49) 
 
In this first mention of “mind” early in the “Hymn to Love” (the first of the four), 
Spenser’s emphasis upon the greater power of mind over the expressive power of 
language seems—indeed, is—a basic ineffability trope.  Nonetheless, with each return to 
the concept of mind he increases the significance of this early mention.  As I will show, 
this mention foreshadows an ugly tension between words and thoughts. It warns of a 
troubled relationship between the idealized power of form and order, the Platonic or 
Neoplatonic understanding of the intelligible reality governing our sensed reality, and 
what Spenser conceives of as the shadowy, disturbing property of spoken language. 
Robert Ellrodt has shown that Spenser’s version of Platonic and Neoplatonic orders is not 
orthodox, noting in particular how Spenser shifts the foundations of “mind” (Latin mens 
or Greek nous) away from earlier conceptions by asserting that man’s “more immortall 
mynd” (“Hymn to Love” 103) plays a part in the specifically Christian conception of the 
duty to “multiply the likenesse” (100) of its own kind.9  So “mind” is a tense if 
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9 In Neoplatonism in the Poetry of Edmund Spenser, Robert Ellrodt, after considering in detail the likely 
commonplace influences on Spenser’s form of Platonic thinking, argues convincingly that Spenser’s 
depiction of the “more immortall mynd” referred to in the “Hymn to Love” follows this Christian pattern.  
He explains: “Had he followed the renaissance interpreters, he would have contrasted the immortality 
attained through propagation of the species with the immortality conferred by the productions of the mind 
or the love of virtue” (128). Ellrodt’s basic assertion that Spenser modifies tenets of Platonism to suit 
Christian ideals is inarguably right.  The assertion of a “monogamic idealism about sex” (360), as C.S. 
Lewis describes it, underwrites Spenser’s depiction of the spiritual union of the flesh, and the view thus 
represents a slightly different class of Platonic thinking, whatever the influences from which Spenser drew 
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productive definitional site for Spenser as a Christian at play with Platonism. But the 
first, the “Hymn to Love,” hints at a vulnerability of mind that plays upon the already-
agonized relationship between mind and language in Platonic and Christian thought.10  
Spenser soon describes how the “refyned mynd” (192) is a mirror of the higher 
intelligible order.  On the one hand, this good mind is “affixed” (204) in visionary 
contemplation of that intelligible order, and in such a stable state fulfills its customary 
function as part of the soul.11 On the other hand, Spenser distinguishes between such 
“stedfast mynds” (171) attached to “heavenly beauties” (169) as to polestars, and the 
“baseborne mynds” (173) which are guided by an earthly desire instead of love.  If 
Spenser were not calling upon classical philosophy so explicitly here, we might consider 
his use of “baseborne mynds” a simple reference to appetitive aspects of the soul that are 
separate from the rational mens or nous.  Given the rather strict focus on such 
philosophically idealistic categories, though, we might justly ask why Spenser continues 
to call this appetitive irrationality a “mind.” If it is merely part of attraction to lower 
order, it can be and has been defended by others (Ficino among them) as a simple earthly 
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his reasoning.  However, as Carol Kaske has shown in “Neoplatonism in Spenser Once More,” the doctrine 
of preexistence provides one way in which Spenser’s view of the “propagation of the species” can be made 
to fit the prescriptions of stricter Platonism and Neoplatonism’s view of the soul (162-167).  Thus we need 
to view Spenser’s approach as a flexible, adapted version of Platonism whose roots, at least on some issues, 
reach backward to the type of inquiry proposed by philosophy as much as by religion or poetry. 
 
10 Both the Phaedrus and the Cratylus consider the limitations of language as a medium by comparison to 
pure knowledge, the former dialogue under the heading of rhetoric and the latter under the heading of 
naming. In both, Plato asserts that the best linguistic methods, whether discourse or not, can give us is an 
approximation or likeness of true knowledge.  The Phaedrus has specific relevance to our concerns because 
Socrates there describes the way in which speech is more valuable than writing.  This I will consider at 
length later in this chapter.  In my introduction and in my third chapter, I will provide further information 
explaining the particular relevance of Plato’s Phaedrus. 
 
11 See my later comments on Ficino’s definition of the mind’s contemplative function.   
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love, a lust we would say.12 It is to some degree, then, an oxymoron (in Platonic terms) to 
speak of a “base mind.” And while it is indeed a general and standard philosophical 
conundrum to discern what parts of the soul are vulnerable to the darkness of the body, 
for this very reason “spirit” (or “spright”), as the part of the soul conventionally liminal 
for Christians,13 would have been a more appropriate term to use in order to depict the 
problematic meeting between the intellective and the bodily.14  
Why then does Spenser dignify the mindless with a mind? Robert Ellrodt has 
partly answered this question by showing that Spenser wishes to adapt a “chivalric ideal” 
to the Platonic reasoning (139-40).  But more than that is involved here. Spenser places 
particular emphasis upon the effect of the tongue as a troubler of the mind. When the 
lover imagines his or her competition, according to Spenser he has a “troubled mynd” 
(253).  Envy rather than desire besets this lover, and the “thousand shadowes vaine” that 
confuse the light of the mind have highly specific traits: 
The gnawing envie, the hart-fretting feare, 
The vaine surmizes, the distrustfull showes, 
The false reports that flying tales doe beare, 
The doubts, the daungers, the delayes, the woes, 
The fayned friends, the unassured foes, 
With thousands more then any tongue can tell  (“Hymn to Love,” 259-264) 
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12 There is precedent for Spenser’s contradictions of Platonic reasoning about the soul.  Sears Jayne points 
out that Ficino, in his Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love (or “Sopra l’Amore”), “states both the 
heretical Platonic view that the soul descends from a previous existence (IV.4) and the orthodox Christian 
view that the soul is created by God directly on earth and rises toward bliss in heaven” (19).  Ficino 
according to Jayne intended to “defend the property of personal love by showing that it  is merely a natural 
part of a perfectly respectable cosmic process” (12).  Ellrodt concludes that it is precisely this portion of 
Ficino that has influenced depiction of the soul in general (139-40).  
 
13 See John 3:8, a speech of enormous importance to the Christian view of spirit. 
 
14 John Quitslund has argued precisely this about the nature of the use of the word “spright” in The Faerie 
Queene (176-7). 
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In this passage, Spenser complicates the previous logic of the “Hymn to Love” in which 
the great glory of the intelligible form of the divine agent was inexpressible.  Here, the 
“tongue” is unable to describe the thoughts and words that constitute the nature of envy 
and fear.  This is a curious problem, of course, because the tongue itself is responsible for 
a good proportion of them in the “false reports” and “flying tales,” if not also in the 
“surmizes” and “distrustfull showes.”  What function does the tongue have if not to 
account for the limited range of mortal defects since, as the opening of the poem 
indicates, expressive description of the ideal is not possible?  After all, Spenser is not just 
limiting the purview of poetry or speech as a means of describing the good, true, or 
beautiful; he is fixing the tongue in the body and making the assaulted, dark, sense-
riddled body incapable of giving proper voice to the very things it either does or is.   
 Spenser does not always associate speech with the mind in the next two stages of 
The Fowre Hymnes. However, he takes key moments in the “Hymn to Beauty” and the 
“Hymn to Heavenly Love” to re-assert the problem of the defective mind itself.  As he 
does so, he reveals that the mind’s failure is one in which, like the tongue, it becomes 
unable to sense or express its own natural products––literally, the “unmindful” mind 
cannot see its own self.  In the “Hymn to Beauty,” Spenser first stresses that the “inward 
mynd” (76) and the “minds of men” generally are vulnerable to the “outward shew of 
things, that only seeme” (91), but he is careful to note that the outwardly dazzling 
influences are not beauty itself, but merely sensual influence. As he goes on, Spenser 
insists that “soule is forme” (133), as is “spirit” (127), and that beautiful bodies are 
essentially fit vessels for such purity (120-140).  As expected, there are all kinds of 
wrinkles, figurative and physical, in the relations between form and substance.  These 
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variations enable a set of confusing relations between mind and world. However, when 
Spenser turns to the cause and nature of corruption, he warns: 
Yet oft it falles, that many a gentle mynd  
Dwels in a deformed tabernacle drownd, 
Either by chaunce, against the course of kynd, 
Or through unaptnesse in the substance fownd, 
Which it assumed of some stubborne grownd, 
That will not yield unto her formes direction, 
But is perform’d with some foule imperfection. (141-7) 
 
Here we find that some “unaptnesse” in the substance impedes even a good mind.  
“Mind” here has taken the place of spirit, the traditionally vulnerable and liminal part of 
the soul. This would logically have to be the case on every occasion when the immortal 
soul fails to lend its perfections to its body or to shed the imperfection of the body itself.  
But as Spenser turns to justify his position philosophically, he makes a novel distinction 
between the sensual and the intellective.15 Before he does so, his advice to those women 
he wishes to turn to love instead of lust is to “be mindfull still of your first countries 
sight” (166). The choice of the term “mindful” here signals that Spenser is deliberately 
making mind part of a crucial distinction regarding its own identity.  The “first country” 
here is the soul’s origin—God. And Spenser has posited a “mind” that can forget this 
God, its own pure origin—in effect, becoming unable to recognize itself.  This work is 
part of what Carol Kaske has shown to be a pattern of calling upon the somewhat 
unorthodox (and un-Christian) Platonic ideal of the soul’s pre-existence (162). A similar 
philosophical struggle over the mind’s identity surfaces again, and with unmistakable 
intent, in the “Hymn to Heavenly Love.” There mind assumes a wholly paradoxical 
position unjustifiable even via a theory of pre-existence: Spenser describes how the self 
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15 Again, see Ellrodt’s argument concerning this distinction (128-9). 
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whose mind is fouled with “durty pleasures” (220) “un”-minds mind: self is “unmindfull 
of that dearest Lord” (221) which made it. 
 By the time a reader reaches the last of the four hymns, Spenser returns pointedly 
to his earlier assertion that the great glory of the intelligible form of the divine was 
inexpressible, but now sets up a close correspondence between the tongue and the mind. 
The first stanza foregrounds the incapacity of language itself: Spenser senses his “tongue 
to fold” (7) in anticipation of the difficulty of his proposed subject, much as it did before.  
Yet in this case he calls for divine aid—a gesture conspicuously absent from the earlier 
segment.  He calls upon the “Almighty Spright” of Heavenly Beauty itself to aid his 
speech.  Then he concludes the next stanza with an image of the mind’s failure that is set 
neatly parallel to the tongue’s in the previous stanza, describing the faintness of the 
image of “immortall beautie…/ which in [his] weake distraughted mynd [he sees]” (13-
14).  We are meant to know that language is the absolute servant of the mind’s sight, but 
we are even so provoked to recall that language has been, up to this point in the poem, 
merely the symptom of the mind troubled by a variety of other possible sources of 
ineptitude.  Or, more simply, we are meant to wonder at the obvious underlying problem 
of a poem—of words—conveying what has been described as solely available to the 
mind’s insight, which seems if anything weakened by the service of language. 
 Spenser forces the issue of mind and language to a dramatic crisis in the final 
hymn, repeating in the fifteenth stanza that his subject (the angelic ranks of heaven, in 
this case) is “beyond all telling” (101) and then asking: “How then can mortall tongue 
hope to expresse/ The image of such endlesse perfectnesse?” (104-5)  His answer at the 
opening of the sixteenth stanza appears nihilistic, dismissive, a total Platonic cave-in: 
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“Cease then my tongue, and lend unto my mynd/ Leave to bethinke how great that 
beautie is…” (105-6).  Spenser has previously demonstrated that he is not directly in line 
with Platonism, but in this case he is, like Platonists, rebelling against all sensuality, 
opacity, and materiality in language, finding that it is an obstacle to truth. Even so the 
“Hymn to Heavenly Beautie” subtly asserts the value of scripture in a way that makes a 
breathtaking suggestion about Spenser’s attitude toward poetry more generally. Spenser’s 
call for inspiration from heavenly sources asks that this inspiration might improve the 
mind itself—the very agent that has been stripped of language.  He hopes to look upon 
God’s face, he informs us, by seeing it reflected in God’s works:  
The meanes therefore which unto us is lent,  
Him to behold, is on his workes to looke,  
Which he hath made in beauty excellent, 
And in the same, as in a brasen book, 
To reade enregistered in every nooke 
His goodnesse… (127-132) 
 
Reading the ultimate intelligible form as a reflection rather than directly apprehending it 
recalls, indeed, the allegory of the cave, and it just as powerfully figures the Christian 
scion of the Platonic cave: the Pauline image of the mirror or glass through which the 
divine is indirectly apparent to mortals. Spenser has already conveyed to his reader a 
specific interest in 1 Corinthians 13 by bringing up God’s “looking glasse” (115) and the 
invisibility of his “face” (117) two stanzas previously. He improves upon the image of 
the book by making it a form of writing reflected in the surface of a “brass book.”  Thus 
he neatly preserves the Platonic ideal while engaging writing and reading as the agent of 
mind’s improvement to an adequate perception of the divine.  Spenser writes that 
“gathering plumes of perfect speculation/ to impe the wings of [the] high-flying mynd” 
(134-5) is the means to improve communication and make it adequate to the task of 
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capturing the image of heavenly beauty. “Speculation” in this context means, like its root, 
a sort of essential mirroring.  “Plumes” meanwhile double as the quills that are the 
instruments of writing.16 
Having made us sensitive to the plight of mind in self-identification in the 
previous hymns, and having so carefully connected this plight to the problem of 
language’s bodily corruption in the first hymn, Spenser has neatly found his point of 
resolution in making the very image of scriptural perfection its mystical Pauline mirror-
form.  If we are in doubt that this is his intent, he confirms it in a more dramatic manner 
as part of a description of the apparition of Sapience and general contentment in heaven: 
So full their eyes are of that glorious sight, 
And senses fraught with such satietie, 
That in nought else on earth they can delight, 
But in th’aspect of that felicitie, 
Which they have written in their inward ey; 
On which they feed, and in their fastened mynd 
All happie joy and full contentment fynd. (281-7, italics mine) 
 
With this passage, Spenser brings the crisis of mind and language to resolution.  The 
material and bodily apparition of language has vanished into an “inward ey” that 
perceives the imprint of the divine on itself. This reflexive capability of self-inspection 
should remind us of nothing so much as an author contemplating and recognizing his or 
her own work and investing it with his or her identity.  To make us sure that this kind of 
improved tool of perception has relevance to his previous concerns about the failure of 
the tongue and the ineptitude of the mind, Spenser actually refers to the “fastened mynd,” 
implying that the permanence of writing itself enables self-recognition.  Writing, which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 This insight comes courtesy of Dr. Joseph Loewenstein and not, as has sometimes been reported by my  
colleagues, of a visionary dream involving Sir Plume of Alexander Pope’s Rape of the Lock. 
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has the convenience of representing authorial presence outside the body, can elevate 
language from the shadows of reality into the forms of the intelligible. 
 Spenser’s dogged contrasts between tongue and mind and his ultimate emphasis 
upon a novel conception of the relationship between mind and writing in the Fowre 
Hymnes re-works some elements of Platonism. The revision of Platonism is consistent 
with the emphasis placed on the contrast between mind and tongue in Mother Hubberds 
Tale.  That is, it gives a more precise view of the function of good poetry as it is touched 
upon in that satirical work.  Therefore this philosophical pattern of belief about language 
appears to be exactly what he had in mind when he set out to rebuke Lord Burghley for 
supposing that Spenser’s poems were no more than “false allurements.”  However, there 
remain two important technical questions. First, setting aside the apparent parallel to 
Mother Hubberds Tale, how can we be sure that Spenser subscribed to this change of 
viewpoint on writing and mind in or for works other than The Fowre Hymnes? Second, if 
we are going to consider the ramifications of this intellectual matter for social matters, 
what consequence does this change have for the conception of a social and 
communicative identity generally—not just for poets or writers?  In the next section, I 
will turn to answering those questions to prepare the way back to Book 6 and its more 
complicated visions of mind, language, and reality. 
3. “You stop my toung”: The “Platonic Coloring” of Spenser’s Work  
So Spenser uses Platonic theory; so he also uses modifications of Platonic or 
Neoplatonic systems of thought. So what! my skeptic announces: such modification and 
use was common enough in his period and not important in and of itself.  My response is 
again quite simple, though. It is, rather, important because he modifies it for discernible 
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rhetorical goals that fit into the larger contexts of his work as a political and social 
message about language.  After all, Platonism itself is not a rigid unified doctrine, but a 
flexible set of assumptions based on methodical inquiry with particular benefits in view.  
How Spenser modifies Platonism tells us more about his beliefs and interests particularly 
with regard to language.  For this reason, our first question about the Fowre Hymnes’ use 
of Platonic assumptions about mind, writing, speech, and reality tests the nuances of the 
change he has made so that we can better explain the purpose of its intellectual and 
literary manufacture.  
Let us first turn to a key source for the Fowre Hymnes, the Phaedrus, and its 
relevant assumptions. Long after his detailed discussions about the influence of love and 
the fit choices for those trying to make right decisions while in love, Socrates in the 
Phaedrus criticizes any form or school of rhetoric that reduces its art to a mere partial and 
instrumental exercise of influence—a catalogue of specific ways to sway a given 
audience, for example.  To illustrate his reasoning, Socrates asks Phaedrus whether he 
would believe a man to be a doctor who merely is able to “raise or lower […] the 
temperature of people’s bodies” (68, 268B). Naturally, Phaedrus says no, and Socrates 
thereafter freely argues the logical analogy: just as we would not call a man a physician 
for such simple instrumental knowledge, we would not call a man a playwright or an 
artist for simply possessing technical knowledge for how to make an audience laugh or 
cry.17 Moreover, Socrates continues, in order that a speaker have secure knowledge of his 
audience, he or she must know the most essential character of each member of his 
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17 In the Theaetetus, Socrates makes similar stipulations about knowledge: namely, that it must be 
understood in abstraction from particular trades or skills. 
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audience because the site of influence for a rhetorician’s art is the soul of the addressed 
person—that is, rhetoric is “the art of directing the soul by means of speech” in any 
circumstance (55, 261A). Thus, we are meant to understand by the physician analogy that 
just as a physician must know the whole body and the general goal of bodily health in 
order to practice medicine, the rhetorician must have a complete conception of the soul 
and psychological health in order to practice persuasion. But Socrates also reveals here 
that language touches upon the soul in ways that are, like the subject of the psychagogic 
erotic love and beauty dominating the first half of the Phaedrus, subject to moral inquiry 
and dependent upon complex theoretical understandings of how the soul is structured.  
Socrates’ conception of the soul’s “structure” as two horses and a charioteer is famously 
contingent, a product of a similitude he immediately suggests could be improved upon 
both by a perfect divine agency or, in a more accurate similitude, by the human: “To 
describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account, altogether a task for 
a god in every way; but to say what it is like is humanly possible….” (30, 246A).  
After Plato, it was often of central concern to come up with ways to describe the 
soul’s structure.  In that way, how the soul is influenced for good or ill, like the body, 
could be more thoroughly understood.  This manner of thinking about rhetoric may seem 
alien to us in the present for its trespass into areas we now consider medical, biological, 
and scientific.  Yet Renaissance Neoplatonists like Ficino were concerned to represent 
the soul portioned into powers called mind, will, reason, anger, and passion (Gardens, 
15) in order to come up with broad recommendations about diet, exercise regimens, and 
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reading practices.18 In his shorter summaries of Platonic dialogues, Ficino observes that 
“the first power of the soul is the mind, whose action is the eternal contemplation of 
truth” (Gardens, 15) and that “mind… perceives all the principles of nature not by 
discursive reasoning but by simple steadfast observation” (44). An individual with a 
disturbed mind, then, could not make informed and proper decisions about how to direct 
the will.  Thus the observation of beauty, which from the Platonic perspective presents an 
externalized form of the inner form of truth in the soul, can condition the mind.   
Exactly this logic about the structure of the soul is at play in Spenser’s 
characterization of mind in the Amoretti when he describes the influence of his beloved in 
the terms of the ordering power of heavenly beauty over the “thoughts”: 
… Angels come to lead fraile mindes to rest 
in chast desires on heavenly beauty bound. 
You frame my thoughts and fashion me within, 
you stop my toung, and teach my hart to speak… (8.7-10) 
 
Of the poem in general, Kenneth Larsen writes, “Sonnet 8 embodies the standard Neo-
Platonic […] doctrines that love aspires after beauty […] and that virtue overwhelms 
passion” (134).  Indeed, we see the vulnerability of the mind is a Platonic or Neoplatonic 
subject whose formula Spenser preserves.  However, the relation of the “hart” and the 
“toung” that ensues does not fit the Platonic pattern without some adjustment.  Clearly, 
the influence of beauty itself (as a reflection of the true forms) “fashions” the soul of the 
speaker for the better.  But part of that process is evidently the silencing of the speaker’s 
corporal manner of speech, the tongue, in favor of the heart’s speech. This is not just the 
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18 For a fuller picture of Ficino’s assumptions about the curious and comical-seeming interpenetrations of 
physical and mental phenomena, see his Book of Life  (De Vita). 
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theme or point of Sonnet 8 in isolation.  We find precisely this logic at work in the earlier 
Sonnet 3: 
So when my toung would speak her praises dew: 
it stopped is with thoughts astonishment: 
and when my pen would write her titles true, 
it ravisht is with fancies wonderment: 
Yet in my hart I then both speak and write 
the wonder that my wit cannot endite. (3.9-14) 
 
In this earlier poem, mere speech is inadequate and fails in particular when thought is not 
adequate to inform it. The form of the beauty he sees before him, though, as we learn in 
Sonnet 8, can “teach [the] hart to speak.” Writing, legitimized speech, and thoughts have 
conveniently joined forces in some interior state that is somewhat apart from mere 
reactive thought and distinctively apart from the physical body.  
The pattern of emphasis in the Amoretti matches what we find in the Fowre 
Hymnes, suggesting that we should indeed identify a truer heart’s speech with the written 
poems themselves.  In the Amoretti, the heart apparently contains the stillness necessary 
to receiving the effect of the beloved’s heavenly beauty transmuted through the mind and 
pen of the lover.  That the heart should prove to have an attachment to such a specialized 
conception of writing cannot surprise us, given that stillness and silence are part of 
reading and writing, the interchange between beloved and lover in this case. However, 
the “reading” and “writing” in both Sonnet 3 and 8, and arguably in the Fowre Hymnes, 
qualify as a sort of special higher intellectual function linked to the very interior beings of 
the people perceiving and understanding one another. In the scheme of preference we see 
in Sonnets 3 and 8, the tongue itself and physical speech are inadequate.  Interior speech 
and writing, meanwhile—the speech “in the heart”— is sufficient and clearly closer to 
what we find in the printed material Spenser lays before us.  The product registers what is 
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even beyond the individual thinking process, what the “wit cannot endite.”  The clear 
winner here is the writing and reading material itself, which is the ending beneficiary.  
The physical tongue is “stopped” twice while the heart’s speech is encouraged and paired 
with writing. Indeed, in both poems the act of contemplating beauty strengthens the 
expressive and perceptual ability of spirit in Sonnet 3 and mind in Sonnet 8.  In Sonnet 3, 
the speaker’s “fraile spirit” is “from basenesse raysed” as part of the process leading to 
the poem (3.4).  We find the word “frail” repeated in Sonnet 8 in order to emphasize the 
same process: the “fraile mindes” of those witnessing beauty may have their physical 
sight damaged, but they are granted visions of eternity itself through that same beauty: 
“well is he borne, that may behold you ever,” Spenser’s speaker concludes in Sonnet 8.  
The sonnets do not devalue speech so much as more closely link writing or any form of 
beauty-contemplating writing to ideal eternal truths that can come to exist in a properly 
ordered mind. 
Consider one further hint about the valuation of writing embedded in these 
sonnets: Larsen notes that Sonnet 8 was probably written in “friendly rivalry” with 
Sidney (132).  Spenser’s view of the heart’s relationship to the author’s language in this 
rivaling sonnet sequence has in all likelihood been specially conditioned by what Sidney 
figures in the first sonnet of the first sonnet sequence in English: following Sidney’s 
advice in the first Sonnet of “Astrophel and Stella,” an author inspired by heavenly 
beauty should “bit[e his] truand pen” and “look in [his] heart and write” (1.13-14). If 
Spenser pursues Sidney’s advice, and it seems he does, he is shifting the conception of 
mind’s relationship to speech, writing, and the orders of the world in a direction that is a 
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development or extension of the assertions about rhetoric and the soul found in the 
Phaedrus.   
 Spenser’s preferential redemption of writing and reading in Sonnets 3 and 8 as 
themselves elements of the contemplative process and his much more pronounced 
argument for writing in the Fowre Hymnes rely on the same notions of the soul we might 
find in Plato’s discussion of the relationship between the soul and speech; however, in the 
end Spenser produces a new definition of the relation of language to the soul (figured 
through this idea of the printed object), and thus to the intelligible forms, by virtue of 
producing a new likeness of the soul’s relation to the world.  The apparent break with 
Plato on such a point is not a simple turning away from Platonism or Neoplatonism, for it 
is not just a shift in beliefs but a reasoned adjustment of them that even Socrates might 
follow.  The Phaedrus, with its extensive commentary on the relationship between 
beauty, love, and rhetoric, is clearly the most relevant ancient source text for Spenser’s 
handling of precisely these topics in the Amoretti and the Fowre Hymnes. Yet in that 
same text Socrates questions the flexibility of writing as an instrument of learning or 
inquiry, asserting that “words that have been written down [can do no more than] remind 
those who already know what the writing is about” (80, 275 D). Socrates also refers to 
the need for the rhetorician to gain access to the “discourse that is written down, with 
knowledge, in the soul of the listener” (81, 276A) via speech and dialectic in order to 
have any authentic influence.  For a Platonist interpreting the Phaedrus in a strict manner, 
writing is a technical skill like painting: what it represents in the physical world is a 
shadow of the true forms. Spenser proposes an end-run around such limitations on 
writing by reversing the preferences expressed in Platonic philosophy and adjusting the 
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conception of how the soul is constructed, a key part of which involves what kind of 
processes (like writing or speech) give us sure knowledge of it.  In Sonnet 8, for example, 
speech alone has no special access to the soul, as writing can just as well reflect what the 
mind has contemplatively perceived in the heavenly beauty of the beloved.  In fact, 
stopping the “tongue” seems to be an instrumental step in getting to such a contemplative 
act, and thus writing and reading have a clear advantage.  In the Fowre Hymnes, 
similarly, humans can gain access to the purity of divine knowledge by reading the 
divine light that is reflected into the “inward ey” of the soul. The soul here has Platonic 
writing on it, but for Spenser that writing can be observed and outwardly expressed 
without the reason-driven dialectic—that is, the extensive process of spoken dialogue and 
debate—that Plato and Socrates find essential to finding any knowledge.  The external 
expression in writing of an internal and metaphysical writing on the soul that Spenser 
proposes is a radical notion at first blush.  However, the idea of dialectic has not 
disappeared, particularly if we consider the importance of the very culture of writing to 
Spenser’s conception of its presence within and outside the body.  Presumably, as I noted 
earlier of Spenser’s reasoning in the final sections of The Fowre Hymnes, the author’s 
relation to the script outside his or her body makes a kind of dialogue possible between 
the inward visionary speech and the outward reading. An author producing, then 
contemplating and recognizing his or her own work, especially when investing the work 
with his or her identity (which has its origin in the divine), engages in a dialectic process 
that is in keeping with Platonist thinking. 
The interpretation I have proposed gives us an understanding of Spenser’s likely 
reasons for choosing Platonist ideas and his method of adjusting them. My work here is 
!   
! 61!
first responsive to the limitations on such arguments imposed by Robert Ellrodt.  Pointing 
out the problems with trying to find Platonic or Neoplatonic philosophical turns in 
Spenser’s poetry, particularly the Fowre Hymnes, Ellrodt argues that the “seething mass 
of confused thinking” (9) associated with Neoplatonism in the period does not have the 
consistency to produce one definitive result; and that “mere source ascription is 
dangerous and unrewarding” (11) since possible influences are countless and variable 
and, in the case of the Fowre Hymnes, “the cosmogony […] is very largely made up of 
commonplace notions” (127) patched together in a way that, for example, “never so 
much as suggests the Neoplatonic scheme of emanations.”   He adds that “at the very 
heart of Spenser’s Platonism lurks a Christian ideal, quite irrelevant to the Platonic 
conception of the immortality of the soul” (129).  Ellrodt puts up sizeable and necessary 
obstacles to thinking of Spenser as a simple Platonist or Neoplatonist.  However, Ellrodt 
leaves room for seeing more precisely what Spenser chose or used from Platonism. In the 
Phaedrus itself Socrates is careful to base his prescriptions for language on the 
contingencies of the soul’s structure. Regarding this specific feature, Spenser’s new 
reversal of the positions of written and spoken language abides by Socratic reasoning 
even if it breaks with its one-time conclusions. Certainly Christian thinkers did not see 
their similar adjustments of Socratic approaches as illegitimate.  Thus Ellrodt’s sound 
skepticism better illuminates the reasons why Spenser was adapting Platonist and 
Neoplatonist ideas infused with Christian values.  As a writer interested in distinguishing 
the value of his work and how he was doing so in strict philosophical terms, Spenser 
framed writing relative to the powerful philosophical and religious interests of his time.19 
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19 Humphrey Tonkin has an excellent insight on the matter of Spenser’s Platonism that I am not including 
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In pursuing an interest in authentic and trustworthy rhetorical principles, Spenser remains 
consistent with Platonic thought and Christian thought, including Neoplatonic variants, in 
one crucial way. The consistency remains because all are concerned with the self’s or 
soul’s construction as part of their arguments about how it may be influenced.   The 
traditions submit various claims about the constitution of individual identity (self, soul, 
etc.) as part of a larger argument about how to define the meritorious exercise of 
influence through linguistic means.20  
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here but which is indeed relevant to my course of thought. In his commentary on the nature of Spenser’s 
handling of Platonism in Book 6 of The Faerie Queene, Tonkin first observes that, considering the 
historical specifics with which Spenser was explicitly concerned, it matters less that Spenser makes his use 
of one brand of philosophy or another, and more what meanings he produces with his typically 
idiosyncratic approach: “Viewed in this light,” Tonkin comments, “the evaluation of the precise extent of 
Spenser’s Platonism, or the precise influence of Aristotle, one of those traditional battlegrounds of 
Spenserian scholars, recedes in importance” (7-8).  Tonkin naturally concedes that Spenser’s crucial 
concerns, however, are often framed in allegorical language that may “confuse the […] categories” (23) of 
real and ideal as Platonists or Christians would see them.  Yet this confusion can be remarkably minor.  In 
Spenser’s allegorical work, Tonkin asserts, his inquiry differs from Socratic inquiry by concentrating on the 
individual as a means to understand society rather than on the society as a means to understand the 
individual: “When Socrates wished to define the qualities of the just man, he chose to describe a just 
society […]. Spenser […] begins with the self and moves gradually outward toward society” (29).  The 
differences in their approaches, considered this way, have some grave consequences for general moral 
inquiry, but not for our concerns regarding language (or, as Tonkin is more interested to argue, for the 
concerns of those interested in historical matters). 
 
20 Carol Kaske and Elizabeth Bellamy offer some support for this point of view about Spenser’s flexibility.  
Kaske has contended that classifications of Spenser’s approach as Platonic, Neoplatonic, or neither are 
misleading because “Spenser’s thought is not as monolithic as that of, say, Dante, Herbert, or Milton” 
(157).  With similar vigor, Elizabeth Bellamy proposes “reading Orphically,” subjecting the Spenserian text 
to the particulars of Plotinian thought in order  
to understand the pervasive intellectual range of Neoplatonism, its delight in the cosmic rhythms 
of emanation and reversion, its refusal to limit the essence of the gods to anything less than a 
simultaneous and dispersed network of images and associations. (174) 
These approaches presume to re-construct what Spenser means in terms ideally suited to him, but they do 
isolate his poetics as a solipsistic and highly general exercise of mytho-poetic narration. Yet in taking up 
such stances Kaske and Bellamy wish to do more than skeptically set aside general links to Platonism and 
Neoplatonism that Ellrodt convincingly showed to be limited.  Having isolated a specific and reasoned 
point of continuity between Platonism and Spenser’s work that threads The Faerie Queene, Mother 
Hubberds Tale, The Fowre Hymnes, and the Amoretti—though principally the latter two at this stage—we 
can now go further than Kaske or Bellamy by simply examining Spenser’s poetics relative to his 
conceptions of rhetoric and language and to other figures in his time period.  Such practical focus may fall 
short of the Orphic reading proposed by Bellamy, but fortunately the loss of Eurydice accustomed that 
reader to the vicissitudes of fortune. 
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 How then should we deal with Spenser’s conceptualizations of language in a way 
that recognizes his motivations for such Platonist borrowings in his late-life works? We 
cannot, on the one hand, afford to reduce Spenser’s position to that of a mere idealist.  
Consider Judith Anderson’s conclusions about Spenser’s idealistic objection to “winged 
words” (5.2.44.9) from Book 5 of The Faerie Queene—poetry completed during the time 
Spenser also forged the Amoretti and The Fowre Hymnes.   Seeing Artegall’s argument 
with the egalitarian Giant as partly a debate about how to assess words and verbal value, 
she concludes: 
…Artegall’s words—materially tripping him up, perhaps—further indicate not 
just the truism that human beings have minds as well as senses but a far stronger 
privileging of the “inward mind,” repeatedly in this poem a phrase that implies the 
recesses of memory in Neoplatonic and Augustinian senses.  Artegall opts for 
both a subjective conception of truth as against an external and quantifiable one 
and for an interiorly valorized conception of language as against one that is 
material. (183) 
 
Anderson rightly points us to the same crucial idea about “mind” that we have seen at 
play in the Fowre Hymnes, Mother Hubberds Tale, and the Amoretti. However, as I was 
also at pains to discuss in my readings of those works, Spenser’s “mind” is no simple and 
untroubled creature whose privileges stay in place, nor simply a memorial construction. It 
is true that Anderson reads the term “mind” itself as convenient for generalizing about 
Spenser’s attitude toward language: 
…Artegall’s views, which are neither those of the proem to Book V nor 
necessarily co-extensive with Spenser’s, are touched by the antilinguistic 
extremism of Platonism and by what I would imagine to be the projected anxieties 
of the poet. (184) 
 
For Anderson’s purposes in discussing the ways in which Renaissance writers found 
words to be material, it is eminently useful to show how Spenser is the idealist exception 
that proves the rule.  Her findings here fit Spenser into a historical trend that she is 
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tracking among many authors.21 Yet this approach leaves us in some doubt about just how 
to understand Spenser except by contrast with materialists, and on this matter Anderson’s 
approach leaves a great deal of room for new work.  We already know from Ellrodt that 
any simple association of Neoplatonism and Spenser’s arguments is insufficient, so 
Anderson’s assertions here fall short of explaining why or how Spenser chose such 
essentialist and idealist positions except as echoes of ideas about memory brought to bear 
in Book 2.  Anderson’s assertion that Artegall’s “choice distinctly favors the Platonic end 
of the spectrum” (183) simplifies the complex metaphysics into an Idealist/Materialist 
binary momentarily at this stage in her argument.22  However, Anderson also takes pains 
to show that Spenser’s ideas about words—most notably the word “scrine”—depend 
upon a complex conception of the play of ideal forms deeper than any simple Platonism 
and heavily reminiscent of the sixteenth-century struggle in lexicons with defining 
whatever might be substantial in words.  Anderson is not wrong to suggest that Artegall’s 
misgivings about words, and the misgivings about language abundantly in play in Book 
5, are “projected anxieties.” She is right, too, that there is an “indictment of language” 
going on in various places in Book 5 that relates to the many episodes where words fail, 
as I will more fully examine in my fourth and final chapter. Yet, as we shall see soon 
enough, Spenser addresses this topic in Book 6 in a way that is uniquely beneficial for 
extending the inquiry I have begun about The Fowre Hymnes.  
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21 See my introduction for a fuller consideration of how scholars track such trends in the development of 
ideas of meaning and struggle with Spenser’s place in particular. 
 
22 See my introduction for a consideration of the significance of Anderson’s argument from Words that 
Matter as a whole. 
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 Barbara Strang’s analysis of Spenser’s language in The Spenser Encyclopedia 
shows a line of thought to add to my own thinking about the Fowre Hymnes and develops 
Anderson’s line of thought about The Faerie Queene.  Strang argues that Spenser’s 
“Platonic coloring” (428), as she terms it, relates to his conception of language and his 
poetics. According to her, Spenser does not “cheat” as a poetic stylist either in the way he 
chooses words, spells words, or rhymes them. She continues: “I would suggest that there 
is a quality in Spenser’s exploitation of variability that nearly always protects it from the 
appearance of license or mere contrivance.” Strang suggests that the systematic quality of 
Spenser’s handling of language in this way is akin to his constrained use of names—his 
attempt to have them retain key-like meanings.  She refers to this as a “Platonic coloring” 
and comments in detail: 
In each case, the etymological meaning [of a word like “Faerie” e.g.] is the 
immutable essence; vagaries in time, in form or meaning, are mere accidents.  In 
proportion as the poet’s goal is the permanent in language, variable surface 
realizations are functionally a matter of indifference.  Contemporary variation in 
the standard language, advanced, even slangy colloquialisms, dialect forms, and 
archaisms are all on a par. To Jonson, this meant that Spenser writ no language, 
and in a surface sense this is undeniably true.  But it is not a relevant sense.   
Spenser’s exploitation of variation gives him great license, but the sympathetic 
reader does not perceive him as taking liberties or the easy way out because his 
freedom is in accord with a deep, pervasive, and coherent intuition about the 
nature of poetic language—at least for poetry of this kind. (428) 
 
Strang here is essentially looking at formal  properties as evidence of a confidence in the 
structure of works as a reflection of the true underlying forms of reality.  For the 
Platonist, this would be the real “material,” of course, and thus Strang’s idea of Platonism 
echoes what Martha Craig and John Leonard argue about the influence of the Cratylus—
a matter I noted in my introduction. In other words, Strang argues that both Spenser’s 
method of structuring his prosody and his methods of choosing and thinking about words 
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conforms to his broader beliefs about the forms underlying the productivity of language.23  
This is not just a matter of good naming, but of developing a systematic framework for 
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23 Strang’s arguments about formal properties of language bring up a number of issues about how and why 
ideas from linguistics, cognitive studies, and philosophy of mind are appropriate and necessary for 
discussing Spenser’s work. One of the most difficult problems with the desire to examine the conceptions 
of language in an author from Spenser’s period concerns the differences between our present conceptions 
of language and theirs. We need plausible ways to explain Spenser’s choices for defining language, but 
there is no established way to define language in the present or past.  Spenser’s manner of sketching out an 
idea of the permanency of an individual’s use of language in the Fowre Hymnes highlights more generally 
his complex understanding of relations between language, reality, and mind.  We might in the present day 
find his understanding puzzling not simply for its Platonic and Neoplatonic overtones.  Over the last fifty 
years, biology, medicine, and technology have taught us that language is a specially human faculty which 
may be defined in part by the structures of the brain. But when Spenser, Platonists, Neoplatonists, and 
Christians argue about language in the sixteenth century, it is not our language but a much stranger 
amalgamation of mind, brain, language, and body with threads of similarity and difference amid each of 
these additional ideas/terms and ours.  Some in the present consider language as pure matters of rhetoric in 
disconnection from the body (which is to say, the physical body rather than some generalized notion of it as 
a figure); some do not, of course, but they are located in scientific fields now radically separate from those 
engaged in the study of English literature.  For the sake of a coherent inquiry into a period in which the 
disciplinary conventions about defining mind, brain, and body were not set as they are today, it is 
sometimes necessary to consider both differences in the view of language from Spenser’s period and ours 
and some of the subtle and problematic commonalities.  The commonalities mainly exist between our 
contemporary fields of scientific inquiry and Spenser’s inquiry.  For the sake of setting reasonable 
disciplinary boundaries, English studies has moved apart from the welter of arguments in linguistics while 
remaining dependent in a variety of obscure ways on the sorts of conceptions of language that linguistics 
expertly debates.  Such matters from philosophy and linguistics are logically central to an appreciation of 
Spenser’s motivation in handling Platonic ideas for his description of language, then, but my readers within 
my discipline find them unfamiliar and distracting, particularly since they are tinged with empiricist and 
scientific thought.  The notes I provide below are simply a gesture in the direction I think the study of 
concepts of language should go, but they are also logically central to my larger argument and interest in the 
fields of linguistics and philosophy of mind. 
The defining linguistic and psychological assumptions in Spenser’s poetics such as I will begin to 
detail them in this thesis have never disappeared from academic inquiry, but rather have been recast in the 
terms of contemporary disputations about the relation between individual thought and language mostly 
located in the fields of linguistics and philosophy. That is, Spenser’s doubts about the adequacy of spoken 
language, the corporal “tongue,” and his corresponding envisioning the “inward ey” of the mind remain 
part of current critical considerations of mind and language.  Just as Spenser is concerned with features of 
mind that are beyond immediate physical representation in words, so some parts of linguistics are 
concerned with structures in the mind, namely idiolect, whose appearance in printed or spoken language is 
only residual.  Robert Hall explains: 
…all phenomena of language exist only in the ‘know-how’[…] of individual speakers, i.e., their 
idiolects.  For something to exist at all, it has to have a locus existendi. It must be given a local 
habitation and a name, or else it remains airy nothing. (353) 
The “locus existendi” of Platonists and Neoplatonists was the soul, and in Spenser the place was just as 
often the division of the soul termed the “mind.”  As Hall further explains, the essential idiolect is in many 
ways more important than the variable expressions of language in print and speech: “Any supra-linguistic 
entity (dialect, language),” Hall notes,  “is only an abstraction built up by observation of two or more 
individuals’ language-activity” (353).  The “supralinguistic” comprises all the visible or heard entities we 
loosely term language itself.  The model Hall describes, while not being a Platonic one, preserves for 
linguistics the concept of an underlying reality whose shadows, in the form of our outward expressions of 
language, merely reflect an inner generative formula.  Hall even goes so far as to point out that materialist 
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conceptions themselves are not essential to his concern with structure of idiolect: “The locus existendi of 
the correlation between signifier and signified is in the ‘minds’ of individual speakers (however we define 
the term mind, whether a non-physical entity or as the activity of the brain and central nervous system of 
the human body)” (354). Spenser would be deeply gratified that the “non-physical entity,” though only a 
ghostly alternative to material science, still merits consideration.  However, for our purposes what remains 
important is that Hall’s idiolect closely parallels the inward writing on the soul (even in its defective forms) 
that Spenser hypothesizes in the Fowre Hymnes, while the “supralinguistic” features of language (which 
Hall defines as a limited and somewhat misleading external set of representations) are consubstantial with 
all forms of signified order (things we would consider relatively non-linguistic) outside the individual mind 
in Spenser’s estimation. Unlike Hall, however, who sees supralinguistic order as inherently disconnected 
from the idiolect, Spenser sees the material “tongue” as the source of that disconnection.  
(A side note: We will ultimately find that Spenser is concerned with the connection between 
supralinguistic order and the essential sources of meaning deep in the mind.  Hall’s essay is principally 
aimed at showing the problems with establishing such a connection.  Ian Lancashire’s scholarship, on the 
other hand, attempts to get around such problems at least when it comes to the essential identity people 
develop in and through language.  I will not be addressing the entire difficulty here in any detail.  However, 
the reader should recognize that there are some variables in any conception of supralinguistic order for 
present and past thinkers because of the nuances of conceiving of meaningful orders inside and outside 
language.  I cannot account for all of these variables.  Mainly, though, the difficulty resides in 
understanding to what extent general meaningfulness, especially thought, is extralinguistic, which is to say 
wholly averbal, and to what extent it governs or is governed by language, being supralinguistic or 
intralinguistic.  We do not need to resolve all these difficulties so much as recognize the different 
possibilities with precise terminology so that both differences and similarities between present and past 
conceptions can be detailed as necessary.  “Supralinguistic” order is, for example, virtually the entire 
concern of those who see meaning as principally communally or socially held.  The “extralinguistic” 
addresses not only those things that are meaningful outside of language, but necessarily those mental 
processes such as sensuous perception itself.  For Platonists, however, such sensuous perception is not 
necessarily part of a mental or intellective process.  These differences are important but larger than my 
concern in this study.) 
While Robert Hall’s essay on the “Idioseme” from the middle 1980s ultimately points out that 
linguistics is severely limited so long as it cannot gain access to the actual neural structures that establish 
correspondences between signifiers and signified, the more recent literary theorist Ian Lancashire contends 
that idiolect itself remains central to our humanist interpretive enterprise in a variety of practical ways that 
have further relevance to Spenser’s work.  In his 1999 essay on Shakespeare’s idiolect, Lancashire argues 
that “mind is now analyzable biologically by scientific methods” and that “in the humanities, authorship 
attribution uses quantitative profiles of lexical, grammatical, metrical, and syntactic regularities […] as 
markers of idiolect” (728).  More importantly, though, Lancashire recognizes the importance of the 
different “language modes” of “writing, oral speech, and inner speech, a subvocal utterance expressed in 
words audible only in the mind” (728-9) to our conception of language itself and a more distributed ideal of 
idiolect: “Idiolect embraces the textual, auditory, and subvocal traits of ‘uttering’” in such a way that it 
cannot “be separated from how authors think averbally, using images mentally, and feel emotions” (729).  
In short, then, Lancashire argues that idiolect can be approached by looking at the use of language (broadly 
understood as supralinguistic elements ultimately tied to structures of mind presumed to be “neural 
networks” [729]) as a reflection of individual cognition or “cognitive style.” Lancashire’s entire approach 
reveals a deep continuity between the Platonic conception of the individual soul’s construction and his and 
others’ current attempts to find and define identity in the brain. Neuropsychologists, by looking for 
structures of the brain that condition perception, thinking, and response crucial to linguistic processes, are 
fundamentally engaged in the development of new similitudes––like the Socratic one of the soul as a 
charioteer––by which to describe the limits of our volition and the susceptibility of our mind to influence.  
They are looking for individual identity there, among other things.  Spenser’s conceptions of language and 
mind rest upon Platonic criteria, too, and arguably his poetry itself and the poetics that guide it pursue the 
same goal of constructing new similitudes descriptive of a reality centered upon the mind.  As with 
Lancashire, so also with Spenser: the basic material features of language are no more than clues to mind’s 
structures of meaning and identity that guide and determine the material shadows and trivialities. 
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the generation of stable meaning. What Strang’s arguments label “intuition,” moreover, 
has a rudimentary philosophic expression in the Platonic argumentation of the Fowre 
Hymnes. There, Spenser’s condemnation of the “tongue” as essentially licentious 
ultimately produces a panegyric for a writing that is spiritually linked to God and 
intimately linked to an individual consciousness of stable identity.  Such writing linked to 
identity is what we would call idiolect or simply an individual mind, but it is much more 
than that in Spenser.  Spenser posits an idiolexic essence, one necessarily self-conscious 
as a “mindful” thing, situated within a greater intelligible order of the world.  True, the 
writing of value is all “inward,” but such inward writing nonetheless constitutes an ideal 
vision of individual expression that may, in the shadow reality of human day, struggle 
against the limitations of the flesh insofar as it comes into alignment with the eternal.  In 
other words, what you say is what you are in flexible and contingent ways. 
 Strang’s argument shows us two kinds of evidence we should be looking for in 
order to understand the significance of the distinction between speech and writing that 
appears in The Fowre Hymnes and its relationship to questions of identity.  First, we 
should look for evidence that Spenser saw language as defective in speech because of 
problematic relations to mind.  Such evidence can show us more fully how Spenser 
envisioned the writing on the soul or mind as he was conceiving of it.  Second, we should 
look for further evidence that he saw individual language as ideal if crucially tied to a 
larger order—an order in which a poet might distinguish his or her own identity and 
place.  Such evidence can show us how Spenser conceived of the overarching order of 
things in reality that he may have felt was connected to language—namely, the social and 
political practicalities associated with figures like Lord Burghley. Strang’s observations 
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about Spenser’s sense of the value of language lying in immutable forms clearly has 
some links to features of Spenser’s poetics.  However, Spenser’s poetics as seen through 
these Platonic lenses also reveals a potential source of his anxieties about the place of 
poetry in a society dependent upon excellent discourse and limited by the seemingly 
inherent defects of speech.  In other words, Spenser’s work on language is not just a 
matter of idealism and form; it has political and social contexts.  It is a matter of good 
and bad forms tied to good and bad material realities.  Upon this point Judith Anderson’s 
analysis is apropos: she rightly finds defective speech and language are a key focus in 
Book 5—and one which is made all the more active by contrasting references to a 
superior mind.  Anderson writes of the appearance of the Blatant Beast at the end of Book 
5: 
…this ugly episode acknowledges the biting reality of words, figurally, 
affectively, and also historically, since it blatantly alludes to the fate of Arthur, 
Lord Grey de Wilton; that is, it acknowledges the reality of words in terms that 
are fully material.  Thus this episode, too, bitterly reattaches the narrative “to the 
events of the world.”  At the same time, however, this disfiguring end of Book V 
might also be seen to enable Book VI, in which words have real effects, whether 
physically, as when the Beast bites Timias and Serena, or ideally, as when the 
Graces materialize to dance on Mount Acidale. (189) 
 
How does the allegorical work of Book 6 of The Faerie Queene manage the issue of 
language, then?  Is it really for language that the Graces dance?  And, if so, how can it be 
a “material” language?  Anderson’s concluding gesture on Book 5 raises the questions I 
propose to answer about Book 6. 
4. Good Reading Leads to Good Selfhood 
A casual survey of the Spenser concordance shows that Spenser rarely uses the 
word “tongue” with positive connotation in The Faerie Queene.  The tongue is often an 
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instrument of flattery or deception.  Archimago can “file his tongue as smooth as glas” 
(1.1.35.7) to fool Redcrosse, and he has a “faire filed tong” (2.1.3.6) for Guyon, too. 
Despair has a “subtile tong” (1.9.31.5).  Britomart even accuses Redcrosse of having a 
“courteous tongue” (3.2.12.5) that unfairly favors Artegall’s reputation. When not an 
instrument of deception, the tongue seems a source of instability or evil.  There are 
“fawning” (1.3.6.2), “foltring” (1.7.24.7; 1.9.24.9; 2.1.47.4; 3.11.12.3), “sad” (1.7.25.3),  
“babling” (4.7.45.6), “burning” (5.8.49.2), “vile” (5.12.42.7; 6.1.8.8; 6.12.38.4),  and 
“venemous” (6.1.8.8) tongues in human and monstrous hosts. Spenser finds fault with his 
own tongue at the outset of the epic, imploring the muse to “sharpen [his] dull tong” 
(1.pr.2.9).  Book 6 preserves and adds to this demotion of the tongue in part because, like 
the Fowre Hymnes, it develops the Platonic tension between the ideal quality of the mind 
as a site of virtuous identity and the problematic variability of speech as the shadowy un-
real world plaguing and confusing the mind.  In the Proem, Spenser asserts that “vertues 
seat is deepe within the mynd,/ And not in outward shews, but inward thoughts defynd” 
(6.Pr.5.8-9).  The steady virtuosity is idealized in Calidore’s trial by the endlessly 
proliferating variables of rumor and slander embodied, but not idealized, in the “Blatant 
Beast” that “with vile tongue and venemous intent/ […] sore doth wound, and bite, and 
cruelly torment” (6.1.8.8-9).  
 While many sections of Book 6 show the tension between mind and language, 
cantos four to seven in particular dramatize the negative influence of misreport, rumor, 
and lying upon the minds of various characters.  The Salvage Man, who lacks language, 
begins this process.  He first focuses our attention on both mind and language in the 
fourth canto.  “For other language had he none nor speech…” (6.4.11.6), Spenser tells us.  
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Spenser uses the word “other” here, but he immediately stresses that the “soft murmure, 
and confused sound/ Of senselesse words” that the Salvage does have is not a human 
language, but only that “which nature did him teach” (6.4.11.7-8).  The words are not 
really words at all.  And this is the only use of “language” in the singular in Spenser’s 
poetic works.  It hints at the importance of the Salvage’s language-lack to his allegorical 
position in the story. Indeed, as we read the succeeding cantos it becomes clear that the 
Salvage’s invulnerability to words represents his greater purity of mind, which furnishes 
some of the reasons why Spenser elevates reading over speech.  The Salvage is described 
as having a “gentle mynd” by both the narrator and Serena (6.6.1.8; 6.5.29.9), a mind that 
Serena claims “plainely may […] be red” (6.6.2.1) in his actions and self.  Being so 
“plain” has a value that appears most starkly when the Salvage understands the situations 
and people immediately before him so well.  At the beginning of the fourth canto, for 
example, he hears Serena’s cries for help and, arriving on the scene, rightly judges 
Turpine as a bad man at one glance (6.4.2). His quick, violent response to and defeat of 
Turpine contrasts the Salvage with Calepine, who fails to deal with Turpine and, though 
evidently quite the courtier, generally proves inadequate to the circumstances in which he 
finds himself before running into the Salvage.24  The contrast between the wordless 
Salvage and Calepine is made deeper because complex dialogue and social interchange 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 In “Defining Courtesy: Spenser, Calepine, and Renaissance Lexicography,” Daniel Fried observes 
exactly the contrasts between the Salvage and Calepine that I examine in this paragraph, considering 
Calepine in the light of his association with questions of “linguistic competency” (242) that are the primary 
association with his probable namesake, the lexicographer Ambrogio Calepino.  Fried also notes the role of 
Turpine (and the passages from the end of canto three that illustrate Calepine’s incompetence) in setting up 
the contrast between Calepine and the Salvage.  Though his consideration of these things is briefer and 
serves different interests, I have drawn on it for my analysis here.  I have left the discussion of Fried’s work 
on this subject for later since I am here concerned more with discussing the complex network of allegorical 
meanings in the sequence of cantos and not simply with the question of Calepine as courtier.  In addition, in 
my second chapter, I consider more deeply the limits of Fried’s arguments and the intellectual significance 
of the name. 
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play an enormous part in Calepine’s circumstance and character right up to the point that 
he meets the Salvage. First Calepine is caught in an awkward and embarrassing situation: 
Calidore surprises him while he is dallying with his love, Serena, in the woods (6.3.20).  
Then he and Calidore, engaged in extensive tale-telling and polite discussion, are caught 
unawares by the Blatant Beast (6.3.22-24).  Afterwards, trying desperately to get help for 
Serena, Calepine is snubbed by Turpine (6.3.31-43) and ultimately left out in the cold.  
Turpine’s words to Calepine even indicate that proper interpretation of one’s 
circumstance is the essence of courtesy and social status: “Perdy thou peasant Knight,” 
Turpine says in refusing Calepine’s request that he allow Calepine to ride with him, 
“mightst rightly reed/ Me then to be full base and evill borne,/ If I would beare behind a 
burden of such scorne” (6.3.31.6-9, italics mine).  As A.C. Hamilton points out, Turpine 
has, probably willfully, misunderstood the circumstance, not realizing that Calepine put 
Serena on his own steed (645n), and thus assuming that Calepine is a mere peasant not 
worthy of help.  Ironically, while not reading the situation properly himself, Turpine 
frames the situation as one in which a correct reading of the circumstance would produce 
socially appropriate results.  The Salvage’s right reading and successful intervention 
without the benefit of speech clearly contrasts with the wrong readings of Calepine and 
Turpine, both of whom have the power of speech and appear unrewarded by it. 
Moreover, the events of the end of canto three follow mostly from the arrival of the 
Blatant Beast, who allegorically represents the free reign of rumor and libel, linguistic 
products that it is logical to conclude the Salvage does not recognize.  Serena’s and 
Calepine’s suffering stem from social impropriety reported and distorted. That is, their 
suffering represents the consequences of speech gone wrong.  Turpine’s addled reading, 
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too, is a product of his own social impropriety, albeit one separate from Serena’s and 
Calepine’s. The Salvage’s silent, attentive listening, intuitive reading, and forceful action 
represent one necessary response to this social Babel—though not one fully adequate to 
treating the whole range of social ills implied.   
In canto five, we learn that the Salvage man’s wordlessness is hardly adequate to 
the complexity of Serena’s plight and a variety of other circumstances.  Only Serena’s 
timely intervention with speech, after all, prevents Timias and the Salvage from killing 
one another during an initial meeting (6.5.26-7). A fuller exploration of the inadequacy of 
the speechless mind of the Salvage emerges in canto six, though.  There Timias’ and 
Serena’s struggle to achieve an ascetic plainness (recommended to them by the Hermit) 
in the restoration of their reputations (after the Blatant Beast has bitten them) offers a 
more nuanced sense of how to respond to the social and linguistic disaster of proliferating 
rumor and scandal. For it is only through the diagnostic power of the Hermit that Serena 
and Timias figure out how to cure themselves of the Blatant Beast’s bite-wounds—
allegorically understood as wounds to their reputations. Spenser stresses that the Hermit 
“in the mindes of men had great insight” (6.6.3.6, my italics) and that he was able to 
provide “counsell to the minde” (6.6.5.9).  The Hermit is not without the power of 
speech, of course, “as he the art of words knew wondrous well” (6.6.6.3), good courtier 
that he once was.  (And thus Spenser is not “antilinguistic” in any simple sense.) 
However, the Hermit’s therapeutic advice consists principally in telling Timias and 
Serena to exercise inner control of their senses, among which senses he includes their 
speech and tongue repeatedly:  “your eies, your ears, your tongue, your talk restraine” 
(6.6.7.8, my italics), he advises.  The Hermit even prescribes that they should only “talke 
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in open sight” (6.6.14.8). In this way, the Hermit’s insight (emphasis upon the “in”) 
properly accounts for interior problems.  Such insight is not linked to masterful use of 
language, but rather linked to curtailing the use of language to certain forms.   The 
Hermit prefers forms of speech that permit self control. Naturally, if ironically, such 
forms are the most public ones.  Such public speech facilitates a private and interior 
dignity closely linked to identity, the self writ large. To be sure, Spenser goes to great 
pains to stress the Hermit’s understanding of interiority by pairing the relatively newer 
and anomalous use of the word “self”25 with a foremost power of the soul, the will: “For 
in your selfe your onely helpe doth lie,/ To heale your selves, and must proceed alone/ 
From your own will…” (6.6.7.1-3, my italics). Thus Serena’s and Timias’ plight deeply 
contrasts with the Salvage’s, and the Hermit represents a limited parallel to the Salvage. 
The Salvage reads situations correctly, but he requires no interior power or understanding 
of others’ exterior power: Serena notes that the Salvage cannot “conceive” others’ minds 
(6.5.30.4), for example. Spenser thus uses the rehabilitation of Timias and Serena to 
stress the superiority of the power of a quiet interpretive act (the Hermit’s, especially) to 
any form of powerful speech, courtly or not. Such a quiet interpretive act, we might note, 
has important parallels to reading as an intellectual activity, a form of interiority, and a 
self-defining discipline.  And to “talke in open sight,” similarly, might be thought of as 
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25 The O.E.D. lists Spenser as the first to develop one more recent sense of the word “self”: “An 
assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be conceived as constituting one of various 
conflicting personalities within a human being.”  It cites Sonnet 14 in the Amoretti as one crucial use: “And 
in my selfe, my inward selfe I meane, Most liuely lyke behold your semblant trew.”  The use of the word 
“self,” like the use of various other terms like “heart,” extends and complicates the vocabulary of Platonic 
representation of identity. I cite this here rather than provide a full argument on the subject, but it is clear a 
fuller one could be made.  I owe thanks to Carter Revard for pointing out to me the historical significance 
of Spenser’s use of the word “self.” 
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published writing, the natural complementary discipline to reading, though such an 
interpretation appears as yet unwarranted. 
The Hermit’s work with Serena and Timias at the opening of canto six better 
defines an understanding of the tension between mind and language: it shows the way in 
which an ideal mind, through control of language and self, can respond to the problematic 
variability of speech in the community. Correspondingly, the conclusion of canto six 
shows that the natural purity and a-linguistic state of the Salvage does not suffice for 
answer to the complex corruption in characters like Turpine and Blandina. The villainy of 
such characters is closely bound not just to their use of words, but also to the distortion of 
their minds (and identities) in a way that Arthur, but not the Salvage, can interpret. 
Spenser carefully casts Blandina as the opposite of the Hermit when it comes to the 
direction of the willpower of those around her through controlled uses of language: 
For well she knew the wayes to win good will 
Of every wight, that were not too infest, 
And how to please the minds of good and ill 
Through tempering of her words and lookes by wondrous skill. 
 
Yet were her words and lookes but false and fayned… (6.6.41.6-9, 6.6.42.1, 
italics mine) 
 
Blandina’s mastery of words and appearances (words, we have just learned, are of 
secondary importance to the diagnostician Hermit) is sufficient to infect rather than 
correct the interior will—her own and Arthur’s.  The will in this instance is the very thing 
that, with the mind, would guide the soul (or, in Spenser’s use, the self) in the proper 
moral direction in a Platonic scheme.  It is essential to the Hermit’s sense of self-control. 
In this way Spenser takes the opportunity to remind us of the absence of meaning in mere 
physically expressed words.  This absence, curiously, is a problem wholly irrelevant to 
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the Salvage, who was just prepared to tear up the inherently bad Turpine at mere sight.  
Yet what becomes plain in this instance is precisely that the Salvage does not really hear 
words in the way people must.  He constructs meaning in a way that Spenser does not 
define but suggests is simple and wordless: Serena explains that “he cannot expresse his 
simple minde,/ Ne yours conceive, ne but by tokens speake” (6.5.30.3-4).  However, this 
is a logical conundrum in the instance of Blandina, whose speech is integrally bound to 
her will and falsehood. What, then, does Spenser intend his readers to see about the virtue 
of courtesy that the allegory surrounding Blandina, the Salvage, and Arthur addresses? 
Spenser theorizes in the Salvage a kind of perfect noble being with a perfect 
perception; this reading of the signs itself ends up adequate in the case of Turpine and 
Blandina, who later prove to richly deserve the punishment the Salvage initially wants to 
give.  Unlike Arthur, he does not hesitate. Yet the Salvage man serves an allegorical 
purpose much like that of his mechanical predecessor of the previous book, Talus.  Talus’ 
justice is too ideal (too brutal) for the social world and needs to be restrained or informed 
by Artegall.   The Salvage’s rough courtesy is similar.  Its application would be too brutal 
for us to come towards any greater understanding of the convolutions of courtesy as a 
human social matter. To show this to us, Spenser emphasizes, as Canto 6 draws to a 
close, that Blandina’s words and looks are more part of the sensory, transient world than 
part of any stable reality: “Yet were her words but wynd, and all her tears but water” 
(6.6.42.9). Obviously, the Salvage would see such material things for what they were.  He 
would see them as absent of significant meaning.  However, the Salvage cannot see any 
meaning in them in any case and thus cannot conceive of the use of language to feign 
things, only the general malignity he conceives altogether.  Spenser’s fantastical wild-
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man shows us that to be justly social, to be courteous, we need the consciousness of the 
potential for false words.  At the close of canto six, it is obvious that Arthur possesses a 
consciousness of just such a kind of falseness that the Salvage does not.  Only Arthur’s, 
the Hermit’s, or another human’s capacity to choose to disregard spoken language and 
then construe meaning from an array of more trustworthy, intelligible signs could serve in 
this situation. The Salvage can only disregard speech. Arthur, in regarding falsehood and 
its mechanism, has a broader consciousness of the villainy before him and a more 
gracious command of the social situation.  Such graciousness is, to be sure, the essence of 
courtesy in this context—and thus a core part of this book’s concern. Through its 
emphasis upon the virtuosity of the Hermit and Arthur and the deficiency of the Salvage, 
then, canto six brings the question of perceiving virtue in the mind to a crisis centered on 
thorny matters of the perception and communication of stable facets of identity.  Spenser 
in effect makes the social situation complex enough that we as readers see that the 
Salvage’s abilities are insufficient.  At the same time, though, Spenser makes plain that 
words and language are not sufficient in the way that interpreting and understanding must 
be. 
 Canto seven commences with continued attention to the question of mind, but 
now Spenser shows how the mind’s self-revelation and self-recognition is crucial to the 
matter.  “The baser mind it selfe displayes,/ in cancred malice and revengefull spight” 
(6.7.1.3-4), he tells us, and then refers to this sort of mind as a “vile donghill mind” 
(6.7.1.6).  The reader is meant to question how Spenser intends to model the relationship 
between identity, speech, and action: Can a mind be a mind without recognizing its 
principal rational observational power?  And if it lacks that, is it really a mind? This same 
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crisis develops in the Fowre Hymnes: there, as I noted earlier, mind’s un-mindfulness 
cannot be cured by communicative words, only by the reflective inspiration from a higher 
order of beauty. Spoken discourse alone—the tongue—proves fruitless.  In the Fowre 
Hymnes, the question is restricted to the speaker’s or poet’s concerns; it is not 
complicated by a vision of morally complex social choices. Having been faced with 
Turpine and Blandina, we know that Spenser is bringing into focus the most complex 
social situations possible in order to unfold questions of self-knowledge.  Canto seven, 
moreover, introduces us to Mirabella who, though she recognizes her fault, cannot 
improve her low-born status or her bad habits.  Arthur himself ultimately must allow her 
to suffer.  Naturally there is much more to the psychology of these passages than is 
relevant to the question of language.  Even so, the problem of good reading or writing as 
general interpretive acts, Spenser indicates, devolves upon the individual’s mind itself 
and its capacity for proper interior communicative acts—that is, thinking well by 
reflecting fully upon one’s identity and position in the world and coming to recognition 
of such things.  Blandina, Turpine, and Mirabella have conspicuous problems with such 
activities.  
We might be able restrain ourselves and imagine that Spenser’s work remains 
broadly philosophical on points about the mind, self-recognition, and speech (not linking 
them to broader questions of language) were it not for the name of one of the key 
characters: Calepine. As we have seen, Calepine is meant to be understood as a young 
courtier who is, unlike Tristram or the Salvage, made of words much more than of 
actions.  This interpretation follows from further evidence. Calepine’s name, as 
Humphrey Tonkin observes, comes “from Friar Ambrogio Calepino, author of the 
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famous Dictionarium” (66), a polyglot dictionary.  Daniel Fried’s research into 
Calepino’s well-known lexicon and its editions reveals why this name suits a young, 
inept courtier: 
From a late sixteenth-century English perspective, then, Calepino would likely 
have been viewed as a sort of long-term guide through one’s education, the early 
modern equivalent of a pedagogus.  One would have consulted Calepino through 
the course of one’s  basic schooling in Latin grammar, continued using the work 
until just below the level of serious scholarship, and then took it along (or found it 
abroad) when one graduated, on one’s travels that were supposed to finish and 
perfect the grace and elegance of the young nobleman, and prepare him for court. 
It is this latter characteristic—the importance of Calepino to achieving the more 
worldly goals of humanistic education—that rendered the lexicographer useful to 
Spenser, and that hence make the character of Calepine a useful scholarly index to 
understanding the internal hermeneutical acts required by the period patronage 
system. (234) 
 
Fried here assumes that the Calepino lexicon’s central significance in this reference must 
be its role in helping people achieve “the more worldly goals of humanistic education,” a 
limited understanding I will discuss in detail in the next chapter.  However, Calepine is 
indeed a young man abroad struggling to understand who must be understood as a kind of 
reflection of the lexicon itself.  Calepine’s clumsiness in Canto Three, as I described 
earlier and Fried also observes, blazes into significance by comparison to the direct action 
of the inherently noble Salvage (242). Thus Spenser sets up an obvious contrast between 
a Salvage who lacks words and a courtier who cannot pursue his basic occupation 
without them.  This contrast informs the events that surround Calepine by making the 
question of good reading a matter of identity and identification. Reading as a form of 
interpretation and understanding informs our appreciation of Turpine’s misreading of 
Calepine, the Salvage’s perfect yet inadequate perception of Blandina, and the Hermit’s 
therapeutic and diagnostic recommendations.  All these instances offer a reformed view 
of proper adult courtiership that most clearly stands to inform a figure like Calepine.  
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Spenser’s choice of the name Calepine shows that he intends readers to see precisely this 
map of good and bad reading as crucial to the play of allegory in the book. 
Linked to all the questions of speech, reading, mind, and identity that have built 
the commentary on court culture, Calepine’s character also helps Spenser construct a 
larger conversation about the links between identity and writing because he is crucial to 
understanding the book’s central hero, Calidore.  Looking ahead to canto eight, Fried 
concludes that “the frailty” of Calepine’s and Serena’s condition as they escape from 
danger in canto eight is meant to demonstrate the vulnerability of the humanist figure to 
the depredations of a society hostile to and perverting of education (243). Thus, Fried 
argues, Calepine, as a model of courtiership, is meant to be “transcended by the more 
complete heroism of Calidore, who has the same external attainments but adds physical 
prowess” (243).  In such a scheme, Calidore is the fully mature version of the callow, 
book-learned Calepine. As we move on to consider Calidore in detail, it will become 
apparent that this simple point is not sufficient to explain Spenser’s meaning in 
contrasting the two. Fried does not observe any distinctions between types of language or 
visions of the mind; and he does not pursue the question of Spenser’s concept of 
language at all.  Since both those distinctions and questions are implicated in Spenser’s 
work with the name and character Calepine, they are essential to understanding the larger 
context of meaning.  We can pursue that question shortly by considering how Calidore 
adjusts and continues the thematic concern with the tension between mind and language 
in which Calepine’s character is tangled. 
But before we move on, it is important to observe just how appropriate the 
reference to Calepine is to the intellectual argument Spenser has generally engaged with 
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Lord Burghley—a contest which, as I mentioned at the outset of my chapter, forms a 
crucial starting and ending point for the 1596 continuation of the epic. This 
characterization of Calepine is not relevant to court simply because Calidore’s physical 
prowess evokes ideas of martial strength that contrast with the bookishness of Calepine. 
As an artifact of intellectual and educational concerns, the Calepino lexicon is linked to 
humanist efforts starting at the beginning of the sixteenth century, efforts circumscribed 
by an effort to reform the use and vocabulary of Latin. As I will explore and consider in 
my next chapter, the work became the basis for the first English language lexicon of Sir 
Thomas Elyot, and it was associated with all the efforts to systematically define and 
improve English use, too. It is part of the English effort to become part of the humanist 
learning generally—and a very old and conservative part by the 1590s. Making fun of 
Calepine’s wordy ineffectuality indicts the stolid tradition of Latinity on which it was 
built.  This tradition and the “treasuries” of Latin and English being developed for 
education and for cultural improvement in the sixteenth century constitute precisely the 
old movement with which Lord Burghley’s Cambridge contemporaries were associated.  
Thus Calepine the character extends our understanding of just what kinds of intellectual 
and courtly figures Spenser targeted with his satiric attacks at the end of Book 6: they are 
not just people who cannot control their speech or avoid gossip, nor just the people 
slandering Spenser’s ally Lord Grey, but those whose culturing of speech, like Calepine, 
was not entirely suited to the tasks faced by them in the establishing English language 
culture. Calepine reflects aspects of courtly education, and specifically language 
education, that are crucial to Spenser’s view of the relevance of his epic to court itself. 
Again, though, we will have to examine the strategic contrast between Calepine and 
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Calidore to understand the most basic aspects of Spenser’s conception of language and 
mind before being able to give vivid color to the political dimensions of the work. 
5. Naming Pastorella 
Calepine’s name and identity fit neatly into Spenser’s adaptation of Platonism and 
continue to illustrate the problematic nature of the relations between mind, speech, and 
identity in Canto Eight. His name and identity do these two things because his character 
is instrumental to promoting silent interpretive reading over physical speech and tying 
this promotion to the question of naming and inspiration itself. The link his character 
makes between identity and speech is then essential to Spenser’s move toward the 
assessment of poetic inspiration in Canto Nine. When we last see Calepine in Canto 
Eight, he is contrasted with a new collective form of the salvage. The “salvage nation” of  
Canto Eight, unlike its noble predecessor, speaks plenty.  They debate among themselves 
what to do with Serena (6.8.37-43); their priest advises them, makes an oath to their gods 
(6.8.43.7-9), and “mutter[s] […] a secret charme” (6.8.45.6) in anticipation of sacrificing 
Serena. However, all their linguistic preoccupations are like their cannibalistic physical 
appetites for immaterial beauty: perversions of the spiritual into the bodily.  “The peoples 
voyce” is “confused” (6.8.46.2-3) like the “religion” (6.8.43.9) that guides their 
cannibalistic ceremony. Harry Berger’s extensive analysis of the Neoplatonic dimensions 
of the scene in “A Secret Discipline” concludes that this nation, in its encircling of 
Serena, its ritualistic worship, and erotic zealotry, push toward Spenser’s basic goal of 
tracing the evils we have seen cropping up in characters like Turpine, Blandina, and 
Mirabella to their origin in a failure to perceive or use the greater power and reality of the 
!   
! 83!
mind (57-8).26 To be sure, Berger’s is an accurate understanding. Just as he argues, 
Spenser wishes his readers to see that this cannibal’s circle around Serena is a defective 
version of the rings we will soon see around Pastorella and around the unnamed figure on 
Mount Acidale.  So too we are meant to see Calepine’s transformation from a courtier of 
words to a man of action as a prelude to Calidore’s transformation.  But part of this 
transformation occurs despite the complicating and resistant powers of speech, which are 
set in contrast to contemplation and action. Calepine was initially set in contrast to the 
silent Salvage.  Here he is set in contrast to the “voyce” and “noyce” (6.8.46.2-4) of the 
cannibals.  Calepine rushes to the scene, spies upon it, and then without words dispatches 
the cannibals.  Even after this point language does not serve him. Once Calepine rescues 
Serena from the nation, his attempts to “question” her and then to “cheare [her] with 
speaches kind” meet with failure (6.8.50.6-7).  Serena will not speak “one word” 
(6.8.50.9) and remains naked and silent as the canto closes.  Formerly voluble, Serena has 
been reduced to the silent meaningfulness—or meaninglessness!—of the noble Salvage.  
Similarly, the formerly inept courtier, whose significance in the allegory has been his 
linguistic association, attains the power of the noble Salvage in the face of the Salvage 
nation, but as he does so his knowledge of Serena awaits the coming day: “But day, that 
doth discover bad and good/ Ensewing, made [Serena] knowen to him at last” (6.8.51.8).  
Thus Spenser forcefully separates identity-revealing meaning from speech and places the 
whole of it in the revelatory power of “day”—of the light and the properties of vision.  
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26 Berger’s approach, which I will examine again momentarily, rests upon the assumption that Spenser’s 
work in Book 6 depends upon a thematic consideration of a necessary detachment between the world’s (or 
nature’s) order and the mind’s more poetic, perfect and independent order—one reflective of the divine.  
He sees Book 6’s Neoplatonic imagery—the repeating circles, for example—as linked to an effort to assert 
the power of this imaginative order, “the behavior of the poetic mind” itself (36).  He argues that Spenser 
wished to argue that “the poetic mind must confer upon the world its mythic forms” (37).  
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Calepine’s silent and evidently limited success has many possible implications, of course.  
However, seen as an instance of some of the Platonic ideas we have been so far tracking 
in Spenser’s works, this silent revelation of a character’s true identity by “insight” 
(instead of through speeches or simple declaration) is mightily important.  Such insight, 
unlike language, rests in an ultimate knowledge of which Spenser clearly wants his 
readers to be observant.  It is a knowledge that will have the same diagnostic and 
therapeutic potential accorded the character of the Hermit.  
In so far as his character Calepine retains symbolic force associated with his 
namesake dictionary, Spenser delivers a message about the power of mind that is more 
specific to Calepine: with the character of Calepine, Spenser hints that he does indeed 
view words as in need of a complicated interpretive shaping in the mind.  Calepine’s 
name is key to his identity, yet this key is constituted, we can only presume, by the total 
properties of language available to the lexicon itself, its swirl of words.  His name and 
identity are defective when considered only in these linguistic terms, though. Indeed, in 
Book 6 the character is not successful with speech or action alone.  His actions do not 
make him dramatically more complete. Yet in the final scene Spenser takes us right to the 
brink of some transforming possibility with Calepine.  A limit or threshold is crossed 
somehow as the two characters, Serena and Calepine, wordlessly recognize one another 
in the “day” after speech and action have not sufficed. Once the words and acts have been 
contemplated—that is, placed under the ordering and revelatory influence of the 
intellective power—they attain, even in the awkwardness of the circumstance, a sort of 
power and dignity not possessed before.  It is as if words were being protected by the 
mind—or finding their composed meanings there.  This association between mind and 
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language in the allegory suggests that Barbara Strang’s sense of the “Platonic coloring” 
inherent to Spenser’s poetic strategy is accurate.  Spenser’s depiction of the man named 
after a lexicon is one in which he hopes the very naming is fitting and logical in ways that 
a simple matter of speech could not be.  Calepine’s fate as a name and word is 
contextualized by intellectual interpretive acts.   
 Those who have paid close attention to the nature of Calepine’s move toward 
better self-definition in canto eight are amply rewarded in cantos nine to twelve.  There, a 
parallel pattern in the story of Calidore’s discovery and rescue of Pastorella reinforces the 
ideas about language dramatized in Calepine’s redemption. This final narrative of the 
book follows Calidore’s assumption of his own true identity and the revelation of 
Pastorella’s matching noble identity.  The cantos address not just the humanist learning 
with which Calepine’s name and fate is associated, but also the foundational edifice of 
humanist poetics as it relates to the question of spoken and written language, more 
thoroughly developing the sort of assertions about language and its relation to poetics that 
Strang proposes.  As with previous cantos, Spenser here situates the term “mind” in ways 
designed to signal problems with language and identity.  Early in the canto, Pastorella, 
who is to prove of noble stock, is set in a ring of maidens (6.9.10). Like Serena 
surrounded by cannibals, she attracts attention, though in a more positive way. 
Pastorella’s ring of women exhibits and ornaments her beauty, while the ring of slavering 
men around Serena perversely hopes to ingest her beauty. Spenser is careful to 
foreshadow Pastorella’s value as an object of observation—if not a lens with which to 
focus the reader’s gaze on higher intellective knowledge—when he refers to the other 
maidens around her as “lesser lamps” (6.9.9.5) of a firmament and then asserts of 
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Pastorella that “higher did her mind ascend” (6.9.10.9). In that great Platonic and 
Neoplatonic tradition, then, Calidore views Pastorella and is attracted to the nobility 
which inherently he himself is—that is, he is attracted to the form of beauty whose truth 
he himself contains.  
Though his gaze will eventually be focused on the proper object, Calidore’s 
immediate view of himself is far from clear, and thus his mind, speech, and identity are 
confused.  Calidore is struggling with a desire to abandon his quest to overcome the 
Blatant Beast and settle down in the ideal pastoral landscape with the ostensibly country-
born Pastorella.  Spenser foregrounds the tension between desire, language, and mind in 
Calidore’s conversation with Meliboe and viewing of Pastorella: “That twixt his 
[Meliboe’s] pleasing tongue and her [Pastorella’s] faire hew/ He [Calidore] lost himselfe, 
and like one halfe entraunced grew” (6.9.26.8-9).   Here we cannot miss the presence of 
the ill-working material “tongue,” and Spenser is careful to pair it with a lost sense of 
identity.  Immediately after, Spenser describes how Calidore tries “to worke his mind,/ 
And to insinuate his hart’s desire” (6.9.27.1-2, my italics).  By even trying to move the 
mind from its needed stability, Calidore errs, and Meliboe appears to warn him of it: “It is 
the mynd,” the old man says, “that maketh good or ill” (6.9.30.1). As in The Fowre 
Hymnes, the worst problems occur when the mind un-becomes itself and fails in the 
essential task of self-recognition.  This task has been part of our understanding of 
Calepine and the work of the Hermit, so it is familiar at this stage, and it is deeply bound 
up with the idea of the mind as a site of virtue that is a general theme of the book. By the 
beginning of Canto ten, Spenser signals that just such a problem has occurred for 
Calidore, who is described as “unmyndfull of his vow and high beheast” (6.10.1.3). He 
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has begun to lose himself, his own identity, and we shall see that what will ideally 
transpire in Cantos Eleven and Twelve is his return to his role as representative of 
courtesy through his match to Pastorella, soon revealed to be of noble birth.  In fact, as 
Calidore composes himself to rescue Pastorella in canto eleven, Spenser describes how 
he “in his mind with better reason cast” (6.11.34.4).   
Before Calidore can resume his identity, though, he suffers a serious setback. 
Other authors might have let the already-complicated thematic pattern of the book ride 
smoothly towards the conclusion, but Spenser takes the opportunity in Canto ten to 
complicate Calidore’s situation by introducing Colin Clout and, necessarily, himself and 
his poetic interests.  Harry Berger describes the dance of the Graces on Mount Acidale as 
“an evocation of an ideal […] community, completely unified and controlled by the 
mind” (50) through which Spenser himself asserts that “poetry’s true work and pleasure 
require detachment rather than involvement” (41).  Yet even Berger, drawing upon 
Neoplatonism to characterize the broad trends of the book, finds something amiss in this 
community of the mind.  Berger finds the vision of the Graces, as it is described by Colin 
in stanzas 25-28, to be disturbing for what it says about poetic method itself in part 
because “they imitate the movement of figures around a center beyond the reach of 
language” (67, italics mine).  The scene remains pastoral, he says, though it “resonates 
with the full amplitude of cosmic harmony” (67) and yet ultimately teaches us only what 
poets cannot understand until it is actually achieved: 
And in this movement it is not simply the described figures but the vision itself 
which seems stanza by stanza to shift and revolve, expand and contract, unfolding 
as if the poet does not know what he thinks till he sees what he says. (68, italics 
mine) 
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What disturbs Berger, however, improves my own interpretation.  The nameless figure at 
the center of the dance that is beyond linguistically-accessible description confirms the 
case in Book 6 against any language other than that achieved by or constructed by the 
inward intellect. Indeed, to “see what you say” happens most concretely in writing and 
reading, interpretive activities par excellence. Colin even asks “Who can aread?” this 
central nameless figure.  By “aread,” Colin intends the older meaning, “arede,” which 
means “to decree” or “to divine,” arguably an archaic and archaistic meaning that was in 
use in Spenser’s time and later. But the word’s archaic meaning overlaps significantly 
with its more prosaic meaning, “to read,” and thus at the least contains the sense of “to 
interpret.”27  Calepine, as we have lately seen, only attains dignified knowledge in action 
followed by a deeply shamed silence under the light of day.  Calidore interrupts a vision 
for a linguistic report from Colin whose value, as a mere reflection of the original sight, 
Spenser encourages us to question.  Calidore’s description of himself as “the author of 
[Colin’s] bale” (6.10.29.4) provokes us to see the vulnerability of the authorial position 
itself here, among other things.  In the description of the “discourses” between Colin and 
Calidore that follow in the thirtieth stanza, Spenser also provokes us to realize that 
Calidore’s delight with Colin’s poetry has been a serious distraction from his duty to 
Pastorella and his true identity. “Such discourses […Calidore’s] greedy fancy fed,” 
Spenser tells us, adding that Calidore’s “sences” are “ravished” by the circumstances 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 The Oxford English Dictionary online cites the archaistic meanings of “arede” as essentially extensions 
of the basic root word, “read.”  Aside from “to decree,” the oldest meanings, and perhaps the ones Spenser 
wanted us to consider, have three overlapping denotations that the OED provides: “To divine the meaning 
of (obscure words), interpret (a dream), solve (a riddle or enigma).”  These meanings are somewhat broader 
than the term “read” as we currently take them. In support of this approach to the complexity of the word, 
Ann Ferry in The Art of Naming points out that the meanings of the verb “to read” (not just Spenser’s use 
of it) were quite broad in the sixteenth century (9-11) and argues that “Spenser’s uses of the verb to read in 
The Faerie Queene create a special relationship among the narrator of the story, the characters in it, and its 
audience all of whom are called on to perform acts of reading of every kind” (39).  
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even though Calidore “with reason red” the words themselves. In other words, in his 
abstracted state without proper identity, he lacks the essential steadiness of mind to 
achieve the silent contemplative form of interpretation rewarding to the Hermit and 
Calepine.  Calidore’s inattention to his own identity during this dalliance proves to be the 
near loss of Pastorella herself, as his desire to delay with Colin results in his absence 
while Pastorella is carried off by the Brigants.  In such respects, Spenser’s work is 
adjusting rather than simply conforming to the sorts of cosmic Neoplatonic visions and 
values that underwrite a great deal of his imagery. 
 Berger’s interpretation focuses exclusively on the passage in which Colin re-tells 
what happened—the point after Calidore’s interruption.  Yet it is not in the re-telling of 
the scene that Spenser presents his most vibrant depiction of poetic agency, but in the 
initial description and, from Calidore’s view, experience of the event.  Canto ten provides 
in stanzas ten to seventeen a description of a scene whose particulars, had Calidore 
interpreted their meaning rather than interrupted to ask for explanation, would have 
provided him all he needed to know about the noble nature of Pastorella and the nature of 
his own response to her as someone still bound to his “high beheast.” But more than that, 
the scene describes vatic inspiration itself.  It shows how the mere interruption of a 
bungling man curious to ask what is going on divests language of its requisite power of 
contemplative interpretation.  In the fifteenth stanza, what Calidore sees in Colin’s 
devotion to the central figure is a reflection of his own necessary duty to Pastorella, the 
central figure in Calidore’s drama:  
…But that faire one  
That in the midst was placed paravaunt,  
Was she to whom the shepheard pypt alone,  
That made him pipe so merrily, as never none. (6.10.15.6-9) 
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In the vision, Colin’s service in music lies with this central figure to whose beauty he 
responds with his own virtuosity.  This is the well-established pattern of love in the 
Platonic study.  Since we have learned in cantos nine and ten that Calidore is conscious 
of his legitimate attraction to Pastorella, here indeed is a foreshadowing (or 
forebrightening?) of the nature of her identity and his response to it that he should see.  
After all, we are never to learn Pastorella’s real name, only the name bestowed on her as 
a foundling.  After her true identity is discovered, she remains nameless.  However, even 
though Calidore could not anticipate such events, he does not read the scene before him 
by understanding that his position is parallel to Colin’s. He does not see that they are 
reflections of one another.  Calepine as a figure, following Fried’s interpretation, signifies 
a deficiency in the humanist social position that requires a stronger arm, which Calidore 
is fated to provide. Similarly, Colin represents the vulnerable poetic ethos that, when 
properly aligned with a power like Calidore who understands their sympathetic identities, 
can be “read” and defended. What happens instead of this reading and defense, however, 
is instructive both in terms of what it tells us about Calidore’s powerful role and Colin’s 
relationship to it.  Calidore interrupts and turns Colin’s devotions into a deluding circus, 
distracting his own power or authority from its truer purpose and forgetting himself.  The 
scene thus dramatizes the relationship between psychology, sociology, and poetics; the 
production of poetic work is linked to the establishment of a political and social identity 
sufficiently conscious of itself––its position in a universal order and its duties in that 
order––to interpret the identities of others properly.  
 The scene on Mount Acidale also presents an image of the reflective dialogic 
nature of writing, as a conversation between author and author’s self on the page, in a 
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curious and subtle way.  Spenser’s interjection (“Who knows not Colin Clout?” 
[6.10.16.4]) refers to his own published authorial identity. The dialogue that ensues 
between Colin and Calidore, therefore, suggests if not enacts a conversation between 
public selves. On the one hand, such selves could depict Spenser’s double public 
authorial selves as the author of this work and the mind behind Calidore. On the other, 
they could represent Spenser and one of his powerful allies in court—like Essex, 
perhaps—as the selves whom Calidore and Colin represent.  While all such figures and 
contexts are appropriate, it is most clear that Spenser has already suggested a political 
context for this book in particular and for his own role as a poet serving political powers.  
Spenser had chastised Lord Burghley in the beginning of Book 4 for misreading the 
intent and usefulness of his visions of love and beauty.  Here in Book 6, we have a scene 
of love and beauty.  We also have an example of a bungling power interrupting a poet’s 
vision—and thereby revealing his own failure to interpret what is before him properly. 
Burghley’s criticisms of Spenser’s themes of love and beauty from his earlier books 
were, in the scheme of making writing public, an instance of meddling in the poetic 
vision even as it was constructed.  Colin would have felt interrupted; Spenser certainly 
did.  At the close of Book 6, Spenser directs our attention specifically to the failure of 
communication between himself and Lord Burghley.  The implications are ready: by this 
particular scene of allegory Spenser means to show how a properly self-conscious 
political agent will not get distracted, as Calidore does, by not recognizing what is 
important in a poetic vision or by trying to meddle in its process.  Spenser intends this 
advice to Burghley specifically and to other court patrons generally as a way of defining 
the relationship of political power to poetry.  It is a more appropriate piece of model 
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advice if we observe that Spenser has made his contest with Burghley not just a matter of 
political culture but one of intellectual and academic culture.  The scene justifies 
Spenser’s critical rebuke of Burghley by asserting that he, as Colin, knows his role as 
poet as well as Calidore, as Burghley or any statesmen, must know his role relative to the 
poet if he is to interpret the work and deal in the matters of public image and reputation 
that poets do.   
Setting aside the likely political and intellectual contest between Burghley and 
Spenser, we can see that the scene presents Colin and Calidore in the idealized pastoral 
landscape projected by their poetic and heroic endeavors.  Such “selfly” agents need not 
be named, naturally, as in the course of the allegory they become Platonic essences that 
Spenser does not need to name.  These ghosts of identity behind the bold imposition of 
Colin illustrate a view of the mind as a singular place of meaning that can host multiple 
words and identities, a deeply Platonic ideal. Canto ten presents the assertion of 
Spenser’s own authorial identity as an un-named essence at the core of the intellectual 
product of his verse, suggesting that he sees an extension of the order of the mind or soul 
into the publications themselves.  He retains some of the paradox of Neoplatonist 
philosophy, which suggests that this physical material owes its significance to a soul, a 
soul which in turn owes its meaning to a reflection of the light of creation in the 
hypostases exterior to time and space.  However, Spenser’s position here differs from 
Platonism or Neoplatonism because he invests identity with so blatant a connection to 
publications of a specific kind rather than the abstractions of philosophical dialectic. 
Colin is Spenser’s signature character––knowledge of him is complete in the implied 
estimation of the rhetorical question “Who knows him not?”  Everyone must know him in 
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a way that transcends the simple personal knowledge of physical association because 
published work exists outside the author’s immediate physical being and can multiply 
endlessly.  The oral dialogue between Colin and Calidore is cast as the corruption and 
downfall of the vision.  Yet the written character (Colin) tied to the vision itself is outside 
the temporal and sensual decay typical of the dialogue between Colin and Calidore. 
Needless to say, all of what Spenser provides is written.  But the consistent assertion of 
the value of writing and reading (as contemplative activities) over speech sets up canto 
ten’s depiction of individual identity’s authenticated link to the printed media.  It does so 
by figuring the importance of sympathetic recognition to the power of a mind reacting to 
and organizing language as a part of an idealized social order.  
The assertion of Platonically-determined values of language with some 
identifiable political contexts in canto ten amounts to the development of a poetics with 
several important features.  In this poetics, individually produced meaning (the work of 
one poet or another) ideally proceeds from the essential properties of the productive 
mind––the individual speech and mind of the one person producing it. Such poetic 
meaning nevertheless confirms its own value and function by falling into alignment 
within a greater order made up of psychological, social, historical, and cosmological 
forces.  Naturally, that greater order can break down, annulling poetic meanings. If 
someone like Calidore, who ought to be true to his own identity in assuming positions of 
leadership, should fail to pursue what is basically his own identity, then that order breaks 
down.  (Brigants arrive and dissolve civil society. Clumsy courtiers interrupt and dissolve 
visionary order.) However, if the order does not break down, the poet too may be true to 
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his or her own identity, making it possible for him or her to sing truly of and exist 
harmoniously with what he or she depicts. 
 The play of ideas surrounding Colin and Calidore makes it easier to understand 
the nuances of Spenser’s treatment of Pastorella’s birthmark in the final canto of the 
book, and then to show how the two sides of the final canto link together in allegory.  
Spenser stresses the security with which the birthmark links Pastorella to nobility, 
associating its symbol with a sort of fixed personal identity rather than a merely arbitrary 
sign.  First, he stresses that it is a beautiful mark in and of itself, a “rose” (6.12.7.9).  
Then he notes that Melissa, the nurse, “well […] markt” the birthmark upon abandoning 
the infant in a field.  The mark is meaningful even to those that might not themselves be 
noble, it appears.  Pastorella’s identity is thus not a matter to be established by loose 
speculation or story, which is convenient precisely because Spenser’s readers would have 
been so highly conscious of the problems posed by rumor and talk for hereditary 
monarchy. Words, whether of story, rumor, poetry, or rhetoric, are not only insufficient 
grounds for the establishment of legitimate identity in a hereditary monarchy, but they are 
also the perennial source of problems for the legitimacy of a monarchy. As if to signal his 
sensitivity to such problems, Spenser has Melissa describe Pastorella herself as though 
she were mere gossip in the mouths of the people: Pastorella, she says, “in misfortunes 
mouth was plaste” (6.12.16.9) when abandoned.  Similarly, Claribell, on initially 
receiving Melissa’s report, questions “how mote [Melissa’s] words be understood” 
(6.12.17.3.) and Spenser notes that she is “troubled at that speach” produced by Melissa.  
The doubt over spoken report is palpable, and Spenser’s intent becomes clearer once he 
shows how it is resolved.  He contrasts the doubt of speech with the “most certaine 
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markes” (6.12.18.3) that Claribell sees herself and then further confirms with “very 
certaine signes” (as if astrological signs) and “speaking markes of passed monuments” 
(6.12.20.3-4).  The “speaking markes” in particular evince the value of writing in this 
context.  Moreover, the presence of these marks puts Pastorella’s position, as a foundling, 
in profound contrast to the earlier example of the child adopted by Sir Bruin and Matilde.  
That foundling’s association with the bear’s infant/whelp-shaping tongue (and hence, in 
an allegorical way, with the shaping power of rumor and language generally) is 
complemented by the manipulation of a prophecy and the truth in his adoption—as A.C. 
Hamilton puts it, Sir Bruin “believes that his wife bears the child that she in fact received 
from a bear” (652n).  
 At stanza 22 in the final canto, Spenser shifts from the subject of Pastorella to the 
subject of the Blatant Beast’s capture.  However, the two subjects together provide an 
allegorical message about writing and public speech: if legitimized, writing fits into an 
established order in such a way as to quell and defeat the instability of the kind of talk 
that so easily slides toward the very defamation the Blatant Beast represents. Pastorella’s 
resumption of her true identity is a securing of communication itself which in turn creates 
a more secure social order, where defective uses of language may be tamed. This 
interpretation makes yet better sense if we remember that Mount Acidale presents an 
assertion and justification of the place of poetry in writing and publication, not mere 
speculative speech and fancy, but as an instrument deserving the sympathetic and 
intelligent readings of agents of power and public order.  The book’s concluding gesture 
toward Lord Burghley confirms this view.  Spenser there contrasts the “wicked tongues” 
(6.12.41.5) with “rimes” in “better measure” (6.12.41.8), showing off his own preference 
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for writing and his high opinion of published poetry’s potential.  The irony that Spenser 
attacks Burghley with this speech is certainly not meant to be lost on us.  Rather, it is 
clearly meant to help us envision both the ordered state, wherein that comment is true 
praise for Burghley, and the disordered one, in which it functions as a timely rebuke. 
 Book 6 argues, quite conventionally, that the proper recognition of individual 
identity is inevitably virtuous. However, there is a twist which ties the matter of self-
recognition to communication and meaning of a different sort.  Book 6 simultaneously 
pins the means by which virtuous identity is assumed to the metaphysical question of 
naming as an un-spoken and inwardly read or written form of being much like the vision 
of identity presented at the end of The Fowre Hymnes. We never know Pastorella’s name, 
but we know that her true identity is, like Calidore’s, made possible by her achievement 
of her proper place in society through the reading of unerring signs. Once in her place, 
she is—perhaps—as good as named.  In such work, Spenser adjusts Platonic theory’s 
view of speech and writing in terms of their relation to the soul in a manner parallel to 
that developed in the The Fowre Hymnes.  Yet in the “Legend of Courtesie” his emphasis 
upon naming, such as with Calepine, Pastorella, and the unnamed central figure on 
Mount Acidale, urges a Platonic view of the essences from which meaning proceeds as 
the means by which to understand if not regulate poetic effort and inspiration.  Mind in 
all its silence rules language. Poetic effort insofar as it is connected to a good 
cosmological order must fit in with the society in such a way that powerful figures, like 
Calidore, understand its relevance to their public identity well enough to protect it.   
6. Conclusion 
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The problematic relationship between mind and words laid out and resolved in the 
Fowre Hymnes establishes and asserts a great value for the interpretive or mental aspects 
language in the form of a kind of metaphysical writing.  This figure of the writing on the 
soul is Spenser’s method whereby to describe the soul’s ideal relation to language.  While 
in some respects this approach violates Platonic reasoning on the subject, and while it is a 
mistake to think of Spenser’s approach as rigidly Neoplatonic or Platonic, in other 
respects his reasoning about writing conforms to the assumptions about investigating the 
soul laid out in Plato’s Phaedrus, though not its specific conclusions.  Just as importantly, 
Spenser’s approach to language generally takes on a sort of “Platonic coloring,” as 
Barbara Strang calls it, which forms a useful means of thinking about how he sees an 
individual poet’s relation to the collective phenomenon of language.  Examining these 
strategies reveals more completely the intellectual basis for the challenge Spenser issues 
to Lord Burghley both in Books 4-6 of The Faerie Queene and in Mother Hubberds Tale. 
Book 6 of The Faerie Queene reflects the view of language presented in the 
Fowre Hymnes: Spenser routinely promotes writing and reading over speech by 
establishing tensions between the ideal state of the mind and spoken language, 
particularly in cantos four to eight.  But Spenser does not simply rest in this Platonic or 
Neoplatonic territory.  He is struggling to redefine the relationship between mind and 
language in a way that accounts for the meaningfulness of an individual’s use of language 
as a sort of self-recognition.  In the crucial scenes of cantos ten through twelve, Spenser 
asserts a poetics in which artful language use (ideally figured in Colin’s vision) is 
attached to the virtuous expression and recognition of identity not just among poets, but 
among those figures in society who should be in a position to defend poets. Spenser uses 
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Calidore’s failure to recognize his sympathetic relation to Colin as a critical vehicle for 
such a view. Then Calidore’s ultimate “mindfulness” of his true identity “marked” in his 
bride, Pastorella, corrects errors of identity.  Pastorella’s silent naming—her “reading” 
into her proper place—becomes the final hurdle to clear before the courteous task of 
taming rumor and slander is achieved. The proper order of society, we can only assume, 
enables the exercise of virtuous self-expression for a Calidore, Colin, Calepine, or 
Pastorella.  
Book 6 does not resolve the question of language’s role in exactly the way that 
the Fowre Hymnes does.  In the latter, we come to see that insight into the language on 
the soul, converted into writing itself, is the honorable source of stable knowledge in the 
world.  Such an honorable source in the soul is also revealed in the The Faerie Queene, 
but access to and acknowledgement of this source is no longer a matter solely of 
individual redemption.  With Calepine, Calidore, and Pastorella, language, mind, and 
identity are public, political, social, and military matters.  The Blatant Beast of slander 
and rumor is merely one symptom of an illness within this larger dimension of 
acculturating material interests.  The Beast is a mutt, not a great unholy dragon, after all, 
which is perhaps why his capture is so anticlimactic and why the failure to tame him in 
that present is part of a secular problem larger than Spenser is willing to address at the 
end of his treatment of the virtue of courtesy.  Moreover, the shamed if potent silence of 
Calepine, the unnamed figure at the center of the dance in canto ten, and the 
namelessness of Pastorella suggest that the writing on the soul which comes so clear in an 
individual song of devotion to love and beauty is, in the public realm, far more elusive. 
The ideal order for language and society is not achieved.  The defective state clearly owes 
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to Spenser’s recognition of the defective English colonial project of which he was a 
part—and, indeed, this is a troubling recognition that scholars like Richard McCabe have 
ably sighted and linked to Spenser’s misgivings about the Irish language and culture, as I 
will consider in my final chapter.   
Because such questions remain unresolved and indeed cannot be resolved by 
simply understanding the idealist Platonic patterns, they need to be understood partly in 
the already-established political and social framework Spenser provides with his 
complaints against Lord Burghley.  Thus far I have a sufficient basis for understanding 
those complaints as rooted in the sententious, conservative typing of Lord Burghley 
himself.  However, as the direct reference to lexicography through Calepine’s name 
reveals, Spenser’s intellectual concerns are ever broader than one figure and his political 
power. In the next chapter, I will turn to a more detailed description of Spenser’s ideas 
about lexicography and how they fit into the artistic and educational interests addressed 
in Book 6. 
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Chapter 2:  
Consulting Spenser’s References:  
The Significance of the Lexicography of Dominico Mirabellio and Ambrogio 
Calepino  to Spenser’s Views of Language 
 
In the first chapter, I argued that Spenser’s adjustments in Platonic theory inform 
his figural engagement with ideas about speech, writing, and mind in Book 6 of The 
Faerie Queene.  At the center of that effort lies his characterization of Calepine, a heroic 
but not entirely elegant or admirable figure. As a representative of the lexicographic work 
on Latin from the early sixteenth century of which the Calepino lexicon was part, 
Calepine tangentially serves some of Spenser’s criticism of Lord Burghley’s aged 
intellectual and scholarly associations.  Burghley’s milieu had methodical intellectual 
priorities, and Burghley conspicuously aligned himself against an English vernacular 
poetic effort of which Spenser was a part.  Of course, a reference to the lexicon is more 
than just a reference to Lord Burghley or his associates. As Daniel Fried points out, the 
Calepino lexicon was subject to many changes in the latter half of the sixteenth century.  
Fried believes that Spenser and his readers would have associated the Calepino with a 
“linguistic competency,” among other things, and he focuses on how the text was likely 
used in order to explain just what the character of Calepine signifies.  And Fried’s work 
is just a start. In the present chapter, I sharpen our understanding of what Spenser means 
in referring to the Calepino lexicon by comparing its history to that of the Polyanthea 
lexicon of Dominico Nanni Mirabellio. Spenser refers to the Polyanthea and its 
lexicographer with the character of Mirabella, who is placed right alongside Calepine in 
the allegory of canto eight of Book 6. As I show, Spenser’s choice of the names Calepine 
and Mirabella as references to the Calepino and Mirabellio lexicons helps him define his 
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ideas about the relationship between language and knowledge that each lexicon evinces.  
They do so in part because they reveal his attitudes toward the lexicography of his time 
and its bearing on English-language issues in the sixteenth century. The Calepine 
character is meant to reflect and comment on the troubled and yet useful features of the 
Calepino lexicon: troubled because it could not serve English-language lexicography 
well, useful because it provides a more reliable model of how to define good and bad 
language use roughly in line with humanist thinking.  Spenser expresses more 
reservations about Mirabellio’s Polyanthea, though.  His far more negative 
characterization of Mirabella, given the history of the Mirabellio in rejecting classical 
language poetry and rhetoric, shows he intends to satirize Mirabellio’s scornful 
condemnation of love poetry and the attendant stance on how to understand and craft a 
good language.  Together, I argue, references to the lexicons through these allegorical 
characters reveal Spenser’s general dislike of lexicography’s work in defining language, 
turning us toward a more serious examination of his advocacy of the role of poet and 
poetry as the means to understanding and defining how language should be studied and 
learned. 
1. Problems with Lexicography 
Bo Svensén begins his recent Practical Lexicography by emphasizing the 
difference between dictionaries and encyclopedias: both are “arranged in an arbitrary 
way” for “a user who needs to fill a gap in his knowledge on a very specific point,” but 
whereas an encyclopedia “communicates knowledge about the world,” a dictionary 
“gives information about individual units in the communication system (i.e. the language) 
by means of which people exchange messages about the world” (2). Svensén afterward 
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recognizes problems with the distinction: “encyclopedic” dictionaries exist, dictionaries 
offer information that is purely about the world (not about language alone), and 
encyclopedias offer purely linguistic information as well (2-3).  Nowhere in Svensén’s 
commentary, however, does he explain why such distinctions are so problematic.  Rather, 
he immediately supplies a “concept” of a “linguistic sign”(3) in order to distinguish the 
interest of contemporary lexicography from any broader practice.  Such a sign can be 
isolated from other signs and be tracked in terms of its “expression” and “function” such 
that a dictionary maker would simply desire to describe its “formal characteristics” 
separately from its basic meaning, its “semantic characteristics,” and its “combinatorial 
characteristics” (2-3).  Interestingly, despite such careful definition, he also suggests that 
the dictionary-maker should supply information about the “pragmatics” that “includes the 
non-linguistic facts that are involved in the use of the  words” (3).  At every stage in his 
description then, we are led to see the difficulties in trying to separate linguistic from 
non-linguistic knowledge. 
Svensén’s view is, as the title of his book stresses, practical.  As such it tells us a 
great deal about lexicography generally.  It tells us what sacrifices enable studies in 
words for those wishing to construct manageably small texts for a “user,” as he puts it, 
with specific interests: a dictionary for someone who wants to learn conversational or 
literary French, for example.  On the one hand, then, Svensén constructs a vision of an 
autonomous linguistic essence of knowledge—the “linguistic sign” he refers to.  
Conceiving of languages as independent systems, formal communicative devices with a 
set of operational laws, renders a dictionary’s function more or less comparable or 
parallel to that of grammars (the meta-linguistic devices, to be precise) with which the 
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systematic properties of any given language, but not all languages, may be understood.  A 
grammar, of course, is not the actual and complete system whereby a language generates 
meaning, though.  No linguistic study or philology has managed to describe that 
system—if indeed it is a formal logical system.28  Therefore, on the other hand—and in 
complete contradictory defiance of even positing the autonomous linguistic sign-
system—Svensén accedes that practical information and knowledge from outside that 
formal system is necessary to explaining words.  That is to say, grammar alone is not 
enough: both a special semantics and “non-linguistic” elements must be understood to 
explain the sign system.  What’s practical about this?! the observer of so obvious a 
contradiction might ask.  In the face of ignorance about how knowledge and language 
work together (how thoughts and minds are related to linguistic expression and 
understanding, for example), Svensén suggests a focus on the systematic properties of 
language presumably for the construction of texts explaining words in isolation.  In other 
words, Svensén’s choice is made for those who want to do lexicographic work—books of 
lexicography, dictionaries of languages and translation.  For practical purposes, then, he 
insists that they try not to produce encyclopedic works describing the whole of 
knowledge itself, but rather works limited to a view of what can be said of the system of 
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28 This is not to say that recent lexicography does not have good reasons for supposing that languages have 
special systematic features.   It is simply to say that lexicography currently takes faith in the systematic 
nature of words and languages as a whole and our potential to gain access to the system through study and, 
in particular, works whose organization lay bare the system’s function.  This potential is a realistic one.  
After all, the last two hundred years of philology and linguistics have revealed an enormous amount. I in no 
way wish to dismiss it or the value of lexicography’s alliance with linguistics and philology.  Rather, I wish 
to make plain how difficult it is to understand the relationship between knowledge of a general kind and a 
specific, language-bound knowledge for lexicography historically. Understanding that circumstance makes 
Spenser’s reactions to lexicography and quarrels among lexicographers about Latin easier to explain. 
!   
! 107!
words in languages and a few additional non-systemic matters helpful to imagining that 
system. 
The vision of a word existing in isolation, of a text designed to expose the world 
of meanings in complete disconnection from the world of things, has a whiff of madness 
easily detected amid the enthusiasm of lexicographers.  Consider Sidney Landau’s 
comments on the same subject in Dictionaries: The Art & Craft of Lexicography: after 
stressing the split between encyclopedias and dictionaries by dismissively citing the 
“apothegm, ‘Dictionaries are about words, encyclopedias are about things,’” (7) and even 
acknowledging exceptions to that very distinction, he pauses to reassert what he has not 
been able to assert.  That is, he writes, Dictionaries “are not encyclopedias” and bustles 
onward to define their essential identity.  Such discreet nonsense suggests that the 
lexicographic scholars do not want to admit that words might be nothing more than 
especially complicated things whose special uses for and relation to minds accounts for 
that complexity.  After all, a dictionary that simply explained a special set of complex 
things would be nothing more than a type of encyclopedia or history book.  The value of 
a lexicographic and linguistic formal expertise would dip noticeably.  Perhaps more 
upsettingly for the devoted lexicographer, such a demotion might reveal the prescriptive 
force behind language dictionaries to be more obviously culturally embedded and thus 
less intrinsically authoritative. Naturally, lexicography has much support for the view of 
language as an autonomous system from the extensive and persuasive work of philology 
and linguistics.  However, to acknowledge such theory-bound arguments about language 
and their histories might risk demoting the value of independent lexicographic work 
further. 
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This problem with lexicographic theory and practice as I have outlined it above 
merits my sustained attention because it plays a part in understanding of the Calepino 
lexicon (and, perhaps more importantly, the Mirabellio Polyanthea) and its relevance to 
Spenser’s allegory.  Daniel Fried, as I pointed out in my first chapter, produces a just and 
swift appraisal of “the role which the Calepino dictionary played within” early modern 
culture (230).  He first indicates that the original version of the Calepino in 1502 and 
shortly thereafter, although it was “meant as a fairly advanced reference tool for scholars 
and students” (230), was in fact full of mythology, geography, and history since it 
“served partly in the role of what we could call an encyclopaedia.” Fried immediately 
makes a distinction that has all the perils Bo Svensén’s and Landau’s distinctions 
illustrate.  That is, Fried distinguishes the Calepino as encyclopedic in nature even if 
lexicographic in design; he does so with the presumption that a true dictionary somehow 
performs a purer analytical and less culturally-bound work.  Moreover, in his haste to 
explain how the many later printings of the work after 1550 or so converted the lexicon 
into a “true polyglot dictionary” (231) that associated the work strongly with “exclusively 
linguistic competency” (242), Fried neglects to account for the purpose of the original 
work and its conspicuous place in the history of humanist learning.  As John Considine 
reports, “the dictionary was a response to the new dissemination of classical Latin texts, 
and aimed to document their vocabulary while excluding that of the post-classical world” 
(29). And indeed, as Ann Moss shows in her Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language 
Turn, the work was crucially embedded in humanist debates about how to find and use 
the best forms of Latin: she points out that Ambrogio Calepino’s own introduction 
recognizes the debate by citing a dispute with Lorenzo Valla (23).  Fried, in his haste to 
!   
! 109!
characterize the general history of the work’s use—the very concern that crucially directs 
Svensén’s “practical lexicography”—overlooks the work’s original design and that 
design’s value to the very pedagogical interests of which it later became a part. Such a 
matter would have been, as I shall show in more detail later, of great interest to Spenser 
and contributed to his reasons for assigning its name to a character in his epic. 
As I made plain in my last chapter, I do agree with Daniel Fried that Calepine’s 
character is deliberately associated with matters of language, reading, interpretation, etc.   
He is right that the lexicon was chosen because it, like Book 6 in general, is “naturally 
contextualized by the problematic mix of education, travel, ambition, and display that 
was felt to dominate the early modern royal court” (236).  However, I was at pains in the 
last chapter to provide an interpretation of language issues that accounted for the flexible 
Platonic ideas Spenser uses in conjunction with them: it is difficult to explain Spenser’s 
ideas about speech, reading, or semiotics without taking into account the notions and 
figures for mind and thought that condition them.  Fried takes a much blunter approach to 
the issues of language and mind: he argues that Spenser chooses the name Calepine 
because he recognizes that the theme of the book, courtesy, “is fundamentally semiotic” 
(237).29 By “semiotic,” though, Fried means that the book focuses on interpretive acts 
that are larger than simply those in the system of language. Here we have a sensible-
seeming yet anachronistic distinction. Linguistic knowledge and general worldly 
knowledge associated with representations or signs to be read are not easily 
disentangled—even, as Svensén’s example illustrates, for the lexicographer.  Certainly 
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29 Fried goes on to suggest that the other books of the epic do not concern the level of semiotics we find in 
Book 6.  This claim seems particularly questionable in the light of Spenser’s rather deliberate investigation 
of the meaning of justice relative to words in Book 5.  
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Spenser does not make the distinctions easy—he does not distinguish a linguistic sign 
and a sign for general cognition.  Fried goes on, however, to argue that the “course of 
humanist pedagogy with which the [Calepino lexicon] was so closely associated” enables 
Spenser to criticize a sort of “bookish and philological side of humanistic education” that, 
without the physical prowess of a Calidore, was merely “courtesy as a form of elite 
culture only” (242).  There are some problems, though, with Fried’s characterization of 
the Calepino’s significance.  First, how can this “encyclopedic” work be reduced to a 
question of language competency when Spenser, as Starnes and Talbert show, so 
extensively relies upon it and its ilk for mythology?  Spenser’s view of the work could 
not be so narrowly critical considering his long relationship with it and considering the 
complex and competing facets of humanism itself.  Second, how can the failures and 
problems of the lexicon be made to fit a character, Calepine, who is relatively successful?  
After all, if we are to see the Calepino lexicon trapped in a downward spiral of polyglot 
courtesies, it would be awfully strange to have its representative courtier performing a 
successful and silent rescue mission of Serena among savages, as we find in canto eight. 
Clearly, Fried is right that Spenser means his readers to envision in the character of 
Calepine some criticisms of pedagogy, language-learning, and the relationship between 
those things and courtesy.  (I will address precisely those in fuller detail in my fourth 
chapter.) But Fried does not supply a nuanced idea of Spenser’s discourse about 
semiotics or language to explain Calepine’s position in the book.  He presents a notion of 
the Calepino lexicon’s evolution and position relative to other lexicons that is loaded with 
undefined ideas about language, knowledge, and their relations.  He provides only the 
most cursory overview of the significance of the Calepino lexicon and the significance of 
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lexicography to the poetry for which it was one of his most crucial sources.  I have 
addressed some of the problematic complexities of Spenser’s views of language in the 
previous chapter.  In this chapter, I now turn to a more thorough accounting of 
lexicography as a set of ideas and histories to which Spenser found himself reacting. 
 
2. Ambrogio Calepino’s Barks and Bites 
What if Spenser named Calepine not just after a lexicon, but also after the author and 
person responsible for that lexicon?  I raise such a question because I think Spenser 
provokes it as part of a reaction to the problems with lexicography as a means of 
understanding knowledge in language. As allegorist, Spenser provocatively transforms 
this man, who had been transformed into a book by his association with it, back into a 
man in a book.  It is a playful poetic metamorphosis of word and thing, even a blurring of 
difference between word and being, with a range of implications. As Fried argues, 
naming the character after the lexicon directs the reader to consider the use of the lexicon, 
its familiar cultural place in the school and library as a pedagogical tool. Similarly, the 
name also allows Spenser to acknowledge the importance of a source and a class of 
sources. In Classical Myth and Legend in Renaissance Dictionaries, Starnes and Talbert 
document Spenser’s reliance on information from the Calepino lexicon and others—
many of them, like Thomas Cooper’s Thesaurus, heavily reliant on the Calepino (44-
110). “Even if [Spenser] did not actually consult the Calepine,” they write, “it is 
sometimes the best illustration of allusions in his poems…” (77).  This is earliest evident 
in E.K.’s notes for the Shepheardes Calender. Starnes and Talbert show that E.K.’s 
comments in the April and October eclogues translate key terms from the Calepino 
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lexicon’s entries on the subjects they address, suggesting he did indeed consult it (78-9).  
This use of the Calepino and other texts as sources is, as I will argue later in the chapter, 
crucial for understanding the implicit argument in Book 6 about lexicography and 
language. 
Of course, Spenser blurs the lines between things and words in The Faerie 
Queene long before we encounter Calepine.  He does so in ways that are arguably part of 
an interest in commenting on the nature of language and use philosophical ideas about 
language. In The Art of Naming, Ann Ferry considers how Spenser introduces the 
character of “Shamefastnesse” in Book 2, Canto 9.  Like many other characters in the 
epic, Shamefastnesse is given characteristics before being given a name, and the reader is 
clearly expected to guess at her identity by observing those characteristics.  In the case of 
Shamefastnesse, though, Spenser creates an extended scene designed to emphasize how 
the words and the thing are intertwined.  In the scene, Guyon meets Shamefastnesse, and, 
like a modestly befuddled reader so often confronted by Spenser’s deliberately veiled 
meanings, he is unable to identify her—though he, like the reader, is given a description 
of her modest and bashful appearance—blushing cheeks, shy demeanor, etc.  At that 
point in the text, Alma explains that Guyon should be able to see in the character the very 
things he himself is. That is, as a virtuous knight, Guyon is supposed to be “shamefast”; 
and so he should easily identify the character who is, as Alma tells him, “the fountaine of 
[his] modestee” (the source of characteristics he himself possesses) (2.9.43.8). Pointing 
out that Spenser appears to apply Aristotelian distinctions between accidence and 
substance through the distinctions between adjectival properties and noun-based identity, 
Ann Ferry explains: 
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By evoking the distinction between substance and accident, Alma’s words express 
the notion that the blushing lady’s visual appearance—her “rosie red,” “bashfull 
bloud,” “flashing bloud”—is composed of accidents or qualities enabling Guyon 
to read her in the senses of seeing, knowing, and judging her substance. At the 
same time, by invoking the analogy between substance and noun substantive, 
accident and noun adjective, Alma’s speech embodies the conception that the 
pairings of adjectives with nouns in the description which enable the reader to 
visualize the damsel’s “rosie red,” “bashful bloud” are analogous to the visible 
blushes that Guyon is supposed to read. This is yet another instance where words 
are likened to nonverbal phenomena, as this allegorical episode makes their 
function identical.  (81) 
 
Ferry goes on to argue that for Spenser and his contemporaries, “words are not 
consistently distinct from nonverbal things; [and] reading is not clearly differentiated 
from seeing” (81-82).  Setting her specific ideas about language and philosophy aside, 
there is no doubt that Spenser means this scene to be “read” in the broad sense of 
intellective apprehension, and that he means Guyon’s mimetically real experience to be 
filtered into the literary readership’s experience in reading the epic and thinking through 
the issues present there: Spenser wants readers to see Guyon’s reading of reality 
alongside their own reading of the text.  Therefore Spenser’s intention in this earlier case 
evokes the same spirit of play we are later to see in the choice of the name Calepine 
where we read of a book that was a man.  It confirms the need for concern about what 
Spenser might be thinking about by referring to such a figure in the world rather than 
simply referring to some pure figural essence of bookishness or book use.   
The views of language and of the Calepino lexicon presented by Spenser’s former 
headmaster at the Merchant Taylor school, Richard Mulcaster, begin a further, crucial 
context for understanding the what is at stake in any general reference to the Calepino.  
As he is warming up to offer a “table alphabeticall” of English words to his readers in his 
patriotic and pro-vernacular Elementarie, Mulcaster cites his desire to, like the classical 
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authorities, “[expound his] own words in [his] own language” (188).  Yet Mulcaster then 
does a curious thing.  He cites “Stephanus, Perot, Calepine” (189)—the creators of two 
Latin-language lexicons and a humanist Latin grammar—as scholars who have created 
works that illustrate the “tungs, they have gained by labor” and as examples for English-
language lexicographers and grammarians to follow.  Having followed those examples, 
“we should then know what we both write and speak,” Mulcaster explains. Mulcaster’s 
decision to praise those Latin lexicons as models for how to investigate and authorize the 
English language identifies a larger part of what Spenser might have had in mind with his 
reference to the Calepino lexicon in Book 6. The Calepino lexicon is a natural starting 
point of comparison for Mulcaster when he wants to enable any political and social 
interests behind developing the English language in a way that would permit knowledge 
of how it is rightly or wrongly to be used.  Yet Mulcaster’s Calepino lexicon does not 
resemble the complex character we find in Book 6.  His Calepino is a simply good 
example, not a clumsy, tongue-tied, polyglot courtier.  This raises a relevant question: 
Does this difference mean that Spenser disagreed with Mulcaster’s view of the Calepino 
lexicon?  
It is not surprising that Spenser might not share Mulcaster’s precise view—
indeed, that he might fault the Calepino lexicon in particular as a model pattern or book 
for developing the legitimacy of English as a national language.  Consider the dramatic 
nature of what Mulcaster says about the book itself as a tool for political and social 
definition—to “know what we both write and speak,” he says, we must create the 
equivalent of these works on the Latin language. Yet obviously the Calepino was not the 
source of the authority or linguistic identity for the imperial Romans. No one wishing to 
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imitate the greatness of Roman literary culture would necessarily reason that a lexicon 
would be the ideal tool.  And, indeed, Ambrogio Calepino’s book uses a method that is 
profoundly dissimilar from those used and recommended by Lorenzo Valla or Erasmus.  
The latter two relied upon considering fuller Latin phraseology in combination with 
authoritative reference to build works—the Elegantiae Linguae Latinae of Valla and the 
Adagia of Erasmus—that were considered more definitively instructive than the Calepino 
lexicon about Roman culture by virtue of not being organized like lexicons.30 The works 
that helped these authorities learn were the original texts.  Even if the Calepino lexicon 
seemed like the right form with the wrong content to Mulcaster, it might easily have 
seemed like a problematic mixture of both to Spenser.  
Ambrogio Calepino’s introduction to his lexicon shows just how troubled and 
unusual this text itself was at its genesis, just how striking its humanist concern with 
language and society are.  In his elegiac distichs directed to his book itself, Calepino 
starts by impugning the customary usage of language: “Custom is rotten” [“Mos est 
putidus.”].31  This gesture appears to make his work unified with others of its time, like 
those of Valla or Perotti, attempting a reform of medieval Latin gone rotten with 
customary usages, distortions of original meaning of earlier Latin. However, in his 
dedicatory preface, Calepino is careful first to cast his interests as religious to avoid 
wholly aligning himself with Latin purists. He explains that he writes “contemplating in 
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30 See Chapters 2-4 of Ann Moss’s Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn  for a fuller description 
of the difference between basic alphabetical lexicography and the more culturally-bound approach of 
humanists like Valla.   
 
31 All citations from the prefatory poem are from the 1510 edition of the Calepino Dictionarium. All 
citations from the preface are from the 1518 edition of the Calepino Dictionarium.  All translations are my 
own. 
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some way the salvation of souls.”32  Moreover, he specifically rebukes Lorenzo Valla’s 
approach, writing, “What’s more, for me the seriousness and learning of Ambrose, 
Jerome, or Augustine--and of the Greeks—are more valid than the eager censure of 
Lorenzo Valla.”33  Calepino’s work is thus from the start involved in a highly specific 
effort to direct a humanist rehabilitation of Latin without sacrificing the authority of 
patristic literature.  As Ann Moss points out, Calepino’s lexicon abides by this approach 
in more than spirit; the lexicon, she explains, adopts some innovations in the 
understanding of how language is to be defined from Perotti and classical/pagan sources, 
but in other ways retains definitions of the relationships between words, mind, and reality 
developed in sources like Augustine (23).  In other words, the Calepino lexicon and 
author present complicated stances on the proper way to develop a language tradition; as 
part of those stances, Calepino stakes out a specific view of the way to understand the 
relationship between words and things, a matter at issue in Spenser’s very naming of the 
courtier after a book named after a man.  Like Spenser’s courtier Calepine, then, the 
namesake author was not the heroic ideal, but one with complicated, perhaps realistic 
flaws.  More specifically, like the fictional courtier, he appears to have a difficulty with 
language in terms of managing its relation to the world.  But is this language/world 
correspondence accidental or intended? 
We can in one way show the parallel is intended with just a slightly deeper 
reading of Calepino’s preface to his lexicon.  Key points of emphasis in Ambrogio 
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32 “…quo de salvandis animis tantummodo cogitandum foret.” 
 
33 “Plus enim apud me Ambrosii Hieronymi vel Augustini gravitas et doctrina valet et graecorum quam 
Laurentii Vallae studiosa repraehensio.” 
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Calepino’s introduction to his lexicon match key figural elements of Book 6.  This match 
in turn shows that Spenser drew some inspiration from the lexicographer and honored 
some of his efforts toward defining Latinity in the face of detraction.  First, Calepino is 
particularly sensitive to verbal detractions and names the physical tongue itself as a 
metaphorical agent of detraction—a move that closely resembles what we find in Book 6.  
Calepino writes: 
 So I know that there will be those who disparage my work.  For so it happens that 
whatever mortals do privately or publicly is sure to be subject to calumny. Nor 
does a slanderous tongue [“maledica lingua”] spare divine works. Such great store 
the human intellect places in itself! 34 
 
As my last chapter makes plain, Spenser routinely emphasizes the negative features of the 
“tongue,” nowhere more so than Book 6.  Here in the Calepino Dictionarium introduction 
we find a similarly negative view of the physical “lingua.”  More importantly, though, 
Ambrogio Calepino uses this negative image of the physical tongue to emphasize the 
positive features of another, more spiritual form of reading and speech that he indicates 
constitutes his primary labor—that work of saving souls, of extolling patristic literature, 
of defending holy texts. Spenser does not take on exactly that task in Book 6.  However, 
he does create a similar contrast between silent reading or vatic reverie (in the case of 
Colin, for example, in canto ten) and uncontrolled physical speech or talk in Book 6; and 
he uses Book 6 generally, as I explain in Chapter 1, to explore questions of public and 
private speech. In the quote just provided, Calepino touches emphatically on the way 
invasive slander crosses private and public realms in crafting the image of the cursing 
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34 “Scio namque futuros esse qui labori nostro detrahant.  Ita enim sit ut quaecunque agant sive privatim 
sive publice calumniae subiacere certum sit.  Nec divinis operibus maledica lingua parcit. Tantum sibi 
humanus arrogat intellectus.” 
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tongue. Similarly, the whole of Book 6 is concerned with slander, naturally, and 
emphasizes that a retreat into private realms—as with the Hermit in canto six or with 
Calidore’s retreat to the pastoral realm from canto nine—is an imperfect defense against 
slander.   It may be a commonplace notion that slander invades all places, but it is 
unusual that the fictional courtier Calepine’s real namesake uses precisely this notion in 
the introduction to his own work about language.  
It is not just the “lingua” that matches Spenser’s interests in Book 6.  As is well 
known, Spenser represents the holder of calumnious tongues as a great dog.  In claiming 
that his dictionary is itself a form of praise for those in his homeland that might defend it, 
Calepino does exactly the same by referring to the complaints or attacks of the foreign 
slanderers—the fanged remarks of the Lorenzo Vallas of the world—as barkings: 
For to what place the most potent work to be conferred about literature [meaning 
his lexicon] was owed except to a homeland and indeed to that homeland in which 
there are men with such a great and excellent nature, who for seriousness, for 
jurisprudence, and for all kinds of knowledge stand out by merit; which, as if 
fences, I have relied upon to keep back the barkings!35 
 
The “fences” make it obvious that Calepino is comparing his detractors to attack dogs. 
More importantly, though, the word used for barking is not the casual “latro,” but the 
beautifully malleable and intense “oblatro.”  In this word we can more easily hear in the 
Latin word which was the likely root for the “Blatant Beast” of Book 6: “blatero.”36  
Indeed, the definition word “blatero” in the Calepino lexicon reads so: “the ancients [used 
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35 “Nam cui potissimum conferari opus de re literaria debuit nisi patriae et illi quidem patriae in qua magno 
et excellenti ingenio viri sunt qui de gravitate de iuris prudentia deque omni scientarum gengere praeclare 
merit essent quose ego tamque obices oblatrantibus constitui opponere.” 
 
36 In his edition of  The Faerie Queene, A. C. Hamilton quotes the Cooper lexicon and explains in a note: 
“the Blatant Beast: from Lat. blatero, ‘to bable in vayne” (Cooper, 1565)…” (618n). Note that the 
definition is from Cooper who is, as I note later, heavily reliant on the Calepino lexicon. 
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this word] about speaking confusedly and vainly.”37 Not only does Calepino think of the 
tongue, the barking beast, slander, and language in the same way Spenser does, but he is 
also almost desperately concerned with enlisting the defense of his countrymen for his 
lifelong work, a preoccupation with Spenser from his first work in The Shepheardes 
Calender.  Yet here lies a difference, too: Calepino sees his great opus as one 
representative of the wisdom and knowledge of his countrymen, not their linguistic 
resources, linguistic type, or literary achievement in a particular language.  Is this a 
meaningful difference, though?  Should we think that Spenser would have seen a 
difference between his efforts as an English-language poet and Calepino’s monumental 
effort as a Latin-language lexicographer? 
 Such parallels between Calepino’s introduction and Spenser’s project in Book 6 
explain basically why Spenser chooses to portray Calepine sympathetically.  Calepine 
already fit the interests we find in Book 6. But now the tougher question is this: What did 
he find fault with in Ambrogio Calepino or his work? Daniel Fried identifies the 
degrading metamorphosis of the lexicon into a functional but undignified polyglot 
dictionary (the “exclusively linguistic” work) to be the source of Spenser’s desire to 
make Calepine a somewhat hapless, tongue-tied courtier.  Fried’s argument makes some 
sense, but the deeper limitations and problems with the Latin lexicon as a model for how 
to fashion English (indeed as an example of how to develop and support a language and 
the literary traditions tied to them) are just as conspicuous and just as likely responsible 
for Spenser’s handling of the courtier’s characterization.  Indeed, Spenser likely chose 
Calepino because his resistance to some of his humanist contemporaries, among other 
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37 “Veteres dicabant pro incondite et inaniter loqui.” 
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things, well represents the troublesome nature of some humanist plans for language and 
literary development linked to interests in vernacular grammar and lexicography.  To 
show how and why this is so, though, we need to return to Spenser’s teacher, Richard 
Mulcaster, and reconsider how and why this influential headmaster was willing to name 
the Calepino lexicon an example for how to develop the English language. 
 There are some clear compromises in Mulcaster’s nomination of Calepine 
(alongside the Perotti and Stephanus works) as a model for his own project based in 
English language teaching.  These compromises limit the clarity of Mulcaster’s 
arguments about language.  In particular, they reveal his struggle to find a plausible way 
to divide a type of cultural knowledge (a knowledge that is essentially part of a specific 
language like English or Latin) from a type of pan-cultural knowledge (a knowledge that 
may be transferred from Latin to English, for example). Such arguments about language 
have a context I earlier identified and to which I hope to show now that Mulcaster was 
sensitive: to name a Latin-language work as an example of how to create a powerful 
means for authorizing materials for vernacular English, Mulcaster has to reconcile his 
respect for what the classical languages offer (in terms of existing literary sources, 
established grammatical structures, and pan-European audiences) and his patriotic desire 
for his own language to rise to the same level of distinction.  Before Mulcaster could 
preface his own listing of English words with this praise for the Calepino lexicon, he had 
to justify his interest in the English without jeopardizing his reputation by impugning the 
integrity of the Latin or its status as lingua franca and source par excellence. 
In the tenth Chapter of the Elementarie, Richard Mulcaster specifically addresses 
what makes “the entrance of language, and iudgment thereof, which is wrought by 
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grammer,” a key part of education (55).  Note first that he thinks of grammar as a means 
of judging language, ascertaining what is meant by language.  However, he also means 
something further—that grammar’s logical processes refine language use itself in specific 
ways advantageous to or complementary to matters of judging and understanding:  “For 
by the course of natur and use of antiquitie,” he writes, “grammer travelleth first to have 
the naturall tung of ech cuntrie fined to that best, and most certain direction, which the 
ordinarie custom of that cuntrie which useth the tung, can lead her unto…”  Note how 
Mulcaster uses “travel” to mean “labors” in this instance, and how he puns on the other 
meaning, “travel,” since grammar has crossed national boundaries.  He is clearly aware 
that cultural importations are at hand.  In the first half of this sentence, using the terms 
“ordinary custom” and “use,” Mulcaster establishes the standards from ancient sources 
like Quintilian, whom he cites soon thereafter.  He is advocating the construction of 
English grammatical norms along the same lines as those that were being established for 
Latinity by humanists.  He continues: 
…As how to reduce our English tung to som certain rule, for writing and reading, 
for words and speaking, for sentence and ornament, that men maie know when 
theie write and speak right.  Which direction was both the first, and the most 
ancient use of the original grammer.  (55) 
 
Note the subtle omissions from Mulcaster’s reasoning on the points above.  Grammar 
established by observing “custom” becomes a set of rules for judging the rightness of 
speech more broadly—customs that in “antiquitie” and through “natur” came into being.  
Yet if it were only custom as produced by nature, that would not be enough for 
refinement.  “Fining” for Mulcaster means that the language is worked toward a better 
state.  In such a process, presumably a sort of reasoning is applied in order to construct 
the grammar itself.  “Custom” may be the starting point, but refinement requires reason, 
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too, which Mulcaster at length partitions into three separate functions of grammar itself—
and then one unnamed function placed in the power of a “professor.” Mulcaster 
continues: 
[Grammar’s] professors because of their iudgment were called Critici, as 
Aristarchus among the grekes, Palaemon among the Romanes.  Secondlie 
grammer, as it hath been used sence, seketh to help us to the knowledge of a 
foreign language, as the Latin, the Italian, and such other tungs, which at this daie 
is the principall use thereof.  Where it serveth in the natur of an anatomie, for the 
resolving of the writen speche: in the natur of an interpreter, for turning the foren 
into the naturall; in the natur of an artificer, for making up the habit of a foren 
tung in the studious learner, by writing and speaking. Now in either of these 
kindes, whether to fine our own tung, or to learn a foren, we are much bound to 
grammer, even for it self alone, but a great deall more in respect of hir professor, 
which must perform the three things, that I named  before of his own abilitie.  For 
grammer of it self is but the bare rule, and a verie naked thing, but the professour 
must have somwhat more then his rule. (55-6) 
 
The reader should be justly confused now since Mulcaster is stringing him or her along 
towards ideas about language and learning and rules that have “somwhat more” than can 
be identified.  Note, however, that grammar’s function is to reveal the knowledge inside 
these other languages.  The “naturall” qualities of a language are important in ways that 
even so cannot be reconciled to its function as a carrier of knowledge.  As the succeeding 
paragraphs prove, there are two things at hand that professors must acknowledge in 
addition to grammar.  First, Mulcaster asserts that a “grace” exists in each “tung” (each 
people’s language, he clearly means) (56): 
…and he [the speaker or teacher] onlie hit the right in everie tung, which could 
both waie the rules [the grammar], and pease the force of speche according to that 
grace, which everie tung hath. 
 
Mulcaster offers an essential linguistic identity special to English people.  And yet 
Mulcaster contradicts himself.  On the earlier page, he says it is the duty of grammar 
itself to refine that essential quality.  We must ask, if that quality is beyond the grammar, 
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how can grammar be bound up by it?  Mulcaster evidently thinks that grammar is a sort 
of adjunct labor force for shaping what is essential to the identity of a language—a 
linguistic identity being an entirely other thing than grammar, we might guess.  This is 
the first unknown quantity for grammar and part of a consistent if confusing approach on 
Mulcaster’s part.  The second, Mulcaster comes to tell us, is knowledge itself, whose 
importance looms large because of the great respect the knowledge of the ancients 
certainly commanded.  To get at this question of the mind’s relation to language and 
grammar, Mulcaster explains it with a kind of parable:  
When learning, and knowledge came first to light, those men, which were the 
autors thereof, uttered their mindes in that same speche, which theie then used, 
when theie bred the things.  And as theie neded no forein tung for the matter bred 
at home, so had theie no other use of anie grammer, but onelie that, which 
endeavoured to find their natural speche at home.  But after that the same their 
devises, being first set out in their own tungs, were afterward sought for by foren 
students, to encrease their learning, and to enrich their cuntrie with foren wares, 
the foren students were then driven to use the assistence of grammer in the second 
kinde, because theie could not understand those things which were written in a 
foren tung, without the knowledge of the tung it self. (56-7) 
 
Grammar is not needed without foreign tongues, it seems, and yet the whole issue of 
correct speech for native speakers is also at stake!  Correct speech requires grammar 
before Mulcaster addresses the business of translation, but later it apparently does not 
require it!  After all, Mulcaster has been at pains earlier in his text to explain the value of 
reading both as a source of basic knowledge and a language-based knowledge of “perfect 
utterance”: “…doth not Reading then which is the first principle seme to season verie 
sure? enriching the minde with so precious matter, and furnishing the tung with so perfit 
an utterance?” (24).   
In sum, Mulcaster’s Elementarie aspires to the purity of Euclid’s Elements, but its 
reasoning is conspicuously troubled on matters of knowledge, mind, and language.  Such 
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issues, as his parable shows, pit a signature humanist desire to understand the information 
in classical texts—ineluctably foreign in their cultural trappings—against the patriotic 
and teacherly desire to have students proud of their own language and what it might offer 
to the learner. As the argument of his book progresses, he ultimately describes the way 
English might borrow words from other languages without losing its essential purview 
and identity as “enfranchisement”:  
Wherefor I think it best for the strange words to yeild to our lawes [of 
pronunciation &c.], bycause we ar both their usuaries & fructuaries, both to enjoy 
their frutes, and to use themselves, and that as near as we can, we make them 
mere English, as Justinian did make the incorporate peple, mere Romanes, and 
banished the terms, of both latins & yieldings. (174) 
 
Mulcaster’s reasoning here addresses a few rough ideas about word meaning and 
ownership, but it does not address the larger questions of grammar or cultural knowledge 
that he mentions.  That is, it appeals to an English reader’s desire to see his or her 
language as appropriating others just as Imperial and Christian Roman culture 
appropriated other tongues and cultures.  Nonetheless his stop-gap “enfranchisement” 
does not prevent us from seeing how the conflict culminates in Mulcaster’s confident 
citation of the Calepine lexicon as a model.  He clearly does not see the conflict as 
debilitating, but Spenser very well might have.  That is, while this conflict might not have 
been conspicuous or problematic for someone with equal interest in the classics and the 
development of English-language reading skills—a teacher or scholar—it would have 
been far more likely to have troubled an English-language writer who felt himself in 
direct competition with classical and Neo-Latin authors and authorities, especially one 
who is recreating their style and its links to the kind of cultural knowledge that works 
Vergil’s Aeneid contained and dispersed. 
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Mulcaster presents a very special case in that he illustrates the problems with 
thinking about language that accompany initial efforts toward adapting lexicons to 
vernaculars.  The general problems with adapting the Calepino lexicon to the English 
language had a conspicuous history that was already specifically associated with the 
Calepino lexicon’s use by earlier lexicographers.  The first Latin-English dictionary for 
classical Latin was Sir Thomas Elyot’s 1538 Dictionarium.  As Dewitt Starnes puts it in 
his Renaissance Dictionaries, “…the chief source of Elyot’s Dictionary is the Latin 
Dictionarium of Ambrosius Calepinus, of Bergamo, Italy” (51).  Starnes, like others, 
mentions that “scarcely an important dictionary was published” (52) in the Renaissance 
that did not owe a conspicuous debt to the Calepine.  But the patriotism of the Calepino 
Dictionarium, Starnes argues, made it an even more attractive model for Elyot: 
Proper names are distributed alphabetically among other entries throughout the 
text. These are names of countries, islands, cities, rivers, mountains, and persons 
mythical and real, with descriptions or biographical sketches as the terms may 
require.  The Calepine was thus at once a dictionary abounding in grammatical 
and etymological information and an encyclopedia especially instructive about 
men and matters of antiquity.  It is not strange that Sir Thomas Elyot, seeking for 
his own dictionary a more satisfactory model than his country had to offer, should 
turn to the Dictionarium of Calepine. (52) 
 
Indeed, it is not strange.  It was an expedient and logical choice for a man like Elyot 
interested in creating a culture where the youth could educate themselves in the classics.  
Elyot wished the classical sources to be seen as the place of powerful, life-altering 
knowledge for noblemen—and he more or less says so in his earlier Boke of the 
Governour.  Even so, we cannot fail to notice here that a proud Englishman creates a 
Latin-English work based upon the Latin work of a proud Italian.  Questions of cultural 
propriety and ownership were perhaps not as severe during Elyot’s time.  However, 
questions of ownership, of whose fidelities are where, are bound to occur as a question of 
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English or Italian identity becomes more conspicuous in matters of literature generally.  
We have already seen Mulcaster struggling to identify an essential Englishness.  (And, 
indeed, we should privately consider, in the light of this, what more clever and witty way 
to comment on such an lexicographic history than to name a proud Faery courtier 
Calepine and cast clouds of suspicion over his suitability?)   Fortunately, we do not have 
to speculate about the inevitability of such questions about the Calepino lexicon as a 
source. Elyot himself recognized his dependence on the Calepino lexicon as problematic.  
In his own introduction, he concedes the faults in his work and attributes them specially 
to the Calepino lexicon: 
All be it for as moche as partely by negligence at the begynnynge, partly by 
untrue information of them, whom I trusted, also by to moche trust had in 
Calepine, some fautes may be founden by diligent redynge… (A iv) 
 
It was not unusual to fault the Calepino lexicon.  Indeed, Robert Stephanus made the 
same sorts of complaints even as he constructed a new classical Latin lexicon in the 
1520s.38 However, Elyot has chosen to announce a complaint about a work upon which 
he is conspicuously dependent.  Starnes points out “eleven successive definitions in 
which Elyot is freely translating Calepine” (53) and argues that “almost any opening in 
Elyot’s text will show that the English compiler follows the Latin of Calepine.”  More 
strikingly, “Elyot not only derives much of the content of his Dictionary from Calepine 
but also adapts his method of presentation” (54).  Ambrogio Calepino’s comments about 
slander seem almost prophetic when we consider what transpires, then, as Elyot carps 
about the man whose labors and techniques he steals.   
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38 In Dictionaries in Early Modern Europe, John Considine describes Robert Stephanus’ (a.k.a. Robert 
Estienne’s) process and reasons for composing his new lexicon in the 1520s & 1530s to replace the 
Calepino (40-41).  
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 Spenser, using the Calepino lexicon and others as sources, could not have avoided 
seeing the quarrel about the Calepino lexicon itself.  The contempt for the Calepine, and 
the dependence upon it, is recognized ten years later in Thomas Cooper’s title page for 
the 1548 augmentation of Elyot’s lexicon, which announces that the new edition provides 
“the true significations of wordes, whiche were greatly amisse by over muche following 
of Calepine.”  Yet Cooper was just as fundamentally dependent on the Calepine as Elyot 
had been.  As Starnes observes, Cooper was lifting his improvements in part from Robert 
Estienne (73), who had in turn relied upon the Calepine.  It is instructive to consider, 
therefore, how Robert Estienne himself referred to such happenings in a 1553 edition of 
the Calepino lexicon produced by his press.  In the introduction, he begins: 
It is amazing that among men some should find the audacity and impudence to 
transfer another’s labor freely to themselves and to manifest that they have in 
their writings done that which was accomplished by another.39 
 
Stephanus chastises both those who have lifted material from Calepine and from his 
emendations of Calepino lexicon while he himself acknowledges his own borrowing.  
Yet Stephanus goes on to note the deficiency of the Calepino lexicon—the very work, 
albeit an emended version, he is introducing! In this way, the identity of Ambrogio 
Calepino and his lexicon are consistently and rudely thumped; meanwhile, the 
lexicographers are almost comically over-concerned about Calepino’s influence and their 
own failed independence.  Moreover, the influence of the Calepino lexicon on active 
lexicography was felt even into the 1590s in a manner that had very direct bearing on 
definitive English lexicography and Spenser’s likely awareness of it.  As Starnes reports, 
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39 “Permirum est quod inter homines aliqui reperiantur ea audacia & impudentia, ut alienum laborem ad se 
libenter transferrant: ostendantque scriptis suis, id quod ab alio factum est, se fecisse.” 
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Thomas Thomas’ 1587 Dictionarium linguae latinae et anglicanae “seems to have won 
immediate popularity and, if we can judge by the number of printed editions which 
followed, to have maintained its vogue for many years” (115).  This lexicon would have 
had an effect upon English culture during the time Spenser was actively writing The 
Faerie Queene, then.  This is, moreover, the very lexicon that Thomas dedicated to Lord 
Burghley, the lord whose control of patronage and preference for Latin and foreign 
language over English vernacular works was well known.  As I explained in my previous 
chapter, Spenser mounts an attack upon Burghley in the final lines of Book 6. There he is 
plain about his scorn for the common idea of “treasure,” a word whose etymological link 
to “thesaurus” is closely associated with the lexicon in the fifteenth century.  This lexical 
treasury, too, as Spenser well might have known, was compiled out of the Cooper and 
Calepine works, sharing in the Calepine legacy (Starnes 115, 123). Thus the main lines of 
English lexicography bear not just the influence of the Calepino lexicon, but also a 
predictable resentment of that influence. 
 The issues of identity and language in the Calepino lexicon’s introduction and in 
the history of its influence upon English lexicography suggest that Spenser’s choice of 
this name educes a quandary about Latin lexicography’s service to English language and 
English humanist goals.  Calepine the character is a positive and yet imperiled identity. 
This suggests that Spenser would have been sympathetic with the original Calepino’s 
statements about language—and certainly to the desire to advance knowledge.  However, 
Book 6 presents many figures that reflect Calepine’s deficiencies as a book-man in a 
manner that obliquely complements what we know of the lexicon’s and lexicographer’s 
problematic influence and identity. In the main hero of Book 6, Calidore, we by contrast 
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find someone whose identity is obviously more stable than Calepine’s.  Calidore is a man 
of action capable of great discretion.  And he is not the only one who fares better than 
Calepine. In Colin Clout, we find a poet whose direct vatic vision is superior to any form 
of meddling inquiry intrinsic to lexicographic study and citation of poetry or mythology.  
In Pastorella, we find a heroic female whose identity is written upon her being in ways 
that transcend linguistic terms—she is an identity that only has a borrowed name, but her 
claim to nobility is assured.  In surrounding Calepine with those who excel him in such 
ways and in concentrating on Calepine’s and Serena’s susceptibility to the calumniating 
Blatant Beast, Spenser apparently envisions the limits to what the Calepino lexicon could 
do for English identity. In all probability, he envisions such limits not only because, as 
Fried argues, the lexicon had become associated with a sort of mindless polyglot 
expansion, but because it could offer no certain identity for scholarly practice and hence 
for the establishment of English grammar and eloquence—and because the work was 
under assault even among the lexicographers. For Spenser, then, it would seem that 
Calepine finds himself silenced in canto eight because the Latin Calepino lexicon, 
whatever its basic worth, could be at best a sort of mute testament to civility for a true 
English-language courtiership.  That silence appears to house an implicit critique of 
Spenser’s old headmaster, Richard Mulcaster, and his faith in Latinist humanism, but, as 
my succeeding chapters will show, Spenser’s argument about the authorities over 
language and learning is much broader than this single implicit critique. Finally, then, the 
deliberate confusion of word and thing in the identity of Calepine arises from Spenser’s 
desire to produce a figure whose tangled idea of language and reality are a potential good 
but a sometime hindrance to realizing that potential. 
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3. Dominico Nanni Mirabellio and the figure of Mirabella 
 As the evidence I have compiled so far shows, the name Calepine in Book 6 
makes complicated references to the lexicon, its author, and the lexicographic history of 
which the name was a key part. The history the name refers to involved more than simply 
gaining or creating access to information about language in a neutral or transparent sense. 
That tradition, as Richard Mulcaster’s commentary within it shows, involves arguing for 
a cultural sensibility about language by explaining a possible relationship of knowledge 
to language. However, we need not rely exclusively on Mulcaster’s opinion and citation 
of the Calepino lexicon to see that Spenser was concerned with how lexicographic work 
defined the relationship of knowledge to language in culture.  In Book 6, Spenser also 
makes a comic and critical allegorical reference to Mirabellio’s Polyanthea, a text that 
was, during the sixteenth century, linked to this issue of the relationship between 
knowledge and language.  
In her essay examining the knowledge-organization systems of the period, Ann 
Blair describes Dominico Nanni Mirabellio’s work of “florilegia,” the Polyanthea, as 
“the most widely printed Renaissance florilegium”; she further explains that it “started at 
c. 500,000 words and grew in successive editions to about three million words by 1600” 
(302). Like the Calepino lexicon, then, the Polyanthea experienced great growth during 
the century. Blair’s essay focuses upon the value of such kinds of work (the tradition of 
florilegia) to philosophy rather than to literary interests.  However, this distinction 
between issues of knowledge and language would not have been so clear in the sixteenth 
century.  Her description of the expansion affecting Polyanthea’s class of encyclopedic 
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texts describes a class logically including the Calepino lexicon.  Blair explains the 
methods of data collection relevant to the Polyanthea and its results:  
Renaissance scholars faced an unprecedented growth of content in [a variety of 
fields of knowledge], largely through the accumulation of discrete chunks of 
information (similar in many ways to what we call “facts”), but the methods they 
deployed to organize all the material were medieval in origin.  Selecting or 
summarizing from textual sources and sorting and storing these passages under 
topical headings constituted the basic operations underlying medieval florilegia 
and the compendia conventionally called “medieval encyclopedias.”  The size and 
sophistication of these collections increased in the thirteenth century, during an 
earlier period of knowledge explosion, thanks to new practices of alphabetization 
(starting with the biblical concordances of the thirteenth century, then spreading 
to the alphabetical indexes for many kinds of texts) and textual layout which 
facilitated reading by consultation rather than straight through. Collections of 
historical material in print experimented with new techniques (e.g. dingbats, 
different fonts and formats, greater use of centering and blank space) to increase 
the consultability of volumes which became steadily larger in size without, thanks 
to printing, becoming prohibitive in  price. (294) 
Once-exclusive texts, in other words, were becoming cheaper and more compendious at 
the same time and in roughly the same way that the Calepino lexicon was becoming 
cheaper and yet more full of information from and in other languages.  The expansion 
trend included the first English-Latin lexicons.  Thus Mirabellio’s work suffered much as 
the Calepino lexicon did. Like the Calepino lexicon, the material in Mirabellio’s work 
was being altered even as it was claimed by others.  Ann Moss describes a “spectacularly 
successful afterlife” of the Polyanthea that culminates in 1604 with Joseph Lang’s 
Polyanthea Nova (Renaissance Truth… 27).  Ironically, this “vastly expanded form […] 
served a humanist rhetoric” that Mirabellio had earlier designed the work to avoid.   
On the question of humanist rhetoric itself, there was a key difference between the 
Calepino and the original work of Mirabellio. In the Polyanthea, Mirabellio took a 
position opposite to Ambrogio Calepino’s lexicon on humanist language ideals while 
attempting to create a rival to its predecessor’s position as an authoritative text on 
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language itself.  Editors like Josse Bade took advantage of this difference. As Ann Moss 
explains:  
In 1512, Josse Bade published yet another alphabetical Latin dictionary 
emanating from Italy, the Polyanthea of the secular cleric, Dominico Nanni 
Mirabellio, which had its first printing at Savona in 1503.  This compilation, 
strictly contemporary with Calepino’s, also attempts to be a resource for both 
Latin language communities [Moss means scholastics and humanists, who regard 
Latin’s intellectual and cultural function differently], but it has a slightly different 
agenda, which to Bade obviously made it seem a sound commercial proposition.  
Whereas Calepino edges Christian language into the humanists’ lexis by making 
accommodations, Mirabellio confronts the issues involved rather aggressively.  
He has a very ambivalent attitude to Latin poets and historians, the authors 
favored in the humanist enterprise. The subject matter treated by poets, in 
particular, is morally dubious in his eyes, however fine their rhetoric of praise and 
blame… (Renaissance Truth… 24-5) 
 
The Polyanthea was thus a work with a mixed message.  On the one hand, it presented an 
abundant resource for both those of religious concerns and those with professional 
ambitions to speaking and writing well.  On the other, it presents a distinctive scorn and 
distrust for the resource it provides.  Mirabellio is explicit about the subjects of his 
distrust in his preface. He names a humanist orientation toward copious, eloquent speech 
and Vergilian/Ciceronian Latin as a source of intellectual weakness: 
I don’t doubt that a wealth of good speech [dicendi copiam] may bring more of 
good than evil to men. With it they equip eloquence with a sword of no small 
value so that we are be able to both defend and attack well or poorly. Yet I have 
seen some people scorning [irridentes] sacred scripture and disdaining 
[dedignantes] whatever lacks Maronian or Ciceronian charm, having chosen only 
by the pleasuring of the ear—with the result that they felt contrary to Catholic 
truth in the meanwhile.  I have seen many shunning Aristotelian writings because 
of the obscurity of the reading itself—and also being scared of the difficulty. (a2) 
40 
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40 “Non me latebat dicendi copiam boni ne an mali hominibus plus attulerit dubitari posse.  Unde non 
immerito quidam gladio eloquentiam aequipararunt quo et ad oppugnandum et ad propugnandum tam male 
quam bene uti possumus.  Videbam nonnullos scripturam sacram irridentes et quicquid Maroniano 
Ciceronianoque caret lepore ita dedignantes ut etiam contra catholicam veritatem interdum sentirent. 
Videbam multos Aristotelica scripta devitantes ipsius lectiones obscuritate ac difficultate perterritos.” [All 
my citations and quotes for Mirabellio come from the preface and prefatory poem for the 1508 edition.] 
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Thus Mirabellio aligns himself against orators, Cicero in chief, and poets, particularly 
Vergil, and alongside Aristotelian scholastics.  In this, Mirabellio was being true to the 
roots, or perhaps the stems, of his labor, but he was also choosing to behave scornfully 
about the problematic behaviors of scorn and disdain themselves.  Polyanthea is more 
conspicuously conservative because of its reliance on an earlier source aligned with 
medieval tradition. In the substance of the Polyanthea—and in the very name he gives to 
it—Mirabellio drew upon the earlier work, the Manipulus Florium [Handful of Flowers] 
of Thomas Hibernicus (“Thomas of Ireland”).  This text, as Ann Moss notes, was a “well-
known preaching manual” (26) as well as a key early florilegium. Thus the Polyanthea 
takes up a form of conservative religion that is overtly hostile to poetry when it comes to 
issues of language—a marked distinction from the Calepino lexicon. 
Like Ambrogio Calepino himself, Mirabellio is outspoken in his prefatory poem 
and preface in ways that powerfully characterize the work and associate the author’s 
attitudes with the work itself. In particular, Mirabellio is hostile to love and anything that 
might feminize men.  In the Latin poem for the reader on his title page, Mirabellio 
identifies the classical sources with indecent Venereal leanings:  
Whoever [you are who] loves to decorate the temples [of your head] with a 
flowery crown 
And desires to ring your hair with various flowers, 
Come into these gardens and rosy scents.  Nanus 
With the composition gives roses to your alert brow. 
This is what may suit boys and youths and old men. 
No Venus for us, no loves are sung of here, 
Nor Jove, nor the thefts of Mars will there be. 
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For all that he rejects the feminine and love, though, Mirabellio lays claim to things 
associated with women and love.  His “no Venus for us” phrase signals an odd desire for 
a kind of verbal chastity given the luxuriant floral imagery that precedes it.  That is, while 
conspicuously “ringed” with pastoral imagery and in the Latin elegiac distichs natural to 
pastoral verse, Mirabellio takes pains to tell us that his is not a playful Ovidian work.  No 
“amores” for him, indeed!  The author militates against any kind of poetic or 
mythological means toward knowledge of language even as he is using it. Similarly, a 
few lines later Mirabellio’s statements about women and flowers enact a somewhat 
perplexing description.  Punning on “legere,” which means both “gather” and “read,” he 
tells his male reader: “You will not read sedge and monk’s hood [here in my book]./  A 
woman and a little girl can collect these flowers.”41  For Mirabellio, women evidently are 
meant to collect the useful and common herbs of speech, while the more difficult and rare 
products of language are like flowers meant to adorn men. Mirabellio appears to think 
that men need more protection from potentially crude topics or language than women do 
and seems to scorn women as a result. 
Exactly like Ambrogio Calepino, Mirabellio uses self-deprecating humor and the 
image of the bad and physical tongue itself as a key part of the rhetorical chastisement of 
his learned detractors.  Just at the end of his preface, he writes: 
For who am I? I am not Atlas. I am Nanus [“Nanus” in Latin means “dwarf” and 
so is a show of punning humility here]. Whoever bites me doesn’t steal the club 
from the hand of Hercules. Why, meanwhile, should I flatter or elevate myself 
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41 “…non tribulos non aconita leges./ Hos matrona potest legere et virguncula flores.” (ll. 16-17) 
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among such a great variety of judges when I see that the tongues of my detractors 
do not indeed spare the fonts of the Latin language, Cicero and Vergil?42 
 
In this passage, the biting critics have actual tongues.  With Calepino, the cursing tongue 
did not even spare sacred works.  For Mirabellio, the detractors’ tongues do not “spare 
of” their sanctified Cicero and Vergil.  The Latin verb “parcere” has the same potential 
double meaning as the English verb “spare” in this context.  In this case, though, it 
suggests that the Ciceronian and Vergilian advocates are arrogant in ways that Mirabellio 
is not.  Such advocates are unsparing of their verbiage; they lack control of their speech; 
they are blathering, biting beasts. 
 With the complex character of the Mirabellio lexicon and its author in mind, it is 
possible to see a witty and pointed criticism implicit in Spenser’s characterization of 
Mirabella in Book 6, cantos six, seven, and eight of The Faerie Queene.  Spenser’s 
reference to the Mirabellio lexicon there is subtle but unmistakably deliberate.  To tease 
out the subtleties, we must first consider all the different features of Mirabella that, like 
the equally complex factors relating Calepine to the Calepino lexicon, appear to be 
appropriate to commentary on the reference work and its author.   
When we first see Mirabella, she meets Timias and Serena as they depart the 
Hermit’s hospitality.  She is described simply as a “faire Mayden clad in mourning weed” 
who is “unmeetely set” on a “mangy iade” and led by a “lewd foole” (6.6.16.7-9). She 
appears to be a threat of some sort to the fragile stability Timias and Serena have 
achieved by their stay with the Hermit.  Spenser puts off the description of her character 
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42 “Nam quis ego? Atlas non sum.  Nanus sum.  Qui me mordebunt, clavam de manu Herculis non 
subtraxerint. Quid est praeterea quod in tanta iudiciorum varietate mihi blandiar aut arrogem? quum videam 
detractorum linguas ne ipsis quidem latinae linguae fontibus Ciceroni et Vergilio pepercisse.” 
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until later, a delay designed to heighten our curiosity about just what sort of threat she 
represents.  He is first engaged in dealing with the overt figures of courtly deception, 
Turpine and Blandina, who are obviously vicious for all their wily designs. Mirabella is 
not so simple as they are.  Indeed, her figure is immediately imbued with contradictions 
when she reappears in canto seven.  She is a woman “of great dignitie” (6.7.28.1) but low 
birth.  She is “proud and insolent” herself, and she is accompanied by personified forms 
of Scorn and Disdain that strip her pride and render her obviously miserable.  Since the 
word “dignity” comes from the Latin meaning “worth,” we are in part meant to see that 
any actual worth is mirrored by an outward or inward feeling of being without worth: 
after all, “Dis-dain” comes from “De-dignor,” a verb that describes the action of stripping 
worth, devaluing.  The clever use of a possessive in the opening quatrain of canto seven 
foreshadows the reflexive relationship between her pride and her punishment: it states 
that her “punishment”  is “for love[’]s disdain.” This use implies that she disdains love as 
unworthy of her, and it implies that she is, consequently, disdained or de-valued by love.   
In canto seven, Cupid’s disregard for Mirabella enacts reciprocal disdain.  Her 
relationship to Cupid naturally becomes a tissue of resistance and denial.  Cupid 
discovers that men who were supposed to be in love were missing from his rolls; he 
creates a grand jury in which the characters of Infamy and Despight give “evidence… 
that they were all betrayd/ And murdred cruelly by a rebellious Mayd” (6.7.34.8-9).  
Mirabella is then named and called to court, but she still refuses love.  Cupid sentences 
her to a penance in which she is to wander the earth saving as many loves as she formerly 
denied, but as a result of “her dispiteous pride” she fails just as rigorously to find love 
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(6.7.38.7).  Though Arthur even rescues her in canto eight, she refuses this, too, claiming 
her penance despite its futility.   
At a psychological level,  Mirabella’s character is meant to illustrate a vicious 
cycle of pride native to those who early on learn to resist love in order to assert their 
social superiority.  That is, she illustrates a problematic dependency of a low-born 
woman on her own misplaced pride in the rewards brought to her by superficial beauty.  
It is easy to understand why this character would be valuable to a study of courtly 
behavior as we watch, in canto eight, Mirabella refuse to be rescued from Scorn and 
Disdain by Arthur.  She explains that she had learned to love herself “in schoole,” had 
“triumphed long” in her youth at such self-love while she was “sitting carelesse on the 
scorners stoole” (6.8.21.5-7). Though nominally she earns penance for past wrongs, it is 
only her continued respect for her once powerful position of disdaining which makes her 
endure Scorn and Disdain themselves as her companions and victimizers.  Mirabella is a 
perversion or simply an extreme version of a court beauty. 
 Spenser makes a careful contrast between Mirabella’s case and the more 
successful one of Serena and Calepine that immediately follows.  In the conclusion of 
canto eight, just as Spenser turns our attention back to the case of Serena and Calepine 
from Mirabella, he somewhat comically stresses the goodness of Calepine despite the 
blame Serena accords him.  As Serena wanders toward the den of the Salvage nation, site 
of her future rescue, she “evermore… blamed Calepine, / The good Sir Calepine, her 
owne true Knight” (6.8.33.1-2). We are meant to see that there is something good and 
true about Calepine, whatever his faults, once we see her rescued.  Calepine is as good—
if not entirely reliable—as Mirabella is unredeemable.  Serena’s flight was precipitated, 
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after all, by Mirabella’s arrival with the bullies Scorn and Disdain.  This obvious 
juxtaposition and character contrast has more weight when we consider that the name 
Calepine refers to a standard and comparatively reliable lexicon. Presumably Mirabella is 
the opposite of Calepine: a trouble-brewing and essentially bad thing.  Presumably, too, 
with this contrast Spenser hopes to suggest things about the books to which each name 
refers and the linguistic and philosophical issues they address.  But what?  
I am not the first to note that the names Calepine and Mirabella both concern 
Italian lexicons, and my forerunners have identified the importance of Spenser’s choice 
of the names without actually exploring it.  In Spenser’s Courteous Pastoral, Humphrey 
Tonkin, after commenting on the name of Calepine, writes:  
Perhaps Spenser’s eye next [after Calepine] lighted on Mirabellius’s Polyantheae 
(1503), a less-known but influential dictionary which he may have also used.  
This would give him a very suitable name for the proud Mirabella. (66) 
 
Tonkin only adds that he does not think it coincidence that Spenser begins to name the 
“products of Italian publishers,” and that DeWitt Starnes and  Ernest Talbert have 
commented more on  Spenser’s possible use of the Mirabellio text.  Turning to Starnes’ 
and Talbert’s Classical Myth and Legend in Renaissance Dictionaries, though, we find 
an informative detail.  Starnes and Talbert identify the Polyanthea as one of a set of 
possible sources for Spenser’s information about Cupid, Venus, the Graces, their origin, 
traits, and order of appearance, as well as information about Mount Acidale, all crucial 
elements of Spenser’s mythology in canto ten of Book 6 (88-91).  They also provide 
Spenser’s other candidates for this information: the Calepino lexicon, Perotti’s 
Cornucopiae, and Robert Stephanus’ Thesaurus…, Cooper’s  Thesaurus, Alciati’s 
Emblemata, Textor’s Officina, and Cartari’s Imagines Deorum.  While information about 
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the specific mythology would  have been available in some classical sources, too, Starnes 
and Talbert conclude that the role of the sixteenth-century reference texts was essential: 
 Spenser would have found much more information [in the Renaissance lexicons], 
as, for example, why there are three graces, why they are painted naked and with 
hands joined, why one has her face turned away from us and two have theirs 
turned toward us, why they are depicted as youthful and laughing. (91) 
 
Colin Clout’s descriptive report of the graces, “Venus[’] Damzels” (6.10.21.4) from 
canto ten, stanzas 21-24, provides exactly such mythological information.  With this, 
then, Starnes and Talbert show us that Spenser knew about the information available 
from the encyclopedic texts.  They make it possible for me to credibly claim, too, that 
Spenser acknowledged his sources—and his critical interest in the nature of these sources 
themselves—with the names Mirabella and Calepine even if he does not mean us to think 
that the Mirabellio and Calepino lexicons are the key or sole sources for Book 6 itself.  
More likely, indeed, Spenser intended for readers who recognized the references to see 
just how elegantly he was re-shaping the raw information from those source texts into the 
narrative and allegory of his work—and into the moral messages of them. Yet since he 
sets Calepine and Mirabella in contrast, and sets them both in starker contrast to the 
information that follows about the graces in canto ten, stanzas 22-25, he more than likely 
acknowledges, too, what is evident from the basic contrast between Calepine and 
Mirabella as figures.  That is, he acknowledges that the Polyanthea was one significant 
rival to the Calepino lexicon, with rival information about classical subjects and, quite 
possibly, a rival stance on matters crucial to the development of English and crucially 
known to humanists with interests in Latin idiom.  It is therefore logical, as a first step, to 
add up the parallels between the Mirabellio lexicon and Mirabella, then to consider what 
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Spenser meant by the condemnation of Mirabella and Mirabellio relative to the tempered 
view of Calepine and the Calepino lexicon. 
As I have already shown, the lexicographer Mirabellio clearly disdained to 
include love poetry in his description of Latin words, and he rejected poetry in particular 
as a source for knowing word meanings.  Ironically, though, Mirabellio complained of 
the disdain of others for his work, and just as ironically he embraced poetry and pastoral 
imagery as a means to characterize his lexicographic work in a prefatory poem.  First, 
then, Spenser means Mirabella as a witty mirror-image mockery of Mirabellio: in her 
own pastoral setting, Mirabella shares the lexicographer’s disdain and scorn for love, and 
she is, presumably like him, scorned and disdained by love itself in return. Second, the 
gender change emphasizes these parallels all the more: Spenser has converted a man who 
wishes to hold himself aloof from love poetry and women into the passive, aloof dura 
puella of Latin love poetry as if to suggest that Mirabellio is rejected by the very 
language he attempts to capture. Just as importantly, Spenser identifies Mirabella as a 
woman of low status aspring to a status she does not deserve.  As I stressed earlier in my 
quotes from Blair and Moss, it was apparent in the late sixteenth century that the 
Mirabellio text and other reference texts with such proud authorial prefaces were in fact 
the humble and common sourcebooks for courtiers and scholars consulting them for 
working knowledge of Latin commonplaces.  This characterization of Mirabella and the 
Mirabellio lexicon grins and wags with yet more toothy wit than the one of Calepine and 
the Calepino lexicon, then.  Consider: Spenser takes pains, in stanzas 32-37, to indicate 
that Mirabella is punished because she refuses to take part in Cupid’s court despite the 
love of many courtly denizens for her.  Her lovers do not show up in the rolls because she 
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does not show them love.  Thirdly, then, if we look at the character of Mirabella as a 
representation of the products and practices of those who ambitiously acquire speech and 
knowledge about speech from the Mirabellio book, we can see that Spenser means to 
criticize a specific set of courtiers. That is, he means to criticize those who used their 
education in, say, the love poetry of Ovid and its intense Latin-language refinement, a 
matter of wondrous beauty, toward an ugly set of practical, self-serving personal 
ornaments in letter-writing or Latinate speech appropriate to court but not in keeping with 
any true moral self-improvement or desire for true courtship of women or men.  Such 
people would, like Mirabellio himself, deny the worth of the verses whose material they 
drew upon constantly to craft the beauty of their work. With this in mind, it is plainer 
why Spenser has Mirabella describe herself “in schoole.”  This was the place of her first 
triumph, and indeed there was a corresponding basic triumph for those seeking basic 
information like schoolboys learning about the Graces without being graceful in their use 
of language.  And so, the harder work of learning how to live gracefully was beyond 
Mirabella or Mirabellio, Spenser appears to argue. 
Of course, we should not forget that some graces are beyond Calepine, too, not 
just Mirabella.  The Calepino lexicon and Calepine himself are benign but troublesome 
figures.  What accounts for the greater condemnation of the Mirabellio lexicon, though, 
and what does it tell us about Spenser’s view of lexicons and language?  First and most 
directly, on the matters of poetry and love, Dominico Mirabellio is unequivocally 
condemning, whereas Ambrogio Calepino is silent.  This is the core difference between 
Mirabella and Calepine, too. We can reason that Spenser finds the authority of these texts 
on language inadequate when they do not properly relate to poetry’s function as part of 
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language.  He subtly praises the Calepino on this point even as he suggests that Calepine 
is a clumsy but well-intentioned lover to Serena.  However, we can go further than such 
matters of love poetry.  Both Ambrogio Calepino and Dominico Mirabellio are concerned 
with their own reputations as authorities on language.  On this subject, the difference is 
correspondingly more delicate and relates to their comments about the defective physical 
tongue itself by contrast to the value of their efforts to understand and authorize language 
uses of specific kinds.  Both lexicographers use terms and consider matters of language 
relevant to Spenser’s theme of courtliness and the problem of controlling speech, thought, 
and language use, a theme that is crucial to Book 6.  Yet to interpret and authorize 
linguistic use and structure, Mirabellio relies upon an Aristotelian philosophical tradition 
that is steeped in a source associated with Ireland (Thomas of Ireland) and associates 
good language use with that kind of general communal interest, artistic or not.43 In 
contrast, Calepino, while not abandoning religion, associates his view with the Valla- and 
Perotti-associated effort to prize out the valid or best use from periods in which the 
language produced the best material.  He has nothing bad to say about the authority of the 
virtuosos of Latin literature and oratory, Vergil and Cicero.  Spenser’s decision to 
condemn Mirabella (and by extension Mirabellio) so strongly and to affirm Calepine (and 
thus Calepino, though with some evident misgivings) suggests that on the crucial matter 
of correct or good language use, Spenser sides with those who seek the best and most 
elegant periods of use as models.  The Calepino lexicon was created as a reaction to the 
spreading knowledge of the Latin idiom in the classical texts.  To side with the Calepino 
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43 Bear in mind that Spenser throughout his epic communicates deep suspicions about the Irish culture and 
language, associating his sense of the racial defects of the Irish with their language.  This matter has been 
detailed in Richard McCabe’s ninth chapter of Spenser’s Monstrous Regiment, but it is a subject I will put 
off until I analyze the significance of A View of the Present State of Ireland in my fourth chapter. 
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against the Mirabellio text is a strong gesture towards its particular humanist leanings 
associated with defining an independent kind of linguistic knowledge.  However, the 
ardent quality of the condemnation of Mirabella and her rejection of Cupid/Venus, 
considered in the light of the association between valuable poetry and the divine 
inspiration described in canto ten, suggests that even as he is siding with the Calepino 
lexicon, Spenser sees a more crucial role for poetry in the shaping of the English 
language rather than the one he appears to associate with the lexicographic effort typified 
by Mirabellio and Calepino. Colin Clout and his vision of the graces are, after all, 
strongly positive and superior by comparison to the portrayals of Mirabella or Calepine.   
4. Conclusion  
Partly out of self-interest, no doubt, Spenser prefers the role of poet to the role of 
grammarians or lexicographers in the shaping of a language. Yet Book 6 when seen as 
engaged in a debate about lexicography and poetry presents a more detailed rationale for 
his preferences in which Spenser effectively responds to specific elements of the ideas of 
prior authorities on language. Consider again Mulcaster’s views.  Before advocating the 
Calepino lexicon as a model (among other lexicons) in his Elementarie, Mulcaster 
defines a crucial element of his beliefs about language. He argues that a “soulish 
substance in everie spoken tung […] fedeth this change [the instability of languages over 
time]” (177). Mulcaster intends to define his own period as the one in which that peculiar 
pattern of language identity and change meet in the ideal and best rules for writing and 
speech:  “I take this present period of our English tung to be the verie height,” he 
explains.  This rationale is crucial to Mulcaster’s citation of the Calepino lexicon; indeed, 
it is crucial to his own effort to list and define English words.  However, this “soulish” 
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thing is clearly an evasion of the problem of how knowledge is related to or transmitted 
in language that, as I showed previously, dogs his work. What Mulcaster refers to as a 
“secret misterie” or “quickning spirit in everie spoken tung” is both a source for 
instability and a source of identity.  
Spenser’s decision in Book 6 to address the question of how to control public 
speech and how to link speech to a personal identity relies heavily on an idea of mind that 
is at once spiritual and material.  The physical tongue is considered degraded while the 
spiritual elements of vatic reverie and written identity, as I argued in my first chapter, are 
elevated.  In these respects, Spenser is dealing with much the same questions about 
knowledge, language, and identity that Mulcaster addresses. His decision to use 
allegorical references to two famous lexicons suggests that he is not only engaging the 
same questions, but sketching out an intellectual response on the matter that Mulcaster 
engages. Spenser’s decision to align himself so strongly against the Aristotelian 
scholastic view represented by the Mirabellio lexicon shows that he does not disagree 
with Mulcaster’s humanist notion of such an idealized state of language.  More 
specifically yet, Spenser’s decision to show qualified approval of the Calepino lexicon, a 
text proposing a method of re-constructing ideal Latinity from past models, suggests that 
he agrees in principle with the vision of ideal language it proposes.  Finally, though, 
Spenser’s obvious qualification and hesitation over Calepine suggests a disagreement, 
too.  
In my first chapter, I argued that, in the crucial scenes of cantos ten through 
twelve of Book 6, Spenser asserts a poetics in which artful language use (ideally figured 
in Colin’s vision) is attached to the virtuous expression and recognition of identity not 
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just among poets, but among those figures in society who should be in a position to 
defend poets.  One person who he clearly believes has sided with lexicography over 
poetry is Lord Burghley, and some of the satire of the Mirabellio and Calepino lexicons 
seems to be directed at the staid, methodical steward of the court.  Clearly, Spenser’s 
expression of reservations about lexicography, his prominent figuring of problem-
stricken Mirabella and Calepine, complements this vision of poetics: he intends us to see 
that the lexicographers were not in a position to defend an English courtesy in which 
poetry might have a place.  Moreover, Spenser’s use of information about mythology 
from the lexicographers in his idealized poetic vision puts him in competition with those 
lexicographers for the defense and defining of English. Not surprisingly, he believes that 
lexicography fails as an enterprise for defining the relationship of language to knowledge 
in a way that poetry does not. Spenser intended for readers who recognized the references 
to the lexicons to see just how elegantly he, as poet, was re-shaping the raw information 
from those source texts into the narrative and allegory of his work—and into the moral 
messages of them.  In this way, Spenser’s work sets the horse of model uses of language 
itself back before the cart of lexicographic catalogues of model use—even the Calepino.  
Lexicographers like Calepino and Mirabellio complain of detraction and are vulnerable to 
it, but Spenser’s use of language is shaping language in ways that provide the good 
examples in vernacular that English dictionaries need in a manner that is shielded from 
detraction.  Spenser’s manner of handling the Calepino lexicon thus recalls the 
complaints that figures like Thomas Elyot had about their dependency while Spenser 
himself asserts the value of English vernacular quite independently.  Spenser’s approach 
is a crucial forerunning action to an independent English lexicography.  While his 
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teacher, Mulcaster, had urged that students of English model their ideas by using the 
Calepino lexicon as a guide, Spenser has suggested that the model of both humanists and 
those skeptical of humanism is insufficient to the language and the poetry needed by 
English civilization.  In short, poetry, in this view, seems a primary kind of evidence for 
valuable language use.  Yet if this were the case, we should find Spenser’s attempts to 
have poetry play this role in more than the allegorical play with names.  To address this 
matter, we must turn to Spenser’s earlier work, The Shepheardes Calender, to study the 
kind of proposals he there makes about poetry, language learning, word meaning—and, 
indeed, what such things have to do with lexicography or supplanting it. 
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Chapter 3: 
 Relational Meaning, Authorial Intention,  
and the Poetic Diction of The Shepheardes Calender 
 
 
Do not trust in another god 
—Inscription translated from an Assyrian stone  
statue from the Temple of Nabu (God of Writing)  
in the city of Nimrud, circa 810 B.C.E.   
(The work sits in the British Museum.) 
 
 
What would it have been like for the artificer of the stone statue of a god of writing to see 
his or her work placed in the alien context of a museum?  I began wondering this almost 
as soon as I saw the statue in January of 2004, and it has colored my understanding of 
acts of “translation”—of moving items from one cultural place to another—ever since. 
Would the creators or the scribes from the temple view the meaning of the statue in the 
museum as the same as the meaning it had in its original place?  Would they trust the 
translation?  The translator?  Surely, no—or at least not immediately.  I can only assume 
that they would at first resist the collection and definition of their statue’s purpose 
because it was meant to confront visitors to their temple—people who would have had an 
interest in making decisions about whom they should trust.  The collection and 
explanation of culture in a systematic way in a museum enlists museum-goers in a 
complex process of understanding cultural objects divorced from their original context. 
The museum places all such objects in a new organizing matrix or library of influence.  It 
is unlikely that the creators of a religion of writing (presided over by a God of Writing) 
would have failed to be flattered by the important placement of their image and writing in 
so conspicuous and prestigious a place as the British Museum.  So with time they might 
accept the re-orientation of their cultural work.  Still, at any moment in history before 
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such a removal, they would have resisted the organizing principles and ideas about 
meaning behind the very drive for the museum’s collection and display. 
Spenser must have been a little like those scribes in the temple of writing.  For 
him, poetic work was partly a process of response to prior work.  Thus he would have 
been suspicious of attempts to create a system into which his efforts might be placed for 
the very way it might change the meaning of his works.  He also would have been able to 
craft his poetry to resist that process of placement.  In general, it is not hard to believe 
that poets could build a form of resistance into their work, an interior voice as it were, 
that responds to those who will take a volume of poetry and sooner strive to find its place 
in the library than find a place for it in the service of the society.  Indeed, it is very easy 
to see that Spenser, given as he is to complicated and hidden architectures of meaning 
like that so recently unearthed in his Epithalamion,44 would strive to guide the 
interpretation of his work in anticipation of its translation into the larger spheres of 
English and international culture.  
This chapter explores Spenser’s resistant diction in The Shepheardes Calender, a 
vocabulary that has been long acknowledged for its idiosyncrasy. In focusing on 
Spenser’s diction, my enterprise builds upon the efforts of scholars like Andrew Zurcher.  
In Spenser’s Legal Language, Zurcher shows how Spenser was concerned with “lex”—
the constituent meaningful unit of law and the word as an instrument to the construction 
of a legal code. He is focused on Spenser’s desire to shape and comment on the law 
through lexis. However, I am more concerned to consider how Spenser addressed the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 I am referring to Kent Hieatt’s late 1950s discovery of the diurnal chronology coded into the lineation of 
Spenser’s poem. See Hieatt’s book, Short Time’s Endless Monument: The Symbolism of the Numbers in 
Edmund Spenser’s Epithalamion (New York: Columbia UP, 1960). 
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hermeneutic process that preceded the establishment of meaning in a national language 
instrumental to legal codes and other regulated and regulating social institutions.  That is, 
I am in pursuit of a broader understanding of Spenser’s conceptions of how language 
functions.  In trying to describe Spenser’s views of language, I cannot avoid seeing his 
poetic diction in The Shepheardes Calender as particularly resistant to the invasive 
authority of lexicographers. This group in Spenser’s lifetime was doing the work of 
writing the history of language and defining the way it worked. Moreover, lexicographers 
were—at least in one clear instance involving Henri Estienne for this chapter, and 
certainly in the much earlier case in history of Mirabellio noted in the previous chapter—
citing poets even as they were in some sense striving to replace them as definers and 
teachers of what a language is and does.  Lexicographers were, for example, part of a bid 
to have an effect on the laws that would be written in the languages they struggled to 
define.  Latin and Greek were key sources for technical languages and nomenclature in 
English and other European vernaculars.  
How would Spenser have resisted interpretive practices that accompany a 
lexicographic authority? In a nutshell, I will be arguing that Spenser resisted a view of 
word meaning more dependent upon accepting denotation as natural to language.  The 
idea of denotation benefits the authority of glossators a little and lexicographers a great 
deal.45 It is implicitly referential.  As a result, a denotative idea of linguistic meaning may 
be separated from an idea that meaning emerges from the relations among words and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Please consult the comments on Richard Waswo’s Language and Meaning in the Renaissance on pages 
9-15 of my introduction, where I outline Waswo’s basic ideas about the difference between relational and 
denotative meaning.  I rely on that same distinction, though I believe Waswo’s explanation of its relevance 
to Spenser is insufficient in some ways.  In Spenser’s Legal Language, Andrew Zurcher accepts the idea 
that Spenser depends upon a notion of relational meaning for his works in general.  See my later note on 
Zurcher for more details. 
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things—their contexts and web of texts.  The latter is what we roughly call a relational 
notion of meaning—“roughly” here for it contains many different assumptions about 
mind, reality, language, thought, and knowledge.46 If reader and poet submit to a 
glossator’s or lexicographer’s approach, they accept a denotative/referential notion of 
meaning more readily than they accept the relational notion of meaning.  In such 
acceptance they also hazard acceptance of what meaning has been in preference to what 
it might be.  A glossator’s work with poet and readership thus potentially anticipates the 
dictionary-maker’s advances toward getting a readership to accept his or her definitions 
as binding, normative, and even as the way words themselves “work” with other words or 
within the mind.  As I noted in the previous chapter, this is the prescriptive force behind 
lexicography that a lexicographer might be uncomfortable acknowledging.  Removed 
from the context of poems, placed in numbered and/or alphabetized lists, words may be 
learned differently because their function is re-contextualized by the lexicographer and 
re-considered, often with an efficient sense of reference to things in the world 
dominating.  For example, the dictionary-maker defines the noun “pig” in a way that 
separates the reference to the animal from the metaphorical or associational idea of the 
greedy human. Once a lexicographer has defined a word, the ensuing work of a poet with 
the meaning of a word may be restricted: the real “pig” and the metaphorical “pig” are 
never to be confused. Of course, the poet’s response depends on the poet’s beliefs about 
language and sense of his or her own authority over it.47 In any case, the poet’s response 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 For a detailed assessment of a variety of assumptions about the relations between thought and language, 
see the first three chapters of Jerry A. Fodor’s The Language of Thought. (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1975). 
 
47 As my first chapter has already shown, Spenser’s adaptation of ideas from Greek philosophy in his later 
work contain some powerfully idealistic visions of the relation between words and mind. I construct the 
present chapter’s argument with the reasonable assumption that Spenser’s ideas about an individual’s mind 
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to the lexicographer is not necessarily the same as his or her response to a former poet.  A 
prior poet may provide a sample use of a word in a context, but the poet does not control 
the meaning of a word. Whatever is to be metaphorical or literal about a term defined by 
a lexicographer, though, may be explicitly pre-set by the act of definition in a manner that 
restricts the liberties of poet and reader in the future.   
Spenser’s poet and his glossator, E.K., carefully manage the terms by which 
Spenser’s Shepheardes Calender is to borrow from tradition and shape a poetic diction 
reflective of the interests of the growing English nation. Though this management on its 
surface appears the effort of two separate individuals, I take the position that E.K. is 
much more likely a persona employed by Spenser.  For me, as I have already argued in 
my introduction, this is a reasonable if not incontrovertible position—and, indeed, it is 
one shared by scholars like Edward Armstrong, whose arguments I consult for this 
chapter and the next.  Thus Spenser’s and E.K.’s management constitutes the force of 
resistance I examine as a product of Spenser’s skepticism about denotative or referential 
notions of meaning.  My study of their effort as a whole brings us repeatedly back to their 
concern with the influence of Greek culture because Renaissance humanists learned 
about how to borrow from other cultures in part from the way in which Romans learned 
about how to borrow powerful ideas from Greek rhetoric and philosophy.  The work done 
by Henri Estienne, the premier Greek lexicographer in Spenser’s time, participates in the 
political process of defining what it means to borrow from the Greek language and 
culture. And Estienne is a figure whom Spenser simply could not have avoided had he 
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and language did not appear from nowhere in his later life, but emerged organically from earlier ideas that 
would be consistent with the thinking about poetic authority over diction I am here outlining. 
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spent any time reading the Greek he so frequently refers to.  Indeed, as I will show, Greek 
philosophy, poetry, and language is the obsessive focus of E.K.’s comments in the 
Epistle, the Generall Argument, and the glosses to The Shepheardes Calender.  
Ultimately, it is by attending closely to Spenser’s and Estienne’s shared focus on dialect 
and particularly the Doric dialect of Theocritus that we can see most clearly the nature of 
the difference between Spenser’s view of how language should be shaped and interpreted 
for poetry and Estienne’s view of the same. 
My chapter is divided in two parts.  The first addresses E.K.’s arguments about 
poetic diction in his Epistle and General Argument.  I begin by examining the problem of 
the meaning and spelling of the term “æglog” as E.K. considers it in the Generall 
Argument.  This choice of spelling rejects the wisdom evident in standard lexicons of the 
period, amplifies the authority of Theocritus (and Greek culture generally), and asserts 
the value of the poet’s and annotator’s joined authority above all else.  The choice 
effectively defends the privilege of the poet’s intention in naming. In this way, E.K. 
establishes the preeminence of the poetic effort over any attempt by scholarly gloss or 
lexicographic definition to intervene. In the Epistle that precedes the Generall Argument, 
moreover, E.K. mixes pragmatic and idealistic approaches to defending Spenser’s poetic 
diction.  E.K.’s effort there shows why Spenser is so concerned to preserve the poet’s 
authority over language, for E.K. imagines a vatic poet with a responsibility to the 
English culture specifically.  This is precisely the kind of poet defined by the dedicatee of 
the Shepheardes Calender, Sir Philip Sidney, in his Defence of Poesie. All these factors 
taken together show that Spenser is concerned to preserve a relational notion of meaning 
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in place of a denotative one, and they show that his reasons tie his authority as a poet to 
the idiosyncratic diction he produces. 
The second part of my argument focuses upon the play between E.K.’s notes and 
the text proper of The Shepheardes Calender.  This play reproduces and extends the ideas 
about diction and relational meaning from the prefatory pieces. To show that, I produce a 
close reading of the April, August, September, and October æglogs (and their 
annotations), first considering a variety of factors that lead us to see how and why Henri 
Estienne’s lexicographical view of how to define the value and power of language in 
three of his texts from the 1560s & 70s provides an ideal contrast with Spenser’s 
modeling of poetic meaning in The Shepheardes Calender.  Spenser’s use of dialect and 
regional terms in the September æglog and elsewhere follows the prescriptions for a 
composite dialect accepted by vernacular French poets like Ronsard, among others.  
Henri Estienne’s views on poetic uses of dialect and studying dialect in French in his 
1579 La Précellence du Langage François, and his complementing views of how to 
study language in his 1565 treatise on the similarities between Greek and French, 
illustrate a quite different approach to hermeneutics. The overall contrast reveals that 
Spenser’s approach to the composite literary dialect asserts the importance of relational 
meaning over the kind of denotative meanings and grammatical structures essential to 
lexicographic projects.  Indeed, Spenser’s use of dialect compels the reader to resist or 
reject the agency of a glossator or definer alone. 
 
1. Reading E.K.’s (and Spenser’s) Prefatory Argument About Diction As Implicitly 
Dependent on Ideas of Relational Meaning 
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In Broken English, her book-length consideration of the concept of dialect in 
Renaissance literature, Paula Blank notes in passing that each of E.K.’s glosses for The 
Shepheardes Calender “participates in the politics of early modern lexicography 
generally, where ‘understanding’ must be mediated by a master of words” (104).    As my 
previous chapter showed, by the 1590s Spenser’s awareness of lexicography was refined 
in ways that made it responsive to nuances of the humanist tradition: that is, Spenser 
reacted to the specifics of the Calepino and Mirabellio lexicons and placed that reaction 
within a sophisticated and equally specific understanding of language and mind.  This 
naturally raises the question of what specific issues about lexicography might have been 
at play in The Shepheardes Calender.  How in this earlier work did Spenser consider 
himself the “master of words,” particularly in his use of or positioning of himself relative 
to his annotator, E.K.?  Was Spenser the same as we later find him in Book 6? 
In his Epistle to the reader, the explanation that E.K. offers for the diction of The 
Shepheardes Calender stages a sort of mocking combat with the classicizing traditions 
associated with early modern lexicography.48  This combat in turn suggests Spenser was 
already distrustful of what early modern lexicography might provide and sought to assert 
what he likely felt was a more complicated and resistant model for linguistic skill.  E.K.’s 
commentary requests a readership attentive to the details of word definition.  Consider 
one part of E.K.’s “argument”: 
…But for the word Æglogues I know is unknowen to most, and also mistaken of 
some the best learned (as they think) I wyll say somewhat thereof, being not at all 
impertinent to my present purpose. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 As noted in the previous chapter, Starnes & Talbert show the ways in which the lexicons were used as 
sources of information on classical authors, myths, and beliefs.  
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 They were first of the Greekes the inventours of them called Æglogai as it 
were !"#$% or !&#$%'()%. *'#$+. that is Goteheards tales. or although in Virgile 
and others the speakers be more shepheards, then Goteheards, yet Theocritus in 
whom is more ground of authoritie, then in Virgile, this specially from that 
deriving, as from the first head and wellspring the whole Invencion of his 
Æglogues, maketh Gotehards the persons and authors of his tales.  This being, 
who seeth not the grossenesse of such as by colour of learning would make us 
believe that they are more rightly termed Eclogai, as they would say, 
extraordinary discourses of unnecessarie matter, which difinition albe in 
substaunce and meaning it agree with the nature of the thing, yet nowhit 
answereth with the ,%-*./+0 and interpretation of the word.  For they be not 
termed Eclogues, but Æglogues, which sentence this authour very well observing, 
upon good judgement, though indeed few Goteheards have to doe herein, 
nethelesse doubteth not to call them by the used and best knowen name. (22) 
 
E.K. hopes to correct the “learned” class by this commentary on the spelling of æglog.  
Indeed, his thinking is contrary to what we might find in Latin lexicons, but not in a way 
that is likely to persuade.  If we turn to a 1518 or 1553 Calepino lexicon (the latter edited 
by Robert Estienne) to the entry for “Aegloga,” we quickly discover that this spelling has 
been rejected in favor of “eclogue”: “[Aegloga] means the speech about pastoral things or 
goats, as if  !&#1% *'#$0 [word of goats]. But Ecloga 23*$#4, without the diphthong, 
means selection or interpretation or tasteful parts, as in Pliny, Book 4…”49  The Calepino 
clearly shows that spelling authorized by the classical sources cited (Pliny and Eusebius) 
is preferable.  Similarly, in the 1536 edition of his own thesaurus, Robert Estienne simply 
writes “vide Ecloga,” much more airily excluding the legitimacy of the spelling E.K. 
defends.  In a 1598 11-language Calepino, we find that the editors append to the Aegloga 
entry: ““But the Aeglog word for the Bucolics which our ancestor Virgils wrote now is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 The whole entry: “Aegloga, 5&67**+$%, pen.cor. Caprarum seu rerum pastorialium sermo dicitur, quasi 
!&#1% *'#$0.  At Ecloga 23*$#4, sine diphthongo, electio vel explanatio, elegantia dicitur, ut inquit 
Plinius lib. 4 Epist. & Eusebius lib.4. Eccl. hist. contra Tortellium.” 
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rejected by learned people.”50  The Latin term “explosa” or “exploded” suggests just how 
definitively learned people rejected the term, but it also reveals that the effort to shrug off 
the AEG spelling had been ongoing for long enough that so forceful a term seems 
necessary.  The EK spelling is clearly the most reasonable.51 Yet E.K. misrepresents the 
“learned” understanding for eclogue as “extraordinary discourses of unnecessary matter.” 
He interprets the word eclogue as we might “extraneous.” He is, in other words, 
deliberately overlooking the reasonable possibility, a meaning used by classically 
authoritative texts and a derivation easily possible in Greek language—the very language 
of origin and poetic authority he selects for context. Naturally, sixteenth-century 
humanism does not share the all the values of nineteenth-century philology, which would 
insist on extremely methodical forms of word derivation. E.K. all the same departs with 
obvious and impetuous irrationality from the norms of sixteenth-century views as 
represented in the lexicons.  He has, it would seem, picked a losing fight with 
lexicography of his period. 
Assuming that E.K. either is Spenser or is acting under his direction and approval, 
and assuming E.K.’s argument is not exclusively for a kind of comical, pedantic effect 
(like what we might find in Shakespeare’s Holofernes from Love’s Labors Lost), we have 
to wonder what is intended by his artificial dispute. E.K. grounds his dispute in the 
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50 “…sed vox Aegloga qua majors nostri Virgilii Bucolica inscripserant, jampridem est a doctis explosa.” 
 
51  Given the ridiculousness of his argument, we might even speculate that E.K. rejects the EK spelling 
because it transgresses upon his initials as an identity.  However, I think we should avoid thinking of all the 
comical possibilities in E.K.’s comments.  Pedantic though he may be, I will be treating the bulk of his 
argumentation seriously rather than deal with all the possible ironies or duplicities of his material.  There is 
little question in my mind that E.K. in part serves to satirize glossators, and Spenser may have had a 
specific edition of poetry in mind for the bulk of his work with E.K.  Again, though, I will be treating the 
glossator seriously in terms of what it tells us about Spenser’s views of language and his view of how 
lexicography and glossing influenced language-defining thought. 
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authority of the poetic tradition itself, not so much in any lexicographic or linguistic 
tradition, but he calls upon the original status of Greek as part of his thinking about the 
poetry itself.  That is, he places Theocritus as the oldest of pastoral poets, the originator 
of the tradition, and notably Greek.  It is a significant choice because Spenser in a letter 
to Gabriel Harvey, as Richard Helgerson notes in Forms of Nationhood, cites Greek 
culture as possessing linguistic autonomy with respect to its verse choices. Spenser wrote, 
“For, why a Gods name may not we, as else the Greekes, haue the kingdome of oure 
owne Language, and measure our Accentes, by the sounde, reseruing the Quantitie to the 
Verse?” (16) Helgerson interprets the comment’s political and semiotic ramifications, 
arguing that Spenser hoped to “separate himself from himself to become a self-
dominating other” (25) as part of a general effort to distance English from its Gothic 
racial roots and establish it as an equal to classical Greek.  Helgerson may be right, but 
we do not need to resort to the paradox of a “self-dominating other” to think through the 
implications of E.K.’s reference to Theocritus.  E.K.’s comments about a conspicuously 
Greek word in The Shepheardes Calender are not simply an attempt to distance English 
from its Gothic roots.  Rather E.K.’s opinions cast a patterned illumination upon how 
Spenser composes his authority in and with language. After all, these opinions do 
distance English from the Gothic, but they also distance the problem that they address 
from a resolution by linguistic expertise alone.  The AEG spelling has some Greek 
associations, but certainly no more than the EK spelling.  Either spelling might associate 
English with Greek. Thus the spelling choice foregrounds an independent and fanciful 
etymology not for its own sake but rather because it reserves autonomy to the poet-
linguist over the linguist-lexicographer.  
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In case readers might overlook the autonomy granted the poet by the approval of 
the spelling choice, E.K reminds them in an almost teasing way.  He states: “For they be 
not termed Eclogues, but Æglogues, which sentence this authour very well observing, 
upon good judgement…”  In this sentence, we are meant to wonder at an ambiguity: Who 
is the “authour” doing the “observing” in this sentence of E.K.’s? Is it Spenser, who very 
well observes and judges necessary an AEG-spelled, goat-associated name?  Or does 
E.K. observe Spenser’s choice and interpret it?  To my mind, the phrasing deliberately 
joins editor and poet in a way that playfully suggests that these two are not in fact 
separate people.  Nonetheless the logic which E.K. uses does not equate glossator with 
poet.  It defers to the author-poet’s independent right to choose a spelling that reinforces a 
specific intended message for the poetry in deference to a conceived status of originality 
granted to the Greek Theocritus. And the sentence tackles one further dimension of the 
problem: if we consider how that sentence ends, we see that E.K. has defended the choice 
as one based in the customary spelling and language of the period: “…this authour,” he 
writes meaning himself and/or Spenser, “nethelesse doubteth not to call them [the poems] 
by the used and best knowen name.” E.K. and Spenser share in a choice that appears to 
conform with reasoned judgment and custom.  On close inspection, however, their choice 
relates less to reason and much more to questions of authorial privilege as deferred to by 
a willing editorial commentator.  Even so, Spenser has clearly chosen not to announce his 
preference in such a way that readers might see his choice as an arbitrary assertion of the 
will for individual choice or convention.  If Spenser or E.K. had hoped to make a 
conspicuous stand on the matter of custom against, for example, the orthographers who 
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hoped to change spelling to conform more closely to sound,52 neither would have chosen 
to stage the dispute over a word, æglog, where custom’s hold was so firmly undermined 
by reason among the learned. If the glossator had hoped only to highlight the author’s 
power, he hardly would have chosen to make a statement about the matter which 
apparently confused their positions.  What is E.K. (and Spenser) up to? Clearly, the  
“æglog” justification raises a specific complication to the politics of lexicography and 
language.  It demands a broader context for articulating Spenser’s view of language and 
linguistic epistemology for the empowered poet. After all, in staking a conspicuous battle 
over “æglog,” Spenser argues about the meaningfulness of words themselves in the very 
word he chooses to describe the genre of his poetic work.  
*  *  * 
In 1932 Bruce McElderry expertly showed that Spenser’s use of language in The 
Shepheardes Calender was not a set of immoderate experiments as was often thought.53 
Spenser’s archaisms, reliance on regional dialect, and neologisms are explicable to 
McElderry in terms of the poet’s desire to create a certain effect upon the accepted and 
standard idiom of the time: “The main poetic effect is latent in the standard idiom, and it 
is the poet’s business to bring it out.  This is what Spenser did” (169).  Though 
McElderry relies heavily on a veiled notion of what the “poet’s business” should be, his 
sense that Spenser wants to show off what poetry can do for English diction is important.  
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52 For a full description of such advocates, see the ample description of 16th century orthographers the fifth 
chapter of R.F. Jones The Triumph of the English Language.  
 
53 McElderry’s assertions in his 1932 PMLA article, based on a careful study of diction, are exceptionally 
precise: “I have contended thus far this article: (1) that Spenser’s deliberate archaism, traceable in not more 
than 320 words, has been greatly exaggerated; (2) that his reliance on dialect, slight even in The 
Shepheardes Calender, is almost negligible in later poetry; and (3) that his innovations, though they 
number nearly six hundred words, forms, and meanings, are only very incidentally reckless or ignorant” 
(168). 
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If we are to understand E.K.’s decision to sanction the poet’s authority over words, then, 
we must know how E.K. situates that poet relative to the sort of pressures the poet might 
feel from his society about English itself.   
From R.F. Jones’s The Triumph of the English Language, which lays out a crucial 
set of conditions under which the conception of and beliefs about English vernacular took 
shape during the sixteenth century, we can see just where Spenser’s goals as a poet 
influencing the language would have needed to fit.  One the one hand, Spenser would 
have seen much anxiety among his fellow Englishmen about the adequacy of English by 
comparison to other languages.  Jones notes, for example, that English authors and 
translators considered English in varying degrees adequate to convey basic meaning. He 
cites Richard Shacklock’s emphasis upon the adequacy of English to support translation 
as typical, saying that Shacklock believed “the mother tongue can adequately express the 
meaning of an original” (23).  However, such authors and translators, Spenser’s 
predecessors and contemporaries, still did not consider English eloquent: “Until the last 
quarter of the sixteenth century the mother tongue was consistently considered devoid of 
eloquence” (30). In other words, they considered it to lack the sophistication of classical 
languages, and they considered it to lag behind French and Italian in this same regard.  
Such eloquence was considered an integral element for language by many humanist 
scholars of Latin and Greek, who may be considered one strong faction and potential 
influence on Spenser’s view of English.  On the other hand, some Englishmen shared the 
sense that English was adequate while being deeply skeptical of a humanist desire to 
import greater eloquence. Among those not given over to the beliefs of humanists about 
the meaningfulness of eloquent stylistic essentials such as those to be found in classical 
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languages, Jones informs us, “we discover an ascetic distrust of beauty of expression” 
(31).   This latter distrust was particularly typical of those concerned mainly to make 
English instrumental to general education and religion.  Even as this division caused 
anxieties, the general pressure to use the vernacular on behalf of education was 
ubiquitous—it was shared by humanists and those skeptical of humanist efforts alike. 
Jones notes that those looking to make English vernacular a source for education were 
quite common by the end of the sixteenth century: 
One characteristic of the sixteenth century worthy of considerable emphasis was 
the unceasing, if not universal, desire to educate those people, high and low, who 
did not possess the linguistic keys to learning.  The Renaissance Englishman, 
looking around him, saw, on the one hand, the richest stores of knowledge in 
constant process of being increased, but confined within the strict limits of the 
learned tongues, and on the other, a vernacular which, as regards learning, offered 
for the most part only a vacuum.  To fill this vacuum became his earnest desire 
and deep-felt duty. (34) 
 
This is indeed a pressure that Spenser would have felt directly through instruction from 
Richard Mulcaster, his former headmaster at Merchant Taylor’s School, who expresses 
this sentiment in his writings.54 If, as McElderry saw it, Spenser was trying to use his 
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54 A sampling of quotations from Mulcaster’s educational treatise Positions illustrates the case fully:  
The parents and friends, with whom I have to deal [as a teacher], be mostwhat no Latinists; and if 
they were, yet we understand that tongue best whereunto we are first borne, as our first impression 
is always in English, before we do deliver it in Latin. (29) 
 
Of the which two [Latin or English] at whether it were better to begin, by some accident of late it 
did seem somewhat doubtful; but by nature of the tongues, the verdict is given up.  For while our 
religion was restrained to the Latin, it was either the only or the onliest principle in learning: to 
learn to read Latin as most appropriate to that effect, which the Church then esteemed on most. 
(61) 
 
But now that we are returned home to our English ABC’s, as the most natural to our soil and the 
most proper to our faith, the restraint being repealed, and we restored to liberty, we are to be 
directed by nature and property to read that first, which we speak first and to care for that most, 
which we ever use most, because we need it most; and to begin our first learning there, where we 
have most helps to learn it best by familiarity of our ordinary language, by understanding all usual 
arguments, by continual company of our own countrymen, all about us speaking English and none 
!   
! 164!
poetry to enhance English, he would have been sensitive to the pressures I have noted 
from Jones’s survey. That is, he would have been responding to an educated faction 
interested in developing the sophisticated eloquence of the language, to a more anti-
intellectual faction skeptical of such humanist ideas of developing English, and to an 
enormous and most embracing faction hoping that English could become integral to 
education. 
When E.K. refers to Cicero’s De Oratore as a defense for his use of English-
language archaisms in his Epistle, he details particular sensitivity to the historical context 
that R.F. Jones provides:  
And firste of the wordes to speak, I graunt they be something hard, and of most 
men unused, yet both English, and also used of most excellent Authors and most 
famous Poetes. In whom whenas this our Poet hath bene much traveiled and 
thoroughly redd, how could it be, (as that worthy Oratour sayde) but that walking 
in the sonne although for other cause he walked, yet needes he mought be 
sunburnt: and having the sound of those auncient Poetes still ringing in his eares, 
he mought needes in singing hit out some of theyr tunes. (14) 
 
E.K. justifies the use of difficult words by noting that they are used by earlier English 
authors.  E.K has already noted that Lydgate called Chaucer the “Loadestarre of our 
[English] Language,” reasoning that such a star must be accepted as a legitimate point of 
guidance for present writers if it could guide an earlier poet’s diction.  Thus the 
justification for the use of these words by the authority of earlier poets comes as no 
surprise.  Even so, E.K. frames his choice as equivalent to that of a humanist scholar of 
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uttering any words but those, which we ourselves are very well acquainted with, both in our 
learning and living. (61-2). 
 
Though the Latin tongue be already discharged of all superfluities, exempt from custom to change 
it, and laid up for knowledge to cherish it, and of long time hath been smoothed both to the eye 
and to the ear, yet in the course of teaching it doth not naturally draw on the English, which yet 
remaineth in her less unracked and not fined, though it grow on very fair. (62) 
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Latin by reference to a practical justification from Cicero’s De Oratore, perhaps the best 
known work on rhetoric in the Renaissance next to Quintilian’s Institutes.  In De Oratore, 
a dialogue about how to be the ideal orator, Antonius combats his interlocutor Crassus, 
justifying his use of older diction from Latin and borrowed diction from Greek in a 
variety of clever ways: principally, though, in the passage E.K. alludes to Antonius 
constructs the guiding analogy between the sun and influential literature in a way that 
initially makes it seem like a mere excuse for the archaisms as trivial vices: “It is just as 
when I take a walk in the sunshine: even if I do so for another reason, it is only natural 
that I get tanned.”  (Antonius is concerned with many other matters besides this, but for 
now let us concentrate upon that alone.)  E.K. calls upon similar reasoning not just in the 
allusion on its own.  E.K. has made the “loadstarre” (13) of Chaucer, Lydgate, and other 
poets into precisely such sun-tanning influences—magnetically sun-tanning, one might 
say.  Therefore Spenser’s glossator has naturalized the influence of former authors and 
older diction in a way that suggests it should be, firstly, forgiven by those who distrust 
the classical eloquence it pays homage to and, secondly, respected by those who demand 
that the language develop precisely such resources.  This compromise reflects the 
factions as well as the unifying interest in having English assume an educational role 
simply by being so demonstrably parallel to Latin as a literary language. 
 Yet E.K. does more with the reference to Cicero than pacify potential critics and 
appeal to patriots.  While E.K. later in the Epistle also justifies his renovation of archaic 
terms with the xenophobic charge that foreign loan-words are less respectable, his early 
reference to De Oratore contains an appeal to those who understand the necessity and 
peril of the influence of literatures in other languages.  After all, as Cicero’s mouthpiece 
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in a dialogue considering how to assert Roman authority over the Greek domain of 
rhetoric, Antonius executes a delicate office. The character must acknowledge the Greek 
influence over specifically linguistic matters—especially poetry—while preserving the 
authority of the Roman orator in using such linguistic material.   He says,  
…when I have devoted a fair amount of attention to reading such books at my 
villa in Misenum (for there is hardly any opportunity to do so in Rome), I am well 
aware that my speech, through its exposure to them, takes on a different color, so 
to speak.  But I don’t want you to think that this has any wider implications: of the 
things I find in Greek writers, I merely understand what the authors themselves 
intended to be generally understood.  Whenever I happen to come across 
philosophers, misled by the labels of their books […], then I don’t understand a 
single word—so entangled are they by their narrow and minutely detailed 
discussions. The poets I do not even attempt to touch: it is as if they speak a 
different language altogether. (139) 
 
In this passage, Antonius tackles questions of language, rhetoric, philosophy, and poetry 
at once.   He suggests that he has avoided any philosophical and poetic battle over 
language, for he says that he simply picks up important Greek ideas in preference to the 
language while retaining negligible traces of their language’s influence.  It is lightly 
treated, but it is not a weightless subject. The “sun” of these sources is that of Greek 
philosophy and poetry together.  Yet those two forces were at odds with one another and 
with oratory over the way they viewed language’s place in culture and the position of 
language relative to mind—a matter acknowledged in Plato generally and in the 
Phaedrus particularly.  The basic understanding of such cultural matters meant bloody 
battles for Romans, who were in the business of subjugating the Greeks in Cicero’s era 
even though Antonius is speaking from an earlier era.  Antonius speaks with a 
consciousness, too, that Plato’s Phaedrus, with its complex imagery of conversations 
held in the countryside shade on a sunny day shot through with an association between 
light and knowledge, as the very sun-stroke upon which De Oratore began. The setting 
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for Cicero’s dialogue emerges when we hear Scaevola ask Crassus, “Say, Crassus, why 
don’t we follow the example of Socrates as he appears in Plato’s Phaedrus? For your 
plane tree here suggests this to me, by spreading its broad boughs…” (63).  Cicero’s 
Antonius effectively claims for Latin the knowledge of Greek philosophy, but he does so 
in such a way that he de-values Greek language even as he stresses that his own Latin is 
not denatured by the “color” of that predecessor.55  Antonius’s entire approach to the 
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55 My argument is principally about how we may understand Spenser’s view of language itself, not the 
more general questions about rhetoric involved in E.K.’s reference to De Oratore. However, scholarship 
has said much independently about De Oratore’s significance that in turn reveals just how provocative 
E.K.’s reference is.   At the most general level, Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine’s analysis of De Oratore 
in their appendix to From Humanism to the Humanities confirms my emphasis upon the questions about 
language and rhetoric that Antonius’ comment touches.  Grafton and Jardine explain clearly that Cicero’s 
De Oratore was very much about the anxious appropriation of Greek philosophy and poetics, as they were 
embedded in Greek language, by Roman statesmen who needed to affirm the independent efficacy of their 
Latin.  Cicero’s text addresses the formative period in educating an orator who, having “reached 
proficiency in the erudite language, Greek (acquired painlessly by the well-born from Greek nurses and 
slaves)” (212) and then, having conducted basic studies of various texts, is turned over to a teacher called a 
“rhetor” whose duty is “to teach the student eloquence” (214).  As the rhetor attempts to form this creature 
of perfection, however,  
…the problems implicit in the liberal arts programme grounded in the heritage of a foreign 
language become explicit.  For the model of an alien culture is just that: an ideal, an archetype.  Its 
power is its suggestive aesthetic/moral content, its ability to inspire what is felt to be a more 
mundane culture by its shining example.  But if this is the case, where is that “original material” to 
come from, which the orator is to deploy astutely as the occasion demands…? (214) 
Cicero, after all, lived in a Roman world where Vergil did not yet exist as an emblem of original Latin 
cultural eloquence! By alluding to Antonius’ speech, E.K. and Spenser have together evinced an awareness 
of precisely this Roman pedagogical problem as representative of a similar problem bearing upon English 
culture in its adaptation of classical rhetoric to its ends.  However, by deviating subtly from Antonius’ 
metaphor, as I note in my main argument, E.K. has achieved two additional goals.  First, he has removed 
the English people from the position directly equivalent to that of the Romans.  He achieves this by 
emphasizing that the requisite “content” or knowledge for eloquence—foreign Greek, for the Romans— is, 
for the English within the English language’s history and essential identity, not outside it.  By doing that, 
and by acknowledging the eternal and sanctified poetic knowledge of that “eternall image,” he has enlisted 
the philosophical basis of Greek culture as the root of English poetic culture.  (This should not be a 
surprising gesture for Spenser who is later to make such serious claims on Neo-Platonism, as is widely 
recognized.)  E.K. and Spenser are clearly shifting the grounds on which we are to understand the 
relationship between language and knowledge even as they are placing poetry—instead of rhetoric—into 
rivalry with philosophy. 
Edward Armstrong in his recent A Ciceronian Sunburn produces an analysis of E.K.’s reference to 
De Oratore that appears quite different from my own.  He argues that Spenser devises E.K. to engage the 
reader in a dialogic contest over Ramist refigurings of rhetoric, philosophy, and poetry.  As part of his 
argument, Armstrong insists that “E.K.’s many citational and interpretive failings suggest that we should be 
suspicious of subscribing to all he has to say about the eclogues” (42).  I agree.  E.K. allows Spenser to 
comment on how poetry should and should not be interpreted.  E.K.’s tendentious arguments about the 
spelling of “æglog,” as I have already noted, make it quite plain that Spenser’s sixteenth-century readers 
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matter and the metaphor that he chooses is loaded with the question of how the Romans 
will deal with the way the old, powerful Greek ideas are embedded in the Greek 
language. 
Antonius’ position is a complex one regarding rhetoric with fairly straightforward 
implications regarding Cicero’s ambitions for Latin: that is, Antonius frames Latin-
language rhetoric as an easy and necessarily eloquent inheritor of Greek-language poetry, 
rhetoric, and philosophy by ignoring the value of the Greek language and society to its 
forms of learning and speech.  Naturally, Antonius’s view of rhetoric as a whole is not 
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were not meant to receive his arguments uncritically.  Armstrong, however, reads the “æglog” passage as 
one meant to satirize E.K. exclusively as a sort of Ramist—that it is meant to make us see the “absurdity” 
of E.K.’s approach where “meaning is not learned in the act of reading, but by the act of explication” in 
annotation or definition (60).  As I will consider later in the chapter, Ramism is not the only possible 
culprit, but potentially part of a larger range of problematic humanist practices. E.K.’s argument about 
“æglog,” like other references to the Greek culture and dialect, direct us toward Spenser’s larger ambitions 
for English vernacular.  Just as the allusion to Cicero’s Antonius makes us highly conscious of the Greek 
original influence, so the “æglog” justification passage turns us back towards the Greek original form.  
Armstrong’s approach to explaining E.K.’s allusion to Cicero’s De Oratore has problems similar 
to those we find in his interpretation of E.K.’s absurd “æglog” justification.  Armstrong requires that E.K.’s 
reference be specifically directed towards making us see that E.K.’s “assessment of poetry is analogous to 
Antonius’ assessment of rhetoric” (56) in ways geared to make us sensible of a criticism of the reductive 
logics of Ramism.  I do not doubt that E.K. was a means to many different critical commentaries on the 
classicizing glosses he makes and the way in which they frame and re-frame the goals Spenser has in 
setting himself up as a poet responsive to his kingdom.  In other words, I do think that Spenser likely 
advanced some criticism of Ramism through E.K. for the same reasons that I think he addresses criticism 
toward humanist practice such as that to be found among lexicographers.  However, as I have already 
pointed out, E.K.’s handling of the metaphor of “sunburn” is not fully analogous to the metaphor used by 
Antonius.  E.K. changes it to make it fit the issue of the English vernacular he is addressing.  This makes 
the position of English poetry relative to its influences very different from the position of Latin rhetoric 
relative to the Greek.  E.K., like the Spenser who writes to Harvey demanding that the English attain 
linguistic autonomy like the Greeks, places English vernacular poetry in the position of the Greek by means 
of the emphasis upon archaism and upon the English-language syntactical “knitting.” Antonius’ failings 
simply cannot be the object of satire and the means by which to position English poetry so flatteringly 
because the former interpretation demands that the two analogies, Antonius’ and E.K.’s, be equivalent in 
ways that they simply are not.   
In both the case of the “æglog” spelling and the case of the crafting of the analogy, then, Spenser’s 
E.K. stakes out a position that reflects the matter of Roman cultural anxiety over Greek influence that, for 
its resemblance to the issues of cultural adaptation and mimicry undertaken by humanists, animated the 
Renaissance understanding of De Oratore that Grafton and Jardine stress.  However, the way E.K. adjusts 
his use of analogical reasoning from De Oratore addresses the relationship of language, poetry, and 
knowledge in ways that cannot be simply critical of Ramist agendas, but rather must address the larger 
ambitions Spenser entertained for poetry and for the English-language poetry Spenser hoped to cultivate.   
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perfectly consistent with Cicero’s likely views.  As Antonius’ interlocutor, Crassus 
defends quite contrary views about philosophy, knowledge, and other details that show 
the range of Cicero’s opinions.  However, regarding the linguistic question that is under 
consideration by E.K., and the question that is eminently relevant to the historical context 
that E.K. and Spenser together confront with The Shepheardes Calender, Antonius’s 
quite Roman/Latin attitude toward the authority of Greek language and culture is 
representative of what Cicero’s De Oratore had to offer Renaissance artists.  It offers a 
way to deal with the influence of classical languages and their culture on vernacular 
languages and culture.  It is of enormous significance, then, that Spenser’s and his 
speaker E.K.’s position does not logically match what we find in Antonius!  E.K. decides 
to use Antonius’s position on the need for eloquence even under the influence of foreign 
language and culture.  However, E.K.’s argument seeks to justify the use of archaic 
diction from English without explicit acknowledgment of the need for rhetorical 
eloquence.  The essential quality of the language has taken precedence.  The “sun” of 
Spenser’s annotator is English, certainly in the case of Chaucer. Moreover, the matter of 
poetry, far from being abstruse or untouchable and damaging to good speech, is the 
primary substance of craft.  E.K. stresses that the “knitting” (14) of the words is a matter 
of poetic skill. Perhaps more tellingly, E.K. points not to his practical restraint from 
philosophical abstraction, as Antonius does, but to the “eternall image of antiquitie” (15) 
that is to emerge from the use of archaic diction in an effective manner.  In focusing our 
attention on that “eternall image,” E.K. is directing us toward an unchanging ideal rather 
than a practical rhetorical or linguistic shading.  He is concerned with eternal knowledge 
as the substance of linguistic rendering.  The core of E.K.’s justification thus emerges 
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from poetry and philosophy, the Greek arts that Antonius merely wants to draw upon 
incidentally. 
The details of the allusion to Cicero hint at an ambitious leap over the Latin and 
even the basic question of the vernacular to the more sophisticated realm of Greek 
philosophy and poetry as a model of original linguistic and cultural integrity. E.K. returns 
to Greek models regarding naming practices, as with the reference to Theocritus as an 
authority on the word aeglog in the Generall Arugment—as I already discussed—and 
with his reference to Theocritus’ ideas about naming in the August æglog’s notes—which 
I will discuss in detail later.  Such references and others form a fuller proof that what we 
find in the allusion to Cicero is substantially concerned with the Greek question 
addressed in the original. Yet E.K.’s continuing argumentation about diction in the 
Epistle recognizably develops this pattern of interest in the Greeks. He relies on 
idealizing and philosophical notions of language broadly first struck with reference to 
Greek poetry, then steeped in appeals to practical or compromising ethics.  Language 
must “blaze a portraict […] of beautye” as much as ugliness, he first tells us, explaining 
that the ugly words “enlumine and make more clearly appear the brightness of brave and 
glorious words” (15).  The imagery of light mixed with reference to rustic or rural 
subjects (the “naturall rudenesse” of the pastoral subject) retains the reminder to the 
reader of the intellectual and antiquarian “sunburn” even as it skillfully embraces the 
contrary notion that such same words are “hard” or “dark” rather than bright.  The 
reference to beauty evokes the Neoplatonic ideals associated with the Renaissance poetry 
particularly, yoking these to the larger philosophical and rhetorical issues.  His principal 
ensuing example, the early Greek poet Alceus, makes this reasoning by complex 
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association and analogy yet more palpable: “So oftentimes a dischorde in Musick maketh 
a comely concordaunce: so great delight tooke the worthy Poete Alceus to behold a 
blemish in the joint of a wel shaped body” (15).  This imaginative complex of references 
sets up E.K.’s insistence that “this Poete [Spenser] hath labored to restore, as to their 
rightfull heritage such good and naturall English words” (16).  The Greek reference thus 
precedes an understanding of a natural, original condition for the English language, 
which is then counted to possess “of it self”—without any effort toward augmentation—
property “ful enough for prose and stately enough for verse.”  Disparagement of the 
influence of Italian and Latin loan-words succeeds E.K.’s insistence upon the 
independent worthiness of English.  Amazingly, though, E.K. then carefully tempers his 
criticism of such practices by placing himself largely in a defensive position that turns 
into an apparent acceptance of the possibility of loan words from other languages.  He 
likens those who would criticize his reliance on archaisms to “the Mole in Aesopes fable, 
that being blynd her selfe, would in no wise be perswaded, that any beast could see” (16-
17).  Yet these people whom he derides for holding their “natural speach” (17) 
inadequate, he ridicules too for being unwilling “that of other it should be embellished.”  
The reader can only guess now that “other” may mean poet or may mean language in this 
context, which on the whole seems strategic to the farrago of E.K.’s assault on the 
subject. He rounds out a paragraph by likening any critics of the use of archaisms or, 
presumably, foreign loan-words, to dogs that bark at bulls for eating the hay they 
themselves cannot consume.  This “currish kind […] cannot be kept from barking” (17).  
We are meant to see that he will accept any means by which the English might be 
improved so long as that end of improvement is realized. 
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In reserving crucial authority to the poet, prizing an obscure and idealized original 
source, and likening a set of pedantic detractors concerned with individual words to 
barking dogs, E.K.’s position deeply resembles what we are later to find in Book 6 of The 
Faerie Queene. (Perhaps in returning to a pastoral landscape, Spenser renewed his 
interest in the questions of language begun with his pastoral eclogues.)  At this early 
stage, though, E.K. also appears to be choosing his references to the Greeks for reasons 
that are not restricted to matters of diction or humanist lexicography.  That is, he is 
setting up a definition of poetry as both divinely inspired and rationally guided, an 
approach specially effective against Plato’s attack on poetry’s irrational basis from the 
Ion and Plato’s dismissal of its potential role for knowledgeable governors in the 
Republic.  After all, having cited Alceus, he has apparently allied himself with the pre-
Socratic Greek poets of irrational vatic authority, but through his reference to De Oratore 
he has also allied his notion of language to that of Roman rhetoricians who sought to gain 
control of that authority.  These interests seem more natural if we consider the dedication 
of the work as a whole to Sir Philip Sidney.  That is, the question of how to frame the 
poet as philosophically responsible is particularly apt because Sidney identifies Plato’s 
criticism as the most singularly troublesome one for defining the rhetorical agency of 
poetry in his Defence of Poesie.  
*  *  * 
Before we consider the way in which E.K.’s definition is like to Sidney’s defense 
and positioned to answer Greek philosophy, consider how at the most basic level it 
stresses the rationality and control of Spenser’s poetic technique as reflected in the syntax 
that makes up for any loaned or archaic diction. E.K. notes that “the knitting of the 
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sentences” has the kind of physical integrity of a well-made body such as he before has 
us observing in Alceus’ musical/anatomical metaphor.  And E.K. then observes that “this 
Authour [Spenser] is well grounded, finely framed, and strongly trussed together” before 
going on to point out that some “ragged rymers […] which without learning boste, 
without judgement jangle, without reason rage and fome, as if some instinct of Poeticall 
spirite had newly ravished them above the meanenesse of commen capacitie” (17).  He 
likens these uncontrolled poets, by now seemingly classed with other barking detractors 
to his author’s inspired use of language, to “a woman in childebirth or as that same 
Pythia,” then quotes half a line from the Aeneid: “Os rabidum fera corda domans etc.” 
(17).  The reference to Pythia, whom we know to be the Cumaean Sibyl by the line from 
Vergil, is further strategic to the positioning of Spenser’s work relative to the classical 
tradition it draws upon and the vernacular English interests it otherwise pursues.  In the 
scene from the epic alluded to, the Cumaean Sybil is about to advise Aeneas about how 
to go about fulfilling his destiny as founder of the Roman line.  The term “Pythia,” to be 
precise, evokes the Greek prophetess of Delphic Apollo as well as the Cumaean Sybil, 
and in this respect E.K. has inserted yet another original Greek cultural identity into a 
Roman setting. Moreover, E.K. has chosen this quote from Vergil not just because it 
reveals the Sybil as analogous to a poet without control, but because the Sybil is mastered 
in that particular scene by Apollo in order that her poetic enigmas may guide the 
founding of the empire.  The full context of the quote runs so: 
But, not yet enduring Phoebus, the prophetess raves  
Wildly in the cavern as if she could shake the god out  
Of her breast.  So greatly he wearies her raving mouth,  
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Taming her wild heart, and shapes her by reining her.56 
 
The Latin verbals “domans” and “premendo” (meaning “taming” and “pressuring”) are 
the verbs used in chariot-driving and horse-riding.  With some wily duplicity, E.K. has 
chosen to locate within an example of a Italian priestess who has lost control of her body 
and voice to the controlling power of a Greek God, a criticism of poets who lose control 
and a praise for those who maintain Apollonian visionary status.  In Vergil’s work, her 
prophecy, not surprisingly, twins the seminal Greek myth of the Iliad to the concluding 
narrative of the final six books of the Aeneid.  For the Roman reader, this was a 
transmission of Greek culture to Roman control.  But for E.K., the context is shifted to 
suit his preference for the original Greek power as something to be found parallel to the 
essential English linguistic and cultural identity.  To be sure, E.K. has us understand that 
the necessary context is Pythian, not Cumaean, and so the Greek culture is privileged 
here much as the Greek sunshine and Alceus were.  Logically, then, since E.K. has (up to 
the point that he quotes) stressed that the poetry of the Shepheardes Calender will be 
controlled and measured, he has implicitly suggested that Spenser’s poetry will be the 
controlling force—the Greek God—rather than the native female virgin.  Furthermore, 
that native female virgin, like Queen Elizabeth who is soon to be implicitly seen as a 
subject matter to play upon in the April æglog,57 appears to be both the native language 
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56 “At Phoebi nondum patiens, immanis in antro/ bacchatur vates, magnum si pectore posit/ excussisse 
deum; tanto magis ille fatigat/ os rabidum, fera corda domans, fingitque premendo” (6.77-80). 
 
57 In the “Lay of Eliza” in the April Eclogue, as William Oram explains, Eliza as the “child of Pan and 
Syrinx” becomes “identical with the oaten reeds or panpipe that conventionally symbolizes the pastoral 
poet’s ability to compose” (68-9).  Less flatteringly understood, the metaphorical turn suggests a pattern of 
reasoning by which Queen Elizabeth is to be seen as the passive subject material upon which the poet plays 
to produce a national music or art.  Such a darker message is quite plausible because, as Oram also 
observes, “the lay speaks, though indirectly, against the queen’s possible marriage to the French prince 
Alençon” and in doing so also “affirms the concept of the mystical marriage of the Virgin Queen and 
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and the essential English identity.  Thus the logical political context of these arguments 
shows that E.K.’s and Spenser’s conception of the English language’s identity is central 
not just to his aesthetics of diction but to his sense of how a poet is to square up to 
national interests in the manner of a Roman rhetorician.  Seen in this way, it is a 
breathtakingly ambitious statement that a poet would much rather have an anonymous 
editor contribute: the veiling of this message about politics is like the safe veiling of any 
message to governing powers. 
Patrick Cheney provides an interpretation of The Shepheardes Calender that 
reinforces my understanding of the careerist vision of the poet—that is, the vision of the 
poet that becomes so much plainer with E.K.’s quotation of Vergil.  Cheney argues that 
Spenser’s contribution to “Western poetics […] lies in Christianizing the Virgilian idea of 
a literary career” (22).58 But even for Cheney this career points back to the “Orphic” and 
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England that Elizabeth herself had initiated” (69).  Louis Montrose argues precisely this in “The 
Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text.” Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts. Eds. Patricia Parker and 
David Quint. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986).  I will return to this issue in when I examine the April 
æglog in the second half of this chapter. Additionally, though, Spenser could have depended on his 
Elizabethan contemporaries to identify the sibyl with Elizabeth for quite specific reasons: certain events in 
1575 involving Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester.  In a recent article in English Literary Renaissance, 
Jessica L. Malay describes the salient event and context: 
In his famous description of the Kenilworth entertainments of 1575, Robert Laneham describes the 
presence of a group of mythical figures who, in the last decades of the sixteenth century, enjoyed a 
final resurgence of attention and authority. The Queen, as she entered the park near the first gate of 
the castle was met by “one of the ten Sibills . . . cumly clad in a pall of white sylk, [who] 
pronounced a proper poezi in English ryme and meter . . . with prophecy certeyn, of mooch and long 
prosperitee health and felicitee.” By choosing one of the sibyls of classical and early Christian 
mythology as part of his entertainments, the Earl of Leicester engineered yet another opportunity for 
flattery. More importantly, he drew the attention of the audience, including the Queen, to the 
sibylline prophecies. These foretold a ruler appointed to lead God’s people into a golden age. 
Leicester could be certain that Elizabeth would recognize and appreciate the connection. It was this 
same hope of recognition that moved a young Elizabethan woman to choose the sibylline prophecies 
as her subject matter, this time in her hand-crafted gift book, intended for the Queen, entitled The 
Divine Prophesies of the Ten Sibills. (173) 
Spenser, as is well known, closely allied himself with Leicester and his faction.  Thus E.K.’s choice of 
imagery from Vergil is fitting on many political levels that suit the argument about language presented. 
 
58 “Western poetics” is a field to which he apparently attributes some canonical unity. I should note that I 
do not support his choice of the term or his generalization about “christianizing.”   
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ostensibly Greek origin of poetry as a practice.  The very reference to Greek precedence 
complicates the Christianizing mission with a classical sense of originality.  To be sure, 
E.K.’s references to De Oratore, Alceus, and Vergil’s “Pythian” Sybil place 
extraordinary emphasis upon an Orphic original authority for a poet who is simply 
presumed Christian for being prophetic.59  E.K. is unquestionably seizing upon the idea of 
an Orphic poet as one who will be identifiably serving the faith of his day.  (Such a poet, 
as I will consider in greater depth momentarily, will not be as vulnerable to the kind of 
charges of irrational enthusiasm that a Platonist might make against him.) This leads us to 
the imagery that E.K. uses to qualify the Orphic Greek poet as Christian. Cheney argues 
at a more specific level about The Shepheardes Calender that the imagery of birds and 
nascent flight as a vatic poet is key to Spenser’s conception of his career: “…Spenser 
uses a major avian image to signal each stage of the four-part experiential process [of a 
man becoming a vatic poet]…” (79-80).  Cheney goes on to point out that of the “forty-
eight avian images” brought up in The Shepheardes Calender, the “nightingale emerges 
as Colin’s bird” (80).  Setting aside the various ways in which this choice might be 
important for the matter of Christian symbolism, Cheney rapidly concludes: 
By associating his persona with the “sovereigne of song,” Spenser appears to be 
identifying the nightingale as the bird of pastoral poetry; the myth of Philomela, 
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59 Cheney’s argument comes with taxonomical baggage: that is, he makes distinctions between the 
careerist, theological, and/or philosophical interests that might be guiding Spenser’s characterization of the 
poet.  He writes, “Spenser’s immediate goal in writing The Shepheardes Calender is thus career based.  He 
aims to establish his authority as England’s new national poet—an heir of ‘Tityrus,’ that figure who evokes 
both his native medieval heir, Chaucer, and his continental classical one, Virgil, as the two descend from a 
common archetype, Orpheus. Spenser’s career-based goal implies that he defines pastoral poetry (or 
redefines it) in careerist terms—as a genre that contributes to a literary career.  He understands pastoral as a 
genre in which the young poet demonstrates his authority to wear his country’s laureate wreath” (77).  I 
share some of Cheney’s desire to point out the ambitions of Spenser’s self-definition, and indeed I think it 
useful to observe the career itself that E.K. sees as part of poetry, but I do not wish to place too much 
confidence in his specific taxonomy at this stage in my argument. 
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as the arch-myth of pastoral.  In doing so, he is returning to a Theocritan 
identification of the pastoral poet that Virgil evidently rejects by identifying the 
pastoral poet as a dove… (80) 
 
For my most basic purposes, Cheney’s observation provides additional reasons why E.K. 
defers to Theocritus as the key source of original authority on spelling: in the subsequent 
Generall Argument, E.K. is effectively deferring to a poetic authority that he has 
previously cited in the Epistle as central to the poetic career. Just as importantly, though, 
the citation of Theocritus’ poetic preeminence aligns neatly with the emphasis E.K. 
generally places on Greek culture’s philosophy and rhetoric earlier in the Epistle, that 
oratorical and poetic context that, like the “loadestarre” English canonical precedents, 
will bolster the language.  Indeed, E.K. is open about stressing that Theocritus is central 
to the poetic tradition as he sees it, stating outright that Theocritus is the “full fledged” 
predecessor to Vergil: “So flew Theocritus, as you may perceive that he was all ready full 
fledged” (18). This metaphorical maturity follows quick on the heels of some overt 
anxiety about the need for the poems to help the language and culture grow out of 
immaturity.  E.K. writes that Spenser was “mynding to furnish our tongue with this kind 
[pastoral eclogues, that is], wherein it faulteth, or following the example of the best and 
most auncient Poetes, which devised this kind of writing” (18).   Note that E.K. makes 
“this kind of writing” beneficial to the language as well as the poetry.  It is not just a 
matter of poetic diction, but a matter of the health and prestige of the cultural holding of 
language. We might justly wonder what justifies such grand purview. 
For Cheney, the imagery of wings and references to Theocritus in the poem 
proper complement E.K.’s efforts to define and justify poetic work in the Epistle.  
Cheney wishes to show that Spenser is aiming through the nightingale at “the arch-myth 
!   
! 178!
of pastoral” (81) in order to demonstrate his superior and now Christian claim to the 
career that Vergil defined as the progress from pastoral to georgic to epic.  This turn of 
reasoning requires a long history of the nightingale as an image, the place of pastoral and 
elegy relative to Theocritus, and the long swath of English, Italian, and French poets who 
precede Spenser in the business of defining the “arch-myth” (81-86).  Naturally, Cheney 
comes to the conclusion that E.K.’s imagery about wings and fledging fuse a variety of 
traditions into a political and careerist justification:  
Together the classical and biblical matrices of Spenser’s myth form a 
characteristic Spenserian synthesis that situates the divine poet in a political 
context.  He is a fledging poet, in need of parental protection because he is 
vulnerable to abuse.  The avian image permits Spenser to subordinate himself to 
Sidney in order to arouse Sidney’s sympathy; it also places the New Poet with the 
great courtier in the only training ground capable of launching a winged career: 
the patronage system. (87) 
 
In describing such political and careeric interests, Cheney frames an essential context for 
Spenser’s inaugural work.  To this frame I hope to add a precise understanding regarding 
the way he and his glossator, E.K., situate the poet’s authority on and for language.  In 
what way, we might justly ask, is this “fledging poet” serving and subordinate to Sidney 
in crafting such a specific position on the original Greek as a model for English?  And 
what can our observations about the intersection between those two things show us? 
When it comes to matters of language, as my argument as already shown and as 
the detailed argumentation of Cathy Shrank has shown, Spenser and his Shepheardes 
Calender meet the interests of specific English predecessors and meet the pressures well 
defined by R.F. Jones’ study.60 But the work of Sir Philip Sidney and the Greek 
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60 In Writing the Nation in Reformation England: 1530-1580, Cathy Shrank traces the widest range of 
influences on the character of Spenser’s Shepheardes Calender.  To do this, she analyzes Spenser’s work as 
a literary man engaged in the larger national effort of “improving the national tongue” (220).  She sees his 
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philosophy upon which Sidney’s efforts depend have a more precise relevance to the 
passages that we have been examining from E.K.’s prefatory materials. Earlier I took 
note of the philosophical interests raised by the superficially simple reference to Cicero.  
The superficial reference was Spenser’s means of talking about justifiable and practical 
choices of diction.  Ultimately, though, as I have shown, the simple reference leads us to 
bolder claims about the essential identity of English as, like Greek, an origin, a source of 
authority for poets.  Similarly, E.K.’s seemingly innocuous reference to Vergil—political 
in some measures already identified—shortly turns E.K. to references to imagery 
necessary to much larger, more ambitious frames of argument about rhetoric, language, 
and poetry in the deepest ranges of Plato’s thought.  After all, the “wings” and 
enthusiasm of the poet referred to in this segment are not an overt turn toward the myth 
of the nightingale or Theocritus, even if such is true later.  In the immediate context, E.K. 
turns our attention toward the oracular Greek poets who were objects of scorn for 
Socrates in the Ion. The mystical prophets and Greek epic poets who were the objects of 
reverence for Vergil in the Aeneid constitute objects of enormous anxiety for Christians 
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work as responsive to specifically English intellectual and political interests, but also as representative of a 
“fusion of classical, Continental, and vernacular cultures” (221).  For example, she points out that Harvey 
and Spenser together in their letters exhibit a concern with preserving a “natural” English speech that is 
related to the similar concerns of such patriotic predecessors as Thomas Smith (228).  Yet she stipulates 
that Spenser’s actual choices in The Shepheardes Calender, while adhering to custom with unreformed 
orthography, “is a far more eclectic English” that “draws on the language of the period that saw the fusion 
of Anglo-Saxon and Norman French, and the demise of inflected Old English” (229).  She explains that 
Spenser’s choice in this regard reflected a complex version of the influence and interest of English 
predecessors like Thomas Wilson as well as the influence of continental ideas like those of Castiglione:  
Where Wilson wanted to unite a nation of English speakers by banishing regional terms and 
providing them with “one maner of language,’” Spenser is eager to encompass a range of different 
Englishes and the language of England’s Irish territories. Like Castiglione, Spenser chooses 
“woordes out of every part” (“parole […] d’ogni parte”). (229-30) 
Thus Shrank also sees the book design of the Shepheardes Calender, its “old fashioned printing techniques, 
diction, and orthography” as a celebration of “ an English literary aesthetic rooted in history and spreading 
across its geographical dominions” (230). Her argument thereafter compiles a great many more examples 
of political and cultural influences that explain the eclecticism and indeed the “elusiveness” of Spenser’s 
dialogic work (239). 
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who cannot assume the pagan stoicism of Roman pietas. For some in the Renaissance, 
the important question was how to turn the vatic power of poets into rational means that 
might serve a government and people.  This is indeed precisely what concerned Sir Philip 
Sidney, the dedicatee of the Calender. In his Defence of Poesie, Sidney intimately links a 
reverence for Greek culture, an identification of the central role of the poet as vatic in a 
way that draws upon that culture, and a redefinition of some of the terms of that poetic 
role to include a natural or easy understanding of the native tongue.61 Shortly after 
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61 I am in my main argument concerned with showing that Sidney links a theory of diction, a kind of anti-
intellectual notion of the English language, and a preference for Greek culture over Latin as the most 
original one.  However, it is worth showing in a little more detail how Sidney arrives at and thoroughly 
over-determines the value of Greek culture and philosophy to his conception of English poetry in his 
Defence in order to more fully illuminate the ties between Sidney and Spenser. 
  Early and late in the piece, Sidney relies heavily upon references to the Greek culture in which its 
poetry and attitudes toward poetry figure as an original and strong source of information about the value of 
poetry generally.  He also strives to show that the English were specially parallel to the Greeks in their 
linguistic choices, writing, “…I know not whether by luck or wisdome, we Englishmen have met with the 
Greekes in calling [the poet] a Maker” (7). Towards the end of his treatise, he more formally declares that 
English “is particularly happy in compositions of two or three wordes together, neare the Greeke, farre 
beyond the Latine, which is one of the greatest bewties can be in a language” (44).  Throughout, his interest 
in the Greeks partially stems from a desire to absorb their philosophical terms into a description of the 
special achievement of poetic work. Sidney is careful early on to describe poetry as a rational art with 
special claims to aiding the development of knowledge in culture.  For example, he notes that poetry “hath 
been the first giver of light to ignorance, and first nurse whose milke litle & litle enabled them to feed 
afterwards of tougher knowledges” (4).  Moreover, Sidney lets the poet usurp the philosopher in having a 
special duty to advance knowledge itself by formulating a conception of ideal things based not upon 
perception alone but upon reasoning about the most perfect state. He writes: 
Onely the Poet disdeining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigor of his own 
invention, doth grow in effect into an other nature: in making things either better then nature 
bringeth foorth, or quite  a new, formes such as never were in nature. (8) 
Here Sidney transparently uses the word “formes” in a way that suggests the poet’s function is to see 
through his work the ideas that are the essential interest of a Platonic philosopher. He even more plainly 
states this: “And that the Poet hath that idea is manifest…” (8). He bases this more or less on the notion 
that the Greeks gave the poet the name of “maker,” and he blithely ignores the problem, well detailed in 
Plato’s Cratylus, that names themselves are insufficient grounds for understanding the things they refer to 
completely.  Rather, he turns to Biblical grounds, arguing that the Biblical prophets were effectively poets 
given to “imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God” (9). The essentials these vatic poets create, he is 
careful to note, are preserved in the languages they used: “These… may justly be termed Vates: so these 
are waited on in the excellentest languages and best understandings” (10).  Eventually, it is precisely the 
poet’s activated and actualized linguistic testament, a form of demonstrated knowledge that teaches and 
that is part of no specific profession, that makes Sidney feel the poet can lay claim to greater virtue than the 
Platonic philosopher.  He reasons that the philosopher’s “vertue is excellent in the dangerlesse Academy of 
Plato: but mine [the poet’s] sheweth forth her honourable face in the battailes of Marathon, Pharsalia…”  
Sidney simply affords the vatic poet a place in advising actual governance which Plato explicitly denies 
him in the Republic.  
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countering the main charge against poets as it emerges from Plato’s Republic, Sidney 
focuses on the adequacy of English itself for poetry and the question of poetic diction.  
These happen to be the matters E.K. also raises, and it is not surprising that Sidney 
actually addresses The Shepheardes Calender in particular: 
The Sheepheardes Kalender, hath much Poetrie in his Egloges, indeed woorthie 
the reading, if I be not deceived.  That same framing of his style to an olde 
rusticke language, I dare not allow: since neither Theocritus in Greeke, Virgill in 
Latine, nor Sanazara in Italian, did affect it (37). 
 
Clearly, Sidney disapproved of the archaism in Spenser’s work, and yet too much has 
been made of this difference.  The difference of opinion should not cause us to overlook 
the enormous commonalities of reasoning about diction, Greek philosophy, Greek 
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 More and more as his argument moves on, Sidney posits a didactic element to poetry in order to 
elevate poetry and poet to equality with the philosopher. Sidney reasons that poets like philosophers are 
active in theorizing about abstract things and that like historians they also track specifics.  Therefore he 
believes they excel both specifically in that they offer better instruction to potential learners.  Didacticism 
is thus essential to his elevation of the poet over the philosopher and historian, but it is also the source of 
poetry’s primacy culturally, and this cultural primacy becomes an integral part of Sidney’s interest in the 
equivalence of English culture to others. He links the pre-historical antiquity (poetry is “of al humane 
learnings the most ancient”[25]) and its relative universality (“it is so universall, that no learned nation doth 
despise it”) to this essential didacticism.  Poetry’s beneficial political function for allegory is secondary to 
this quality tied to the argument about teaching and learning because the attractive way poetry helps the 
right ideas grow is something that Sidney believes the philosophers rely upon despite their access to greater 
truths.  Christ’s poetical parables are his further example of his reasoning on the matter. 
In long, complicated concluding passages, Sidney attempts to refute four charges against poetry: 
That there are “other more frutefull knowledge’s”; “that it is the mother of lyes”; that it leads people to 
licentious and appetitive behaviors rather than intellective ones; “And lastly and chiefly […] that Plato 
banished [poets] out of his Commonwealth” (28). The last of these dominates his response. Having set up 
poets as fulfilling the roles of rhetorician and philosopher, and having made the learning process itself part 
of their necessary appeal, Sidney is in a good position to blunt the edge of the final accusation.  He has 
made the poet politically and socially worthy for his or her ability to help people learn and retain 
knowledge while never actively addressing the nature of that knowledge.  He has, that is, wholly avoided 
the question of how a thinker might test or tease out the validity of that knowledge—a cornerstone of 
Platonic criticism of rhetoric and poetry in, among other places, the Phaedrus.  Rather than reject 
philosophy’s value or fully address Plato’s reasoning, then, Sidney simply claims that Plato is “Poeticall,” 
then claims that it was not poetry itself that the philosophers were meant to banish, but “the abuse” of 
which poets in Plato’s time were guilty.  Sidney does not really encounter or address the foundational ideas 
about knowledge, reasoning, and ascertainment of truth that are central to Plato’s criticism of poets who 
claim divine guidance and more general authority. Rather, he has simply made the poet into a kind of 
philosopher with special didactic tools in language and some legitimate claim to inspiration—a claim an 
atheistic Socrates might have rejected, but Sidney’s contemporaries might not. 
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culture, and the vatic poet.62 Sidney has focused, like E.K. on justifying English poetic 
culture with Greek precedent and linking that precedent to distinctive linguistic choices.  
After his comment on Spenser, Sidney complicates the matter substantially: 
 But let this be a sufficient, though short note, that we misse the right use of the 
material point of Poesie. Now, for the outside of it, which is wordes, or (as I may 
tearme it) Diction, it is even well worse: so it is that hony-flowing Matrone 
Eloquence, appareled, or rather disguised, in a Courtisanlike painted affectation.  
One time with so far fette words, that many seeme monsters, but must seeme 
straungers to anie poore Englishman: an other time with coursing of a letter, as if 
they were bound to follow the method of a Dictionary: another time with figures 
and flowers, extreemlie winter-starved. (41-2) 
 
This passage defines the place of poetic diction between three tense interests. First, with 
his reference to “Matrone Eloquence” he brings up the central interests of classical 
humanists and rhetoricians.  Second, with his reference to the “dictionary,” he raises 
specter of those who will find ways to impose meaning by simply organizing the 
language arbitrarily.  Finally, Sidney refers to the common reader—“anie Poore 
Englishman”—who needs to take ownership of the language, a figure who stands for 
those who wish to tap into the power of the vernacular as a means to educate and 
empower and those who are skeptical of the ornamentation of language as dissolute.  
These are roughly the same interests that E.K. frames with his reference to De Oratore, 
his refusal of the approved definition of “Eclogue,” and his reference to the natural, latent 
resources of English.  To address all those interests and to establish the value of the 
language to poetry and the poetry to the language, Sidney sanctifies the link between the 
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62 Later in the chapter I will examine just why it was, contrary to Sidney’s suggestion, not unreasonable to 
suppose that Spenser was imitating the Doric literary dialect that is central to Hellenistic Greek eclogues 
Theocritus wrote. 
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two in a way that suggests a poet has a just and honorable inspiration through the English 
language: 
Since lastly, our tongue is most fit to honour Poesie, and to bee honored by 
Poesie, I conjure you all that have had the evill luck to read this inck-wasting toy 
of mine, even in the name of the nine Muses, no more to scorne the sacred 
misteries of Poesie. (45) 
 
Sidney is only partly joking.  He goes on to cite the defenders of vernacular poetry—
Bembo, and Landino among them—and to insist that “poets are so believed of the Gods, 
that whatsoever they write, proceeds of a divine furie.”  Yet it is this reciprocally-acting 
suture between the language communally understood and the inspired poetry itself that 
makes the assertion logical. Before we can have this justification of the vatic, Sidney has 
insisted that English is the equal of Greek in this regard:  
But for the uttering sweetly and properly the conceit of the minde, which is the 
end of speech, that hath it equally with any other tongue in the world.  And it is 
particularly happy in compositions of two or three wordes together, neare the 
Greeke, farre beyond the Latine, which is one of the greatest bewties can be in a 
language. (44) 
 
Indeed, the passage should indeed remind us of Spenser’s words to Gabriel Harvey about 
the freedom and independence of Greek. 
Sidney’s effort to sanctify the link between the English language and its poetry 
relies upon twisting the terms of Greek philosophical rejections of poetry into English- 
and language-based justifications of it.  Like Sidney, Spenser relies upon an emphasis 
upon Greek culture as part of his development of a specific idea of English diction and 
poetic handling of that diction. The association between the two authors seems less 
surprising if we consider this commonality rather than their difference of opinion about 
archaism. More importantly, though, in this commonality we have a tool to explicate the 
logic of E.K.’s choice for using “wing” and bird imagery as he is justifying the vatic poet 
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after so much work establishing the political and social relevance of the poet as a 
controlled and controlling power. Seemingly ready to abandon the notion of vatic power 
in general in favor of some grounded approach at the point he condemns the uncontrolled 
enthusiasm, E.K turns to a variety of ways of justifying a Christian enthusiasm while 
making careful nods toward the relevant parts of the Greek philosophical tradition. E.K.’s 
reference to the poets filled with a “Poeticall spirite” (17) relates to Socrates’ complaint 
against the “inspired” poets in the Ion—men whose credentials as poets depend upon 
inspiration in precisely the way E.K. disparages. Socrates says to Ion the rhapsode: 
You know, none of the epic poets, if they’re good, are masters of their subject; 
they are inspired, possessed, and that is how they utter all those beautiful poems.  
The same goes for lyric poets if they’re good: just as the Corybantes are not in 
their right minds when they dance, lyric poets, too are not in their right minds 
when they make those beautiful lyrics, but as soon as they sail away into harmony 
and rhythm they are possessed by Bacchic frenzy.  […] For the poet is an airy 
thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes 
inspired and goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him. (27) 
 
Socrates roughly describes E.K.’s “rakehellye route of our ragged rhymers” that “without 
reason rage and fome” (17).  We might think that E.K. would simply prefer a rational 
poet, but within the next page he simply insists upon humility in poets: “As for Colin, 
under whose person the Authour selfe is shadowed, how furre he is from such vaunted 
titles and glorious showes…” (18).  The poet whom E.K. prefers (the one he says “Colin” 
and Spenser effectively are) hopes to prove his “tender wyngs”  in order to take a 
“greater flight.”  E.K emphasizes that the first of those to fly, the one he emulates, is 
Theocritus, who was “full fledged,” while Vergil “as not yet well feeling his wings.”  We 
are meant to understand, much as Patrick Cheney sees, that poetry is a matter of spiritual 
maturity that brings with it a legitimate career aspiration, a legitimate place in the society 
and culture.  “So finally flyeth this our new Poete,” E.K. says of Spenser, implying by 
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“our” a national and collective spiritual achievement equal to that of the Romans (19).  
Again, like Sidney’s, E.K.’s sanctification of the poet has come by suturing the poetic 
wings to the language and writing that has been the body of the argument all the way up 
to this point. E.K. asserts that “Colin, under whose person the Authour selfe is shadowed” 
is a strategic figure whereby to exemplify the power of poets over language.  But E.K.’s 
approach to sanctifying the poet takes on an individual color: he states that it will be 
through a conscious and reasoning effort to ornament language that Spenser will work, 
arguing that Spenser is “mynding to furnish our tongue with this kinde, wherein it 
faulteth, or following the example of the best and most auncient Poetes, which devised 
this kind of wryting” (18). Most surprisingly, E.K. argues that the ancient poets 
rehabilitated vatic poetry through writing conventions.  Like the good part of the soul that 
is characterized as growing wings in the Phaedrus, these authors tried “to prove theyr 
tender wyngs” in a literary flight with such written forms.  The first to try this precise 
method was not Alceus or any archaic Greek poets who might fall short in the Platonic 
estimation, E.K. finds for us, but Theocritus—the Greek figure for whom all pastoral 
work in Latin under Vergil will ensue.   
 My readers will rightly hesitate here and ask: “How can you be sure the ‘wing’ 
imagery moves from a reference to the Ion to a reference to the Phaedrus?”  In fact, I am 
quite sure that E.K. and Spenser do not necessarily intend a reference to the Phaedrus 
specifically so much as a reference to the Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Christian idea of the 
soul’s development. However, it is next to impossible to understand the logic that E.K. 
and Spenser turn to without examining matching patterns and isolating key differences 
between the Platonism relied upon and the philosophical ideas engendered.  In this case, 
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Spenser is, like Sidney, substituting the poet for the philosopher and adding Christian 
religion, writing, and the artistic and historic essence of vernacular English to a rough 
pattern based on the Phaedrus.  As I argued in my first chapter, The Fowre Hymnes is 
overtly concerned with the question of how poetic inspiration emerges relative to 
language and writing.  The ascent to higher consciousness with “wings” and the vision of 
writing on the soul are key to that late work, and indeed the relevance of that late work 
was key to explicating the visionary ideas of poetry, language, and identity in Book 6 of 
The Faerie Queene.  Here in E.K.’s prefatory materials, though, we find portents of 
Spenser’s later philosophical interest: the ubiquitous emphasis upon Greeks, a reference 
to orphic/vatic inspiration and enthusiasm, and the wing imagery circumscribe the 
scholarly argument about what the poem and the poet are trying to do for the reader with 
the language.   But E.K. has also steered us to the idea of growing wings because this 
form of imagery counters the proud and irrational vatic poet of the previous page—the 
poet of the Ion.  Here E.K. is indeed turning us toward a vatic poet that usurps the 
provinces of rhetorician and philosopher in much the same way Sidney would have it.  
The Phaedrus is the natural point of interest and relevance for both because there Plato 
used a vivid description of a dialogue in a rural setting to upset the cultural centrality of 
poet and orator in favor of the philosopher.  The Phaedrus was exactly the same point of 
interest for Cicero in De Oratore, though more for its rural setting and sunny imagery 
than for its imagery of wing-growth. 
The descriptions of the spiritual elevation attained by the poet in the Phaedrus 
give us precisely the “wing” and maturation imagery with which we find E.K. 
preoccupied.  Socrates, in defending a key vision of the development of the soul in the 
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rhetorical voice of Stesichoros (the good speaker rather than a sophist), presents a notion 
of the philosopher as growing wings as a consequence of being re-awakened to the ideal 
form of the good planted in the soul by the divine forces that forged it: 
…it is fair that only a philosopher’s mind grows wings, since its memory always 
keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close to which the gods are 
divine. (185, 249c) 
 
As the Phaedrus shows, the philosopher is only first for pursuing these ideals directly, 
not for being the only one to pursue them.  Somewhat earlier, Socrates has specified (via 
some creative spelling and etymology) a historical past in which the nature of truth has 
emerged from prophecies. The priestesses of Delphi and poets, Socrates explains, pursue 
the same ideal truths by trying to gain access to the same divine source, though in 
madness.  This source was available to the name-making or language-making groups, he 
says; and this source is what poets use because it arises from an ancient origin: 
The people who designed our language [“those who made names” more literally] 
in the old days never thought of madness as something to be ashamed of or 
worthy of blame; otherwise they would not have used the word “manic” for the 
finest experts of all—the ones who tell the future—thereby weaving insanity into 
prophecy.  They thought it was wonderful when it came as a gift of the god, and 
that’s why they gave its name to prophecy; but nowadays people don’t know the 
fine points, so they stick in a “t” and cal it “mantic.”  Similarly, the clear-headed 
study of the future, which uses birds and other signs, was originally called 
oionoïstic, since it uses reasoning to bring intelligence (nous) and learning 
(historia) into human thought; but now modern speakers call it oiônistic, putting 
on airs with their long “o.” To the extent, then, that prophecy, mantic, is more 
perfect and more admirable than sign-based prediction, oiônistic, in both name 
and achievement, madness (mania) is finer than self-control of human origin, 
according to the testimony of the ancient language givers [n.b. the Greek simply 
reads “the ancients,” referring back to the earlier specification of their name-
making role] (180-81, 244b-d) 
 
This etymological jugglery is not altogether different in spirit from what we find in 
E.K.’s dogged reliance upon the specious AEG spelling or his insistence on the value of 
the earlier source.  More importantly, though, Socrates spells out a connection between 
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an essential original linguistic form and an authoritative rhetorical position precisely as 
E.K. would have it.63 Thus Plato casts the poets and visionaries as defective philosophers 
and gives wings to the philosophers.  Like Plato, E.K. casts the mantic enthusiasts as 
defective.  However, unlike Plato, when he improves upon these defective visionaries, it 
is with a poet using the best English in a structured way.  For E.K., it is this poet, rather 
than a philosopher, who grows wings and ascends towards a truth.  Finally, E.K.’s poet is 
also deeply invested in the serious contemplation of love and beauty as a means of 
assuring the value of the new vision of rhetoric: the author and “new Poete” who has 
wings, we learn, has “long wandred in the common Labyrinth of Love” and wishes to 
“allay the heat of his passion” (19) in the structured nature of the eclogues themselves.  
The growth of wings comes from the contemplation of love and beauty in what was 
clearly a well-chosen Greek mythological site—a labyrinth.  No place could better be the 
site of contest between bestial passion and spiritual elevation than the daedal 
mythological site of the contest between the minotaur and Theseus! 
*  *  * 
We are now ready to conclude my first part by explaining why E.K. strives to 
justify such an ostensibly unreasonable position as The Shepheardes Calender employs 
about the spelling of the genre, Æglogs. Before we arrive at that justification which so 
prominently features Theocritus, a vatic but rational Theocritus has already been made, in 
the Epistle, the foundational Greek example for the twinned linguistic and poetic interests 
of Spenser in his innovating effort.  This is why, when accounting for the choice of the 
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63 As Jean Nienkamp says of this stage of the Phaedrus, “the discussion later in the dialogue suggests 
Socrates’ second speech about the beloved leading the lover to a vision of Beauty is an archetype for true 
rhetoric leading its audience to the Good” (163). 
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spelling and name Æglog, E.K. cites the Greek in preference to the Roman and defers to 
an authorial decision-making.  E.K. evinces an awareness of the interpretive challenge 
posed by The Shepheardes Calender as one posed by the author for the readership, not as 
a general puzzle of culture or language.  The Calender’s reader must decode a variety of 
signs—from the emblems, the woodcuts, the shifts in fonts, and the shifts between 
languages and kinds of English—that circumscribe an English identity as it is linked to a 
poet’s making.  E.K.’s Epistle and Generall Argument together insist upon a complex 
position on how the author intends language itself to be understood.  This same position 
challenges historical and methodological authority we would find in a dictionary.  E.K.’s 
argumentation allows the reader to see the potential inadequacy of the dictionary’s 
prescriptive power as it is asserting the author’s power over language in particular.  In the 
Epistle, the overlap between Spenser’s (the author’s) concepts of poetic authority and its 
links to linguistic identity determines his management of the linked issues of archaism, 
regionalism, nationalism, innovation in the poetry.  Considering the Greek philosophy 
and Latin rhetorical theory he replies to, Spenser as E.K. finally compels the reader to 
imagine the value of a word choice, æglog, as an alignment of authorial inspiration with a 
meaningful past.  That meaningful past is a source of custom and reason, but only when 
the author makes concerted choices to which the reader may be sympathetic.  E.K’s 
comments therefore block rather than affirm the relevance of classicized lexicographic 
authority, whatever Spenser’s general allegiance to humanist philology.  Nonetheless 
Spenser does not risk allowing the author pure license, else there were simply no need for 
E.K. or the kind of readership practice the annotator encourages.  As we shall see in the 
next segment, questions of poetic authority over innovation, archaism, and dialect in the 
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poem and its notes are handled in a way that encourages the reader to see meaning 
emerging relationally, rather than in definitional terms—not, that is, as products of 
established denotation.  In the larger frame of the work, then, Spenser is asking, even 
challenging the reader to trust the editor within measure and to trust, more importantly, to 
trust in his or her own ability to discover the meaning of the unfamiliar.  He is asking 
most of all for a reader capable of seeing the English language (like the original Greek 
language that is “made” by original architects in a way that Socrates finds rational) in an 
originating and pure mental refraction that accepts the authority of the mind over the 
material word.  The stress falls heavily upon what we must see as a relational idea of 
meaning.64  
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64 As I noted in my introduction, my view of Spenser’s use of E.K. to advance this notion of meaning in 
language as I have outlined it above has in some ways been advanced by Andrew Zurcher in his recent 
book, Spenser’s Legal Language.  After an exhaustive analysis of E.K.’s Epistle, Andrew Zurcher argues 
that the relational model of meaning is essential to understanding both The Shepheardes Calender and 
Spenser’s work in The Faerie Queene (28-41). He notes that there is a difference between “denotative” and 
“relational” ideas about meaning that plays a key role in Spenser’s time period and is an essential part of 
the verbal analysis E.K. expects of his readers: “Although intellectual historians have debated the relative 
prominence of relational versus denotative structures of meaning in early modern linguistic and 
hermeneutic theory, particularly in relation to Lorenzo Valla, the relational model was a fairly standard part 
of sixteenth-century rhetorical theory, if in a slightly restricted sense” (37).  He concludes, much as I do, 
that E.K.’s reliance on this idea of meaning constitutes a challenge to the readership:  
E.K.’s virtuoso account of contemporary language theory and hermeneutics, coupled to his, and 
Spenser’s, promise of a recoverable, pre-existent meaning guaranteed by the author’s Sidneian 
“fore-conceit”, creates a strong emphasis on interpretation as a kind of game, governed by rules, 
that the reader has a chance of winning. (40) 
There is, however, a key difference between our approaches.  Like me, Zurcher sees E.K. as full of 
“insouciant cleverness” (32) but fundamentally performing an “irreverently appropriative defense of 
Spenser’s diction” (34).  Unlike me, though, Zurcher sees Spenser’s insistence upon relational meaning as 
an exception to his adherence to the trends of humanist philological practice (34-37).  As previous chapters 
have shown and as the present chapter will show, Spenser was busy situating his resistance to some ideas 
from lexicography and placing those in a specific philosophical and rhetorical context.  So, while I agree 
with Zurcher’s ideas, I place much more emphasis upon the role of more general ideas from philosophy and 
more specific ideas from lexicography as the motives behind Spenser’s use of E.K. and his 
conceptualization of language.  
There are, of course, further differences between the approach Zurcher takes to the significance of 
Spenser’s notion of meaning and my own. Zurcher chooses, for example, to see this idea of language as a 
sort of relational game as a means of explaining Spenser’s larger literary intent.  Thus Zurcher takes on 
ideas of total formal systems, even closed ones, that liberally conflate ideas from Plato and Aristole which 
Sidney and Spenser and their contemporaries were struggling to redefine.  Zurcher, for example, makes the 
following argument about Spenser’s “hermeneutical game”: 
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So, in his time when humanist and scholarly authority could itself easily tend 
toward the acceptance of the lexicon as the fixed site of linguistic knowledge and thus 
cultural identity, Spenser offered a glossator who is trusting of his readership and barks 
back in answer to the “currish kind” he sees quarreling over the authority of literary 
effort. Yet to confirm that the Shepheardes Calender encourages a notion of relational 
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The hermeneutical game that Spenser and E.K. invite readers to play in The Shepheardes 
Calender, and to which Spenser again invites us, serially, in The Faerie Queene, then, echoes on a 
large and more diffused scale the same tension subsisting in the use and interpretation of 
individual words: is reading an ars, or a scientia? From the author’s vantage, too, a similar 
question hovers over Spenser’s work: is writing a gift, conferred by the Graces or taught by the 
Muse, or a skill, conned by learning and practice?  The confounding of hermeneutics and exegesis 
has a way, in Spenser’s poetry, of mediating the psychological, moral, and political questions that 
perplex his thought, so that the ability of a reader to learn how to be dazzled by Spenser’s verse 
becomes—by a series of conceptual relations involving, say, Aristotle’s ethics—a justification for 
the suppression of Irish customs and cultural identity. The tendency to analogize systems of 
human learning and wisdom in the reading of Spenser’s poetry and prose is occasioned, or made 
possible, by the recurrent preoccupation of his writing with the relation between instance and rule, 
or sensus and sensus germanus, what one might call a meta-structure inherent to most disciplines 
and, indeed, human experiences.  Whether we construe or identify this relation as Neoplatonic 
(phenomenon: form), as hermeneutical (verba: res), as linguistic or allegorical and hence 
synchronic (signifier: signified), as prophetic and diachronic (omen: event), as moral (action: 
virtue), as legal (judgment: principle), in any other number of other locally compelling ways, we 
find ourselves engaging with a problem that freighted the minds of early modern philosophers and 
poets, and one that penetrates to the core of how we construe the relation of ourselves : world. (41) 
I hesitate at these conflations between different philosophies and systems in part because I believe that 
Spenser’s eclecticism does not necessarily join their elements, certainly not completely and smoothly—a 
point I was at some pains to prove in my first chapter by showing the specific elements of Platonism that he 
adjusts.  That is, I simply do not accept Zurcher’s suggestion that Spenser hoped to engage a “meta-
structure inherent to most disciplines” via his play with meaning.  Spenser’s work often operates at a site of 
thoughtful contest over language, as with his partial praise for Calepine or his complicated satirical jibe 
with Bon/Malfont.  The contest and the site in each case simply demands anything but a closed and formal 
outcome for the interpreter. Zurcher labors with an idea of how readers should respond and what meanings 
are essentially right, but I think Spenser’s intent is much more deliberately veiled than revelatory for a host 
of reasons related to the difference between poetics, philosophy, and oratory. My basic interest, like that of 
Zurcher, lies in explaining what Spenser thought about language, why he likely thought it, and then how 
this constitutes a formative part of some of his notions of what poetry should and can do. However, I am 
not interested in a more total explication of Spenser’s effort, particularly one that relates it to one formal 
system of hermeneutics that embraces a range of disciplines outside poetry. Zurcher wishes to interpret 
Spenser’s ideas of meaning, his challenge to readership, and his poetry as a matter rooted to the question of 
establishing law—that is, he wishes to draw upon the “contribution of common law hermeneutics to any 
reading” of Spenser’s allegory (48).   My examination of Spenser’s conceptualization of meaning in 
language, focused as it is upon ideas about writing and the mind, will, I hope, reflect and support Zurcher’s 
general and larger method and its ramifications for our understanding of Spenser’s intent and his place in 
history. However, I am much more interested in being able to distinguish the particulars of how Spenser 
defines his model of relational meaning while resisting the urge to see philosophies and poetries so 
indistinctly as subordinate participants in a larger socio-political and historical enterprise. 
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meaning as essential to the language to be used as part of a national literary effort, and to 
describe accurately how Spenser would have defined such an abstraction, I need to study 
his æglogs themselves in greater depth. 
 
2. Relational Meaning Understood as a Key Part of the Idea of Poetic Vocation and 
Diction in The Shepheardes Calender 
Spenser’s choice to feature a glossator so prominently for The Shepheardes 
Calender is explicable within a larger frame of history surrounding sixteenth-century 
classical lexicography.  This frame concerns quite basic didactic and intellectual issues. 
As Hans Sauer’s brief history of glossing and lexicography in the medieval period 
reveals, the Western European tradition of glossing was closely connected to Latin 
language explication and the general learning process associated with literary study. 
Quoting Hüllen, Sauer notes that “‘glossing and the use of glosses was at the heart of the 
intellectual life’ in the (early) Middle Ages” (19).  Sauer explains that dictionaries 
emerged out of the practice of glossing hard words and then collecting those glosses (21).  
On the one hand, then, glossing and glossary are fundamentally didactic enterprises that 
carry with them a presumption that collective authority over linguistic meanings is 
natural and necessary.  These enterprises were in place before sixteenth-century 
humanism took hold of them.  However, on the other hand, the glossaries themselves are 
authorial and culturally-defining achievements that enlarge the presumption they carry 
about meaning and funnel responsibility for determining meaning into more distinct 
groups and individuals.  With regard to the Latin-language lexicography that had been 
essential to the English connection to general European religion and culture, Sauer 
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explains: “From around 1000 onwards, large Latin-Latin dictionaries became popular for 
learning Latin; some of them were imported to England from the continent, some were 
compiled by Englishmen” (30).  The authors of such works, like Ambrogio Calepino, 
were acknowledged in ways that indicate their achievements stirred particular theories 
about how the languages and meanings they defined functioned as parts of society and 
functioned relative to the minds of individual learners. 
What does this foregoing general history mean for us? Spenser surely knew that 
the scholarly gloss and lexicography were linked. Thus the achievements of lexicography 
in accumulating a culture of learning and literacy out of simple glossing practice would 
have been clear to Spenser as he positioned E.K. to furnish the reasons behind poetic 
diction.  However, his approach to the figure of the glossator—the polyglot scholar with a 
penchant for Greek—reveals Spenser’s anxieties, even likely jealousies, about that 
scholarly culture of lexicography. In Spenser’s lifetime, lexicography and its associated 
scholarship was almost exclusively focused on classical languages.  That scholarly 
culture was in fact the handmaiden of learning and using those classical languages for the 
Neo-Latin poetry that was one important model for vernacular work. The specific history 
around Spenser’s 1570s is instructive in this regard.  Cathy Shrank has pointed out that 
the “‘triumph of English’—manifested in the literary achievements of Spenser, 
Shakespeare, Sidney, and their contemporaries—was not as sudden as it appears […] if 
we look to the writings of the earlier years of the sixteenth century” (25).  Rather, 
Spenser’s predecessors carried on the “search for a national language and literary style” 
in a way that “asserted their Englishness” even while they did so “in relation to Latin and 
the continent.”  Shrank focuses on just a few of Spenser’s humanist predecessors—
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Andrew Borde, John Leland, William Thomas, and Thomas Smith—in order to explain 
how Englishness as Spenser defined it emerged from a complex of continental and Latin-
language humanist influences.  J.W. Binns’ exploration of Latin writings from the period 
confirms Shrank’s insights even as it points to the broadly-planted respect for a 
humanism distinctly associated with Neo-Latin verse as a centerpiece of intellectual and 
artistic life in Spenser’s England. Binns’ reports on the specifics tell us what this would 
have meant to Spenser in 1579 as he dedicated his first major work to Sidney while 
courting more general royal favor.  For Spenser, the centrality of such Neo-Latin and its 
attendant humanism would have been more conspicuous in his own intellectual efforts as 
a poet because, as Binns writes, “Neo-Latin poetry becomes a significant part of English 
culture from about the middle of the sixteenth century onwards”—in other words, as 
Spenser was growing up, going to university, and learning the place of poetry in society 
(11).  He would have known, then, that Neo-Latin verse at the university was seen as 
deeply appropriate to currying royal favor and speaking to powerful individuals.  Such 
verses were composed regularly in honor of the Queen, and they were particularly 
associated with her visits to the university itself. During Queen Elizabeth’s visit to 
Cambridge in 1564, for example, the Provost presented a book of Neo-Latin verses to her 
(35).  An identical gesture was made at Oxford in 1566 (36).  Gabriel Harvey himself 
composed “a [Neo-Latin] poetical record of the Queen’s visit to Audley End” in 1578 
(37).  Binns puts the matter plainly: “Latin poetry, in effect, is here at the service of 
politics as a celebration and reinforcement of royal power.”  Like the Latin tributes to 
Elizabeth’s visit, the largely Neo-Latin verses from in the commemorative volumes 
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commissioned in 1587 at Oxford and Cambridge for the death of Sir Philip Sidney 
indicate the honored place of Neo-Latin verse in the society.   
It is tempting to view these Latin tributes to power as mere formalities, while 
assuming that English was fast becoming the true and pure voice of a larger range of 
people in the period. However, those Latin tributes were frequent and circumscribed by a 
broad-based effort at Neo-Latin verse associated with the legitimacy of the university as 
well as the principal literary models of antiquity that were held in serious esteem. “The 
amount of Anglo-Latin verse printed from the mid-sixteenth century onwards is so great 
that no detailed account of its literary history can be given here,” Binns cautions before 
registering a survey of its characteristic features (46).  Clearly, no English people then 
knew what the future of the vernacular would be, but they did know and have a common 
trust in the established value of Latin as the language of Europe.  There is a further 
evidence of this trust in the poetic choices of Neo-Latin versifiers that is key to 
understanding the character of the Neo-Latin effort that Spenser would have been so 
conscious of: the work of the period, as Binns tells us, is varied mainly in response to 
“devices popular in classical Greek literature from its earliest roots and emphasized 
strongly in the Hellenistic period” (46).  The rediscovery of the Greek influence on Latin 
poetic forms and inspiration made humanist scholars engage in a revival in which they re-
lived that imitative and emulative Latin activity.  Under the influence of Julius Caesar 
Scaliger’s Poetices libri septem, English Neo-Latin poetry took on a particular cast. 
“There is nothing remarkable,” Binns explains, “in a learned Latin poet knowing [the 
devices of Hellenistic Greek poets].  What is notable, however, is the extent to which the 
craze for them developed in the Latin poetry of Englishmen” (46).  With this historical-
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literary context, we may explain why Spenser’s E.K. places such extraordinary emphasis 
upon the adaptation of Greek models to English in the manner of a Roman or Latin 
poet/rhetorician:  Spenser as E.K. is doing precisely as his Neo-Latin competitors were in 
a manner that, for English poetry, placed his work squarely in line for the kind of political 
and courtly significance he saw attributed to the public and university-sponsored efforts 
around him.   
Returning to the matter of lexicography itself, though, there is a further context 
which explains both the English craze over Greek influence and Spenser’s willingness to 
acknowledge that Greek influence in his glossator’s preferences.  Even as English 
vernacular poetic efforts were in their infancy and Neo-Latin efforts held a conspicuous 
legitimacy sanctioned by the Queen and such royal personages as Lord Burghley, the 
finest effort in Greek lexicography was being completed by the most famous of French 
lexicographic sources—Henri Estienne, child of Robert Estienne, author of the most 
important Latin lexicon of the century. 
Here some further history is in order before we discuss Henri Estienne or the 
nature of the Greek lexicography or Greek-language studies. Henri was brought up in a 
printer’s household where Latin was regularly spoken by the polyglot inhabitants 
(Considine 57).  He was keenly aware of his heritage, and indeed his works of Greek 
lexicography bore the traits of his father’s efforts in Latin lexicography.  As John 
Considine reports, Robert’s production in 1531 of the Thesaurus linguae latinae had 
improved upon the commonly-used Calepino lexicon in several key ways: most crucially, 
though, by presenting an “internal history” of the Latin vocabulary that “forces the reader 
to consider the productivity of language” —that quality of copia so crucial to fellow 
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humanists like Erasmus (46).  Even with this ambitious approach to defining the rational 
qualities of meaning in the Latin language, Robert’s work “was meant to be marketable 
to students and learned persons” (43) rather than simply linguistic scholars.  John 
Considine makes plain that “Estienne’s self portrayal as a hero was […] shaped by 
technology” in the creation of a dictionary so meticulously organized and marketed (53).  
Part of the technology of this book in terms of its appeal to people generally, thus, 
involved its potential for teaching the person who consults the work the very systematic 
and productive qualities of the Latin language—not just an idiom, but the broadly-spread 
and culturally-bound processes of reasoning that come with the language and its famed 
texts.  In this respect, Robert Estienne was going beyond the humble aspirations of a 
mere glossator hoping to enlighten an individual on a single point of meaning.  He was 
taking responsibility for the larger scholarly, poetic, literary, and political habits of mind65 
that come with a language whose qualities from historical examples of use can be 
internalized and duplicated in such a way that it exactly resembles or exceeds the 
potentiality of a first language or vernacular. 
Henri Estienne had the task of living up to the family reputation and improving 
upon his father’s legacy with regard to Latin lexicography. As Considine again explains, 
it was to his passion for Greek that he turned in order to meet expectations; and as part of 
that interest, Henri attempted to figure out “the relationship between the vernacular and 
classical languages” (61).  This effort resulted in his 1565 Traicté de la conformité du 
langage François avec le grec.  In this work, Estienne was not attempting to prove that 
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65 I use the term “habits of mind” for the moment as a stand-in for matters of epistemology, knowledge, 
compositionality, intentionality and others that capture the difficult relationship between mind and 
language at stake here.  
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French was a direct inheritor of the Greek language’s words and syntax, but rather that 
there was a strong likeness between the two that justified a high opinion of the Parisian 
French that he himself loved.  “If French was to be shown to be the noblest language of 
the contemporary world,” Considine explains, “then it must be shown to resemble 
Greek,” the language of greatest renown (62).  This concern led Estienne to make a 
number of claims about how Greek poetic uses of dialect and French poetic uses of 
dialect should be similar in his 1579 La Précellence du langage François—a matter we 
shall return to later in more detail.   Suffice to say, then, that Henri Estienne shared the 
view promoted by his father’s dictionary that lexicographic study could teach vernacular-
speakers a way of improving the value of their language in concrete structural and 
semantic ways.  His arguments about the similarity of French and Greek are aimed at the 
same humanistic goal and share the same assumptions about the nature of meaning, 
knowledge, and language. Not surprisingly, then, Henri Estienne’s monumental work to 
establish himself, like his father, was a lexicon begun under his father’s direction: the 
Thesaurus graecae linguae completed in 1572. Henri Estienne dedicated the work to 
several rulers: Charles IX, Maximilian II (the Holy Roman Emperor); Elizabeth I of 
England; Frederick III of the Palatinate; and John George, Elector of Brandenburg.  The 
manifold dedication speaks to the ambition of the work and to the kind of prestige the 
Estienne family carried as language experts with a necessary influence on the humanist 
academic environments dependent upon state management and protection.  Estienne 
rightly saw himself constructing a work to enhance the expertise of scholars who were to 
produce lawyers, diplomats, administrators and the like in a pan-European network. 
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Consider carefully now the political and intellectual forces that converge upon 
Greek-language study and lexicography in the decade when Spenser is finishing 
university studies and aspiring to be an English poet of national distinction.  First, Neo-
Latin poets around Spenser were imitating Greek models.  Second, they were deriving 
much support in the university environment from Queen Elizabeth. Third, the interest in 
Greek language was a competitive one that ironically helped sanction or improve the 
standings of vernacular language efforts. (Henri Estienne did not idly dedicate his work 
to an English protestant queen!)  From the 1550s through the 1570s, these three issues 
were particularly relevant to French poetic and humanistic culture insofar as the Estienne 
family had made a name for itself.  Spenser had to know that name and its significance. 
In fashioning a theory of his own about poetic and enriched national diction for The 
Shepheardes Calender, Spenser’s E.K. refers to Greek culture openly and frequently.  He 
does so not only to address the classical philosophy that potently addressed issues of 
language, but also to situate an English appropriation of Greek poetics responsive to 
competitive French and continental claims on Greek poetry and language.  Part of those 
claims against which Spenser struggled were those circumscribed by a humanist 
scholarly expertise.  That expertise defined language in ways bound to be advantageous 
to scholars and disadvantageous to the authority of poets—the very point to which E.K. 
appears to respond in his disingenuous defense of the AEG spelling. Spenser in all 
likelihood therefore knew that the French models for the vernacular and French 
lexicographic claims on the classical were connected. We already know that it was to 
French-language poets of the Pléiade that Spenser turned for one model for his vernacular 
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work.66  That is, we know very well that he was translating Du Bellay during his early 
years for Jan van der Noot’s 1569 A Theatre […of] voluptuous Worldlings.  From E.K.’s 
notes, we know that one model for Spenser’s principal shepherd, Colin, comes from 
Clément Marot. Spenser could have easily understood that the French were in complex 
competition with the English—as indeed were Italians, Spaniards, and other Europeans—
over an ongoing European poetic and scholarly process of establishing links between 
classical and vernacular languages.  Moreover, as I will show in greater depth soon, the 
competition over the improvement of the vernacular through comparison to the classical 
involves complicated conceptions of meaning and language. Since he later proves so 
acutely aware of the Mirabellio and Calepino lexicons (as I showed in Chapter 2), 
Spenser would not have overlooked the Estienne family’s works and their claims on 
classical languages.  Therefore he very easily could have apprehended the significance of 
their pursuit of authority and its potential conflicts with his own. But what evidence do 
we have that Spenser was directly responsive to the sort of lexicographic claim asserted 
by the Estienne family? And what does it tell us about Spenser’s theory of diction and 
language?  To answer these questions, I first need to explain how Spenser’s composite 
literary dialect is modeled on the literary Greek Doric, then why that modeling is 
contrary to the process Henri Estienne proposes in two of his books addressing the 
subject. Having shown those two things, I can better explain the ways in which the poetry 
and glossing of The Shepheardes Calender mirrors the contrast between Spenser and 
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66 In The Grammar of Spenser’s Faerie Queene (Philadelphia: Linguistic Society of America, 1936), 
Herbert Sugden observed that Spenser’s management of grammar and style in The Faerie Queene is 
systematic, conservative and guided by theories about language that must emerge from Du Bellay and 
Ronsard rather than his English influences (9-12).  
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Estienne’s approach to language and dialect, defining a resistance to the denotative power 
of the glossator even as it trains the reader in an awareness of the need for relational 
meaning. 
* * * 
Paula Blank calls the claim that Spenser crafted the English diction of The 
Shepheardes Calender to resemble the Greek Doric dialect a “reasonable” but “mistaken” 
approach to the matter (116). In defense of her skepticism, she cites among other things 
Sidney’s negative comments from the Defence, and then she states that Spenser’s motives 
in using dialect could not indeed have been a simple imitation of the Greek precedent 
(117). Sidney’s comment suggests to her that Spenser’s use of dialect was quite 
unacceptable to Renaissance humanist views of custom and artistry.  Blank’s is a rather 
isolated view, and she explains her opposition to current in scholarly thinking thus:  
There have been numerous scholarly efforts to assimilate Spenser’s poetic diction 
to sixteenth-century literary practice, but these, perhaps, have overlooked a 
simpler way to understand his purpose: Spenser estranged his language from more 
traditional forms of courtly discourse in an effort to solicit the very attention that 
his diction immediately received. (124) 
 
As I will show, Blank’s skepticism and the problems with it ultimately lead us to a new 
way of understanding what Spenser might be after in imitating a Greek dialect.  In one 
way, her view seems quite wrong: Spenser was almost surely imitating Greek Doric in 
ways that conform to standards in thinking about dialect from his period.  However, she 
is quite right that his construction of Greek Doric does not follow some principles of 
thinking about language and dialect more generally—those, as I shall show, more 
appropriate to a Greek lexicographer like Henri Estienne.  In resisting a model that would 
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have been appropriate to a lexicographer like Estienne, Spenser was indeed being 
contrarian about dialect in ways that further define his view of language and poetics. 
Spenser’s view of language depends upon a combination of philosophical and 
literary concerns so deeply embedded in the culture of his time that it is hard to imagine 
how he could have been only trying to be contrarian in his choices. Sheldon Zitner points 
out that Homer, Ennius, Vergil, and similar classical sources were using “composite 
literary languages” mixing terms from dialects and archaisms in order to achieve the 
dignity of their genre (366). (We will return in a moment to a fuller description of 
classical Greek literary dialects.) Similarly, Zitner notes, figures cultivating comparable 
ambitions for the vernacular (Ariosto, Tasso, Du Bellay, and Ronsard) urged “departures 
from currency in diction” in order to meet the demands of epic and heroic verse (367).  
Altogether, Zitner argues, the effect sought by the poet derives from a philosophical 
belief in the “metaplasm” sanctioned by Plato and Aristotle (368).  That is, Plato and 
Aristotle sanction adopting older forms of the language in various changed spellings and 
adaptations to “create the epic world, radically different from the world implied by 
common speech” in a manner that fixes language more ideally to its referents.  Andrew 
Zurcher cites Zitner’s views, rebuking in particular “the curiously negative, and famous, 
responses of Sidney and Jonson to E.K.’s argument” as inadequate and misleading given 
the kinds of precedent we find in classical sources to which E.K. refers; “Theocritus and 
Vergil did affect a rough and dialect diction in their eclogues” (32n).   
 So Spenser, as Zurcher concludes, does evidently create a “rough and dialect 
diction” following the thinking of his time, and this conclusion is supported by the ideas 
from a range of other scholarly sources.  But some key questions remain. Just how did 
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Spenser understand his construction of dialects of English relative to the artificial literary 
dialects recognized from Latin and Greek writings?  Is it possible he was deliberately 
trying to produce a more artificial effect than such predecessors?  Or some other effect? 
Blank’s study of Spenser finds him contrarian (and his diction deliberately awkward) in 
part because his “poetic diction had no material effect upon the development of a national 
language in sixteenth-century England”—rather, she explains, it had an effect upon later 
“literary” diction (125) and mainly in that it found later writers avoiding the example he 
set.67  Yet if Spenser had any understanding of the tradition he imitated, he was crafting 
diction with a view to its influential place in the larger cultural force of the nation.  There 
likely was no solely literary diction for him, no firm barrier between the literature of a 
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67 On balance, Blank’s analysis is insightful for showing just how deeply literary and artificial Spenser’s 
effort at “dialect” is from our perspective. However, her approach is heavily slanted toward a contemporary 
perspective in ways I feel obliged to explain in more detail because the changed views of what constitutes 
language, as I noted in the first chapter, are so inherently confusing.  Blank rejects the possibility that 
Spenser is following the ideas of the Pléiade, Mulcaster, and/or Puttenham in his construction of provincial 
dialect in The Shepheardes Calender on two grounds, both rather clearly mistaken.  First,  she argues that 
because “he did not seem concerned that the provincial dialect gain general currency”(119), he could not 
have been committed to the same interest as the others. Blank’s reasoning on this matter proceeds from a 
clear misunderstanding of period ideas about literary dialects.  Spenser, like his contemporaries and even 
like much earlier figures in European history like Dante, simply did not view literary dialects as irrelevant 
to the larger project of contributing to the legitimacy of vernacular.  Second, she argues that Spenser’s 
decision not to continue “the [provincial dialect] project into his later works, especially The Faerie 
Queene” signaled a similar difference from his possible influences.  However, since it is clear that 
Spenser’s decision to change his management of dialect reflects a change in genre from the pastoral to the 
epic—and since Spenser’s diction even in The Faerie Queene remains distinctive in its own right—the 
decision makes sense in a larger context.  Blank has simply ignored the arguments of figures like Zitner and 
Craig that explain that larger context. In both of these cases Blank’s ideas about language, literary dialects, 
and genre are muddled by anachronistic presumptions.  She argues that “The Shepheardes Calender does 
not, finally, represent a project of linguistic reconstruction but of linguistic innovation, an effort to produce 
an ‘original’ English—at once old and new—that would have even greater claims to a national status than 
the ‘common’ vernacular of London and the court” (120).  For Blank, it cannot be a true “reconstruction” 
project because it is literary.  Yet Spenser had, stretching for over a century before him, the evidence from 
humanist lexical studies of how the Romans had adjusted their language using the Greek precedent, and he 
had the advice and consent of humanist figures and English scholars indicating that his literary approach 
was a key part of a larger set of interests. Put another way, Blank rejects the idea that people of Spenser’s 
period could believe in improving the standing of a vernacular language (a clear interest of Spenser and his 
predecessors) through literary exercise. Yet clearly many of the figures Blank cites did believe precisely 
that.  
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cultural group and its traditions of speech and thought.  Greek poetry, after all, had 
sustained artificial dialect conventions long before Romans appropriated those traditions.  
Like his philological predecessors in Italy who conducted the debates regarding the 
questione della lingua, Spenser probably understood that the day-to-day speech of 
Romans and Greeks was different from what is represented in their literature.68  However, 
he did not likely contemplate a language wholly separately from literary traditions, but 
rather saw the latter implicated in the value of the former, however subtly. This turns us 
back to consider more carefully the model—the Greek literary dialect—that Spenser and 
others were turning to in order to construct English literary dialect.  Richard Hunter ably 
describes the linguistic conventions that Theocritus’ Hellenistic poetry in particular drew 
upon: 
The language of later Greek hexameter poetry is based upon the inherited poetic 
language of Homer and early epic; within this heritage poets innovated and added, 
by means of analogy (i.e., the creation of forms that “could have appeared” in 
Homer), by the inclusion of material from other “high” poetic registers, such as 
lyric and tragedy, and under the influence of regionally specific morphological 
and lexical items and the requirements of particular genres.  Theocritus is no 
exception to this rule.  His position is, however, made more complex by the fact 
that most of his poems show a Doric linguistic texture, of greater or less 
thickness, in contrast to the Ionic language of the epic tradition.  […] Doric forms 
do not merely offer linguistic variation but have ramifications for poetic self-
consciousness and, ultimately, for the meaning of a poem. (“Introduction,” 54) 
 
Theocritus’ Doric, therefore, participated in a general pattern of Doric literary dialect, 
one that existed by virtue of contrast with other literary dialects.69  From this brief 
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68 See Angelo Mazzoco’s Linguistic Theories in Dante and the Humanists for a fuller description of the 
various ways in which humanists were aware of such possibilities. 
 
69 C.D. Buck explains the nature of Greek literary dialects and their reflection of real social divisions in The 
Greek Dialects.  It is important to understand that “ancient grammarians […] had in mind solely literary 
dialects” in their studies, but that those dialects did exist and “reflected ethnic divisions which also existed, 
or had once existed” in Greece and Asia Minor (3).  The literary tradition of dialects involved manipulating 
existing ideas about the peoples associated with the language variations. Within the literary tradition, as 
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description, we can guess why Spenser’s literary dialect must appear awkward even as it 
is also designed to be in careful conformation with sixteenth-century thinking about genre 
and language.  Following Theocritus’ model use, Doric was supposed to invoke such 
contrariety, such “thickness,” in varying degrees.  Unfortunately, though, Spenser faced a 
problem in attaining such invoked difference.  He lacked a forerunning epic tradition with 
a well-defined dialect—an Ionic epic dialect against which to contrast his Doric bucolic 
dialect.  Vergil faced a similar quandary, but Vergil had as literary forerunner Ennius, 
whose Annales, though lost to us, were the epic against which Vergil’s first eclogues 
might contrast themselves.  Vergil likely only needed to draw upon his own regional 
dialect, a northern Italian dialect that would naturally contrast with the southern Italian 
dialect of Ennius, for that achievement.   
Spenser does not slavishly imitate Vergil’s strategy in using dialect.  However, he 
certainly appears to strive for some imitation.  In the September æglog, he attempts to 
make his readers conscious of dialect differences as flexible matters of literary form 
rather than strict ways of identifying regional speech patterns. For example, the 
September æglog opens with Diggon Davie repeatedly using the pronoun “her” in place 
of “he” or “him” following the general pattern of a native Welsh speaker’s English (ll. 3-
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Herbert Smyth points out, Doric is mainly associated with early Greek lyric poetry (Pindar in particular), 
with Theocritus, and with choral parts in Attic plays (4).  Doric was thus chiefly associated with lyric rather 
than epic poetry, especially since “there is no Doric, as there is no Aeolic, literary prose.”  For Theocritus 
in particular, the use of Doric dialect was notable, as Richard Hunter explains in Theocritus and the 
Archaeology of Greek Poetry.  Hunter argues:  
….the Hellenistic concern with dialect glosses and poetic language  […] made contemporary poets 
particularly sensitive to these issues.  The fact that the language of most “high” poetry was 
traditionally determined by generic, rather than geographic considerations (i.e. “Doric” for choral 
poetry, “Ionic” for epic) was an obvious focus for the attention of the new poets. (31) 
In short, then, we have no reason to believe that Spenser or his contemporary humanists would have had 
trouble understanding the general function of Theocritus’ Doric as dialect specially affiliated with poetic 
labors that stood in need of contrasting Ionic and Attic forms for other kinds of literature. 
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5).  William Oram explains: “The dialect of its opening […] imputes Welsh coloration to 
the rest without actually carrying it through, but it helps make the association of Diggon 
Davy with Richard Davies, bishop of St. David’s in Wales, a progressive Protestant…” 
(149).  Yet Spenser’s E.K. broadens the interest of the matter beyond politics into an 
idealized notion of dialect difference. In the preface to the notes, E.K. suggests that “The 
Dialect and phrase of speache in this Dialogue, semeth somewhat to differ from the 
comen” (161). E.K.’s ensuing suggestion that the Welsh-ism is a result of Diggon being 
“long in forraine travels” would not have fooled any English readers (161).70  It is clearly 
a Welsh dialect. But in that way E.K. indirectly shows us that Spenser does not want to 
“carry through” the Welsh dialect traits so much as register the dialect difference itself—
the literary thickness of a stylized rustic speech in the ideal pastoral place.  The glossator 
furthers this implication by glossing “Wae” (l. 25) as “Northernly” (162) rather than 
suggesting it, too, is foreign or Welsh.  We are not meant to think these rustic speakers 
are true representations of shepherds; we are, however, meant to be conscious of 
linguistic representation of difference fitting the pastoral form. The regional 
identifications help Spenser employ an English pastoral dialect form somewhat as 
Chaucer might have.  After all, Chaucer’s characters, such the Reeve and the Host, use 
distinctively contrasting regional speech patterns. This strategic possibility provides 
another cause for E.K.’s careful emphasis upon Chaucer as a Vergilian father figure from 
the outset of his Epistle—an emphasis that is not exclusively a matter of defining the 
literary genre or the tone of the æglogs.  
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70 The representation of the Welsh speech in Shakespeare’s King Henry V and in Jonson’s masque For the 
Honor of Wales suggests that English audiences were familiar with the traits of Welsh dialect.  Paula Blank 
extensively considers both examples in Broken English. 
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 Despite some thorny contrariety, Spenser’s construction of dialect fits very well 
into the sixteenth-century traditions of framing the vernacular in ways that relate it to the 
literary and linguistic conventions of the classics. Indeed, Spenser’s view matches 
Ronsard’s comments about dialect in his 1566 Abbrégé de l'art poetique françois.  
Somewhat like E.K., Ronsard turns from the Roman to the Greek, beginning by noting 
that borrowing from the Romans is a matter of choosing words that reflect devotion to 
craft: “You ought not reject the words of our old Romans, thus to choose those with care 
and prudent selection.  You will practice the artifice of every trade of sailing, hunting, 
falconry, and principally those which owe perfection to their works… and from that you 
will draw many beautiful and sharp comparisons…” (48).  As he goes on to discuss more 
artful variations in diction for poets, he draws a tense comparison between Greek and 
French dialect: 
You will know how to rightly choose and appropriate to your work the more 
significant terms from the dialects of our France, when those [dialects] of the 
nation will not be sufficiently fitting nor significant, and to not trouble oneself if 
they are from Gascon, Poitiers, Normandy, Manceau, Lyon, or another area 
provided they should be good, and that fittingly they express what you mean, 
without affecting too much the speech of court, which is sometimes very bad for 
being the language of Demoiselles and young Gentlemen who are more of the 
profession to fight well rather than to speak well. And you will note that the 
Greek tongue would never have been so rich and abounding in dialects and in 
words like she is, without the great number of republics which flourished in that 
time, each of which was a lover of its own of its own [dialects, people, etc.], and 
wanted that its own learned citizens should write in the language peculiar to their 
nation… (48-9)71 
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71 The complete passage: “Tu ne dois reietter les motz de noz vieux Romans, ains les choisir avecques 
meure & prudente election.  Tu pratiqueras les artisans de tous mestiers de Marine, Venerie, Fauconnerie, 
& principalement ceux que doivent la perfection de leurs ouvrages aux fourneaux, Orfeures, Fondeurs, 
Mareschaux, Minerailliers, & de là tireras maintes belles et vives comparaisons, avecques noms propres des 
outils, pour enrichir ton oevre & rendres plus aggreable: car tout ainsi qu’on ne perdire un corps humain 
beau, plaisant, & accomply, s’il n’est composé de sang, venes, arteres & tendons, sur tout d’une nayve 
couleur, ainsie la Poesie ne peut ester plaisant, vives ne parfaitte sans belles inventions, descriptions, 
comparaisons, qui sont les ners & la vie du livre, qui veut forcer les siecles pour demourer de toute 
memoire victorieux du temps.  Tu sçauras dextrement choisir & approprier à ton oevre les vocables plus 
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Ronsard continues by asserting—with some provocative elaboration—that since the 
French are under one king, they need to have one tongue that unifies such dialectal 
variation.  Still, what we have here in Ronsard’s argumentation about dialects and 
language is a complex set of suppositions about how a poet represents the nation fairly 
and artfully. Ronsard positions the poet to contribute to a national unity while drawing on 
the precedent of Greek dialects as a way to legitimize variation. That is, Ronsard 
obviously recognizes how Greek dialects enable a poetic diction to register a range of 
social stations and interests relative to their regions.  His view of Greek dialect conforms 
quite comfortably with the description of Hellenistic Greek language variation.  
Therefore he is also clearly recommending a “composite literary language” such as we 
are to find Spenser writing in The Shepheardes Calender.  Even so, the comparison 
Ronsard draws between Greek and French dialect is one that elevates the French above 
the Greek for naked political reasons.  Ronsard encourages the general program of 
linguistic improvement that figures like Henri Estienne engaged. Spenser similarly 
constructs a composite literary dialect in imitation of Latin and Greek models for roughly 
the same reasons Ronsard expresses. The question we need to be asking is whether 
Spenser differs in any significant way in his effort. The work of most of Spenser 
scholarship (that offsets the value Blank’s argumentation) assimilates Spenser to the 
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significatifs des dialects de nostre France, quand ceux de ta nation ne seront assez propres ni significans, & 
ne se faut soucier s’ils sont Garscons, Poite-vins, Normans, Manceau, Lionnois ou d’autre pays pourveu 
que ils soyent bons, & que proprement ils expriment ce que tu veux dire, sans affecter par trop le parler de 
la court, lequel est quelques fois tresmauvais pour estre le langage de Damoyselles & jeunes Gentils-
homme qui sont plus profession de bien combattre que de bien parler.  Et noteras que la langue Grecque 
n’eust jamais esté si faconde & abondante en dialects, & en mots comme elle est, sans le grand nombre de 
republicques qui fleurissoyent en ce temps-là, lesquelles comme amoureuses de leur bien propre, vouloyent 
que leurs doctes citoyens escrivissent au langage particular de leur nation.” 
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period in a way that makes him roughly indistinguishable from Ronsard on the matter of 
dialect even if the contrariety of his construction of a Doric is more pronounced.  Clearly, 
Spenser’s E.K. does differ in that he refers to English dialect and archaism without 
explicit reference to Greek dialect, only to Livy and Sallust, then to the general business 
of imitating Greek forerunners like Alceus and Theocritus. This leaves us at a seeming 
impasse until we consult Henri Estienne’s comments about dialect. 
The contrast between Estienne’s view of language and dialects and Ronsard’s is 
actually quite a subtle one that former scholarship has largely overlooked in linking the 
two. Gigliola Sacerdoti-Mariani notes that Estienne in his 1579 La Précellence du 
Langage François agrees with Ronsard about dialects (21). She cites Estienne’s words: 
“For just as the Greek poets help themselves at need to unusual words from a certain part 
of the land of Greece, so our French poets should be able to make a profit from several 
words which in any event are only in use in certain areas of France” (168).72 In this and in 
many other regards, Estienne’s view is the same as Ronsard’s.  Yet Estienne’s comments 
about the nature of the French language and dialect are more extensive than those of 
Ronsard. They include a much more concerted effort to assert an understanding of the 
way to identify and describe the structural elements intrinsic to the pure form of the 
language in a way that Estienne argues cannot be done in other languages and cultures.  
He writes,  
…if the Italians wish to boast of receiving an equal accommodation with their 
dialects, I would respond to them that those of the French are by reason not only 
more greatly extended, but also more greatly authorized than theirs are.  For we 
know yet that all which is not Tuscan language (which alone is held for the good 
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72 “Car ainsi que les poetes Grecs s’aidoyent au besoin de mot peculiers à certains plusieurs vocables que 
toutesfois ne sont en usage qu’en certains endroits de la France.” 
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and pure) may not be Bergamasque, however well it may be that one wishes to 
mix it with Tuscan a little: and there are many other kinds of language than 
Bergamasque, which one would not want to mix any more than iron with gold. 
(168-9)73 
 
Estienne goes on to explain that there is a harmonious and ordered political state  
allied to the harmonious and hierarchical state of French and its dialects—a state in which 
the French, he says, reserve “first place” to Parisian dialect, leaving the others to vie for 
first place in an unsettled but civil way.74  French is one uniform language by virtue of an 
intrinsically complementary relationship between the language and its people.  He 
continues by insisting that the establishment of proper understanding of French dialects 
and their place will come with a systematic and proper registering of each of the 
variations in speech.  It is clear that he sees ambitious humanist lexicographers fulfilling 
the role of arbitrating these matters.   
Thus Estienne’s earnest humanist lexicographic interest promotes a thinking 
about language that is distinctively less flexible than that “composite literary dialect” 
advocated by his countryman, Ronsard.  Both authors are quite patriotic, but Estienne, as 
I will show more fully in a moment, wishes to study and expose precisely what is best at 
the grammatical and semantic level as evident from records.  In doing this, he assumes a 
power that might otherwise be reserved to the poet while transferring what is poetic into 
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73 “Que si les Italiens se vouloyent vanter de recevoir une pareille commodité de leur dialectes, je leur 
respondrois que ceux de François ont par raison beaucoup plus grande non seulement estendue, mais aussi 
autorité, que les leurs ne peuvent avoir.  Car nous sçavons qu’encore que tout ce qui n’est pas langage 
Toscan (lequel seul est tenu pour le bon et naïf) ne soit pas Bergamasque, toutesfois y en a bien peu qu’on 
vueille mesler avec ce Toscan: et y-a mainte sorte d’autre langage que la Bergamasque, qu’on n’y voudroit 
mesler non plus que du fer ave de l’or.” 
 
74 “Mais quant au langage de nostre France, il en va bien autrement [than with the Italians], car nous 
donnons tellement le premier lieu au langage de Paris, que nous confessons que celui des villes prochaines, 
que sont aussi comme du coeur de la France, ne s’en esloigne guere. Et pource qu’ Orleans voudroit bien 
avoir le second lieu, Tours aussi, pareillement Vandosmes […] à fin que les unes ne portent point d’envie 
aux autres, nou laissons ceste question indecise…” (169-70). 
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the ordinary and essential speech of his own country. From his earlier 1565 Traicté de la 
conformité du langage François avec le grec, Estienne makes equally clear how he 
intends to investigate and prove himself in the study of language: that is, he sets himself 
up as a grammarian rather than a poet for his later thinking about dialect.  In that work, 
Estienne methodically examines distinctive features of noun, verb, adverb, adjective, 
participle, and so forth before coming at last to syntactical and phrase patterns.  In other 
words, he studies each part of speech for its similarity to the idealized Greek forms in a 
manner that prizes all form without clear thought for its relationship to any larger realm 
of knowledge or mind. His interest and his approach complements his lexicographic 
study and confirms his authority in that form of study, turning readily to examples of 
dialect from poetry to assert that authority. For one example, Estienne writes: “Greek 
does not use its adjective in the neuter for a substantive only, but also for an adverb.  This 
usage is also familiar in the French language” (22).75 Estienne goes on to cite an example 
of such a usage from French and from Theocritus’ idylls, clearly thinking of Theocritus 
as an eminent and exemplary form of speech.  Yet Estienne is much more notably 
interested in the shared disposition of the languages (French and Greek) as it is evinced in 
trivial turns of phrase.   In one case, that triviality is distinctly associated with the Doric 
dialect in Theocritus: 
There is nothing more common in our language than these ways of saying, Come 
here a bit, Listen a bit, Tell me a bit. But I find (what I’d never thought) that the 
Greeks have shown us the manner for this speech, too.  Theocritus in the fifth 
Idyll, 
--"8’ 9 :;%5 (+33<% ,3$./!% [/] =>6’ 2%8?%. 
[O neighbor, come over here and listen a bit to us] 
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75 “Le Grec n’use pas de son Adjectif au Genre neutre pour un Substantif seulement, mais encore pour un 
Adverbe.  Lequel usage aussi est familier au language François.  Car comme ceste assettee qui est en 
Theocrite dit au paoure Pasteur…” 
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But one must note how much this adverb seems to be completely superfluous (just 
as the parum of the Latins wouldn’t be useful for anything, being added in some 
places, but would rather be ill-fitting) yet if one considers it closely, one will find 
some little secret hidden, for it brings some demonstration of modesty… (79)76 
 
There is no mistaking that Estienne here means to match the essence of what makes 
Greek good to the essence of what he finds charming in Latin and French.  The colloquial 
language of the Greek affirms the structural and essential goodness of the French. 
Taking these comments about languages from the 1565 work into account, 
Estienne’s comments on dialect from his 1579 Précellence… describe a kind of authority 
about language that is distinct from what we find in Ronsard or Spenser’s E.K.  To be 
sure, E.K. has a patriotic view of the resources of English literature, and his view of 
dialects may not be distinct in any particular way.  However, as already noted, E.K. flouts 
lexicographic authority with obvious resistance to the “EK” spelling.  That indeed is a 
lonely instance of bucking lexicography, but for good reason. Spenser’s target is a kind of 
authority over language, not lexicography itself.  His glossator’s position is resolutely 
secondary to the poet’s in ways that affirm what that particular flouting of lexicography 
means.  In his Epistle, E.K. acknowledges the poet’s role in shaping the use of dialect and 
archaism alongside a careful staging of classical precedent, but the nature of that 
precedent is a poetic manipulation of the terms and language of the political state.  He 
barks back at the curs who resent and encroach upon his authority (as poet-glossator) 
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76 “Il n’y a rien plu commun en nostre langue que ces façons de parler, Venez un peu ici, Escoutez un peu, 
Ditez-moy un peu.  Or je trouve,(ces que je n’eusse jamais pensé) que les Grecs nous ont monstré le 
chemin quant à ceste locution aussi.  Theocrite au cinquieme idyllie, 
 --"8’ 9 :;%5 (+33<% ,3$./!% [/] =>6’ 2%8?%. 
Mais il fault noter que combienque cest Adverbe, semble ester du tout superflu, (car mesmes le parum des 
Latines ne serviroit de rient estant adjousté den tells entroicts, mais plustost seroit inepte) si est-ce que si on 
le considere de pres, on y trouvera quelque petit secret caché, car il emporte quelque demonstration de 
modestie…” 
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over dialect, even as he asserts equal control over his eager powers of inspiration, that 
“Poeticall spirite” (17) he identifies with the sibylline origin of poetry’s matter.  
Predictably, then, the æglogs themselves maintain this emphasis upon a question of 
poetic control over the material of propaganda, suggesting that the language of the state 
itself must follow suit.  For example, in the April æglog, by having Eliza as the offspring 
of Pan and Syrinx (ll. 91-4), Spenser makes his queen the instrument upon which the poet 
plays in order to issue the poetry itself.  In the poem, Spenser emphasizes the careful 
control of the imagery that comes with the song itself: 
Ye shepheardes daughters, that dwell on the greene, 
hye you there apace: 
Let none come here, but that Virgins been, 
to adorne her grace. 
And when you come, whereas she is in place, 
See, that your rudeness doe not you disgrace: 
 Binde your fillets faste, 
 And gird in your waste, 
For more finesse, with tawdry lace. (ll. 127-135) 
 
The subject matter here may be sartorial, but the political and social context is 
acknowledged firmly.  This passage concerns a courtier poet’s responsibility to the 
Queen and for the image of court, even his power over that set of identities.  He has been 
describing the dress of the queen and all who surround her, controlling their appearances.  
For this reason, this passage in the poem hearkens back to the Epistle’s discussion of how 
the poetry suits and improves the language.  E.K. notes on the Pan and Syrinx references: 
“So that by Pan is here meant the most famous and victorious King, her highnesse Father, 
late of worthy memory K. Henry the eyght” (80).  E.K. stops short of completing the 
allegorical sequence the poet presents: If Henry is Pan, and he chased down Syrinx (who 
becomes reeds when caught), then the “song” is the issue of their union—Queen 
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Elizabeth is the song, obviously.  E.K. explains the context reasonably well, but the 
essential meaning is left untouched in part because it designates the political power of 
poet over Queen in organizing an expression of what constitutes her identity.77  In 
connection with the Epistle, though, this allegorical play is as relevant to language as it is 
to politics.  It is the precision of control over that song, the “finesse,” of which Spenser 
most clearly boasts, and that boast mirrors the boast over his control over a vatic priestess 
from E.K.’s Epistle. The poet’s authority over this unstated meaning is primary and 
controlling.  The glossator’s meaning merely defends the poet against misprision—and, 
as such, presents a conspicuously insufficient interpretive aid.  E.K.’s gloss on the lines 
about attending and “binding” the virginal queen “for more finesse” is even more 
obviously insufficient and deprecating: “Binde your) Spoken rudely, and according to 
shepheardes simplicitye” (83).  If this is rude or simple speech, it is only so for being 
associated with an archly rude literary dialect that demonstrates a control of meaning the 
glossator can only serve to help along.   
Fairly seen, then, The Shepheardes Calender places glossating in a losing 
competition with the generously imprecise poetic fashioning of language.  Just as E.K. is 
merely assuring the poetic control over political language in the April æglog, E.K. later is 
assuring the poetic control over the dialect variations in the September æglog.  This 
process can be much better understood by seeing precisely the model Spenser might have 
desired to resist—and that model is not the general one of literary dialect, the “Doric” of 
Greek, but rather the aggressive appropriation of that poetic and literary dialect by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 As noted earlier, Louis Montrose argues precisely this in “The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian 
Text.” Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts. Eds. Patricia Parker and David Quint. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1986). 
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lexicographically-minded authorities like Estienne.  Thus it is toward competitions 
among humanist visions of meaning that I wish to turn our attention.  Lexicography in 
particular required certain understandings of how to define and value a language. 
(Glossating as a didactic practice is historically associated with such understandings.) 
The Estienne family and Henri in particular cultivated such understandings of language in 
order to secure the didactic function, the selling-point of their work as a teaching tool. 
People like Sidney and Spenser were aware of such matters when they considered the 
value of English relative to Greek.  Consider: Sidney observes the structural similarity 
between Greek and English as part of his reasoning about why he disregards any 
organized didactic structure of grammar for English.  First, he rejects a methodical 
approach to grammar as not sufficient to the interest of improving the standing of English 
and poetry together, even as he is approving the composite nature of the language: 
I know some will say [English] is a mingled language: And why not, so much the 
better, taking the best of both the other? Another will say, it wanteth Grammer; 
for Grammer it might have, but it needs it not, being so easie in it selfe, and so 
voyd of those cumbersome differences of Cases, Genders, Moods, & Tenses, 
which I think was a peece of the Tower of Babilons curse, that a man should be 
put to schoole to learn his mother tongue. (43-4) 
 
Then, after this passage, he notes that English is “neare the Greeke, farre beyond the 
Latine,” which is precisely Estienne’s contention for French. Unlike Estienne, though, 
Sidney is not concerned with specific structural features or phrases that show the 
likeness.  Rather, Sidney argues that English is superior to others “for the uttering sweetly 
and properly the conceit of the mind.”  For Sidney, the authority of the poet as maker is 
key to the framing of the style and the language together, not the authority of the 
grammarian, orator, or philosopher. In making such comments, Sidney made it clear that 
he understood quite well that proponents of English and proponents of other languages 
!   
! 216!
were competing over which one was more Greek-like.  He might have had Estienne’s 
ideas in mind; he might have had a work like Leon Trippault’s 1582 Celt’hellenisme, an 
etymological dictionary asserting the likeness of French and Greek (Considine 62).  He 
might have more generally understood the trend to try to claim the heritage of Greek 
poetry in English versifying of his time. Clearly, though, he seeks a way to make English 
superior through the agency of poetic authority and expresses its identity by contrast to a 
grammarian’s or lexicographer’s authority. 
With his comment to Harvey about the “the kingdome of oure owne Language,” 
Spenser expressed an understanding of the competition between different strands of 
thought about authority over language similar to what we find in Sidney’s Defence.  
Granted, Spenser and Sidney differed in their view of the Doric dialect’s intended effect, 
but Sidney likely had misgivings about how to engage in the quarrel over which language 
was more like Greek. That is, we can understand his rebuke to Spenser’s use of dialect as 
an evocation of his anxiety that simply imitating Doric might not gain English the kind of 
credibility that lexicographers and etymologists might.  Even so, in modeling itself after 
the Greek Doric dialect as a composite poetic language, Spenser’s Shepheardes Calender 
asserts a conception of meaning in language that is like what Sidney advocates.  
Spenser’s conception is not antagonistic to what we find in Ronsard’s vision of a poet’s 
use of dialect, though.  Rather, his conception is antagonistic to what we find in Henri 
Estienne’s vision of dialect in the 1579 Précellence, to his systematic approach to 
examining language in the 1565 Traicté, and—as I will show momentarily—with the 
specific notion of the value of poetry to language studies expressed in the preface to his 
1572 Thesaurus graecae linguae.  Ironically, though, without my having reconsidered the 
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value of Paula Blank’s vision of Spenser’s contrarian assertion of a composite literary 
dialect, a vision that was doggedly dismissive of earlier assertions that Spenser imitated 
the Greek Doric, this particular contrast (Spenser/Estienne) might never have come to my 
attention. 
 
*  *  * 
 
The October æglog overtly addresses many of the concerns about how a poet 
organizes and interprets the material of language.  Not surprisingly, the same passages 
that help Spenser address ideas about language and poetry also help Spenser discuss the 
politics of patronage. For example, the young and learning poet, Cuddie, appropriately 
laments: 
But ah, Mecoenas is yclad in claye, 
And great Augustus long ygoe is dead: 
And al the worthies liggen wrapt in lead, 
That matter made for Poets on to play: 
For ever, who in derring doe were dreade, 
The loftie verse of hem was loved aye. (ll. 61-66) 
 
Cuddie laments the lack of present-day equivalent of Vergil’s patrons, but as part of that 
argument, Cuddie also continues to explain how the lack of such patronage is related to 
the quality of the poetry itself. As he continues this line of argument Cuddie complains 
that poetry has descended from a high art to one that merely strives to flatter or please.  
Yet these lines also implicitly frame the manner in which poetry can organize life, 
thought, and speech itself, detailing the method by which poetry is to achieve its 
meaningfulness.  The “dead” poets of the past are also “worthy,” the dignified material 
“for Poets on to play.”   Spenser is using Cuddie to frame the larger question of how 
English poets can manage the tradition of foreign and native poetry with which they have 
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to work.  On the one hand, this tradition directs poetry to speak to the existing political 
powers: just before the passage quoted above, Piers had urged Cuddie to return to the 
April æglog’s address to Eliza or to “advaunce the worthy whome [Eliza] loveth best,/ 
The first the white beare to the stake did bring” (ll. 47-8).  (The “white beare” refers to 
Leicester’s family, as E.K.’s note explains.)  However, on the other hand, Cuddie sees 
patronage as related to preceding models of his pastoral poetry, the arguably good 
material that is to be reworked to further good effect.  By this material, he means a range 
of model works—Pindar, Theocritus, Vergil, Mantuan, or even the English translations of 
Mantuan—and not, as he stresses, the “rymes of rybaudrye” of a “Tom Piper” (ll.76, 78).  
E.K. is keen to mention such models in the notes to the October æglog, as I will consider 
presently.  The interpretation of such models is, we know from E.K.’s Epistle, key to the 
organizing of verse in such a way as to avoid making the poet merely one of the 
“rakhellye route of our ragged rymers” (17) and key to the poet growing those 
philosophical wings of power.  And so, as Cuddie mentions this “matter” with which he 
must “play,” we are meant to wonder about the more earnest game of developing the 
language and poetry together.  That is, the question of how English is to raise the value of 
its language and literature, we are meant to see, hinges upon the catalytic or at least 
complementary operations of the political and patronage forces enabling poets and the 
action of enabled poets upon the material of speech itself. 
It is not just E.K., Cuddie, and Piers who align themselves on the subject and 
problem of enabling poetic speech.  Using a more directly authorial voice, Spenser in his 
introduction to the October æglog echoes E.K.’s concern with the problem of poetic  
enthusiasm—which is to say, irrational but vatic inspiration—in order to position the 
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figure of Cuddie to address that very problem yet again. He argues that “in Cuddie is set 
out the perfecte paterne of a Poet,” but we know already that Cuddie is an aspirant rather 
than an accomplished poet like Colin.  Cuddie’s own speech about his manner of 
enthusiasm in fact reveals his lower status. While complaining of an inability to rise to 
the challenge Piers sets before him, Cuddie begins his soon-to-be-cut-short ascent to that 
challenge by claiming that drinking wine, as per the traditional Greek bacchic source of 
god-possessed frenzy, will aid him:  
Thou kenst not Percie howe the ryme should rage. 
 O if my temples were distaind with wine, 
And girt in garlonds of wild Yvie twine, 
How could I rear the Muse on stately stage… (ll.109-112) 
 
Cuddie gets no wine and does not produce any marvelous rhyme.  Such enthusiasm is 
explicitly criticized by E.K. in the Epistle. But such an enthused poet also falls short of 
what Spenser’s argument at the head of the æglog prescribes.  The October argument 
describes the best poetry as a “divine gift not to bee gotten by laboure and learning, but 
adorned with both: and poured into the wit by a certain 2%8./+!/(<0.” Cuddie has the 
enthusiasm, but he lacks the power to further the enthusiasm into learned adornment.  
Colin’s more perfect song in the November æglog, particularly by its address to “Dido,” 
raises the stakes of bucolic to a suggestion of a greater career of poetic work.  Yet by 
addressing Cuddie and enthusiasm in the argument and in the poem itself returning the 
reader to those formative grounds of Greek culture, Spenser is using the “paterne” of 
Cuddie to raise again the question of how English poetry is to appropriate Greek poetic 
and linguistic precedent to the advantage of the English language.  After all, Cuddie’s 
dialogue with Piers also returns us to the question of the influence of and appropriation of 
Greek culture.  Piers gives the impression that Greek culture is central to the question of 
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poetic power by invoking the myth of Orpheus.  In the course of the æglog as a whole, he 
and Cuddie appear to come to an agreement that a sanctified devotional love rather than 
the pagan eros is the answer to the matter, suggesting that Christian modifications of the 
classical tradition are in order.  However, they disagree about the results for present 
poetry.  Piers argues that “love does teach [Colin & the poet generally] to climbe so hie” 
(l. 91).  Cuddie agrees, but he points out that “lordly love is such a Tyranne fell:/ That 
where he rules, all power he doth expel” (ll. 98-9).  In making this claim, Cuddie in part 
appears to misunderstand willfully or petulantly Piers’ faith in the Christian devotional 
ideal.  However, in so far as the argument about how poetry can effectively draw upon 
the Greek tradition, it is clear that converting the tradition to Christian ends alone does 
not solve the problem of the “power” that may manipulate the poetry—whether it is a 
question of patronage or the ends to which a particular tyrannical patronage may turn the 
poetry.  Cuddie is a mouthpiece for complaints about the direction (meaning method, 
subject, etc.) a “loving” patronage or political defense may turn poetry toward.  Just as 
the Colin Clout of Book 6 of The Faerie Queene is beset by a problem with the invasive 
worldly power of Calidore, who interrupts his vision of the Graces and compels him to 
degrade it in a backward-looking recount of the experience, Cuddie’s aspiring poet is 
concerned with how temporal powers corrupt a vision of the past that requires him to find 
“the matter made for Poets on to play.”   
The October æglog thus revives questions about poetry that come up in the 
argument about poetic diction from E.K.’s Epistle. What, then, is the upshot of this 
æglog’s vision of poetry’s situation? How does that place affect the linguistic matter it is 
to control following the Greek Orphic pattern to which it hearkens? If the poetry is to be 
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“raised” by the inspiration of a perfect love—that is, if it is to grow the philosophical 
wings theorized by E.K. in the Epistle and use this new instrument to the betterment of 
the tradition that Spenser crafts—where will the authority be located to achieve this end?  
It is not enough to say that Spenser responds to such a question by asking for better 
patronage alone.  Rather, Spenser’s October æglog refuses an answer to this question, 
choosing to frustrate any sense that there is an authority outside the mindful and inspired 
manipulation of the poet. Piers asks, “O pierlesse Poesye, where is then thy place?”  (l. 
79). The æglog answers only by demonstrating that poetry achieves a place by adorning 
itself with learning and labor, by putting on what it is to be without locating a specific 
originating authority.  Its power is located amid a play of originating forces, but not in 
one specific tyrannical one. Clearly, the poet needs some help.  To be fair, Piers himself 
presents a reward in the form of a kid to Cuddie to indicate that poetry writ large should 
have some reward adequate to the struggle it takes to make it.  But the bulk of the æglog 
echoes the concerns from the Epistle while suggesting a strong need to resist a specific 
site—material or political—from which the authority for the poetry springs.  Just as the 
September æglog used a composite dialect with no specific regional basis, whether Welsh 
or northern, the October æglog locates poetic material and authority somewhere and 
everywhere while suggesting a need to resist a specific rewarding authority.  It is logical 
to ask, who and what are poets meant to resist?   
To understand how Spenser identifies the types of poetry-making and language-
making authority he wishes to resist in the October æglog, we need to return to a close 
reading of E.K.’s annotations as they lead up to it.  In the Epistle, the Generall Argument, 
and then in the February, March, and April æglogs, E.K. refers to Theocritus.  As I have 
!   
! 222!
already shown, his reference to Theocritus in the Generall Argument is part of a strong 
push to have the author’s power over the name to the poems, the so-called “æglogs,” 
recognized despite the contrary authority of lexicography.  E.K. builds up to that 
declaration of authority by situating Theocritus amid the crucial line of poets in many 
languages, suggesting thereby that the English language’s authority will come from a 
sophisticated emulation of these examples.  In the notes to the æglogs themselves, E.K. 
cites Theocritus amid the other authors of bucolics.  For example, in commenting on the 
use of the name “Phyllis,” E.K. reasons, “The name is usuall in Theocritus, Virgile, and 
Mantuane” (49).  The note of Theocritus amid those influences on the tradition is not on 
its own usual.  Throughout the notes to the æglogs, E.K. is at pains to show that 
Spenser’s work suits the tradition to which it aspires, imitating and emulating all details 
of the forms.  However, name-making is key to thinking about language in general in 
Spenser not just because he is later to prize allegoresis for his epic, but because in Greek 
the notion of original language-making is, in the Phaedrus and Cratylus, called “name-
making”—a matter particularly salient to the thinking about poetry and language from the 
Epistle, as I discussed earlier in the chapter.78  In the April æglog, E.K. hints further at the 
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78 Spenser’s contemporaries viewed the idea of a name with much the same flexibility as Plato did—as a 
noun with a complex relation to the system of language and reality.  When Richard Mulcaster in his 
Elementarie brings up the Cratylus, which explicitly concerns questions of naming, he does so in the 
context of explaining the way in which words may be understood to function systematically in English 
usage in an English-language lexicon. First he writes, “For the matter of speech is a thing well thought of, 
whether ye waie the words and the forces these have, or the uttering thereof by pen & voice” (188).  The 
“forces” of the words that he refers to, he soon makes plain, is part of a relation among words that is 
exactly like to the question of right naming in Plato’s Cratylus.  After he makes a quite explicit connection 
between the “cunning” of name-giving and the crafting of language generally: 
We need not to prove by Platoes Cratylus, or Aristotles proposition as by best authorities […] that 
words be voluntarie, and appointed upon cause, seeing we have better warrant. For even God 
himself who brought the creatures, which he had made, unto that first man, whom he had also 
made, that he might name them, according to their properties, doth planelie declare by his so 
doing, what a cunning thing it is to give right names… (188) 
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importance of such name-making when he links the honorific naming of Colin’s dura 
puella, Rosalind, to the tradition of idealized beautiful objects of naming found in 
Stesichorus, Theocritus, and Petrarch: 
[…the woman named Rosalind] should be commended to immortalitie for her 
rare and singular Vertues: Specially deserving it no lesse, then eyther Myrto the 
most excellent Poete Theocritus his dearling, or Laruetta the devine Petrarches 
Goddesse, or Himera the worthy Poete Stesichorus hys Idole. (78) 
 
The passage emphasizes a process whereby the designated name becomes a means of 
approaching the ideal more nearly.  We know from passages in the Epistle, the poetry of 
the October æglog, and a whole host of passages from Spenser’s later work (as detailed in 
my first chapter on Book 6, the Fowre Hymnes, and the Amoretti), that the beloved ideal 
becomes a highly specialized sort of name whose marking represents an un-nameable, 
which is simply to say ineffable, place in the mind.  Therefore it is not particularly 
surprising to find Spenser as E.K. here using the figure of Colin and the naming of 
Rosalind to model an idealized way of using names in poetry.  The beloved object is 
tyrannical in its power there much as it is later to be in Cuddie’s somewhat flawed 
acknowledgment. 
While E.K. mingles references to various model poets in the April æglog, he is 
much more specific in the August æglog.  In fact, E.K.’s commentary has a direct bearing 
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And it is not just Mulcaster who thinks in this manner. In his 1589 Latin-English lexicon, Thomas Thomas 
defines the Latin “nomen” as “a name’s honor, authority, renowme, fame, bruit,” thus extending the 
meaning from a simple referential identifier into a broader network.  Earlier Latin dictionaries, like the 
1553 Stephanus version of the Calepino lexicon, begins its definition of  “Nomen” by an etymology from 
“nosco” or “recognize/know.”  While it goes on to say that a name is given to a single thing, the definition 
begins by recognizing that names are part of mental processes, their systems.  The name and noun is 
therefore the abstract site at which the question of relational and denotative meaning becomes evident in 
lexicons, and we should not be surprised if it bears unusual importance in E.K.’s commentary or Spenser’s 
poetry.  This isn’t, of course, to say that lexicons could afford to offer strong support to the complex idea of 
naming and language in the Cratylus—after all, Mulcaster rejects the work’s authority in order to advocate 
for an English lexicon. It is to say that we need to view Spenser’s handling of issues of naming as likely 
related to questions of language under some conditions, especially those I adduce above. 
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on his citation of Theocritus, his arguments about naming, and the connection of both to 
larger concepts of relational and denotative meaning. In the  argument, E.K. explains that 
the contest between the shepherds represented in the poem itself is “made in imitation of 
Theocritus” (137), while a note on the engraved vessel that is the prize adds an essential 
understanding of the relationship between the genre Theocritus devised and the name he 
gave it: 
Such pretie descriptions every where useth Theocritus, to bring in his Idyllia. For 
which special cause indeed he by that name termeth his Æglogues: for Idyllion in 
Greke signifieth the shape or picture of any thing: whereof his booke is ful.  And 
not, as I have heard some fondly guesse, that they be called not Idyllia, but 
Hædilia, of the Goteheards in them. (146) 
 
E.K.’s comments somewhat reverse what we found in his statements about genre names 
from the Generall Argument. There, he simply refused the customary and logical 
etymology for the “EK” spelling associated with a scholarly-minded word for “eclogues” 
meaning “selections” in favor of a name associated with the goat-heards—goat-song, as it 
were.  Here, he rejects the fanciful spelling associating a logically-chosen name 
associated with the goats—the Latin “haedus” in this case—in favor of a more scholarly-
minded notion of the Greek word for figure or form.  It is a crucial move: E.K.’s 
reasoning about meaning shifts the meaning to suit the context of the poem.  He does not 
impose a systematic reasoning from outside the poem upon it in order to determine or 
illuminate meaning, but rather shifts the external or circumambient realm of philosophy, 
language, and rhetoric in close complement to the poem’s interior realm of meaning.  
Moreover, the description of Theocritus’ picturing and figuration obviously is a close 
match for the mixture of emblems, pictures, notes, and multi-font text that we find in The 
Shepheardes Calender.  The glossator helps the poet to appropriate Theocritus’s method 
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and to make a statement about the right way for the poetry to fashion the language for 
and with readers. After all, he here associates Theocritus with a strategy of naming and 
language-making.   
Despite the careful help he affords the author through Greek etymology, E.K. 
remains abstracted from the simpler name of the work upon which he comments. Much 
of this play about naming arguably relates not only to the words æglog, eclogue, idol, and 
idyll, but indirectly to Spenser’s playfully ambiguous choice of name for the work as a 
whole.  In the name Shepheardes Calender, reference to Christ as a shepherd of mankind 
is unmistakable, but the form and name hearken back to the central characters and 
speakers in the original forms—pagan though they be.  Naturally, too, the name retains a 
profitable ambiguity in the difference between singular and plural—the calendar is both a 
work for the collective and a work for an individual entrepreneur.  The note on 
Theocritus from the August æglog therefore both reveals and obscures the function of 
Spenser’s naming strategy.  For the most part, though, it affirms the authority of his 
naming and language-crafting through the prized precedent of Theocritus. 
There is an additional enlightening complexity to Spenser’s depiction of the prize 
for the singing contest in the August æglog. The figural prize that E.K. provides more 
detail on is fundamentally claimed by Spenser: that is, Spenser as poet is responsible for 
crafting the material that is here to win. However, E.K. certainly asserts his own ideas 
and authority within the notes.  As readers, we are challenged to perceive that the notes 
on their own furnish a kind of contest over the process of identifying precedents and 
authorities for poetic meaning—the work in which E.K. engages.  Since E.K. has been 
asserting himself for quite some time and particularly on the matter of the value of 
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Theocritus and Vergil as models, this is quite obvious.  Here again, though, we should 
briefly turn back to the poem itself rather than just the notes for a fuller perspective.  
Spenser all but assures us of the compromises and complementarities that circumscribe 
such contests over meaning in the way he manages the actual singing contest in the 
æglog.  After the singing contest between Willye and Perigot, Cuddie declares that “ech 
have gayned” (l. 131) in the contest.  He awards a lamb to Willye and the engraved bowl 
to Perigot.  The engraved bowl becomes the subject of E.K.’s note, but it is hardly the 
more symbolic or valuable thing, given the positive Christian associations with a lamb. 
Then at the conclusion of the æglog, Cuddie steals the thunder from the contest by 
reciting Colin’s sestina, thereby unsettling any obvious sense of victory.  All these factors 
are recognized in the Latin and Italian emblems that conclude the æglog: Perigot’s 
“Vincenti gloria victi,” Willye’s “Vinto non vitto,” and Cuddie’s insouciant “Felice chi 
puo.”  In the first (roughly translated “To the winner the glory of the defeated”), it is 
impossible to avoid the ambiguity. The glory of the defeated hardly seems any reward!  
The second emblem compounds the comedy of the first by declaring the “conquered not 
conquered.”  Cuddie’s emblem makes him appear blithely ignorant of the question of 
defeat or victory, declaring only that “Let him be happy who can be happy.”  Clearly, the 
æglog refuses to acknowledge a winner in the poetic contest.  Even so, putting the poem 
together with its notes reveals a faith in the synergistic production of meaning from 
competing forces.  Such a vision of meaning depends not at all on positing an 
indeterminate sense of authority as responsible for producing meaning but rather on 
positing a composite structuring of meaning out of honored precedents with a powerful 
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authorial will behind it as the source.  So careful an approach begs the question: Why 
such care?  
Let us return to the October æglog in order to understand how Spenser continues 
refining his commentary on how and why a poet shapes the raw matter of language. 
E.K.’s notes to the æglog affirm and develop the argument about Greek linguistic and 
cultural influence from the Epistle and Generall Argument, pointing again to the 
precedent of Theocritus. By this point, E.K. has made plain that Theocritus is central to 
the notions of naming and language-crafting that underlie the pastoral form Spenser 
engages.  Moreover, in the September æglog Spenser has further prepared the grounds by 
more conspicuously using dialect, that hallmark of Theocritan pastoral. As we arrive at 
the October æglog notes, E.K. makes the reader acutely conscious of how political speech 
nests amid allusions and literary influences.   He there pre-emptively claims the influence 
of Theocritus as a way to underscore the political commentary of the particular æglog: 
“This Æglog is made in imitation of Theocritus his xvi. Idilion, wherein hee reproved the 
Tyranne Hiero of Syracuse for his nigardise towarde Poetes, in whome is the power to 
make men immortal for theyr good dedes, or shameful for their naughty lyfe” (176). 
Readers who have been attuned to the political commentary throughout the æglogs will 
be ready to accept this claim, of course. However, E.K.’s claims about that influence and 
the actual substance of the October æglog itself are not perfectly aligned.  As William 
Oram’s comments point out, E.K. in part claims the influence of Theocritus in order to 
diminish the more apparent influence of the Neo-Latin Mantuan (176n). Indeed, a cursory 
study of Idyll 16 shows that Theocritus’ poem is not in dialogue form as, for example, 
Mantuan’s Eclogue 5 and Spenser’s æglog are.  Yet Spenser has good reasons for 
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imitating Mantuan if he was to appeal to an English audience of his time. Mantuan’s 
Neo-Latin pastoral was already familiar to English readers and even translated into 
English by George Turberville in 1565.  Spenser’s work therefore looks considerably less 
arcane or pretentious for imitating the widely-adopted “moral” Mantuan. Moreover, by 
seeming to take over the Neo-Latin style with which Mantuan was so successful, Spenser 
appeals to those who considered Neo-Latin more authoritative and even to those who 
desired English to supplant Latin. 
Of course, E.K.’s reference to Theocritus is not in vain. By modeling his work on 
this Neo-Latin predecessor while calling upon the original work of Theocritus as the 
ultimate source, E.K. again addresses the same range of interests he appealed to in his 
comments about De Oratore and diction from the Epistle. As in the Epistle and the 
Generall Argument, then, E.K.’s reference to Theocritus intimates that the poetry itself is 
poised to leap over the Roman into the originating Greek influence.  And truly, looked at 
as an emulation rather than a slavish imitation of Greek poetry, the verse of the October 
æglog is laying claim to the power of Theocritus’ commentary on patronage together 
with the Platonic ideas about rhetoric that suffuse E.K.’s concluding pages of the Epistle. 
Cuddie and Piers address the forces that rule over poetic work, both temporal and 
spiritual.  This becomes more plain as Piers and Cuddie address the relation between 
idealized love and the inspired poet: as noted before, for Piers, Eros is a true Platonic 
inspiration, and for Cuddie Eros is a “Tyranne fell.”  In this respect, their dialogue 
reflects Idyll 16’s address on the potential good or ill of a poet to the Syracusan tyrant, 
especially considering that Idyll’s constant emphasis on Hiero’s dependence upon the 
divine inspiration that guides the poets.  After all, Theocritus there argues that “all good 
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fame comes to men from the Muses” (l. 58)79 and stresses the responsibility of the poet to 
the high ideals of such divine forces. Spenser’s reasoning in the April æglog has made 
roughly this same point already.  E.K.’s allusion to the specific Idyll 16 allows the 
annotator to locate Spenser’s philosophical priorities for a reader attuned to the earlier 
political commentary.   
E.K.’s gloss on Piers’ suggestion that good poetry is “good advice” intended “to 
restraine/ The lust of lawlesse youth” (ll.21-2) complicates the initial reference to 
Theocritus even as it foreshadows and intensifies the effect of Piers’ later rhetorical 
question about poetry’s “place.” Responding to Piers’ suggestion, E.K. glosses: 
To restraine.) This place seemeth to conspire with Plato, who in his first booke de 
Legibus saith, that the first invention of Poetry was of very vertuous intent. (177) 
 
E.K. here and in an ensuing note challenges the reader to see Theocritus’ address to a 
specific political power as part of a larger project within Greek poetic and philosophical 
tradition. With this reference to Plato’s Laws, he recognizes multiple types of poetic 
“making” with different appeals to people’s better and worse natures.  Most strikingly, 
though, E.K. identifies both Piers’ exhortation and the Greek philosophical/poetic 
tradition as “this place.” The place is both imagined and institutional, being both the 
abstract guiding of virtuous actions that poetry undertakes as well as the concrete roles in 
society.  E.K. spends much time thinking through the historical details, too. Instead of the 
poem simply being advice about the necessity of vatic poetic craftsmanship to a ruler’s 
virtuous reputation—that is, instead of poetry being an instrument for the exercise of 
virtue and power simultaneously—E.K. now considers Plato’s argument that poetry 
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began with wholly “vertuous intent” and was thereafter turned to “lighter musick” that 
could “diversely […] affect the  mynds of men” (177).  The Laws historicizes the vatic 
poet, but E.K.’s reference to the work asks the reader to imagine a separate (if wholly 
unclear) history.  It is a history in which English joins Greek, as part of Piers’ and 
Cuddie’s quite English oblique visitation of the terms imagined by Plato. In the Laws, 
Plato gives poetry a more fundamental place than the Republic does in the didactic 
processes leading to the foundation of a just state.  But is E.K. right?  Is Piers conspiring 
with Plato in trying to construct this place for poetry? 
 Even though Piers and E.K. are both relatively confident of what place good 
poetry is to assume, E.K. strains much harder than Piers to claim that place as part of his 
response to Cuddie’s lament about a lack of proper patronage. Cuddie describes the need 
for patronage and Vergil’s career beginning at line 55, and in notes for lines 55, 57, and 
65 E.K. considers this instance of patronage.  He explains that Maecenas “moved” Vergil 
“to write in loftier kinde,” then explains how this propelled Vergil’s progress from his 
Eclogues and Georgics to his “divine Aeneis” (179-80). E.K. is tutoring the reader as to 
how an English poet should properly imitate the Vergilian and Roman model. Even so, 
this tutoring is graceless for being no more than a prosaic iteration of Cuddie’s comments 
sans the lament about the lack of proper patronage.  Awkward and immature as Cuddie 
may be, his description of the “matter” that a poet is obliged to fashion, as well as his 
argument about the ideal quality of past examples and the sad state of the present, speak 
more eloquently than the copious argumentation of E.K.  The latter’s comment on the 
significance of Cuddie’s choice of the words “for ever” illustrates the case: 
For euer) He sheweth the cause, why Poetes were wont be had in such honor of 
noble men; that is, that by them their worthines & valor shold through theyr 
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famous Posies be commended to al posterities. wherfore it is sayd, that Achilles 
had neuer bene so famous, as he is, but for Homeres immortal verses. which is the 
only aduantage, which he had of Hector. And also that Alexander the great 
comming to his tomb in Sigeus, with naturall teares blessed him, that euer was his 
hap to be honoured with so excellent a Poets work: as so renowmed and ennobled 
onely by hys meanes. which being declared in a most eloquent Oration of Tulies, 
is of Petrarch no lesse worthely sette forth in a sonet   
Giunto Alexandro a la famosa tomba  
Del sero Achille sospirando disse  
O fortunato che si chiara tromba. Trouasti &c. 
And that such account hath bene alwayes made of Poetes, aswell sheweth this that 
the worthy Scipio in all his warres against Carthage and Numantia had euermore 
in his company, and that in a most familiar sort the goode olde Poete Ennius: as 
also that Alexander destroying Thebes, when he was enformed that the famous 
Lyrick Poet Pindarus was borne in that citie, not onely commaunded streightly, 
that no man should vpon payne of death do any violence to that house by fire or 
otherwise: but also specially spared most, and some highly rewarded, that were of 
hys kinne. So fauoured he the only name of a Poete. whych prayse otherwise was 
in the same man no lesse famous, that when he came to ransacking of king Darius 
coffers, whom he lately had ouerthrowen, he founde in a little coffer of siluer two 
bookes of Homers works, as layd vp there for speciall iewells and richesse, which 
he taking thence, put one of them dayly in his bosome, and thother euery night 
layde vnder his pillowe. Such honor haue Poetes alwayes found in the sight of 
princes and noble men. which this author here very well sheweth, as els where 
more notably. (180) 
 
This passage is consistent with E.K.’s earlier concern about the influence of Theocritus 
and the relevance of Plato’s Laws—instances in which E.K. imposed his own interpretive 
thinking on the poetry.  But E.K. goes further with this gloss.  Here he tries to stand in for 
Piers in advising Cuddie not to despair. We know that E.K. goes further because it is in 
response to the same passage that Piers declares, “O Pierlesse Poesye, where is then thy 
place?”  That is, in contrast to E.K., Piers accepts Cuddie’s charge that poets are not 
given a fair place in the court in the present day.  Contrary to what E.K. says, “this 
author” and his poetic spokespersons do not show that poets have “always” been 
esteemed of rulers.  As E.K.’s disquisition on Plato’s Laws made plain, the “place” of 
poets can be imagined through a programmatic push on the part of the state.  E.K. is not 
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out of alignment with Piers and Cuddie about poetry as a whole. As E.K.’s note on line 
67 shows, “the cause of contempt of Poetry [is] an idlenesse and basenesse of mynd” 
(181).  Piers would not disagree. Yet E.K. in the process of his argumentation seems to 
take on assurance that poetry’s place has never been challenged, and this is not an 
assurance Piers, Cuddie, or Spenser share. 
It is in his commentary on the immature poet from the October æglog that E.K. 
most strives to compete with the authority of speaker-poets, Cuddie and Piers, for 
recognition.  He is striving to be recognized as an advocate for poetry.  Yet even as E.K. 
is producing a note which extols the honor due to poets from rulers, he is presuming upon 
his own argumentation as the rhetoric that will win such honor to the poet.  That is, E.K. 
wants his own rhetoric to take poetry’s place, his own argument to be instrumental to the 
laureate work.  This trespass is the more obvious because E.K. has been competing for 
the “prize” and trying to control the understanding of the naming process in previous 
instances—and especially in two previous cases when the influence of Theocritus has 
been raised.  Here in appearing to claim the heroism of the poet that Cuddie seems 
unequal to, E.K. makes an appeal to patronage in place of the poet.  Since the very heart 
of the matter in Cuddie’s lament is the question of how patronage enables poets to shape 
the inert matter of precedents—and arguably the composite language that is essential to 
the poetry—E.K.’s challenge is exactly like the trespass of those scholarly magnifiers of 
annotation and glossing, lexicographers.  Ill-defined as they may be as a group, 
lexicographers are, after all, one group that E.K. has been implicitly quarreling with over 
the subject of poetic diction from the start.  The quarrel has been about the interpretation 
of poetry and the role of poet, but the questions of naming and language have been 
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carefully woven into that subject as well.  The quarrel and its crucial issues come to a 
head here. 
It should come as no surprise then that elements of E.K.’s appeal on the subject 
matter of line 65 are similar to those in the appeal made by Henri Estienne, one crucial 
representative of lexicography, as part of the dedication of his 1572 Thesaurus graecae 
linguae.  In that work, Henri Estienne claims the very role of Theocritus in making rulers 
immortal.  A few sentences into his dedication of his work to Elizabeth (and other rulers), 
Estienne justifies his effort with the claim that “[his works] not only could increase your 
[the patron’s] honor, but also could join you to immortal glory” (4). As he continues, he 
cites Theocritus’ Idyll 17, the “Encomium to Ptolemy,” in order to establish the value of 
his own work, obviously stressing that his work in Greek literature gives people access to 
such riches: 
However, about the effort of such material which befits princes, the Syracusan 
poet [Theocritus] already once sang to king Ptolemy in these verses (in as much 
indeed as my Latin Muse can follow Greek): 
-- for what, great prince, is worthy 
To furnish immortal honor for you and yours? 
This remains salvation to the sons of Atreus: in contrast in the gloom 
Those things now lie hidden, buried, whence nothing is given return, 
Whatever had been won from the sacking of Priam’s city. 
Wherefore he sings about the Atrides, that nothing else of immortal glory remains 
safe for them, and the same concerning all other heroes (I omit countless other 
brave men), but by name he had been able to sing about Achilles: when 
Alexander stood by his grave, he said, “O Fortunate young man who finds a 
Homer herald of your virtue.” But you have in your academies a sure repository 
of heraldric praise… (4)80 
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80 The Latin for the entire passage, including the previous quote:  
Minime enim verendum fuit (opinor) ne, si vobis eas consociarem, tantum illarum honori addere, 
quantum vestro detrahere iudicarer: quum illae non solum honorem vestrum amplificare, sed etiam 
immortalem vobis gloriam comparare possint. Huius autem comparandae studium prae quovis alio 
principes decere, iam olim Ptolemaeo regi cecinit Syracusanus poeta, his versibus, (quantum 
quidem Musa mea Latian Graecam assequi potest)      
--quid enim mage principe dignum 
Hoc manet Atridis salvum: calignine contra 
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This passage is similar to the one we find in E.K.’s comments on Cuddie’s view of poetry 
and patronage in several ways. Both stress that the poetry affords immortal glory to the 
rulers—that indeed the “treasury” of the poetry is greater than material treasury, and thus 
is a kind of cultural wealth to be transferred from antiquity forward.  Both cite Plutarch’s 
report of Alexander visiting the grave of Achilles, and thereby connecting Alexander’s 
imperial success and respect for verse to a sort of spiritual superiority of the Greeks over 
the wealthy, decadent cultures in Asia Minor (the Trojans) whom they conquered.  
Indeed, both Estienne and E.K. (for the æglog as a whole) call on Theocritus, as though 
he himself were a monument to the duration of Greek literature’s success, to help them 
describe why patronage is essential to their enterprises while their enterprises are 
arguably essential to the construction of the national richness identified with empire.   
Despite such similarities, there are notable differences in how E.K. and Estienne 
describe the value and place of poetry. The differences relate to the languages used in 
their appeals and the implied status of poets or humanist scholars as users or interpreters 
of language. For example, E.K. uses the Italian of Petrarch for the poetic rendering of the 
scene at Achilles tomb.  In contrast, Estienne reports in his own Latin translation of the 
Greek—that is, he supplants the Greek poetry with a Latin version.  Estienne’s Latin 
suggests the pan-European and educational nature of his enterprise.  E.K.’s (and 
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Nunc adoperta latent (nullus datur unde regressus) 
Quacunque obtigerant Priami populantibus urbem. 
Ubi quod de Atridis canit, nihil aliud illis quam decus immortali salvum manere, idem de reliquis 
omnibus heroibus, (ut alios innumeros fortes viros omittam) ac nominatim de Achille, canere 
poterat: cuius ad tumulum quum Alexander astitisset, O fortunate, inquit, adolescens, qui tuae 
virtutis Homerum praeconem inveneris.  At vos in academiis vestris non solum certum vestrarum 
laudum praeconium repositum habetis, set etiam in illis, non secus ac patres in liberis, vobis ipsis 
quodammodo superstities esse potestis: quandoquidem tanti vicissim in earum alumnos liberalitas 
ac munificentia vestra extitit, ut vobis, secundum deum, omnia debere dici possint.   
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Spenser’s) choice of Petrarch foregrounds the vernacular, and hence English’s obligation 
to compete with the rival Italian tradition. Moreover, as Estienne continues his argument, 
he links the entire development of the language and national power to the academies.  He 
asks:  
Where truly will you find a food of liberality more distinguished and fitting to 
princes than in those places which (as M. Tullius called the house of Isocrates the 
laboratory of eloquence) are just like certain laboratories of all the liberal arts? 
Which could be said to be the seed-stores [seminaries] to the literary republic? 
Which at last can seem in several places of your realms not otherwise than as 
souls are bound by bodies? (4)81 
 
For Estienne, the academies are the spiritual force behind the development of the matter 
of culture and language.  They are the place in which his work will be a gift empowering 
those whom he believes deserve his praise and the praise of the poets his work will 
empower.  This places the researching lexicographer in an implicitly powerful position: 
he or she provides a work to the academies that will help guide the education of those 
who will contribute to this “literary republic”; he or she effectively is responsible for 
what Theocritus formerly attributed to the Muses.  There is no such placement fixed in 
Spenser’s poem, only in the ambitions of E.K. as glossator speaking for his poets. So we 
can immediately appreciate the difference between what Estienne recommends as the 
social structure for the enforcement and development of an enriched national language 
and the more elusive depiction of that place and process that Spenser, his speakers, and 
E.K. compile in their relationships as poet, characters, and glossator.  On this basis, 
moreover, we can appreciate why Spenser (on his own or as E.K.) has chosen Theocritus 
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velut officinae quaedam sunt? quae literariis rebuspublicis seminaria esse dici possunt? quae denique 
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Idyll 16 in place of Idyll 17 as the most suitable allusions.  The former, as I explained 
earlier, attributes power to the poet through the inspiration of the Muses. The latter refers 
to poets as “intermediaries”82 between the Muses and the ruler, a ruler with a virtually 
God-like status.  The former is a song of praise for the tyrant Hiero on the poet’s home 
island, a context more resonant for an Englishman. The latter is a song of praise for the 
regent of Egypt—not the place of Theocritus’ origin, though certainly his land-locked 
academic home—that translator Anna Rist characterizes says “proceeds duly and dully 
through the obvious themes” (152).  Summarily put, Estienne and Spenser have elegantly 
contrasting visions of how poets work with patrons toward the establishment of an 
enriched national language. 
My point in this extended comparison of Estienne and Spenser is not that Spenser 
has designed the similarities and differences to lead us specifically from E.K.’s passage 
to Estienne’s. That is to say, Spenser did not craft a veiled allusion to the Thesaurus 
graecae linguae.  Rather, the correspondence in argumentation leads us to a larger 
understanding of Spenser’s effort to resist the kind of hermeneutics available from 
lexicography. Spenser’s October æglog has been designed to present the reader with a 
crisis over the “place” of poetry within the society that turns especially towards a 
problem with the function of poetry within the society.  How, Spenser is asking, do we 
want poetry to work for us?  And, indeed, a huge part of that question has been the matter 
of shaping the English diction, its use, its interpretation.  Spenser—not just E.K. alone, 
but the combined force of Spenser’s speaking agents within the poem and his annotator—
presents the citation of Theocritus and the modeling of meaning from precedents in other 
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languages as a matter that needs careful attention.  As E.K., Spenser appears to struggle 
with the significance of the patronage issues raised by Theocritus’ Idyll 16 after 
struggling to lay claim to the Greek Doric of Theocritus and the pastoral tradition of 
Theocritus.  It is not accidental that Estienne would try to claim the same poet’s 
relationship with patrons or that he would cite the same Greek poet.  The competition 
here is not just over who gets to claim this model, but also who gets to demonstrate how 
this model works.  For Spenser, the linguistic and cultural inheritance from the Greeks 
works without a name or place and with considerably less strain within the poetry as an 
active process of thought.  It works within the example of the poetry that is read and 
fashions the reader’s mind and sense of language as a kind of rhetoric. He resists a claim 
that simply names or cites authorities; Spenser un-names the authority, effectively 
showing that his poetry can work through allusions to multiple authorities.  To assert the 
value of English, such a strategy is eminently useful.  He never needs to apologize for 
English’s inferiority to classical models, and he can assert its equality in fashioning new 
vernacular poems that work with readers to improve their minds in much the same way as 
Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy prescribes. Moreover, he can use words that are as-
yet undefined in ways that call upon original model patterns (like the pattern of the Doric 
literary dialect) in order to command the reader to fashion that place in his or her mind 
where the poetry can become meaningful by virtue of meaning being more than the 
servant of a defining authority. For Estienne, though, the cultural and linguistic heritage 
works much more broadly as part of the society and its institutions—and much more 
rigidly in relation to his task of re-constructing diction one lexical item at a time.  That is, 
for Estienne Theocritus’ warning to rulers is one that lexicographers can claim inasmuch 
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as they are poets of reconstruction in the Vergilian tradition.  Estienne claims the role of 
poet just as he claims the poetry as material that he may shape for patrons. In comparison, 
Spenser stakes a claim on poetry that is exclusive, yet by asking where poetry’s place is 
and what matter it may legitimately shape he speaks out against those who would trespass 
on poetry’s function in shaping the language and linguistic reading practices of his 
audience.   
 Spenser’s complex view from the October æglog sets his approach to Theocritus 
and language in contrast to one of the most famous lexicographers of his day.  And in this 
view of patronage, of poetic diction, and of a grasping glossator, we find the author 
reacting to ideas that would have been important to the academic and political forces at 
play about Cambridge in the years before he constructs The Shepheardes Calender.  They 
are not coincidentally ideas deeply embedded in Estienne’s work, his specific appeal to 
patrons, and the assumptions about hermeneutics that the work and its appeal to 
patronage carry.  Indeed, it is remarkable to consider that Estienne had dedicated two of 
his works to Sir Philip Sidney (Considine 90-1). Thus the primary political force behind 
Spenser’s first major work was a dedicatee and patron that the poet shared with Henri 
Estienne. In sum, Estienne’s heroizing of lexicography appears essential to an 
understanding of Spenser’s almost certainly competitive, resistant, and contrasting view 
of the poet’s role in defining the English language. 
*  *  * 
 
Of what value is this realization that Spenser’s work compels the readership to 
take on a different view of the hermeneutic process than Estienne’s lexicography does?  
That is, of what value is it that we can see both the correspondences and contrasts 
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between the two in terms of the competition for patronage, the use of Greek authorities 
like Theocritus, and the effort to redefine the role of the poet relative to scholarship?  
There are three relevant responses to this question, and one general thread of reasoning 
emerging from those responses that leads us into the next chapter. 
Spenser decides to continue the struggle that E.K. begins over matters of poetic 
diction into the body of the poem. The decision relates to poetry’s capacity to define 
diction.  Inasmuch as his glossator E.K. defends the authorial intent against a general 
scholarly intrusion well exemplified by lexicography, Spenser indicates that the scholarly 
and poetic roles need to complement one another.  However, insofar as there are limits to 
how a scholar’s glosses can aid the readership in understanding the poem and differences 
in terms of how patronage is viewed by scholars and poets, Spenser privileges the role of 
the poet in defining how diction itself works.  This claim on diction reflects how 
seriously Spenser takes any claim on defining national diction and discourse, explaining 
much of what we find in the conflicts between E.K.’s glosses and the sophistication of 
Spenser’s comments on the Elizabethan poet’s command of political language in the 
April æglog.  This claim on diction also reflects Spenser’s strategy in fashioning the 
composite literary dialect in the September æglog. Commenting on the nature of attempts 
to augment the English language through revivals of archaisms in The Triumph of the 
English Language, R.F. Jones writes,  
…the field in which archaisms were chiefly employed was poetry, and the motive 
of the practice was not concerned with increasing the number of words in the 
language, but with utilizing the poetic force and imaginative suggestiveness of old 
expressions. (120) 
 
Clearly Jones fairly appraises the value of the “poetic force” that Spenser wishes to 
employ at the level of diction alone.  However, in such comments Jones also strives to 
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diminish our expectations regarding the ambitions of the poetic effort to use archaisms in 
order to frame poetry itself as a means to affect the larger sphere of language and 
rhetoric.  He adds, 
So revival came to have more to do with poetic diction and style than with the 
language per se, though it might be considered as a means of adding eloquence to 
a language by increasing its poetic vocabulary.  
 
Where Jones says it “might be considered,” we can now for Spenser’s case say it must be 
considered a means of increasing eloquence by proving the potentiality of poetic 
manipulations as primary sources of meaning in language. While it is perfectly true that 
archaisms become elements of poetry mainly in “subsequent discussions” about 
language, Spenser’s use of regionalisms, foreign loan words, and archaisms are not a 
blunt-force attempt to augment the language piece by piece, but a flexible method to be 
applied and understood generally.  As I noted earlier in rejecting Paula Blank’s view of 
Spenser’s literary ambitions and the significance of his composite literary dialect, there is 
no reason to believe that Spenser thought language could not be deeply defined by 
exemplary literary pieces that model the ideal rhetoric and uses, especially if he 
considered the thousand years during which Homer’s or Vergil’s composite literary 
dialects provided samples by which to understand Greek and Latin as languages “per se.” 
Spenser’s contest with scholarly authority thus explains why and how Spenser 
places weight upon the mental actions required of readership in order to decode his play 
with diction.  Gigliola Sacerdoti-Mariani acknowledges this in particular in her analysis 
of Spenser’s innovative handling of archaic diction.  For example, Sacerdoti-Mariani 
notes that Spenser uses the verb “hight” in the past tense “hote” not to mean “call,” but to 
mean “recall” or “remember” (17).  In the July æglog, Thomalin says: 
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This had a brother, (his name I knew) 
the first of all his cote. 
A shepheard trewe, yet not so true 
as he that earst I hote (ll.161-4).  
 
Here Spenser has not recovered the older word “hight” since he already uses it 
abundantly. His purpose also cannot be to add a new word to English, one that it lacks or 
needs: “to remember” is not, to be sure, a special addition to English. He instead 
profitably conflates two quite different meanings in order to force the reader to do the 
work of an innovation seemingly only for the sake of innovation. The word “hight” 
simply means “to call” or “to name,” but in this new use describes an act of 
remembering—a “re-call.”  Instead of the prefix that suggests the repetition, Spenser uses 
a tense shift.  To understand such an innovation, the reader cannot simply refer to a 
designated definition or grammatical category. He or she must think through the way 
time and action are being conceived relative to memory. Even so the reader cannot think 
of the change in meaning as a figurative use of language. Spenser does not guide the 
reader along with any colored explanation of “calling in the mind” or the like. And E.K. 
is of little help.  For line 161, E.K. writes: “His name) he meaneth Aaron: whose name 
for more Decorum, the shephearde sayth he hath forgot…” (133).  E.K. notes the 
obvious, that memory and naming are at issue, but he conveniently overlooks the 
innovative use of tense.  For a lexicographer like Estienne, such an innovation can be 
found in classical languages and even matched to an existing use, but it cannot be created 
in the way that Spenser is showing us here.  If we were in doubt about Spenser’s play 
with this word, he makes sure—again, as Sacerdoti-Mariani notes—that we are aware of 
it by innovating once more with the same word within the September æglog: “Say it out, 
Diggon, what ever it hight” (l. 172), says Hobbinol.  In this context, “call” has come to 
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mean “means” or “purports.”  While in this case and the previous, the word use aids with 
a rhyme, the shift in meaning itself in the latter case gets no notice or explanation from 
E.K. at all.  This deliberate innovation reinforces the sort of message Spenser has been 
emphasizing about the poet’s primary responsibility for meaning.  It is a technique that 
outstrips the lexicographer even as it depends upon a readership sensitive to its methods. 
Most notably, perhaps, it depends heavily upon contextual clues essential to a notion of 
relational meaning. 
Finally, then, Spenser’s fight against lexicographic authority propels him into the 
labors of didacticism—the heart of the allegorical thinking about language which is to 
dominate his career and The Faerie Queene. Spenser is not just indicating that a poet can 
change word meanings and thereby begin to define the language of the nation rationally.  
He is acknowledging the role of learning language in the development of thinking and the 
role of thinking in the development of language. This is the reason why Spenser’s E.K. 
spends such time describing the “growth” of the poet’s wings.  The imagery of the 
Phaedrus from which such flying imagery partly proceeds is useful for Socrates teaching 
a young student about how philosophy outstrips rhetoric in teaching us how to persuade 
one another.  The imagery and word-play that Spenser supplies regards poets being 
“fledged” even as their language is made sufficient to enable them to surpass 
philosophers in how they persuade. It is imagery that closely reflects the basic 
prescription that the dedicatee Sidney has for poets in his Defence. In the simplest 
analysis, by taking up an anti-denotation stance on word meaning, Spenser resists a larger 
social authority’s terms for how word meanings work—he resists competing scholar 
rhetoricians and ambitious lexicographers like Henri Estienne. However, by defending 
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Cuddie rather than Colin from those who might trespass on the role of the poet, he is 
defending a learner-poet along with a learner-reader.  In that way, he is questioning 
systematic and productive potentialities of lexicographic tomes as maps of the generative 
powers of a language.  We know from the history of the Estienne Latin and Greek 
lexicons that an appeal to a readership hoping to acquire a sort of powerful system for 
thought and speech was central to their fame.  Such works are aimed at students, but they 
are of no help to Cuddie and mainly seem, if we take E.K.’s word on it, to infringe upon 
the necessary role of Piers or Colin in teaching.   
Through E.K. and through the competitive, striving characters in the poem, 
Spenser presents learning about their word-use not just as relevant to his effort to define 
the composite literary dialect he uses, but as a process relevant to the ambitions of other 
authors.  He tells poets and writers not to trust in the forces of those outside the temple of 
his own profession much as the Assyrian priests once warned the faithful not to trust in a 
God other than Nabu.  And so Spenser effectively argues that authorial intent and 
complicit (if not always compliant) readership precedes the ideas that generate 
meaningful and persuasive discourse in the society.  Ultimately, though, Spenser could 
not have failed to be aware of the larger meaningful orders of his social world. There 
were things he could not change, and there were processes of learning he needed to 
understand more fully in order to make a career move from acknowledging the centrality 
of didacticism to teaching a readership what he felt to be most important.  It is in Books 5 
& 6 of The Faerie Queene and in the View of the Present State of Ireland that Spenser 
tackles what language-learning can and cannot change about thought and culture.  And so 
it is to those materials I turn (and return) in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: 
 Finding Spenser’s Good Bitch: 
 How the Figure of Samient in Book 5 Anticipates  
Critiques of Humanist Notions of Learning and Language in Book 6  
and Complicates Comparisons to  A View of the Present State of Ireland 
 
Much of this chapter represents an effort to forestall a view of Spenser as a 
fatalist.  Such a view, which emerges partly from knowing the grim colonial politics in 
which Spenser participated, accompanies the most condemning present-day 
interpretations of Spenser’s handling of issues of language and politics in Books 5 & 6 of 
The Faerie Queene and A View of the Present State of Ireland.  Part of the justification 
for such a sense of his fatalism seems to appear in the Proem to Book 5. There, Spenser 
points to the degeneration of the world as a problem in which “vertue” comes to be 
identified as “vice” (5.Pr.4.1-2).  Words, we are intended to see, have fallen wholly out of 
alignment with the things. From this we might be tempted to believe that Spenser sees 
language as hopelessly degenerated, and that his linguistic idealism simply emerges in 
response to observing the inevitable physical degradations of the tongue.  Given the 
connection between language and poet, and the connections between this specific poet 
and the rhetoric of the colonial mission, we may find ourselves plying a logic that starts 
from this cosmic desolation and makes it of a piece with the political disconsolation of 
Spenser’s A View of the Present State of Ireland.  (The latter political tract, after all, 
surrounds its wolfish recommendations for overwhelming military action with a herd of 
wooly arguments about how Ireland’s laws, tongues, bards, and culture are hopelessly 
degenerated.)  The Proem to Book 5, however, unseats the hopelessness that initiates 
such reasoning.  Despite the changes that shift the nature of things and their names, 
Spenser honors “those Aegyptian wisards old,/ which in their Star-read were wont have 
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best insight” to whom he suggests “faith may be given” (5.Pr.8.1-3).  The “wisard’s” 
interpretive act is given heavy but not unconditional emphasis—not the emphasis of 
despair in the last option.  Spenser argues that the “Soverayne Goddesse”—his queen—
must just such a “righteous doome aread” (5.Pr.11.1,4) to the people as the priest-like 
interpreters might offer.  Such “reading” is not an immediate judgment that cannot be 
judged in turn or shaped, however binding and enforcing an impact Spenser advocates.  
After all, the queen’s ability to “aread,” which means to interpret or narrate, is met with 
Spenser’s claim that he will “dare discourse of so divine a read” (5.Pr.11.7) to his own 
readership in Book 5.  The peril and boldness of this line comes from how close “a read,” 
being a passive reception of the Queen’s narration, is to “aread,” which is an active and 
usurping fashioning of interpretation.  Spenser argues for a poetic responsibility to the 
Queen’s image in The Shepheardes Calender, but here he goes a step further in arguing a 
rhetorical or communicative responsibility for characterizing law and judgment more 
broadly.  Reader, readership, and poet are embroiled in this together, responsible for 
imagining the state and choosing its best courses.  The passage is not about dictating the 
right choice or right interpretation in the face of dire conditions or disordered rhetoric.  
Indeed, such bold claims on interpretation do not force us to see lawmaking or the 
executions of power as a uniform re-alignment of the heavens in which thing and name 
are forever purely to be seen and understood, but rather a delicate and diplomatic process 
more reflective of the push-and-pull of persuasion.  It is not possible to view that position 
on language as one consistent with a fatalist despair over the loss of a prelapsarian order. 
The nuanced, diplomatic tissue of thought, speech, and reality at that opening of 
Book 5 forms a pattern closely matching one implicit in the quandaries about mind, 
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language, culture, and meaning that have animated my dissertation’s investigation of 
Spenser’s linguistic idealism. In my last chapter, I addressed Spenser’s strategy of 
evoking a form of poetic resistance to classicizing lexicographic authorities over 
language. To reveal this strategy, I focused upon his habit of controlling matters of word 
origin, history, and the kinds of organizational patterns that make it possible to deploy a 
word’s meaning and function flexibly as a part of a poetic tradition rather than simply a 
scholarly museum of meaning. Such resistance in Spenser’s habits with lexis in the 
Shepheardes Calender logically emerges from the mixed influences of patronage 
anxieties, his reaction to the prestige of lexicography and classical languages, and an 
earnest desire to establish a prestigious national vernacular.  Yet the mixture itself and the 
resistance emerging from it in the early work help us explain Spenser’s more dogged 
resistance to the material word and tongue we find in his later work.  That is, it also 
allows us to explain how the negative apotheosis of the material word, the Blatant Beast, 
in Book 6, roars forth to address lexicons, politics, language, and poets together. Here is a 
creature relevant to concerns about how to control a national language, and thus relevant 
to the issues of knowledge and language that are raised by the differences between the 
Calepino and Mirabellio lexicons.  To provide the fullest picture of the origins of this 
vocal dog, though, the present chapter considers how education and learning have a 
special place in Spenser’s thinking about language and its relationship to political power.  
Indeed, the problematic identity-shifting possibility that people grow and change as 
individuals, that they are shaped by language, has a crucial role for those who wish to 
explain anomalous features of Spenser’s work in A View of the Present State of Ireland as 
well as in Books 5 & 6 of The Faerie Queene.  
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In the first segment of this chapter, I show that Andrew Hadfield and Richard 
McCabe both use the political perspective of A View of the Present State of Ireland to 
forge a faulty depiction of Spenser’s ideas about language.  The two scholars hobble 
Spenser’s intentional control of the argument being presented about language, stressing 
that he is so psychologically complicit in the colonial program that his ideas about 
language split in the chimerical contradictions of colonialism itself.  I study the logical 
problems with Hadfield’s and McCabe’s sense of Spenser’s intentions, turning in 
particular to the alternative perspectives on Spenser that are offered by M.L. Stapleton 
and Edward Armstrong.  Then, in the next segment of the chapter, looking closely at the 
opening to Book 6, I argue that Spenser adopts imagery of planting and growth (a 
“nursery” of virtue) there not only to advance his political interests as a colonist, but also 
to respond to humanist ideas of education. Specifically, Spenser there questions 
simplistic ideas about the interrelations of identity, language, and education. Armed with 
a better sense of the divisions between the pedagogical poet that Spenser hopes to be and 
the humanist scholars he takes issue with, I study A View of the Present State of Ireland 
in the third segment of my chapter. A View appeals to English humanist educators in 
ways that Book 6 of The Faerie Queene simply does not.  Indeed, likening the ideas 
about language in the two texts was bound to create the kind of faults and contradictions 
we find in Hadfield’s and McCabe’s analysis on the subject. 
In a fourth and concluding segment of my chapter, I make manifest the advantage 
of seeing the difference between A View and The Faerie Queene. Studying the role of 
Samient, the diplomat and messenger who helps Artegall and Arthur in cantos eight and 
nine of Book 5, I show that she is the beginning of the dog imagery that grows into the 
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language-associated Blatant Beast.  However, rather than being a bad example, she is a 
good one.  As such, Samient’s cooperation and willingness contrast with and more 
powerfully reveal the sequence of problems with communication and justice that begin 
with Artegall’s failure to persuade Sanglier and continue throughout the book.  Artegall’s 
education in dealing justice to animals proves unequal to his communicative needs as an 
instrument of justice.  Samient, in other words, shows how complex Spenser’s conception 
of the relationship between rhetoric and power actually is, how necessary the individual 
will and mind is to the arbitration of their relationship. Spenser’s conceptualization of 
language therefore does not simply become, with the Blatant Beast, a treatise on colonial 
dysfunction designed to address propagandistic detraction.  Instead, the beast plays a part 
in a broader critique of humanist interests and methods than what we find in A View. I 
conclude with an extended justification for the value of my observations in this chapter, 
drawing attention to Erasmus’s influential theories about education and the tongue, 
among other things.  Samient may seem a minor figure in that she in no way undermines 
our sense of Spenser’s support of brutal policies in Ireland.  However, she shows how 
Spenser’s work fits into the intellectual history of his period in a way that preserves our 
understanding of his intentions. If we fragment or unseat this idea of Spenser’s intentions 
with a figure like Samient, we lose sight of what Spenser hoped to do for poetry as much 
as for language in the didacticism he crafts in his epic. 
 
1. Spenser’s Intentions in his Thinking About and Figuring of Language 
 Andrew Hadfield and Richard McCabe have created powerful arguments that 
define Spenser’s view of language as we find it in Book 6. They see a view geared to 
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promote colonial and imperial recommendations for English policy in Ireland. However, 
each author struggles with the way that Spenser’s nuanced engagement with Irish culture 
and language is paradoxically suited to recommendations for its brutal suppression.  In 
Edmund Spenser’s Irish Experience, Hadfield acknowledges this paradox as Spenser’s 
“double movement” (77). In studying it, Hadfield ultimately finds that Spenser is simply 
aligned with the hypocrisies and contradictions of his racist colonial agenda. Addressing 
the same issue in Spenser’s Monstrous Regiment, McCabe finds that Spenser’s view of 
language is informed by a “morbid” psychological state.  Through linguistic borrowing 
and hybridizing, McCabe argues, Spenser unintentionally evinces interest in assimilating 
rather than displacing the native Irish and Old English factions, undermining his own 
“search for absolute linguistic purity” (193).  By focusing on the paradoxes of the 
colonial circumstance, though, McCabe and Hadfield limit any more nuanced 
understanding of Spenser’s intention in his detailed accounts of culture and language.  
This limitation is problematic for me because it obstructs an investigation of the purpose 
of precisely such figures of Spenser’s view of language that I have already found in Book 
6 of The Faerie Queene and in The Shepheardes Calender. 
Naturally, Hadfield and McCabe are not the only ones to observe the 
contradictions of Spenser’s attitude toward Ireland.  Abraham Stoll recognizes precisely 
the idea of a  “double movement” in his comments on Book 5. He argues that the brutal 
policy recommended by A View—a policy enacted by Lord Grey de Wilton’s military 
actions while Spenser was his secretary in Ireland during the Desmond rebellion—is 
represented in Book 5: “Talus recreates these slaughters in Book Five, and Spenser may 
well want them to feel excessively violent” (xiv). Stoll points back to the sympathetic 
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depiction of Irish culture in the View with the suggestion that Spenser must have seen the 
problems of English imperial suppression of Ireland: the View’s “detailed use of Irish 
history, mythology, ethnography, social custom, and language combine to make a 
nuanced humanist engagement with the Irish and the problems of the emerging British 
empire” (xv). Yet it is precisely on the matter of language that Hadfield finds that the 
“double movement” is less towards sympathy and more towards brutal suppression. He 
writes, for example, that Spenser’s use of the word “translate” to describe the transfer of 
English culture to Ireland in the View reveals a desire to eradicate the Irish language 
wholly (23).  Hadfield’s contention specifically addresses Irenius’ claim that the mother’s 
milk and Gaelic-language tutelage of Irish nurses corrupts the English: 
Irenius conceives of a dialectic process whereby speech both introduces and 
reinforces a processes already started in the infant’s life by fostering; the belief 
that the influence of the mother tongue cannot be eradicated implies that all 
subsequent efforts will be doomed to failure. (25) 
 
Quite brilliantly, Hadfield also explains Spenser’s honoring of the power of the Irish 
bards as a sophisticated critique of the way in which Irish society is topsy-turvy. “Irish 
society inverts English society,” Hadfield explains, because whereas poets are powerless 
and placeless in English society without the defense of powerful lords—as, indeed, 
Spenser argues often enough in The Shepheardes Calender—Irish bards are overly 
powerful, propagating rumor without control and contributing to a culture of lawlessness.  
Hadfield’s argument about the representation of language in Book 6 depends heavily on 
his observations about A View.  He argues that the appearance of the Blatant Beast as the 
major critic of Artegall corresponds to English and Irish criticism of Lord Grey and the 
uncontrolled rumor about the English tactics in Ireland itself.  Of the shift from Books 5 
to 6, Hadfield writes, 
!   
! 256!
Spenser is making a neat link between criticism of the hard-line policies of his 
erstwhile patron, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, Arthur, Lord Grey de Wilton—who 
argued for and practiced the suppression of the Irish—and the abuse of language 
itself.  The implication is that failure to accept what must be done to make Ireland 
governable—for Spenser, the deployment of a huge army that will crush Irish 
resistance and enable the English to spread law, government, and civil society—is 
a form of unreason, an inability to think in proper human terms.  And because 
such voices have triumphed in Book Five, Calidore’s quest is impossible: without 
the foundations of social order, the establishment of courtesy is not just difficult, 
but is a meaningless enterprise. (viii, italics mine) 
 
Hadfield connects this view of language back to Spenser’s willingness to distort Irish 
word meaning and etymology shamelessly for England’s propagandistic purposes. For 
example, Hadfield reads Eudoxus’ and Irenius’ comments about the etymology of Irish 
words carefully and comes to the conclusion that Spenser’s dialogue is mainly concerned 
to “refute and displace the false history of the Irish”: “A true etymology is opposed to a 
false one and the frontiers of language are established whereby English truth stands 
opposed to Irish falsehood” (98).   
 Hadfield’s neat understanding of Spenser’s view of true and false language 
categories, while obviously appropriate to illustrating colonial and racist hypocrisies, is 
too simple to explain Spenser’s views of language as I have described them in previous 
chapters. This is all the more strange because Spenser’s suspicion of spoken language, 
clever treatment of lexicography, deliberately inconsistent usage of dialect terms, and 
subtle advocacy of poetic identity as linked to language must predate A View’s arguments 
about language and colonial policy.  Thus it is all the more important to consider how 
Hadfield strives to justify his position—as, for example, when he points to Spenser’s 
treatment of etymology in a section of the View’s dialogue where Spenser ridicules 
Richard Stanihurst’s historical etymology.  In considering that passage, Hadfield treats 
Spenser’s ideas of language in terms that fit the polemical discourse of the View: 
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The fact that Eudoxus can invent a spurious etymology through using his 
Classical, humanist learning to ridicule Stanihurst […] suggests that the whole 
enterprise [of using etymologies and language histories], often regarded as a key 
strategy in humanist history-writing by historians of ideas, was seen by Spenser 
himself as a bit of a cheap trick, albeit useful for propaganda purposes, perhaps 
like the Arthurian legends. […] Or is it more likely that [Spenser’s audience is] 
being given a series of strategies whereby they can fool the public they wish to 
persuade, the joke being one shared among the audience of the text but not to be 
taken lightly by those on whom its arguments will be used, i.e. an English 
audience. (99) 
 
Hadfield’s struggle raises some questions.  If Spenser is relying on an audience to 
acknowledge the fluidity of language history and the nature of propagandistic uses of 
language history, how can he be relying on that same audience to treat his historical 
speculation on Irish terms as without bias?  And why then would Spenser have so simple 
an approach to language in the much more complex allegorical play of Book 6 of The 
Faerie Queene?  Is his etymology and his project there no more than a “cheap trick”? 
Hadfield’s approach to the ethical contradictions of the View undermines his own later 
argument that Spenser uses The Faerie Queene to lay out a straightforward treatment of 
Irish speech as labile and false, English as stable and true.  For precisely this reason, 
Hadfield has to take up an extreme position on Spenser’s view of language—one in 
which Spenser’s ethical and intentional identity is subsumed in the implications of the 
politically- and racially-charged words with which he propagandizes.  His choice of this 
extreme position is not immediate, and is framed with a key concession: Hadfield 
acknowledges that Eudoxus’s and Irenius’s treatment of the etymology associated with 
Ireland’s identification as the holy or sacred island83 suggests that the Irish are not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Irenius says that Ireland “not Called amisse Banno or Sacra Insula, taking sacra for accursed” (145) in A 
View.  He is explaining to Eudoxus that Ireland was called this name ironically in view of the political 
struggles over its control, which were complicated by changes in power in England itself.  See my later 
note on A.C. Hamilton’s comment on the use of the term “sacred” in Book 2 of The Faerie Queene. 
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irredeemable, writing, “In this case, the etymologies point both ways and it might seem 
as if a possible acknowledgement of a hybrid colonial scene has opened up where 
identities are fluid and certainties challenged” (107).  Yet Hadfield steps back from 
precisely this judicious understanding of the linguistic side of the “double movement” 
and argues that Spenser is merely an advocate of a racially pure “English peace which 
excludes the native Irish.” Such a view problematically suggests that Spenser’s 
acknowledgement of vicissitudes in conceptions of race and language is somehow not 
real—as though it could not count unless the “hybrid” it posits were fitted with the 
additional present-day certainty that race is a largely fictive construction.  Hadfield wants 
us to treat Spenser’s political masters and interests as the determining factors in the 
understanding of his thought. Spenser could not know that race was entirely a fiction, and 
it is comically anachronistic to suppose we may attain any ethical insight into ideas about 
race in that way.  Still, Hadfield holds Spenser responsible via his vocabulary: 
The two key terms [in Spenser’s vocabulary] are “Briton” and “Scythian.” The 
history contained in these two words, their etymologies, and the parallel discovery 
that they lie behind the history of so many other words and social practices, serve 
to validate the notions of identity and difference upon which the political 
discourse of A View depends. (108) 
 
In this passage, Hadfield yields his own interpretive responsibility as he says that the 
words themselves have a pre-existing meaning which rips the disguise from Spenser’s 
true intention.  He writes that “the word itself provides an authoritative history and 
history is made up of a series of words” (108).  The latter is obvious and leads to no 
salient judgment: history is made up of events that are transmuted into both language and 
its adherent symbolic systems—math, thought, etc.  Words are complex symbols whose 
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interpretation is always subject to change, not invariant even in and of themselves in a 
given period.  Even if Spenser uses these two terms, and even if his use complements 
English interests and biases, his history as allegorist, poet, and thinker challenges and 
hybridizes word meanings before we find him discoursing on word meaning in A View. 
 Hadfield’s approach, it should be noted, ties an analysis of Spenser’s political 
view of language to Spenser’s choices as a language-user.  In its faults, though, this 
approach reveals that there are some tangles to Spenser’s view of language that 
complicate our view of his politics.  With this complication comes not just a more 
nuanced view of language and politics, but also of Spenser’s intention—a matter that I 
hope to show is linked to the didacticism of Spenser’s approach and the questions of 
language learning he confronts as a humanist and someone changing both humanism and 
Platonism in various ways.  Of Spenser’s intention and language we find the most robust 
account in Richard McCabe’s chapter on “Irenius’s Mother Tongue” in Spenser’s 
Monstrous Regiment.  McCabe also finds a sort of double movement, though he terms it a 
hybridity that is less Spenser’s intention (or the non-thinking product of the history of his 
words to which we are jointly subject) than the accident of his subconscious allegiance to 
Ireland as colonial homeland. McCabe requires us to view Spenser’s idea of language as 
inherently linked to the ideology of the anxious colonist and colonialist: “Spenser’s 
outlook is everywhere informed by a morbid fear of infiltration—both territorial and 
sexual—but the very language in which he expresses such anxieties increasingly 
illustrates the process it deplores” (178).  This leads him to describe Irenius as one of the 
most powerful exponents of Spenser’s view of language and conclude that Spenser’s 
remarks with this speaker reflect a “contemporary debate as to whether ‘meaning’ was in 
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some sense imminent in language or solely a matter of arbitrary attribution, but he was 
well ahead of his time in recognizing how language functions to shape, rather than 
merely express, familial and political bonds.”84  Despite the sophistication of Irenius and 
his puppeteer, Spenser, McCabe envisions the political and social context as 
determinative of Spenser’s view of language:  
Implicit in New English attacks upon the Gaelic language is the dreadful 
suspicion that it articulates “English” nature better than the “mother tonge” by 
words derived from the language of the Irish. The subtle alterations in Spenser’s 
own language, the infiltration of his “mother tongue” by words derived from the 
language of the Irish, bears witness to an unconscious process of assimilation of 
which his conscious polemic fights shy. (196) 
 
Yet McCabe’s presumption is that Spenser as an exponent of the English language insists 
on a need for an inalterable English nature that is to be expressed in a pure English 
tongue; his presumption is that Spenser’s thoroughly composite style of English—a 
tongue overtly under Greek, Latin, French, and other influences—is not in fact intended 
to be recognizably composite or influenced. As was the case before with Hadfield’s 
approach, McCabe’s depiction of Spenser’ idea of language does not match what I have 
found in Book 6 or The Shepheardes Calender. Rather, for McCabe a pressing need for 
ethical insight into the position of Spenser’s literature in past politics (relevant to a clear 
legacy of colonialism) determines that Spenser was merely out of command and 
unintentionally revealing of his fears. There is no question that the New English colonists 
were morbidly afraid of the Irish and the Gaelic influence on Old English groups, and 
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84 McCabe acknowledges that his thinking on this matter owes much to Richard Waswo’s Language and 
Meaning in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987).  However, Waswo’s report does not do full 
justice to the flexibility of humanist thought on this matter in the period, especially since he relies on 
anachronistic features of Saussurean linguistics to advance his basic argument. Andrew Zurcher’s ideas in 
Spenser’s Legal Language, as I considered in the last chapter, offer a more nuanced understanding that 
informs my skepticism.  See my introduction for a fuller comment on Waswo’s ideas about Spenser. 
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there is no question that Spenser hoped both to denigrate and to use Irish language and 
culture for English purposes.  And, following Hadfield’s observations, Spenser was quite 
aware that Irenius’ fanciful etymology and history could only be made to serve a rhetoric 
tailored to the interests of the factions that Spenser spoke on behalf of to the English 
crown in the dialogue.  Indeed, McCabe points out that Spenser’s animus toward the Irish 
bards arises in part from the bards’ perfect awareness that “translation” from Gaelic 
language into English represented both a corruption of the essential Gaelic and a total 
destruction of their culture and way of life:  
In the  Gaelic mind “translation” of the sort Spenser promoted [in the View] was 
tantamount to cultural annihilation, and the bards viciously satirized all those who 
“corrupted” their speech with English vocabulary. (191) 
 
Here, though, intrude some serious problems. McCabe creates a misleading parity 
between the bards’ beliefs about language and Spenser’s. The fact that the bards believed 
in such a cultural essence in language does not mean that Spenser believes in it.  Spenser 
would not have to believe it to play upon such English or Irish fears, or to believe in it to 
advocate the use of humanist learning to propagandize.  In fact, as I argued in my last 
chapter, his apparent indifference to corruption and hybridization of language in his 
management of Greek etymology (particularly evident in E.K.’s frequently flawed 
understanding) and his slipshod borrowings from Welsh phrases in The Shepheardes 
Calender suggest he believes not that an essential nature in a language can be easily 
identified, but rather that it must be proved in the action of the poetry itself and the 
hermeneutical actions of the readership.  This complicated view of heterogeneous 
linguistic authority, ironically, stands in conflict with a view of cultural and linguistic 
purity likely espoused by the Irish bards and knowingly championed by some present-day 
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thinkers about language who see culture (rightly in some cases) as to varying degrees 
dependent upon and forged from language. This does not mean that Spenser did not 
intend to combat the Irish and their bards at a cultural and at a material level by enlisting 
troops to destroy them and their supporters—and teachers to strip their names and 
language from them once they had been militarily suppressed.  It also does not mean that 
Spenser was not an advocate of English empire.  However, it does mean that we cannot 
force his view of empire or politics to agree with his view of language quite so readily, 
and that therefore we must step back from declaring him guilty of an “unconscious” 
desire to be assimilated. The very suggestiveness of the terms of assimilation, in fact, will 
depend upon how the different sides view what might happen to language as part of its 
relations to identity and knowledge in the process. Spenser’s conscious archaisms and 
manipulation of lexis depend intrinsically upon a recognition of language as partial, 
composite, and relational. His choices propose that language might be improved, and 
indeed they depend upon a culture willing (as ours is for the most part not) to accept that 
languages may be judged to be better or worse in instrumental ways. Spenser’s composite 
idea of language is not one of a cultural essence that might provoke its cultural defenders 
to chimerical pronunciations. To the contrary, Spenser’s idea of language as we have 
seen it in my previous chapters is of a wily poetic chimera poised to devour the defenders 
of any cultural essences that stand in its way. 
My point about Spenser’s general view of language becomes clearer if we 
consider a specific instance from The Shepheardes Calender and the problems with 
McCabe’s commentary on that material.  When Spenser borrows the word “kerne” from 
Irish in the July eclogue of The Shepheardes Calender, E.K. provides a decidedly 
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misleading gloss: “a Churle or Farmer” (133).  In the View, Spenser shows that he 
perfectly well understands that the term refers to an Irish footsoldier.85 McCabe goes far 
in exploring the issue.  He begins: “‘Kerne’ is an Anglicization of the Gaelic 
‘ceithearnach’ or ‘ceithearn,’ meaning a foot-soldier or band of foot-soldiers, and its 
occurrence demonstrates the chimerical nature of the search for absolute linguistic 
purity” (193). As already noted, it is not clear that Spenser is searching for linguistic 
purity—a guiding presumption in McCabe’s approach here! Even so, McCabe goes on to 
present a compelling analysis based on the political motivations of Spenser’s language 
choices: 
Yet the matter is a good deal more complex than may at first appear for, as E.K.’s 
gloss recognizes, the primary Gaelic sense is quite inappropriate in the context.  
Rather, the word is being used, as the OED indicates it sometimes was, in a 
derivative sense.  One might even argue that it was only Spenser’s subsequent 
contact with genuine “kernes” that transformed a loose derivative usage into a 
more semantically accurate, if polemically aggressive, one.  […] The use of 
loanwords in English was countenanced by Spenser’s schoolmaster, Richard 
Mulcaster, provided that they obeyed the rules of “enfranchisement” or 
naturalization by which they “becom bond to the rules of our writing… as the 
stranger denisons be to lawes of our cuntrie.”  The kerns of The Shepheardes 
Calender have been assimilated, those of A View remain “salvage.” 
 
I cannot help but admire the beauty of this explanation.  The perfect match between 
colonial mission and linguistic policy bursts ripely into the fruition of Spenser’s role in 
the empire as he perceived it.  Yet there are points of weakness.  First, it seems quite 
unusual that Spenser had conceived of a program of linguistic assimilation for the Irish as 
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85 Irenius proposes a severe need for the reformation of Irish customs and the practices of the “kerne” 
soldiery in particular.  He states: “Both [the old customs] and the kerne allsoe (whome I toke to be the 
proper Irish soldiour [)] Cane I allowe soe that they use that habitt and Costome of theirs in warrs onelye 
when they are led forthe to service of theire Prince, and not usually at home in Civill places…” (123).  
Shakespeare’s similar uses of the word show that it was not unknown to the English.  However, Spenser’s 
Irenius goes on to say that kernes are “ravishers of weomen and murderers of children.” The comment 
nakedly appeals to the worst xenophobic English assumptions. 
 
!   
! 264!
early as 1579.  At that earlier date, as his use of Welsh-like speech in the September 
eclogue of The Shepheardes Calender shows, he was willing to have non-English speech 
unassimilated, relying on forms of syntax that are distinctly non-English for a variety of 
non-English terms.  So Spenser does not seem keen to “domesticate” either English or 
other foreign terms in The Shepheardes Calender or elsewhere.  In fact, as I observed in 
the last chapter, he seems intent on using English in ways that invoke French, Latin, and 
Greek usages, weaving a composite language that improves English by many subtle 
means that are not, to be sure, distinctly English.  But if this criticism does not deeply 
trouble McCabe’s argument, a second one must:  E.K.’s interpretation of the word 
“kerne” in the July eclogue does not offer a correct reading for the context that we find 
the speaker Thomalin providing.  In the passage, Thomalin describes Palinode’s 
unfortunate journey to Rome, where he found that wealth had corrupted the religious 
men. The “fatte kernes and leany knaves” (199) that we find in the passage guard the 
hapless flocks of these corrupted priests—more precisely put, they maintain the flock’s 
“fasting” while the “wisards weltre in welths waves,/ pampred in pleasures deep” (197-
8).  Such men are not farmers or clownish “churls” as E.K. would have it, but rather the 
martial muscle enforcing the Papal authority to collect money from the “flock.”  In other 
words, Spenser’s poetic voice has not domesticated the word “kerne” into an English 
farmer appropriate to the pastoral verse.  Rather, Spenser’s glossator E.K. has done so.  
The word’s Irishness has been preserved in the context of the poem rather than the notes.  
As I showed in the previous chapter, the glossator strategically both competes with and 
yields to the poet over the authority to define the terms in ways that suit the larger project 
of the Calender. In this case, E.K.’s choice shifts the term’s meaning in a way not suited 
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to the task of commenting on the Irish language; rather, the shift strategically exonerates 
and authenticates the poet’s commentary on politics, religion, and power that the 
additional implication of savage Irish soldiery allows.   With this better reading, we know 
that Spenser did not have so tailored a view of the loan word as McCabe desires.  And 
this in turn suggests that we need to hesitate over the degree to which Spenser’s 
management of lexical meaning in loanwords betrays “an unconscious process of 
assimilation” for a hated Other’s and Outsider’s language. The “unconscious” here is an 
idea that is betraying present scholars more than it is aiding them in a pursuit to 
understand Spenser’s politics and poetics! 
 It is futile to dispute whether Spenser was part of a colonial mission, or to dispute 
that this mission and its imperial apparatus was deeply influential on The Faerie Queene, 
including the vocabulary choices therein.  Some of Spenser’s work in that regard is deep 
and subtle, and to be sure the exploration of it was muted in the early years of Spenser 
study.  On the whole, McCabe’s analysis is sound in terms of the political and social 
agendas he reveals, particularly as they become part of the political will of A View of the 
Present State of Ireland. I do not mean my argument about language to form an apology 
for Spenser’s decision to lend his voice to extreme, even genocidal policies in Ireland.  
Yet at some point we must temporarily separate this political and/or social agenda in 
Ireland from Spenser’s argument over questions of the relationship between culture, 
knowledge, language, and identity in such a way that we lose neither intellectual nuance 
nor ethical seriousness.  The intellectual nuance informs the Irish policy Spenser 
advocated, but it is not easy to condemn as the policy itself.  It certainly cannot be 
explained as an accident of his psychology, the group psychology of the colonists, or the 
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simple prejudicial position of aspiring imperialists.  My goal thus far has been to 
demonstrate that the arguments about language based in a reading of colonial Irish policy 
are not adequately consistent in their approach to Spenser’s ideas about language—
Hadfield and McCabe both clearly falter. Spenser’s intention must be more complicated 
than the political agenda that apparently dominates some portions of his work, and for 
this reason we must re-think the relationship between culture and language that Spenser 
proposes in A View by considering how it might emerge out of the more complicated and 
nuanced versions we find elsewhere.  My previous three chapters brought me to this 
position because I have been re-thinking the humanism, idealism, and nationalism of 
Spenser’s approach in some detail already. 
In the course of defending Spenser’s project from arguments like those of 
McCabe and Hadfield, M.L. Stapleton and Edward Armstrong have provided the 
beginnings of the more complex model of Spenser’s intentions in part by resisting the 
lure of characterizing them in terms of his politics. Considering the ways in which 
Spenser’s circumstance in Ireland was thought to resemble Ovid’s, Stapleton writes that 
“it does not seem justified to read Ovidian intertextuality as entirely political” (44).  
Drawing on the work of Richard Helgerson and quoting Louis Montrose, Stapleton goes 
on to assert that Spenser’s resemblance to Ovid should be seen in terms of the way 
Spenser adapts the broadest powers of the authorial role:  
Spenser learned from Ovid’s exil[ic] works that poets should claim the status of 
auctores, authors of venerable antiquity  and unquestioned authority.  This 
phenomenon gives them great power over the readers who peruse their wisdom.  
Since their opinions, biases, and language define the world that we try to enter by 
reading, we rely on them almost exclusively for information and can hardly 
escape them. […] As Montrose says, “In claiming the originative status of an 
author, a writer claims the authority to direct and delimit the interpretive activity 
of an elite community of readers by whom he himself is authorized to write.” (46) 
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From my own reading of E.K.’s and Spenser’s play with authority over word meaning, I 
think it is clear that much of what Stapleton argues here is correct: Spenser was indeed 
appropriating ancient ideas of authorial responsibility as he was advancing political 
thinking to his community, and this appropriation of an authorial voice creates troubling 
paradoxes.  Still, some of those paradoxes are resolvable: my last chapter showed that the 
motivations for doing so lay in a resistance not just to the will of a tyrannical patron, but 
also to humanist authority over language. 
Edward Armstrong takes Spenser’s intertextuality and extends it to a larger 
humanist enterprise of defining author and reader.  For Armstrong, Spenser consistently 
engages in Ciceronian dialogue; Spenserian authorial voices—including E.K., the 
narrator of The Faerie Queene, and the interlocutors of A View—not only bear witness to 
a bold authorial persona, but develop a larger interplay between Spenser and his intended 
reader.  He argues that “the poetic practices of Spenser are grounded in a Ciceronian 
moral philosophy that takes as its fundamental principle that human beings are, as 
Kenneth Burke puts it, ‘Bodies that Learn Language’” (183). Spenser’s “poetry  
acknowledges and exploits poetry’s capacity to shape culture values and, significantly, to 
challenge and reform cultural conventions” because, Armstrong argues, it forms a 
“sophistic”—a method of using language to acquire or produce ethical knowledge.  On 
the latter basis, Armstrong even conducts a defense of the policy recommendations of A 
View, arguing that it models a “process of deliberation” (163) that he believes is parallel 
to the poetic process enacted by the didacticism of The Faerie Queene itself.   
 For my concerns, the merit of Armstrong’s and Stapleton’s approaches lies in 
their willingness to push aside the ponderous ethical judgment provoked by Spenser’s 
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political recommendations ever so briefly in order to talk about what else he intended. 
This willingness allows us to entertain more precise visions of his conceptualization of 
language as an instrument of good.  Even so, both of them seem to respond more 
forcefully to Spenser’s work as an ideal case, a formal experiment rather than an 
embedded and inescapable historical piece with clear prescriptive force.  For example, 
Armstrong believes that Spenser’s poetic method creates an “ethical imperative” for 
shaping language into stories that make a collective history intelligible: “Telling 
(hi)stories is the quintessential rhetorical act informing the poet’s method” (162).  This 
emphasis on historical narrative-making itself is what he believes Spenser achieves in 
place of a specific history. Armstrong and Stapleton contend that poetic rules are more 
than simply those of the imagination and have, rather, an independent, forceful narrative 
value in which the poet’s authority is deeply though not transparently ethical.  This view 
of poets reflects what Sir Philip Sidney advocates in his Defense: the combination of 
historical and philosophical ethics in a poetic praxis.  Such a Sidneian view of Spenser’s 
intentions, therefore, is perfectly in keeping with the Spenser’s priorities for poetry and 
language as I have considered them in the previous chapters—his handling lexis, 
glossators, authorial privilege, the importance of the mind and knowledge, the difficulties 
of lexicons, and the mysterious link between language and identity.  With this approach 
to Spenser’s intentions in mind, we can better consider how he intended us to see 
education’s part in the ethics of language—an ethics in which figures like the Blatant 
Beast and Calepine play cooperative parts. 
2. What Book 6 Intimates About Education, Language, Virtue, and Poetry 
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Book 6 evokes the language of educators in ways that relate directly to the 
colonial circumstance in Ireland, but Spenser’s focus is at once broader and more specific 
than that colonial matter.   That is, Spenser uses the pastoral and farming imagery 
associated with classical poetry, and also associated with humanist educators, to justify 
the colonial work of supplanting the barbarous uncultivated land and people. However, 
Spenser also subtly questions the terms of humanist educators as and because he 
advances his own didactic poetics.  Examining the work of William Kempe, we can see 
how Spenser uses similar terms, and indeed how deeply educators relied upon poetry’s 
cultural legitimacy in thinking about the growth of linguistic skills.  More crucially 
though, we can also see the similarity between Kempe’s agenda and that of 
lexicographers and glossators: like E.K. or Henri Estienne, Kempe appropriates the 
cultural legitimacy of poetry to advance the scholar’s legitimacy.  In his drive to control 
the conditions under which children develop linguistic facility, Kempe ignores the 
questions of materiality and spirituality that dominate Spenser’s thinking about poetry, 
language, thought, authorship, and inspiration in Book 6 and elsewhere.  With this in 
mind, it is clear that Spenser, in the way he characterizes Calidore and Calepine, attacks 
the kinds of ideas that Kempe’s view of education represents. Yet more subtly, Spenser 
eliminates one of the crucial habits of humanist thought about education—a view of the 
long-lasting nature of early influences.  This view is directly connected to pithy Horatian 
adage which appears in different forms in the works of Kempe, Francis Clement, Richard 
Mulcaster, and the famous Roger Ascham. Indeed, by looking closely at Ascham, we can 
see a potent irony in Spenser’s case against humanism if it is understood to implicate 
educators: like Sir Philip Sidney, Spenser had to fight the general notion that poets were 
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intemperate and more physical and bodily than mental.  Therefore we can see why 
Spenser’s preoccupation with the tongue, language, and mind are guiding images and 
figures in his ultimate decision to bring up questions about poetry’s place that attend the 
depiction of Colin and his vision in Book 6, canto ten. Putting all these factors together, 
we can see why Hadfield’s view of the depiction of language in Book 6 is seriously 
inadequate, which in turn will allow us to take a fresh look at A View. 
What, then, does Book 6 teach us about learning language?  For one thing, we 
could only conclude that a good form of courteous speech is a foregone result of the inner 
goodness of the noble heroes of this book if we read with painful naiveté. Spenser does 
heroicize poetry and a secure nobility, of course.  As I argued in the first chapter, 
Pastorella’s inherent, embodied nobility itself is the communicative mark that allows 
recognition of her true identity in Book 6.  Certainly, as I also argued, this mark has been 
placed there by the poetic and the prophetic agent together.  Yet for Spenser and for his 
reader the progress toward such an ideal has been marred by carefully recognized 
political and social complications—the fumbling intrusions of Calidore into Colin’s 
vision, for example. Moreover, matters of intellectual history as they are recognized in 
characters like Calepine and Mirabella complicate our understanding of how Spenser is 
arguing that linguistic authority is to be achieved.  Clearly, Spenser does not believe in a 
pure speech so much as the potential for its existence within a purer mental form.  One 
additional way he complicates our understanding of poetry and speech in this book 
involves how he addresses growth and change. Spenser begins Book 6 by addressing 
“learnings threasures” as stored up in the mind (6.Pr.2.3), but we find quickly that 
Spenser is concerned with the growth of such treasures in a “sacred noursery/ Of vertue” 
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(3.1-2).  Imagery of vegetative growth dominates for an ensuing stanza. Spenser’s point 
about virtue here is that we are not in a Garden of Eden where plants and the people are 
already grown to perfection and balance, nor in a Garden of Adonis in which there is a 
constant cycling of form and matter.  Here “seeds of bounty soveraine” are “long with 
carefull labour nurst” (6.Pr.3.7-8).  It is the work of the Muses to “revele” this nursery to 
Spenser, but they are also expressly in the business of teaching—and there is something 
curious about their teaching.  The stakes are high, the choices difficult as ever. Spenser 
says to the Muses: “Guyde ye my footing, and conduct me well/ In these strange waies, 
where never foote did use,/ Ne none can find, but who was taught them by the Muse” 
(6.Pr.2.7-9).  Why, though, does Spenser emphasize that only the Muses can so lead to 
virtue?  We will be able to return to this choice of emphasis as we consider Spenser’s 
likely and certain responses to humanist educators. 
Spenser’s concern with crafting this image of a garden of learning anticipates the 
figural work to be done with Calepine in ensuing cantos.  I have already dealt with the 
intellectual history to which Calepine’s figuration apparently responds in my first and 
second chapters: Spenser’s decision to use the term “treasury” at the outset, and to 
indicate that access to these treasuries is the right of the muses, suggests already that 
mere lexicons (identified by the word “treasury” frequently enough) with their scholarly, 
glossing producers alone cannot serve the good student as well as the enthusiastic poet of 
inspired divinity.  That said, the colonial political context suits the intellectual context 
with seeming perfection: as a book-man, Calepine’s linguistic learning cannot help him 
with the foreign, savage environment in which he finds himself. Calepine’s partial failure 
as a courtier abroad occurs because like his namesake he is someone trained in 
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continental humanist lore who adapts poorly to the “salvage” land.86 From this 
perspective, Spenser’s choice of vegetative imagery is in keeping with the interest in 
colonial plantations, just as the use of the word “soveraine” signals a constant and dutiful 
attention to the Queen that is part of the colonial subject’s interest.  Further, we may 
plausibly argue that Spenser’s reference to the “sacred” nursery is meant to invoke the 
idea of the “Sacra Insula” (“Sacred/Cursed Island”) of Ireland.  This sacred yet cursed 
place is what we find Spenser referring to in A View—an ironical matter that, as I 
mentioned earlier, Hadfield takes note of. The sacred yet cursed place is also the 
problematic “sacred soile” of Acrasia’s bower from an earlier canto.87 Indeed Spenser 
shortly and cannily directs our attention to the genesis of the “bad” speech of the Blatant 
Beast, in effect assuring us of the relevancy of the colonial and political context. Calidore 
undertakes a description for the sake of Artegall, and in it he matches each of the positive 
“garden” growths engendered by the muses with a negative, degenerated rhetorical 
product elicited by a hellish environment: 
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86 So many lines of inquiry intersect upon Calepine that it can be difficult to keep them in mind. My 
arguments here began with the observations of Daniel Fried, which I considered and expanded upon in my 
first and second chapters.  Let me here add the most concise political argumentation about Calepine’s 
significance to Spenser’s work: Lisa Jardine argues in “Encountering Ireland: Gabriel Harvey, Edmund 
Spenser, and English Colonial Ventures” that Spenser “was familiar with a particular influential model” for 
colonizing Ireland—a classical humanist model—and wrote to express his dislike for the impracticality of 
that model (61). She argues that Spenser’s (or, rather, Irenius’s) negative reaction to naïve humanist plans 
for conquest of Ireland in A View finds expression in his poetry: “…in Spenser’s poetic works there is a 
similar offsetting of a theoretical ideal civility (exemplified by the gentleman knight/courtier) against a 
belief in the culturally constructed gentility to the pressures of the uncivilized” (61-2).  Clearly, as a model 
of a courtier Calepine fits well into this pattern. Spenser’s ambivalence about the place of this book-man 
explains the “double movement” of his sympathies in the most purely political terms.   
 
87 A.C. Hamilton notes of the Palmer’s reference to the “sacred soile” of Acrasia’s island and bower 
(2.12.37.8, 287n) what has often later been observed: Spenser’s Irenius refers to Ireland as “Banno or Sacra 
Insula, taking sacra for accursed” (145) in A View, which suggests that all references to “sacred” things 
need to be carefully considered as veiled references to Ireland. Clearly, the term “sacred” has an irony 
when Spenser applies it to Ireland in the View, and thus there is good reason to see its possible ironies and 
difficulties as Spenser addresses questions of humanist education in Book 6. 
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What is that Blattant Beast? (then [Artegall] replied.) 
It is a Monster bred of hellishe race, 
(Then answerd [Calidore]) which often hath annoyd 
Good knights and ladies true, and many else destroyd. 
 
Of Cerberus whilome he was begot, 
And fell Chimaera in her darkesome den, 
Through fowle commixture of his filthy blot; 
There he was fostred long in Stygian fen 
Till he to perfect ripenesse grew… (6.1.7-8.6-9, 1-5) 
 
The passage frames the relationship between civil speech and a civil society; it suggests 
that sloppy “fostering” of children leads to a dysfunctional social order.  We find such a 
result because Spenser has carefully matched the Beast’s vegetative “ripenesse” to the 
flowering and growing courtesy from the proem’s garden.  The “fen” in which the Beast 
grows is suggestive of the Irish peat bogs, the retreats of Irish rebels.88 Therefore Spenser 
means us to understand precisely this dynamic whereby civility and savagery may be 
contrasted, and he certainly locates civility with the English and savagery with the Irish.   
Powerful as Spenser’s commitment to the Irish colonial project is, we should not 
let it obscure his handling of correlated figural aspects of the “sacred nursery.”  There is 
another context in which Spenser’s theories of learning and speech, both politically 
inflected and not, also fit. In choosing the term “nursery,” in referring to “seeds” and 
plantation, Spenser not only evokes the colonial context, but produces language and 
argumentation recognizable in the childhood educational treatises of figures like William 
Kempe, a Cambridge graduate and associate of Spenser’s friend, Gabriel Harvey. 
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88 In Irish Demons: English Writing on Ireland, the Irish, and Gender (2000), Joan Fitzpatrick points out 
that Spenser’s image in Book 2 of the “fennes of Allan” (2.9.16.2) associates the central bogs with the Irish 
rebels (84-5). Such impenetrable territories were threatening for harboring such rebels; for colonizers like 
Spenser, they also represented places that could not be profitably farmed—a waste of resources that forms 
an excellent parallel for the pastoral imagery of vegetative growth that characterizes virtue and civilization 
in the proem. 
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Kempe’s 1588 The Education of Children joins poetry, education, and the task of crafting 
virtue in a way that deepens our understanding of Spenser’s poetic didacticism.  Kempe 
writes: 
Now, when learning had taken a little roote in Greece, it spred foorthwith farre 
and wide very wonderfully.  Here then a little before the time of Debora, 
Phemonoe commonly called Sybillia, invented the arte of Poetrie, and wrote her 
Oracles in hexameter verse; whereof some peeces remayne to this day.  Then 
florished Orpheus the Thracian, and Linus a Thebane, two Poets, that for their arte 
and passing wit, were reputed to be the issue of the Gods: Which Virgils words do 
import […]. Orpheus with his cunning harmonie, as Poets sayne, tamed wilde 
beastes, and made stones to move at his pleasure: that is in very deede, with his 
sweet eloquence and wisdome, he mollified the fierce manners of unreasonable 
men, and induced their stonie hearts to embrace vertue. Whose Scholler Museus 
was a princely poet also. [...] Linus wrote much of natural Philosophie, as well 
touching celestiall as terrestriall creatures, and had two noble Schollers... (199) 
 
There is no need to believe that Spenser refers to this specific author or these specific 
ideas in Book 6.  However, the abundant parallels show us the kind of ideas about 
education, poetry, and language that Spenser has in mind, allowing us to understand his 
precise position more clearly.  For example, in the quote above, Kempe creates a history 
centered on humanist poetics in order to trumpet education’s ancient pedigree. Kempe 
presents an argument to which Spenser would be sympathetic, and he is careful to note 
that learning and poetry are a joined process which begins with oracular poetry associated 
with the Bible (Debora).  It is in Spenser’s interest as a colonial agent with militant 
protestant connections to see his poetry in such terms. In The Shepheardes Calender and 
its notes, as I considered in the last chapter, Spenser and E.K. address precisely the 
oracular, educating function of the poetry.  Kempe trumpets just such Orphic shaping 
power of poetry as the civilizing force of poetry itself, which happens to have a clear 
educational value in the humanist estimation. For Kempe, effective poets are not 
courtiers. They are princes or leaders.  This seems a positive thing, also likely to gain 
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Spenser’s support if he is hoping to have an impact on English government of any sort. 
Kempe sees the primary function of the poetry as a kind of universally civilizing action 
that flows outward from the scholar-poet to the people, and then is passed down as a 
responsibility from one scholar-poet to the next.  These ideas abundantly relate to 
Spenser’s concern with the virtue and character of Calidore and Calepine as civilizing 
agents in a “salvage” land.  Those two figures, who play dramatic roles in a larger project 
of teaching readers to read  deeply (in the broadest sense of the term), were considered in 
my first and second chapters.   
Yet there is much evidence that Spenser would have disagreed with some 
humanist visions, and thus perhaps with Kempe.  In my second chapter, I showed that the 
characters of Calepine and Mirabella embody critical ideas about lexicography. In my 
third chapter, I pointed out ways in which Spenser as E.K. and as the poet of The 
Shepheardes Calender confronts the question of the poet’s authority over language.  In 
both cases, Spenser is firmly in command of what and how he hopes poetry will teach.  
As for Kempe, there is a serious way in which his treatise, like those lexicons, trespasses 
into the work of claiming poetry’s educational value, presenting the sort of thinking 
about language and education that Spenser would have been logically disposed to resist. 89 
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89 To see the depth of the similarity of Spenser’s imagery to Kempe’s and what it may show us about 
Spenser’s intentions, it may be worth quoting a few of Kempes remarks and considering Spenser’s 
intentions in light of them. (Spenser is not borrowing from Kempe, but from the same sentiment and 
thinking about education that Kempe considers.) As he moves to describe “The Method of Schooling,” 
Kempe uses a diction of planting, seeds, and vegetative growth that closely resembles the pastoral terms we 
find in Spenser’s opening to Book 6: 
Now because our life heere is but a short flourishing floure, and our understanding in our 
Childhood verie slender and feeble, such as shall be perswaded to follow this counsell, would 
knowe also the breefest and easiest way to be used in this disclipine, which by the helpe of God 
we will indevour to search out, if first we consider what children are fit for the same. For as the 
tillage there is required not only a good husbandman, and good seede, but also a good soile to 
sowe it in: so in teaching, there is required not only a learned Maister and good doctrine, but also a 
Scholler both apt and willing to receive the seede of this good doctrine. (217-8) 
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Life is a brief flower, the author seemingly somewhat wearied; children are “tillage” that must be fertilized 
and planted with “the seede” of “good doctrine.”  It is a labor-intensive vision.  We can sense in Kempe’s 
rhetoric much of the weariness evident in Spenser’s opening reference to his “weary steps” and its progress 
through stock references to seeds, flowers, soil, ripeness, etc.  It is a shared world-weariness of the aspiring 
professional who nonetheless sees himself engaged in the most humble and paradoxically most exalted of 
tasks—much as Vergil in his Georgics. That is not the only paradox, though.  Kempe’s interest is in 
creating princely leaders among the commonly educated, and he appeals to individuals who wish to see 
themselves as landholding lords whether they are or not! The stress that falls upon the need for appearing 
to be literate and cultured in the passages that follow is clear, and it strikes upon concerns about class and 
status that were integral to English society. 
Children therefore are vertuously trained up in good learning, partly by the helpe of the Parents, 
and partly by the diligence of the teacher. The parents first care is, assoone as his child beginneth 
to speake, to provide that he use none other companie, then such as are both honest and civill, 
aswell in behavior, as in language.  He shall therefore seclude from his child barbarous nursses, 
clownish playing mates, and all rusticall persons: neither shall he himself speake in the hearing of 
his Child either wantonly, other otherwise, any rude or barbarous speech, much less shall he teach 
him any leawde or unhonest talk, as many do, or suffer him to be in the companie of unthriftie and 
unhonest persons. For a Child like an emptie new vessell being voide of all learning, is most apt to 
receive that which is first taught, and that which is first taught, sticketh deepest in memorie, 
whether it be good or bad. (218-9) 
The most sensitive point in the art of such “cultivation” is the provision of an environment that is 
essentially not crude in terms of behavior and language.  True to the period, there is not a firm distinction 
between language and other kinds of communicative actions in Kempe’s estimation.  Even so, as Kempe 
twins behavior with language, it is clear from the description of the potential playmates and nurses that the 
manners to be learned are crucially signaled in linguistic forms.  After all, in Kempe’s manual so far the 
evidence of good or bad learning has been understood so dominantly in terms of literacy and rhetoric that it 
must be what is at issue for a child’s early learning.  Again, on the surface, it does not appear that Spenser 
would differ from this approach—just as we would have no reason, on the surface, to think that Spenser 
might be ambivalent about the Calepino lexicon. 
Kempe’s treatise, its similarity to the concerns and imagery at the opening of Book 6, its 
dominantly linguistic concern even, provoke larger questions about Spenser’s intentions with such material. 
Spenser adopts vegetative imagery that echoes the educational treatises in an appeal to his sovereign queen, 
clearly desiring to maintain the high seriousness of poetry’s claim to a pedagogical function.  By 
comparison, Kempe’s elitist appeal on the same rough topical area is ironic: Kempe’s work is not, as 
Robert Pepper notes, “intended as guides to the proper education of the sons of nobility and gentlemen,” 
but rather to the “Everyman” (vii). Indeed, as Pepper explains, this is one of the principal differences 
between Kempe and other sixteenth-century writers on education, including Mulcaster, Ascham, and Elyot.  
This is important, I think, for showing one of many reasons why Spenser would have been adopting the 
imagery of educators: the humanism of the Calepino and Mirabellio lexicons had been made part of 
educational systems, but evidently Spenser did not think either sufficiently effective—though, of course, he 
thinks the Calepino lexicon relatively successful by comparison. This should lead us to think carefully 
about the total intention of Spenser’s effort in Book 6 by comparison.   As is most clear, Spenser’s 
didacticism in the epic pronounces in this part a concern with how a civil society might be developed 
reliably through the kind of learned sophistication emblematic of humanism.  The failure to establish basic 
civil order in Book 5, Hadfield contends, propels Spenser to characterize just such a humanist task of 
creating civil speech as impossibly futile in Book 6. Yet the opening of Spenser’s Book 6 seems to stress 
the opposite: without civil, educated individuals, the great garden cannot be made to function properly.  
This stress is not just a matter of creating an irresolvable paradox in which nature and nurture are 
impossibly tangled.  Artegall’s justice depends upon a better state of civil and national order.   Spenser 
contends that civility or courtesy must be grown socially, and that poetry such as he writes is central to that 
formative process.  To that end,  Spenser evokes the imagery of educators, particularly humanist educators, 
and—as we shall see in greater detail soon—suggests the cause of their deficiency even as he advances the 
superiority of the poet’s methods.  
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With such resistance in mind, we can see how and why Spenser might be claiming the 
educational “nursery” to push back against the humanists who usurp what only the muses 
may develop.  In its busy pedantry, Kempe’s treatise tangles with the familiar ideas that 
Spenser’s E.K. engages in his preface to The Shepheardes Calender. Kempe is forceful 
about the didactic value of poetry to such an extent that the poetic seems as much a 
matter of scholarship as of successful poetic skill.  The poets themselves form an 
unbroken chain of teaching and learning that is foundational to a good society.  Musaeus 
is Orpheus’ “scholar”—his student.  Musaeus is also a “princely poet”—a leader of poets 
and of society.  We cannot miss the importance of this sentiment to an understanding of 
the courtly virtues that Spenser tangles with in Book 6. Yet Spenser’s courtiers are not 
succeeding with such ease, and not simply because they are in Ireland—Calidore’s 
trespass on Colin, for example, is clumsy for reasons that have little to do with Ireland. 
As Kempe makes his argument, he does not dwell on the way the culture, whether Greek 
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Again, presumably Spenser has it that the muses are the only sure scouts for virtue because they 
teach forms of inspired speech as well as the patterns of thought behind the organizing of such speech.  
Thus Spenser assumes a high seriousness about what poetry can do.  He assumes no such seriousness about 
humanism altogether. Spenser is appropriating the imagery used in education and then advancing a 
criticism of specific forms this education has taken: as we already know, Calepine and Mirabella represent 
dumbed-down forms of eloquence—alphabetized definitional systems that cannot teach how to speak well 
or how to craft knowledge,  but which become associated with them as necessary aids or inevitable 
functionaries in the society.  They are in Spenser’s contemporaneity the degraded forms of a once elite 
educational appeal—aged and slow like Lord Burghley, for example, and with misplaced faith in the 
Latinity that cannot help English people develop their own systems of useful knowledge. Precisely put, 
humanist preceptors and their books are engaged in codifying knowledge in ways that do not suggest the 
sort of flexibility of speech and thought Spenser consistently entertains—a linguistic, pedagogical, and 
cultural deficiency to which his allegory is geared to respond. In a period of potential changes in the way 
educators work, Spenser’s didactic poetry stages assaults on many fronts to maintain claims to the 
relevancy of poetry and the role of poet as teacher.  As I argued in the last chapter, E.K. stands, as a 
glossator, for part of a nascent tradition of educating through such authority of which lexicons are a part.  
Glossators were the beginnings of lexicons, and educators like Mulcaster as well as important Cambridge 
authorities were recognizing lexicons.  Spenser hoped to establish (or maintain, depending on your point of 
view) a different kind of discursive authority through poetic work: only the muses teach. It stands to reason 
that Spenser would be skeptical of the efforts of humanist educators like Kempe and others who were 
attempting to systematize language learning even as the arbitrary definitional systems of lexicons did. 
Nevertheless, Spenser and Kempe for the most part agree about the higher importance of poets in the 
history of civility. 
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or Latin or other, is linked to the poetry, nor to what is intrinsically poetic in any ancient 
or present philosophical estimation; his view of poetry has few cultural vicissitudes or 
differences owing to language or disposition. Naturally, Kempe is not obliged to provide 
such nuance for our sake or for the sake of other, well-disposed readers.  Yet Spenser’s 
absorption with precisely such nuance is logical.  Spenser is prejudicially concerned with 
the poet’s preeminence as a teacher. For him, Kempe’s faults in laying claim to poetry 
would be plainer.90  Even as Kempe is appropriating poetry as a scholar and for 
scholarship, then, and even as he is nominally doing this in order to join the English to an 
ancient tradition, he is not acknowledging any sacrifices of English identity or language, 
any concessions of native English to Latinity or Greek culture.  In contrast, Spenser’s 
E.K. does note such concessional matters, as I showed in my last chapter. Moreover, 
Spenser aims at such precision not just in that early work, but, as I will now show, 
throughout Book 6.  
Looking broadly at Book 6, many things prompt us to see Spenser’s effort to 
drive a wedge between his idea of learning and that of humanist educators’ views of 
poetry and language in particular.  It is a wedge perfectly similar to those he developed 
by characterizing his glossator E.K. (and producing an argument over lexis and the nature 
of poetic authority with that character) in The Shepheardes Calender, and by producing a 
studied ambivalence about Calepine. First, from his careful characterization of Calidore 
and his emphasis upon the depth of inner self in Book 6, it is clear Spenser does not need 
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90 In my conclusion, I will briefly return to considering other ideas from Kempe that are relevant to Book 
5’s concern with law.  The point there, as here, is not that Spenser is attacking Kempe specifically, but that 
it is easier to understand Spenser’s ideas about language and learning as motivated by a desire to resist 
identifiable competitors for authority over such subjects. In my conclusion and even later in this chapter, I 
will show that Erasmian ideas about education are also likely competitors. 
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to protect against the influence of any superficial notion of barbarity or corruption. For 
example, Spenser is artfully careful to show that he is hedging about the “nature” of 
Calidore as a courteous knight: 
 
But mongst them all was none more courteous Knight 
Then Calidore, beloved over all, 
In whom it seems, that gentelnesse of spright 
And manners myld were planted naturall; 
To which he adding comely guize withall,  
And gracious speech, did steale mens hearts away. 
Nathlesse thereto he was full stout and tall, 
And well approv’d in battelous affray 
That him did much renowme, and far his fame display. 
 
Ne was there Knight, ne was there Lady found 
In Faery court, but him did deare embrace 
For his fair usage and conditions sound 
The which in all mens liking gayned place, 
And with the greatest purchast greatest grace… (6.1.2-3) 
 
Note that Calidore’s education in this practice of courtesy is never mentioned.  Unlike 
Artegall, he has no companion, no mentor, no practicing grounds. This is highly ironic 
given the emphasis on farming and cultivation that starts the work.  Spenser’s assertion 
that Calidore’s “manners myld were planted naturall” shows that the author is conscious 
of the irony.  Rather than argue that Calidore is truly innately courteous, Spenser strives 
to show that it is his “comely guize” and other superficial features—gracious speech, 
even—that is “added.”  We can only suppose that Calidore’s inborn traits have been 
developed by an unspecified education.  Yet Spenser’s narrator suggests that even that 
education must be thoroughly suspect and superficial in any case—a matter of his 
appearance, his “fame,” and communal approval.  Spenser’s decision to have the 
“Salvage man” appear, save Calepine, and become companion and aid to Arthur in the 
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fourth canto shows that he has a sense of humor about just what may or may not be 
innate, what may or may not be savagery in cultural terms.91   
The case might be made that this indecision on Spenser’s part is no true 
recognition of the uncertain origins of truly good cultural identity.  That is, Spenser’s 
evident doubt about Calidore’s courteous nature and how it was shaped might not be seen 
as part of a broader skepticism on Spenser’s part.  Yet there is an important warrant for 
his skepticism and willingness to entertain such uncertainty: he conspicuously omits one 
secure humanist analogy for the education process.  Kempe, as he is stressing the need to 
control the influences on a child’s speech, writes: “For a Child like an emptie new vessell 
being voide of all learning, is most apt to receive that which is first taught, and that which 
is first taught, sticketh deepest in memorie, whether it be good or bad” (219). Spenser 
does not use this reasoning in Book 6.  Spenser preserves the garden, the seed, the 
importance of poetry, the problem of barbarous influences, recognizes the superficiality 
of courtesy and artful behavior, but in the poetry he does not examine this particularly 
pithy idea about the long stay of early influences.  This is the more notable because of 
what we find in other educators.  If we turn to Kempe’s contemporary and fellow 
Cambridge graduate, Francis Clement, we find in his treatise on schooling the basic point 
not only expressed by quoting its origins in Horace, but his own English verse translation 
of the saying: 
The institution of discipline by so much the lesse should be neglected before thy 
riper age, by how much the more thy tender yeares do readily receive, firmely 
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91 I am not, of course, overlooking the ways in which the Salvage Man plays a part in a polemical joke 
about the uneducated and refractory Irish who are, as Spenser takes such pains to say in A View, yet much 
better in their essential nature than the retrograde, mixed-race, and duplicitous Old English factions.  
Nonetheless, Spenser’s intention in one context should not supplant our view of the meaning of it in 
another one. 
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retaine, and hardly loose what then first though shalt conceive and learne be it 
good or evill: of experience surely said the Poet: 
 
Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit oderem testa diu. 
 
The liquor that the vessel is 
first seasoned with withall, 
Will give thereto the surer tast, 




If we turn to Spenser’s much-consulted former headmaster, Richard Mulcaster, who is 
more learned, judicious, and thorough than Kempe or Clement in his description of 
educational principles, and whose work is aimed at a yet more elite class of learners 
attending his London institution, we find that there are planting/vegetative growth images 
distributed in his work such as we find in Kempe. Mulcaster, however, almost invariably 
surrounds such metaphors with more complex ideas that carefully define the relationship 
between material activities and spiritual growth.  For example, in The Elementarie 
Mulcaster contends that structured process of “reading, writing, drawing, singing, and 
playing […] be the only artificiall means to make a mind capable of all the best qualities, 
which ar to be engraffed in the mind, tho to be executed by the bodie” (27).  The 
“engraffed” suggests a grafting process—one that in the horticultural world would 
produce fruit-bearing trees, among other things.  It is an apt way to look at the natural and 
artificial, the mind and the body, and evidence of just how resourceful Mulcaster was in 
his rhetorical turns.  Nonetheless, in arguing that a good early training gives children 
long-term advantages, even Mulcaster turns to a familiar truism:  
Therefor the tender minde of the young infant being first embrewed with these 
principles as the best, for the first liquor: and then furnished with their store, as 
the most for all helps, facilitie must nedes follow in all that doth succeede. (45) 
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The “liquor” in this case is the unmistakable stuff that is to fill the child, as a vessel, and 
to “embrew” that child with a certain character.  It is the same Horatian advice. 
 My contention here is that Spenser omits the Horatian motto because, first, it too 
firmly settles a debated matter about education that comes down from the authority of 
Erasmus and through the English humanists,92 and, second, it supplants the role of the 
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92 The Horatian motto was so well known that it could be part of the logic of emblems in a way that, for 
example, Daniel Russell has associated with a response to Erasmian humanism. In the course of explaining 
the flexible sort of thinking and understanding asked by emblems according to the cultural context they 
invoke, Daniel Russell briefly considers Jean Jacques Boissard’s 1593 emblem depicting the motto 
“Educatio prima bona sit.”  The emblem uses a vegetative metaphor (a tree’s growth) to describe the stakes 
for educating children early and well.  Much more powerfully, though, the text from the book gives a 
marvelously flexible context for understanding the tree, the child, and nature itself as it relates to the 
artificial educational process.  Given humankind’s fallen nature itself, Boissard argues that “Educatio est 
secunda natura.”  Education is a second nature that can effectively change a given state of corruption.  
Russell argues that this philosophical work, the work to be part of the understanding of the emblem itself, 
teaches us about the Renaissance generally.  And in explaining how Boissard might have arrived at such 
images in this specific case, he argues that the image is possibly connected to the work of figures like 
Erasmus, who derive their adages from a mixture of ideas from Horace, Vergil, and Aristotle: 
The reader is directed to equate the education of the child with the early training of young shrubs 
and the proverbial warning that any vessel long retains the odor of its first contents.  Boissard 
could have arrived at this configuration of imagery in a number of ways. Erasmus gives some 
clues in his adage Quo semel est imbuta [Long will the crock, II, iv, 20], where he notes this image 
comes from Horace (Epistles 1, 2, 69-70), links it to Quintilian’s remarks about early childhood 
training, and adds references to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and Virgil’s Georgics on the 
same subject. (79) 
Russell is alive to the significance of this kind of “second nature” as an element of early modern 
understanding of the “realia” of the world that determines their thinking and their method of referring ot 
and arranging significant symbolic units, and he differentiates between the early modern understanding 
conditioned by that sensibility and a later notion of nature conditioned by a firmer sense of the independent 
taxonomies of plants and people, etc. He writes: “In an age before Linnean classification animals were not 
named with the precision we are accustomed to today, and those names reflected concerns quite different 
from the naturalistic ones that push us to distinguish between species on scientific grounds” (89).  He 
concludes: “Emblems and iconographies provide a particularly privileged means of access to the way 
Renaissance men and women ‘saw’ nature and the world around them because these works consciously 
attempt to describe the plants, animals and other realia pictured in them” (89). One thing that we should be 
careful of here is the essential flexibility built into the word “nature.”  It is to this term precisely that Sidney 
turns when  he wishes to describe the “second nature” that poetry can use as part of its didactic mission in 
his Defense: 
And that the Poet hath that Idea, is manifest, by delivering them foorth in such excellencie as he had 
imagined them: which delivering foorth, also is not wholly imaginative, as we are wont to say by 
them that build Castles in the aire: but so farre substancially it worketh, not onely to make a Cyrus, 
which had bene but a particular excellency as nature might have done, but to bestow a Cyrus upon 
the world to make many Cyrusses, if they will learne aright, why and how that maker made him. 
Neither let it be deemed too sawcy a comparison, to ballance the highest point of mans wit, with the 
efficacie of nature: but rather give right honor to the heavenly maker of that maker, who having 
made man to his owne likenes, set him beyond and over all the workes of that second nature, which 
in nothing he sheweth so much as in Poetry. (14) 
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flexible poetic method and the more flexible way of viewing language that Spenser’s 
didactic and allegorical poetry encourages.  To put it another way, it is too material for 
the spiritual and mental poetic method for which Spenser argues—a method earlier 
defined by Philip Sidney in his Defense.  Before we turn to the case of Roger Ascham to 
get a grip on charges against the educational value of poets to which Spenser was 
responding, let us turn briefly back to the text of Book 6, particularly the comments about 
the upbringing of the foundling that Calepine gives to Matilda and Sir Bruin.  
In a remarkably brief episode from the end of canto four, Calepine chases after a 
bear carrying a squalling baby, defeats the bear, retrieves the baby safely, and happily 
stumbles across a childless noble woman, Matilda, who adopts the child in order to 
secure her royal line with the appropriately named Sir Bruin. The implicit word-play 
involving the name “bruin” and the bear has long been noted,93 but it is Richard McCabe 
who most concisely explains the relevance of Irish politics and naming: 
Among the Old English families that Spenser regards as “degenerate” were the 
Fitz Ursalas, now allegedly calling themselves the “MacMahons,” who “did quite 
caste of theire English name and Allegeance… and have still sithens bene 
Counted mere Irishe.”  Spenser associates the two surnames by means of a 
questionable etymology whereby MacMahon is rendered as “the bear’s son” to 
better correspond with its supposed equivalent (Prose, 116).  Through 
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And, as my considerations have shown so far, it is to the idea of nature that Spenser turns in Book 6 as he is 
crafting a message about virtue and the way the muses give access to virtue.  If this book is deeply engaged 
with questions of language, and it is clearly also engaged in an investigation of the “nature” of learning, 
what does it tell us about the two of them together?  Were my focus more deeply philosophical, my 
argument in this chapter might be that the mixture of these two interests produces a critique of the 
irresolvable problem of physical speech’s relation to identity alongside a call for a mentalese form of 
language more firmly linked to identity and more reliably geared to create this “second nature.” Whatever 
the case, this concern with the nature of learning and poetry’s claim to it echoes Spenser’s earliest concerns 
about learning and poetry from the Shepheardes Calender while more elaborately building upon its implicit 
critique of glossing as the mere physical tongue of a more complex process—a process that is an entire 
mental world of representation in his didactic epic. 
 
93 A.C. Hamilton notes that Bernheimer’s 1952 work on Wild Men saw the correspondence between 
Spenser’s allegory and Spenser’s reference to the Fitz Ursalas in A View (652n). 
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acquaintance with the Gaelic Irish, John Derricke alleged, “civil” persons 
degenerated into “bores” and “beares.” A similar conceit supplies the subtext for 
the episode in which Sir Calepine rescues an infant from the clutches of a 
marauding bear […].  Sir Bruin and the “bear” represent twin aspects of the one 
persona, the latter indicative of the savagery latent within the civil knight, just as 
Fitz Ursala and MacMahon are taken to mean the same thing but to signify 
contrary things. The reclamation of the child from the trackless woodlands may, 
therefore, be seen to reflect the hope that a number of Old English families may 
also be reclaimed, perhaps through the intervention of the Court of Wards... (189-
90) 
 
The first thing we need to see about such a claim is just how undeniably accurate it must 
be in its political insights and in its expressed understanding of Spenser’s view of the 
problem with Irish and any sympathy for the Irish language.  Immediately after this 
passage, McCabe points out that Spenser’s argument in A View is that “to translate a 
bardic poem or a daily conversation from Gaelic to English is to decode a criminal 
cypher, to expose the treason that lies hidden in the sinister jargon of the enemy” (190).  
Yet McCabe has to some degree dressed Spenser’s understanding of a political situation 
in a way that prevents us from seeing the episode’s value in a larger intellectual history. 
In A View, Spenser clearly sees the Irish language, law, and culture as bound together in 
ways that, when it is translated, will give the English an advantage against those that are 
set against the English dominion itself.  And, of course, Spenser was right within the 
confines of his own time: the Irish did differ from the English in culture and did use their 
claims on their own language and law to enforce this difference even as the English 
sought to use it to enforce their desire to suppress the Irish. 94  Naturally, Spenser is 
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94 R.R. Davies in a brief history of the language and culture of the British Isles comments that the view of 
the Irish language as an essential marker in ethnic difference and the political fight was quite old by the 
time Spenser came to codify it in A View: 
It was in Ireland above all that tension about language became an important ethnic identifier.  
Ethnic tension was more crudely confrontational in Ireland from a fairly early date of English 
settlement and colonization than it had been in Wales, and language was a part of the explosive 
mixture. […] Much more serious [than simple knowledge of ethnic difference in language] was 
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wrong in his deliberate misrepresentation of the Irish as Scythian heathens, and in his 
suspect etymological work with Gaelic and English—a case made well and broadly by 
McCabe and Hadfield together.  This granted, though, Spenser’s view of the Irish’s 
heightened awareness of their culture’s difference through its language was accurate 
enough, and his sense of an arguable need to attack the Irish on this level becomes 
Irenius’s unsentimental if, from our point of view, vicious identifying trait. McCabe’s 
view of Irenius is appropriate and accurate, and he has correctly found a revealing 
correspondence between Irenius and Book 6 of The Faerie Queene.  Yet just as 
McCabe’s view of Spenser’s polemical use of the term “kerne” required a narrowed 
reading of The Shepheardes Calender, McCabe’s view of the allegory about language in 
Book 6 is narrowed toward the purpose of illuminating a matter of political and ethnic 
bias. A reading settled within the broader context of questions of education and language 
learning entertained by the book suggests different ethical grounds.  Calepine’s speech to 
Matilda overtly raises these issues: 
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the assumption that knowledge of Irish and political disloyalty to the English establishment went 
inevitably hand in hand.  Such a view had been expressed from the early days especially in 
ecclesiastical appointments, because (as it was said) “Irishmen maintain their own language (= 
nation)”; the good citizens of Cork put it even more bluntly, declaring that “those of Irish speech 
are enemies of the king and his subjects.” (12-13) 
Davies goes on to stress that Spenser’s Irenius inflames just this existing perspective (14-15).  By just 
expressing any knowledge of Gaelic, though, Spenser risked being seen as disloyal—and this above all 
necessitated that he never been seen to express the specific view that the Irish language or its words had 
any intrinsic value or any value exceeding that of English, however vaporously propagandistic he felt such 
history to be.  The more important question here, though, is not whether Spenser intended just such 
polemical readings or to what degree—he most certainly did as a matter of personal survival.  Rather, we 
must ask whether he subscribed to such a narrow view of language as a matter of ethnic identification in his 
larger descriptions of language, thought, education, and culture.  That the narrowest version of this, as an 
expression of national loyalty, was important to people of his time is without doubt, and that Spenser 
employs it to his polemical advantage is not subject to doubt. However, given Spenser’s flexible and 
skeptically-enforced Platonist view of language in Book 6, it is doubtful that he would subscribe to such a 
simplistic view for the purposes of his poetry or for the interests of his implicit criticisms of humanism. 
Does the author who doubts Calepino’s and Mirabellio’s authority put such confidence in linguistically-
founded ethnic difference when he proves so willing to play fast and loose with etymology? It seems 
unlikely. 
!   
! 286!
If that the cause of this your languishment 
Be lacke of children, to supply your place,  
Lo how good fortune doth to you present 
This litle babe, of sweete and lovely face, 
And spotlesse spirit, in which ye may enchace 
What ever formes ye list thereto apply, 
Being now soft and fit them to embrace; 
Whether ye list him traine in chevalry, 
Or noursle up in lore of learn’d Philosophy. (6.4.35) 
 
We are certainly meant by this imagery of shaping an unshaped thing to realize that the 
bear (if representing the Irish) or Sir Bruin would in either case have been in the business 
of bringing up this child, each having its own wild or civil effects.  The bear, after all, 
was in mythology thought to shape its cubs into bear-identity with its tongue. Calepine 
seems to have the right general idea for what to do if we think of him as a colonial 
courtier removing a wild Irish child to the care of more civil parents—or, as the case may 
be, an English child from the influence of barbarous Irish nurses. The use of the term 
“noursle” additionally reminds of the central mission of the book to address the “nursery” 
of virtue, that educational mission, while the bear itself reminds us that the “tongue” or 
language is the central question here in education itself.  A little thought, though, reveals 
some startlingly humorous irony framing the event. Calepine’s recommendations about 
raising the child really tell us next to nothing—they are the nonsense of well-meaning 
educators who vaguely address a shaping process of a material thing.  We know they are 
nonsense securely because Calepine turns out within a few lines to be “right glad… to be 
so rid/ of his young charge, whereof he skilled nought” (6.4.38.1-2).  He was bluffing!  
“Skill” here is active, practical knowledge that should make a difference, and he has none 
of it. Spenser tells us that Calepine knows nothing of one of the very things that his 
namesake book is supposed to achieve. We are meant to see this as funny: Calepine’s 
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declaration of ignorance, as A.C. Hamilton notes (653n), is after all preceded by his 
falsely sage summary echoing with the truisms about the nature/nurture duality that may 
be found, among other places, in Castiglione’s Il Cortegiano.  Scorn for such ideas of 
continental refinement, whether directed at Castiglione or not, is appropriate to an 
English book about courtesy, but even more appropriate to one calling humanist ideas 
about education forth for inquiry: 
And certes it hath oftentimes bene seene, 
That of the like, whose linage was unknowne, 
More brave and noble knights have raysed beene, 
As their victorious deedes have often showen, 
Being with fame through many Nations blowen, 
Then those, which have been dandled in the lap. (6.4.36.1-6) 
 
Were Calepine not named after an agglomeration of humanist wisdom about language, 
and were this not a re-play of the question of Calidore’s essential identity and education 
from the second canto, this would not be so funny.  Calepine speaks well, but the 
substance of his thinking is questionable at this early stage in the book.  Later, Calepine’s 
decisive confrontation with the salvage cannibals as he rescues Serena suggests that his 
civility is the best alternative to savagery despite any incidental falsifications, and 
certainly better than the ruinously mistaken example of Mirabella’s form of knowledge 
and learning.  Yet here his tongue, while not in the head of an angry bear, is apparently 
an equally useless instrument.   
Considering Calepine’s depiction, then, the bear-child episode does not produce 
an unequivocal vote for English civility over Irish savagery: the episode comes with too 
great a dose of doubt about humanist civility. We risk misunderstanding Spenser’s doubts 
about education and language if we only see his incentives for prescribing against the 
Irish “savage” care of children.  And there is yet another cause for seeing Spenser’s 
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doubts about the matter: Matilda’s decision not to reveal the truth to Sir Bruin shows that 
Spenser is well aware that a kind of fiction and social trust floats around the rights of 
heirs that is central to monarchic and aristocratic system on which England depends.  The 
complex allusions of the name “Matilda” reassures us that Spenser was thinking of such  
matters.  In his edition of Book 6, Hadfield tries to emphasize the name’s relevance to an 
early English queen: “Matilda’s childlessness indicates the vicissitudes of power in a 
society that based wealth on the possession of land, especially for monarchs. Matilda 
(1102-1167), the daughter of Henry I, was a troubled queen of England who had to fight 
a series of civil wars and left behind no stable heir” (63n).  A.C. Hamilton points out the 
name could refer to either the Matilda in Tasso’s Gerusalemma Liberata, who is the 
nurse of the hero Rinaldo, or to the Matilda who is Merlin’s mother (652n).  Either way, 
what we find here is that Spenser’s patrilineal concern with politics has a matrilineal and, 
with Calepine, a fostering and courtier-related concern that evokes the intellectual history 
in which the nature or nurture approach has remained complex and variable.  It is not just 
the Irish who are labile and false here—though they remain the primary party 
slandered—but the well-meaning but unknowing educators and the unstable social 
structures themselves which do not provide a clear view of what happens to be an ideal 
pattern of behavior. Spenser’s willingness to show us that Bruin’s state is founded on 
falsehood and Calepine’s advice based on ignorance reveals a complicated critical stance.  
Whatever the case, he does not think the question of formative educational influences is 
as simple as a division between a false cipher and a true speech.   
Roger Ascham’s arguments against the potential for poets to teach language 
would have motivated Spenser to design Book 6 to contest humanist authority over 
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poetry.  Ascham was author of the very-well known if posthumous work on education 
entitled The Scholemaster as well as personal friend to William Cecil, Lord Burghley. In 
his work, he, like Kempe and other educators, is deeply concerned with the way in which 
an initially poor learning of a language—Latin in particular—makes any later reformation 
far more difficult. In arguing thus, he clearly thinks that certain forms of speech are 
superior specifically for being the products and producers of good thought. He cites the 
eminent authority Guillaume Budé’s experience of learning to speak unreservedly and 
without discipline in general as leading to a poor understanding of how to speak well 
(16).  Then Ascham notes that if good habits were engendered first, then the learners 
would be fine, but the uncontrolled nature of speech itself (and the “smally regarded” 
question of how to choose the right words) makes the situation one in which the natural 
or existing course of learning cannot be followed: 
…if children were brought up in such a house, or such a school, where the Latin 
tongue were properly and perfectly spoken […] surely then the daily use of 
speaking were the best and readiest way to learn the Latin tongue.  But now 
commonly, in the best schools in England, for words, right choice is smally 
regarded, true propriety wholly neglected; confusion is brought in, barbarousness 
is bred up so in young wits as afterward they be not only marred for speaking but 
also corrupted in judgment, as with much ado, or never at all, they be brought to 
right frame again. (17) 
 
From this, Ascham goes on to argue that students could only learn proper Latin speech 
via a special method.  It is clear that he is arguing that only through a large-scale set of 
social changes or reform of schools can the “nature” of people be brought to a better 
development in terms of their thinking and thus in terms of their capacities as speakers. 
All men covet to have their children speak Latin, and so do I very earnestly too.  
We both have one purpose; we agree in desire, we wish one end; but we differ 
somewhat in the order that leadeth rightly to that end.  Other would have them 
speak at all adventures and, so they be speaking, to speak, the master careth not, 
the scholar knoweth not, what. This is to seem and not to be, except be it to be 
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bold without shame, rash without skill, full of words without wit.  I wish to have 
them speak so as it may well appear that the brain doth govern the tongue and that 
reason leadeth forth the talk. Socrates’ doctrine is true in Plato and well marked 
and truly uttered by Horace in Arte Poetica, that wheresoever knowledge doth 
accompany the wit, there best utterance doth always await upon the tongue. (17-
18) 
 
The uncontrolled speech that concerns Ascham is clearly similar to the root social ill that 
Spenser addresses in setting up the pursuit and capture of the Blatant Beast for Book 6.  
Spenser’s concern with growth and change, and his concern with speech in general in 
Book 6, thus answers to what we find Ascham addressing.  Moreover, Ascham’s concern 
with making the mind govern speech conforms closely to Spenser’s poetic view, as 
explored in the first chapter, of the best poetry and speech emerging from an inspired and 
disciplined mental state.  Ascham even alludes to the Phaedrus’ teaching on rhetoric 
above—the text that has great relevance not just to E.K.’s vision of the wings on a 
growing English-language poet, but to Spenser’s vision of transcendent poetic effort in 
The Fowre Hymnes.  When Ascham describes the method that creates better rhetorical 
discipline in the language of students, he preserves the demotion of the tongue and 
elevation of the brain that is so common to Spenser’s work in Book 6.  For example, 
Ascham criticizes the effect of rote oral learning on children: “Their whole knowledge, 
by learning without the book, was tied only to their tongue and lips, and never ascended 
up to the brain and head, and therefore was soon spit out of the mouth again” (79).  This 
criticism is framed by a description of the approved system of double translation with 
books and its likely benefit to efficient knowledge of the “hard points of  grammar” (78). 
 Ascham and Spenser think in highly similar terms about language itself, but 
obviously Ascham contemplates Latin rather than English.  Their agreements are many, 
then, but the conflict between them looms large.  Ascham is willing to appropriate the 
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best poetry, but he is a hard-line Platonist in his demotion of poetry itself.  For Ascham, 
the didactic function of poetry is insufficient for the very ordering purposes that he 
imagines necessary for society generally: 
Quick wits commonly be apt to take, unapt to keep; soon hot and desirous of this 
and that, as cold and soon weary of the same again; more quick to enter speedily 
than able to pierce far, even like oversharp tools, whose edges be very soon 
turned. Such wits delight themselves in easy and pleasant studies and never pass 
far forward in high and hard sciences. And therefore the quickest wits commonly 
may prove the best poets but not the wisest orators—ready of tongue to speak 
boldly, not deep of judgment either for good counsel or wise writing. (21) 
 
For Ascham, poets are too fast to speak and so make poor statesmen. For Spenser, the 
slowness to act and the haltingness of speech, as with Calepine’s hedging about his 
ignorance, is itself questionable and dangerous. Reading such passages from Ascham 
explains in some measure why Sir Philip Sidney strives to justify the didactic value of 
poetry and to demonstrate its harmony with Platonism in his Defense of Poesie. Sidney’s 
self-deprecating decision, for example, to compare the pride of horse-trainers to his own 
pride in the art of poetry at the very start of his work stems in part from an awareness of 
how poetics may be seen as a base physical training rather than a rarefied mental one, 
especially as he favors a poet who is poised to act in ways historians and philosophers are 
not.  Spenser’s reference in Mother Hubberds Tale to “menaging the mouthes of stubborn 
steedes” (739) shows an equal wit and awareness.  Thus this passage above from Ascham 
unveils what is significant in Spenser’s emphases on language and learning in Book 6.  
Spenser stresses that only the muses do the work of teaching virtue to reassert the 
centrality of poetry in teaching about courteous, ordered, and timely speech—not simply 
materially-bound action, and not simply contemplative distance. He spends such effort 
showing that the mind, not the tongue, is the home of the true force of good speech and 
!   
! 292!
poetry, precisely in order to refute a general perception of poetry’s rhetorical limitations. 
And, finally, he eschews the Horatian adage about the vessel that is tainted by its first 
taste of a particular liquor (or any other clear analogy of that kind) in order to distance 
himself further from the overly physical conceptualizations of language and the sorts of 
educators who might prize just that.  Ascham, for all his stress on the mental, makes 
language learning a physical process so that it is easily subject to control: that is, he 
locates the power over this process in an ideal teacher rather than in the interplay of 
reader, writer, and text that is central to Spenser’s characterization of the ideal learning 
and authorial process.   Spenser’s decision to adopt and manipulate the Phaedrus, to 
stress the many-tongued beast as the enemy to the true vatic Colin of Book 6,95 reasserts 
the centrality of a Sidneian poet in society.    
 Book 6 envisions the functioning of an educational process and theory that was 
well over a century old, deeply immersed in Latin, and only beginning to shift to the 
vernacular by the time Spenser decided to address it; A View, as we will see presently, to 
a great extent espouses humanist educational ideals.  Such ideals are broadly associated 
with pedagogical tools like the Calepine and Mirabellio lexicons. From such superficial 
evidence, it would seem that Spenser dispenses with the kinds of nuance and complaint 
about language, identity, and education he was developing in Book 6 in order to conduct 
the polemic of A View.  But if so, why? Why would Spenser abandon a more complex 
view of language for a simpler one—how, that is, do Spenser’s intentions logically shift?  
My answer: Spenser was strategically responding to the general humanist implication, 
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95 In Chapter 1, I have discussed at length how Colin’s vision is related to Spenser’s commentary on 
language in Book 6. 
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stated so bluntly by Ascham, that poetry was the foundational cultural material but not 
adequate to the active needs of rhetoric and governance.   
 
 
3. The Intentions Behind A View of the Present State of Ireland 
With this more nuanced understanding of how education is handled in Book 6, we may 
examine Spenser’s handling of questions of identity and language-learning in A View 
from a fresh perspective.  Without doubt, one segment of Irenius’s comments on 
language and learning is cited more often than others in assessing Spenser’s opinions.  
Here it is: 
Iren: I suppose that the chief cause of bringing in the Irish language, amongst 
them, was specially ther fostering, and marrijng with the Irish, which are twoe 
most dangerous infections; for first the child that sucketh the milke of the nurse, 
must of necessitie learne his first speach of her, the which being the first that is 
enured to his tongue, is after most plesing unto him, insomuch as though he 
afterwardes be taught English, yet the smacke of the first will alwayes abide with 
him; and not only of the speach, but of the manners and condicons. For besydes 
the yonge children bee like apes, which affect and Imitate what they have seene 
done before them, specially by their nourses whom they love soe well: moreover 
they drawe into themselves, together with their sucke, even the nature and 
disposition of ther norses: for the mind followeth much the temperature of the 
body; and alsoe the wordes are the image of the minde, soe as, the[y] proceeding 
from the minde, the mynd must be needes affected with the wordes. Soe that the 
speach being Irish, the hart must needes be Irishe; for out of the aboundance of 
the hart, the tonge speaketh. (119) 
 
Irenius’s comment that “the smacke of the first will alwayes abide with him; and not only 
of the speach, but of the manners and condicons” appeals to, and echoes, language 
educators like Kempe by paraphrasing the Horatian motto that Spenser, as we have seen, 
avoids in Book 6.  Just as importantly, in such comments Spenser’s Irenius sets up an 
interrelationship between mind and body that echoes the arguments of Ascham and 
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Mulcaster in particular: his comment that “the mind followeth the temperature of the 
body; and alsoe the wordes are the image of the minde…” announces the radical 
simplicity of the educational program that, beyond a mere motto, Spenser was so careful 
not to endorse in Book 6: it proposes a view of the relation between words, mind, and 
reality which is reductive of the possibilities explored in The Fowre Hymnes and 
elsewhere. The educators we have been examining in Spenser’s time sought a method for 
education that offset any negative early influences in a child’s acquisition of language. 
This effort was particularly attuned to the problem of creating fluency in classical 
languages, as we find in Ascham, or, as Mulcaster has it, matching a fluency in the 
vernacular to a good thinking process in general. So Irenius chooses a more militant and 
assured pose on the humanist educational methods than Spenser does in Book 6. Why? 
Tempting as it may be, we cannot conclude that Irenius represents Spenser’s 
“true” opinion—the position that he was only suppressing in Book 6 in the interests of 
having his readership gently led by the poetry to the understanding of what was wrong 
with the uncivilized Irish and how to fix it.  The difference between Book 6 and A View is 
not a matter of true or false, right or wrong, but of complexity and intention. Even if Irish 
politics play a more muted part in the allegory of Book 6, Spenser is no less dismissive of 
the Irish as savages in Book 6, no less urgent in his sense that the colonial project needs 
to be supported.96  In both texts, the sense that the Irish are barbarous outsiders is 
sustained, and this presumption is what makes it possible, in A View, to argue against 
their early influence on English children. However, in Book 6 Spenser has a more 
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96 See Chapter 12 of Richard McCabe’s Spenser’s Monstrous Regiment for a detailed assessment of how 
Book 6 sustains many of the themes of Book 5. 
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complex view of learning, the mind, and language than we find here in Irenius. Hadfield 
accepts a mechanical idea of language learning and education that Spenser seems 
determined to avoid in texts other than A View. For this reason, Hadfield declares that 
Spenser’s “belief that the influence of the mother tongue cannot be eradicated implies 
that all subsequent efforts will be doomed to failure” (25). Even within A View, though, 
Spenser elsewhere details reservations about too simple a view of language.  While his 
reservations are lesser than an enlightened championing of the Irish and rejection of the 
role of oppressor the English had chosen, nonetheless they deserve attention. My 
counterargument here begins by noting that Irenius’s simpler version is expedient for a 
political appeal. In such a political appeal, Spenser compromises: he is attempting to gain 
the alliance of English humanist educators as a political voice despite a complex of 
qualms he announced about humanism in his poetic voice.  Spenser wrote his epic to 
stake out a claim of importance for poetry and poets even against the humanist poetics in 
some matters.  His View, by comparison, must win over even those whom he might argue 
against—especially the English who have never been to Ireland.  Spenser is willing to 
sacrifice the nuances of his view of language, but not the authority of poet over language 
and culture. Thus Spenser strives in A View to acknowledge the role of poetry in 
fashioning history and law.  This effort draws strength from two sources: his strategic 
compromise to flatter the humanist view of language learning and identity; and his 
desperate desire, as a poet with a political voice, to prove their assessment of the poet’s 
role wrong. Clearly, Spenser is trying to achieve two things that conflict: 
a) Spenser wishes to conciliate an aged humanist view of language education by 
accepting its simpler approach to language’s relation to identity. 
b) Spenser wishes to retain a complex notion of poetry’s and language’s social 
and individual function in shaping and evoking identity. 
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To achieve the second of these goals, Spenser must avoid materialist ideas of the tongue 
as itself rooted to language.  But to achieve the first goal, he must admit precisely such 
ideas in some measure.  From the outset of the dialogue of A View itself, then, Spenser 
tangles with the task of defining the poet’s social function in ways that risk associating 
poetry’s benefits with physicalized senses of language.  On the one extreme, Spenser 
risks making poets into the hotheaded orators who appeal to the senses; on the other, he 
risks associating them with the mechanical historian/scholars like the lexicographers. 
Philip Sidney’s death on the battlefield a decade earlier had helped the cause of the 
courtier-poet by showing great commitment to action, but it cut short any opportunity for 
statesman-like oratory justifying the poet’s worth.  As one self-appointed inheritor of that 
legacy, Spenser needs to avoid a charge against his poetic approach when he in fact quite 
hotheadedly wishes to advocate greater military intervention—an intervention that would 
be expensive to the English and seem part of a misleading if idealistic imperial cause 
bound to draw them into deeper colonial mires. A View of the Present State of Ireland 
shows his strategy: he amasses evidence explaining that a practical, slow, large-scale 
reform is futile; at the same time, he aggressively argues that any moderating theories 
about education or culture would best serve the English efforts in an ensuing colonial 
project rather than any advance reform.  The approach hammers in the centrality of 
poetry’s social place for seeing what is wrong with Ireland in the present—for identifying 
the nature of the illness Ireland suffers and the radical reform required— and ultimately 
for reforming after the military intervention. 
Spenser’s appeal to humanist educators is vividly realized in Irenius’s initial 
handling of Eudoxus.  A View begins by addressing questions of history and law, but 
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through various machinations on that subject Irenius convinces Eudoxus to concede that 
“it is in vane to speake of plantinge of lawes and plottinge pollicies till [the Irish] be 
alltogeather subdued” (55).  That is, Irenius gets Eudoxus to think in terms of the need for 
outright war as a logical response to intractable problems of culture and education that 
manifest in a variety of individual cases.  Such cases are, as we will find out, more 
matters of physical being than mental ones. To be sure, Irenius narrates a history in which 
the English have a secure claim to sovereignty that the Irish reject out of willful and 
proud claims to their own native rights.  But Irenius’s main job is to shift the grounds of 
“planting” from the laws in the nation to cultivating individual bodies receptive to 
English law.   It is, so we are led to believe, the paramount need to have individuals 
capable of accepting English cultural rule that necessitates an initial brutal military rule.  
This is why Irenius’s appeals to humanist educators are important. On the subject of just 
why the Irish or the English families who were long in Ireland would could become 
disposed toward disloyalty, Irenius stresses that the carelessness about the upbringing of 
children in Ireland stirs up such disloyalty among the nobility: 
It is allsoe inconvenient in that realme of Ireland that the wardes and marriadges 
of gentlemens Children should be in the disposicion of anie of the Irishe lordes as 
now theye are by reasone that theire landes are helde by knightes service of those 
Lords, by which means yt Comethe to passe that those saide gentlemens children 
being thus in the warde of thseo Lordes are not onely theareby brought up 
lewdelye and Irish like but allsoe for ever after soe bounden to theire services as 
that they willl run with them unto anye disloyall accion. (73) 
 
Irenius’s attention to “the bringinge up of those wardes in good nourture” here stresses a 
long-time humanist preoccupation with controlling the nursing of nobility that, as 
William Kempe and Mulcaster have already shown us, is felt to be equally needed among 
the general populace to assure civil order. Sir Thomas Elyot’s recommendations for such 
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careful control in The Boke Named the Governour echo Erasmus’s similar stress.97  
Rather than allowing this matter to remain one of education, though, Irenius quickly goes 
on to address the origin of specific linguistic terms that instigate and maintain loyalty 
among the Irish.  In the long-term political context, Spenser’s argument for reform of the 
Irish requires stripping them of any familial names and language traditions that instill 
loyalty among the Irish (against the English) and define the culture.98   
Not surprisingly, Eudoxus is skeptical of Irenius’s insight into Irish culture for 
reasons that appear to arise from his confidence in the efficacy of humanist methods of 
education generally. For Eudoxus, one key puzzle regards how the Irish, who are 
evidently and generally civilized from contact with the civilized English, can have such a 
flawed culture as not to absorb the good influence (legal, religious, etc.) of the English in 
peace.  Why has reform so far failed? At one point, he claims that the Irish were 
“allwaies without Lettres but onely bare tradicion of times and rembraunces of bardes 
which use to forge and falsefye every thinge as they liste to please or displease” (84).  
From this, he reasons that Irenius has no sound basis on which to advance history or 
historical etymology.  In response, Irenius stresses in response that he does his “owne 
readinge” of a variety of sources in order to find a “likelyhode of truethe” (84-5).  
Irenius’ consciousness of his own power in constructing a history and culture should not 
be underestimated: it signals Spenser’s abandonment of purist notions of cultural or 
linguistic origins and his practical attitude toward the methods by which any individual 
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97 For details, see William H. Woodward Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance (New 
York: Russell & Russell, 1965) 272-5; and see also my concluding comments about Erasmus in this 
chapter. 
 
98 For details, see Richard McCabe’s Spenser’s Monstrous Regiment  (240-41). 
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or collective cultural identity might be understood. Irenius then corrects Eudoxus’s faulty 
history, emphasizing that the Irish were learned and civilized long before the English 
(87).  Naturally, Eudoxus must then ask what has gone wrong: if humanism is effectual, 
then the Irish cannot logically be both a learned class and so barbarous—else the same 
might easily be true of the English!  This latter threat must be defused else Spenser 
himself will seem traitorously disloyal to English culture. To show us that Eudoxus’s 
question regarding this matter appeals to an accepted humanist formula, though, Spenser 
has this speaker frame it in terms of learning, poetry, and classical scholarship: “How 
comes it then that they are so barbarous  still and so unlearned being soe olde schollers: 
for Learning, as the Poet saiethe, Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros...?”  Eudoxus sounds 
exactly like Kempe or Clement: the quotation from Ovid’s exilic poetry is pedantic and 
appropriate, evoking through “emollit” [“softens”] the idea that children and people need 
to be physically shaped by culture. Spenser has been careful to put the most specifically 
humanist Latin-language appeal in the voice of the impractical Englishman rather than 
the experienced colonist, Irenius. Later, after Eudoxus has fully accepted Irenius’s 
argument, Irenius ironically parrots the Latin-ensconced adage in an English translation, 
commenting that “learning hath that wonderful power in itselfe that it cane soften and 
attemper the most sterne and salvage nature” (218). Initially, though, Irenius answers 
Eudoxus (through a patchwork of observations about etymology, customs, and history) 
that the Irish have essentially reverted to their barbarous Scythian racial stock, and that 
they are at best imitating the habits of Gauls or others to disguise this reversion. Irenius 
trusts the basic record that the Irish were once civilized and literate, but claims legitimate 
interpretive license “by these oulde Customes and other like Coniecturall circumstances” 
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(105). His argument culminates in an example of the Irish drinking blood in imitation of 
the Gauls that follows an example of their borrowing Gallic shield design to conceal their 
Scythian origins.  The concluding example is potent because it draws on an account of a 
distraught mother drinking her son’s blood—taking a bold warrior’s custom and 
perverting it even as she perverts the mother’s duty: 
Allsoe the Gaules used to drinke theire enemyes blodd and to painte themselves 
therewith So allsoe they write that the owlde Irishe weare wonte And so have I 
sene some of the Irish doe but not theire enemies but friendes blodd as namelye at 
the execucion of A notable tratour at Limericke Called murrogh Obrien I sawe an 
olde woman which was his foster mother take up his heade whilste he was 
quartered and sucked up all the blodd running thereareout Saying that the earthe 
was not worthie to drinke it and thearewith allsoe steped her face… (112) 
 
Here Spenser intends to characterize the Irish in terms rooted in the body and, when 
possible, to link such imagery of the body to the tongue and mouth.  The perverted 
motherhood, the earlier references to the importance of upbringing, and the pointed cry of 
humanist confusion precipitate an appeal to a humanist desire to gain intellectual and 
political control over such anomaly, and Eudoxus responds to Irenius’s provocation in the 
ensuing passages much as Spenser hoped English politicians, like Burghley, would be 
swayed by the kind of emergency of physical and mental disorder portrayed. 
In the ensuing dialogue about the effect of the Irish on the English, Spenser’s 
interlocutors exchange terms that evoke the most definitively material and bodily aspects 
of language. Eudoxus questions Irenius’s assertion that the Irish have caused the Old 
English settlers to “degenerate from theire firste natures” (114).  Irenius explains that the 
English do just that by giving up their English surnames and putting on Irish ones.  
Without any show of doubt, Spenser has here equated ancestral names and essential 
nature. Eudoxus exhibits proper and continued doubt, of course, saying that this 
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abandonment of English names is a “moste dangerous Lethargie muche worse then that 
of messala Corvinus whoe being a most learned man thorowe sicknes forgott his owne 
name” (115).  Eudoxus seemingly instinctually invokes medical terms and a reference to 
classical Roman culture, physicalizing issues of language and naming even as he 
demonstrates his humanist credentials.  He is in effect challenging Irenius to pathologize 
the Old English as infected by Irishness by imagining that a form of the disease has some 
precedent in Latin texts!  Irenius responds with examples of those who have forsaken 
their English surnames for Irish ones, but Eudoxus asks yet again for a physical and 
pathological explanation: “Coulde they ever Conceave anye such divillishe dislike of 
theire owne naturall Contries as that they woulde be ashamed of her name and bite at the 
dug from which they sucked life” (116, italics mine).  Such plain material and maternal 
terms prompt Irenius’s declarations about the “the Abuse of language” (118); it prompts 
Irenius’s most famous declarations, too, about how Irish language from Irish mothers’ 
and nurses’ fostering create “dangerous infeccions” in the minds of children (119). Thus 
Irenius’s case—and Spenser’s—has been geared to appeal to educators eager to 
understand and control the physical mechanisms by which language and culture are 
absorbed and transmitted.  Irenius was long preparing the terms for characterizing the 
Irish as cases of physical disease, and Spenser certainly shares in that imagery of the Irish 
in The Faerie Queene. Nonetheless, the characterization of Eudoxus and the facile 
appeals that Irenius directs to him reveal the extent to which A View panders to a kind of 
humanist educator.  I say “panders” here because the pathological terms do not enhance 
the status of a poet or a poetic insight into culture and language, but yield them to a more 
mechanical view of realia and identity. Thus, in their diagnostic thrust, the terms of 
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investigating the relation between culture and language in A View contrast with Spenser’s 
delicate and even enigmatic methods of handling the significance of name, language, and 
identity for the readers in The Faerie Queene. In particular, Spenser’s spiritualized ideas 
about naming in Book 6 form strong counterpoints to any physical “tongues.”  Spenser’s 
nuance in his epic serves his vanity: his authority as a poet depends not upon letting 
humanists help him, but making his art larger and more central to the social order than 
theirs.  Here in his polemical tract, we can see the expediency of his sacrifice: it is 
necessary to urge the crown to send more troops to defend land that he now owns. 
The evidence showing that Spenser has made a strategic compromise follows 
Irenius’s and Eudoxus’s declarations about tongue and mind.  Irenius must now make the 
case that the Irish bards who may contribute to the infections are not the same as the 
English poets—indeed, that the Irish bards are all “mouth” while the English poets are 
definitively concerned with the mind.  First, Irenius distinguishes the “bardes” from poets 
generally even as he concedes that “suche poetes as in theire wrightinges do labour to 
better the manners of men” (124, 125).  Writing is in such a distinction a more cerebral 
and less physical activity than song or speech, being distinct from the vilified tongue just 
as we have found in a variety of Spenser’s late works in the first chapter.  As if to cement 
just such an interpretation of the imagery of writing, tongue, and mind, Irenius adds: “But 
these Irish Bardes are for the moste parte of another minde” (125, italics mine).  In 
describing the influence of the Irish bards, Irenius stresses how the bardic musical and 
vocal methods will sway “a yonge minde.” Within a page, he has repeated the use of the 
word “minde” strategically and evoked the educational responsibility that must attend “a 
yonge minde [that] Cannote reste” (126). As I earlier noted that Hadfield argues, the 
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influence of the Irish bards in Ireland is an inversion of the influence of good humanist 
poets in England.  Two important additions to Hadfield’s insight are necessary, though, to 
see the full implications in the context of the rhetorical design of A View.  First, Spenser’s 
approach to the pattern of imagery is most recognizably stamped with the contrast 
between body and mind that also marks his work in Book 6.  It is a contrast essential to 
his efforts in defending the value of poetry, so we should pay close attention to its 
appearance here.  Second, the potentially redemptive power of poets stands in direct and 
naked contradiction to the fatalistic view of the ineradicable influence of mother’s milk 
on the tongue, speech, and identity of young English and Irish alike.  In the contradiction 
between the fatalism and the poetics, and in the motivation for it inhering in Spenser’s 
prejudicial defense of his own art, we can see precisely the break between Spenser’s 
poetic definitions of language from The Faerie Queene and the prosaic compromise he 
settles upon in A View. It is not a slight matter because it means we must be much more 
careful about confusing views of language and identity found in  A View with the work in 
Spenser’s epic or elsewhere.  The care helps us distinguish the relation Spenser intends to 
have with an audience for his epic from the relation he intends to have with influencing 
specific policymakers.  Neither humanism alone, nor its educational recommendations, 
back the policy or vision of society and the poet’s role in society, for Irenius positions 
himself as the poet-maker of a Sidneian legacy who betrays a portion of what Spenser’s 
nuanced view of language has to offer. To investigate this subject, we must in the final 
section of this chapter turn to study the way in which Spenser’s vision of the political 
poet in Book 5 informs his vision of language from Book 6. 
4. Finding Samient, “Mayden Messenger” and Good Bitch 
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If the Blatant Beast of Books 5 and 6 represents the bad form of speech—the 
abuse of speech, the bad-dog villain or anti-hero of detraction, slander, and a concomitant 
failure of thinking when it is supplanted by the mere physical machinations of the 
tongue—where is the heroic form of language? Where is the good dog!?  In finding 
Spenser a fatalist and pessimist on the political front, McCabe and Hadfield have implied 
that this dog does not exist or does not have key significance.  Looking solely at Book 6, 
they appear justified. The heroic speaker cannot be Colin.  Undefended by his society, 
intruded upon by the questionable courtesy of Calidore, Colin seems far too haplessly 
sacred to fulfill so secular a function even as he seems vulnerable to bad speech like 
others, and thus seems to inform a fatalism promulgating the extreme choices of A View.  
Moreover, like the voice in Spenser’s Fowre Hymnes, he performs a religious and private 
labor.  Truly, defending this holiness is central to an ideal beyond easy ascertainment or 
development, and so it is part of Spenser’s poetics, but such poetics is not the whole of 
Spenser’s idea of language.  The book-man and book-woman, Calepine and Mirabella, 
clearly do not fit the roles of good dogs even as they are linguistic and non-poetic.  
Calidore as a hero serves a kind of expedient courtesy and leadership that is so distinctly 
in line with the compromises of A View and its headlong advocacy of military action as to 
be out of line with the question of language we are addressing.  (More importantly, the 
good dog, as we shall see, deals with issues of consent and persuasion that Calidore 
simply does not.) Pastorella’s inherent nobility looks more like good luck than good 
speech.  The Hermit of canto six, an advocate of silent reading and inward devotion, fits 
the role more neatly, but even then he does not answer to the demands of true, controlled, 
and directed speech we might hope for in the political arena.  Such an absence of a 
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definitively good speaker outside the poet in Book 6 is precisely what prompts the 
conclusion that Spenser sees the project of courteous speech as futile in the absence of 
civil order, and indeed what prompts Hadfield and McCabe to turn to  A View for the  
most definitive ideas about political speech and identity. 
The testimony of Book 6 assuredly reveals Spenser’s anxieties about language, 
and to some degree his anger at his political and military opponents, but it does not hide a 
beam of optimism in Book 5, indeed a very practical idealism about language that the 
whole of my thesis has been a labor to discover.  The Blatant Beast neatly addresses the 
relation between legal order and civil speech implicit in the motion of Book 5 to 6.  But 
Spenser first raises the question of political and civil speech as he addresses the problem 
of establishing social order in Book 5.  The Blatant Beast, rather than appearing purely as 
a reaction to the conclusion of Artegall’s quest, emerges out of a pattern of similes 
involving dogs.  One of the dogs figured is definitively good in a manner that answers to 
the problems with asserting justice in a world in which fraud and force seem the only 
options available to a figure like Artegall.99  Samient, the good bitch, not only forms a 
neat counterpoint to the Blatant Beast, but she suggests that Spenser was more open-
minded about the relationship between political power, learning, and language than what 
we have found in either Book 6 or A View.  Her character in the context of Book 5 
explains why Spenser so rapidly focuses on the question of education in Book 6; and the 
imagery of her episode and previous ones helps us ascertain just why Spenser leaves a 
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99 In the notes to his edition of Book 5, Abraham Stoll lists these instances of dog similes:1.29, 2.25, 6.26, 
8.7, 8.22, 8.36, 8.49, 9.6, 11.12,12.38 (15n). 
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definitive position on the matter of language and identity more open than what we find 
Irenius arguing in A View. 
When Artegall and Arthur stumble upon Samient in canto 8 of Book 5, she 
describes how Adicia has cast her out of her palace unfairly.  Samient is a diplomat, and 
her name, originating from the word “sam” as it is used in Book 1 (10.57.8), means 
“bringing together” (Hamilton 584n).  In “bringing together” Artegall and Arthur in this 
book, she helps to signal to the reader the surpassing cultural importance of the meeting 
of the two types—the one (Artegall) emblematic of the sternest features of a justice 
largely without equity in a colonial wilderness, the other (Arthur) of the binding national 
mythological figure. In such terms alone her significance is monumental despite the 
brevity of her appearance.   Her identifying association with speech or language and her 
joining of the forces of myth and justice are powerfully resonant actions in terms of how 
we should read the episode.  Samient’s significance as a communicative agent in this 
book is cleverly revealed by her seemingly comical comparison to a shamed dog. The 
simile, however, dwells pointedly on the self-appointment of the comparison: Samient 
herself chooses this simile as she describes how Adicia threw her out of the palace after 
arriving, an emissary sent by Mercilla to seek peaceful terms: 
But this proude Dame disdayning all accord, 
Not onely into bitter terms forth brust, 
Reviling me, and rayling as she lust, 
But lastly to make proof of utmost shame, 
Me like a dog she out of dores did thrust, 
Miscalling me by many a bitter name… (5.8.22.3-8) 
 
The emphasis upon names, terms, and Adicia’s lack of self-control foreshadows all the 
features that will come to fit the Blatant Beast. Adicia is to be described as a “mad bytch” 
with a “burning tongue” (5.8.49.1-2).  There is thus an apposite irony to Samient’s 
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decision to call herself a dog, for she is doggedly, gratefully loyal not only to Mercilla 
throughout this episode and one that follows, but to Artegall and Arthur as well.  She 
does not simply bring them together physically as her name indicates, but rather also 
brings the message of Mercilla together with suitable actions of honorable servants.  
Speech and being are joined by her in a way that they are not by the Bonfont/Malfont 
figure we see at Mercilla’s court.  Bonfont/Malfont, indeed, has been stripped of his 
name’s significance by force.  Bon/Malfont seemingly takes no actions that would, like 
Artegall’s actions toward creating justice, reflect a complementarity between name and 
being found in the will of the named being.  In contrast, Samient’s cooperative 
doggishness does not disappear in the process of this victory—and her baying becomes 
meaningful as artful speech does not seem to be.  Certainly she is as much diplomat as 
spy in the way she helps Artegall and Arthur undo the Souldan and Adicia, but Spenser 
returns to the imagery of the dog in the ensuing canto in a way that deepens our 
understanding of the artfulness of her communicative significance.  Malengin is 
described as being so carefully hidden within his lair that “scarse an hound by smell/ can 
follow out those false footsteps of his” (5.9.6.7-8).  Samient is that hound, though: she is 
able to “spy” him and then to warn Arthur and Artegall (5.9.8).  Then, at their behest, she 
sets up such a racket outside his cave, tempting him out into the open where Artegall and 
Arthur may block his retreat (5.9.8-15).  The action is cooperative and conspicuously like 
to a good dog’s work in manipulating more aggressive creatures—bears, for example—
for hunters.  Ironically, the episode with Malengin shows that as a messenger she can 
mislead the bad even as she leads the good.  This wily adaptive quality, we will find, 
stands in marked contrast to the fraud or force that dominates the strategies of others in 
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the wake of rhetorical or diplomatic failure, and it speaks to a vision of power that is 
ultimately allied to neither fraud nor force. 
 In the larger context of the book, Samient’s appearance as a dog corresponds to 
Sanglier’s humiliation in the first canto at the hands of Talus.  The correspondence 
reveals how power, communication, and individual will relate.   When Sanglier is 
reluctant to be shamed as part of his punishment in canto one, Talus forces him.  Sanglier 
is then described as appearing like a chastised dog: “…when [Sanglier] saw it bootelesse 
to resist [Talus],/ He took it up [the head of the woman he had unjustly killed], and 
thence with him did beare,/ As rated Spaniell takes his burden up for feare” (5.1.297-9).  
The similes which implicitly compare Samient to Sanglier deliver a powerful punch: 
Samient is a good dog, made to suffer shame unjustly, who is without fear, while Sanglier 
is a bad dog who suffers just and shameful punishment only out of fear.  The use of force 
to achieve just resolution in the instance of Sanglier initiates a series of problematic 
ironies about will, power, and communication. In canto one, we have been led by the 
instance of Sanglier to think that Artegall, by employing Solomon’s wisdom, has been 
successful in his bid to peacefully resolve a dispute. He has, after all, divined the truth by 
means of a rhetorical sleight.  Since we have seen that Artegall had practiced his form of 
justice “upon wyld beasts” (5.1.7.8) in place of humans before, the first case of Sanglier 
(meaning “wild boar”) seems appropriate. Yet Sanglier’s unwilling doggedness (like the 
simple willfullness of many other figures to ensue) necessitates violent actions on 
Artegall’s or Talus’ part.  Such cases show that Artegall’s initial victory is specious—as, 
similarly, Redcrosse’s initial victory over Error. We are meant to realize that he has used 
fraud to win his way, that he has not altered Sanglier’s nature, and that he has had to 
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resort to an undignified and robotic means of compulsion.  The episode implicitly 
criticizes the failure of law. 
Artegall’s disappointing victory foreshadows more distressing situations in which 
his superior understanding is without advantage and his rhetoric without effect.  The so-
called “egalitarian” giant in the next canto, for example, is distressing for bringing open 
violence rather than mere threats of violence to the functioning of justice.  The giant is 
identified as “admired much of fooles, women, and boys” (5.2.31.5), making clear that he 
is simple-minded but effective as a rhetorician. Significantly, Artegall cannot convince 
him or his followers that a radical social egalitarianism is manifestly unfair and illogical.  
The course of this conversation turns openly to the philosophical question of the 
relationship between language and thought: Artegall defies the giant to weigh words, or 
even to “weigh the thought, that from mans mind doth flow” (5.2.43.3).  Because human 
physical means for attaining understanding is not godlike, Artegall explains, the giant in 
hubris tries “to call to count or weigh [God’s] workes anew” (5.2.42.6).  The hero’s 
reasoning, though based on the familiar principles of distributive justice from Aristotle’s 
Ethics, meets with a rebellion. The giant simply does not wish to yield to the right cause 
or even reason itself: “it was not the right, which he did seeke” (5.2.49.2). Talus thus 
must destroy him, and Talus must bloodily repress the multitudes that riot afterward 
because of their “certaine losse of so great expectation” (5.2.51.5).  The refusals of both 
parties to accede to better reason or justice illustrates the practical problem: the difference 
in understanding available from the extended dialectic process used by fully educated 
philosophical individuals, and that used by or available to a less educated polis.  Plato 
addresses the problem as he is differentiating rhetoricians and philosophers in the 
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Phaedrus and the Gorgias. Aristotle’s technique in the Rhetoric is founded on the need to 
deal with such a practical difference between addressing the empowered/educated and 
umempowered/uneducated. Both philosophers roughly agree, as do many classical 
sources including Cicero, that it is difficult to argue for the morally right or true thing 
without having firm knowledge, and that a rhetoric that simply strives to win arguments 
by an appeal to interests or biases of an audience ultimately tends to mislead.100 Spenser 
is blunt about the violent results here for the same reasons that he is blunt in his initial 
characterization of the giant’s ignorance.  First, he in this way dramatizes a recognizable 
and common philosophical problem to make his reader acutely aware of the practical 
need for persuasion. Such persuasion, of course, happens to be precisely what Spenser’s 
poetic allegory offer in this instance.  Like the Sidneian poet-rhetorician-philosopher, 
Spenser here can show us how much a poet’s persuasion has to offer a culture that might 
be fooled by bad rhetoric—or even a culture that simply discounted the need for it.  
Second, though, Spenser by this example pushes his readership to recognize the 
enormous and insurmountable obstacle of the wills, the perceptions, the very forms of 
knowledge that guide people. Sanglier can be pushed to a false shame through fear, 
appearing dog-like in the process, but not to a true shame.  The giant and his followers, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100  Aristotle addresses these issues in the first book of his Rhetoric, declaring at one point that “in dealing 
with certain persons [those that Aristotle later specifies are uninformed, uneducated, unempowered  
persons], even if possessed of the most accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it easy to 
persuade them by employment of such knowledge” (1.1.12, 1355a, Trans. Freese). Jasper Neels describes 
the implications extensively in “The degradation of Rhetoric; or, dressing like a gentleman, speaking like a 
scholar.” Rhetoric, sophistry, pragmatism. Ed. Steven Mailloux. (New York: Cambridge UP, 1995).  His 
argument deals with English studies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  However,  the summation of 
Aristotle and Plato is quite precise for anyone wishing to understand the relevance of such ideas to 
Spenser’s concern with adapting poetic allegory to the demands of philosophical problems about 
organizing the state and powerful speech in the state.  Neels explains: “Aristotle describes those who 
require rhetoric as ’F$OF$ 6P ,67%!F$%’…  ’F$OF$ 6P ,67%!F$%’ implies persons ‘unable to do a thing,’ 
persons without strength or power” (71).  Neels goes on to show that Plato and Xenophon possess the same 
sensibilities regarding reasoning with groups of people (71-2).   
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similarly, cannot possibly concede it unless they understand Artegall’s point. What are 
we meant to realize by the progress from the Sanglier episode to the Egalitarian giant?  
We are meant to see that the august mystery of Solomon’s wisdom has been wholly 
undone, while the question of how to compose the law and how to administer rhetoric in 
defense of the law remains in all its complexity. 
At this stage, it is important to recognize that the Egalitarian giant episode does 
not simply defend Artegall’s actions as though they were the exertion of an all-too-
necessary and all-too-regrettable force over foolish inhuman masses.101 The allegory of 
“Sanglier” the boar and of the “swarme of flyes” (5.2.53.6) that rebel after the giant’s 
demise do not instruct the reader to see animalized colonists or colonial subjects because 
Spenser is not uniformly negative about animality. For Spenser, animals are not 
consistently imagined as inhuman so much as variously human. For example, in the very 
next canto Spenser narrates Guyon’s reclamation of his horse that was stolen in Book 2.  
The episode furnishes further important wrinkles in the problem of rhetoric, power, and 
justice.  To prove his horse was stolen by Braggadocchio, Guyon takes advantage of a 
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101 Richard McCabe argues that the violence used to solve the problem of the giant and his followers 
“mounts a defense of moral compromise” like other such instances in the work (218).  Spenser clearly 
wishes to defend his political allies in this work, but it is difficult for me to appreciate so simple a reading 
of the questions of morality that Spenser addresses.  The failure of Artegall’s rhetoric shows the reader the 
value and nature of rhetoric in a manner that anatomizes morality and legality broadly, not simply in 
advocacy of the practical need for violence.  As I am trying to show throughout this segment, Spenser 
constantly pushes us to see the limitations of force just as hard as he pushes us to see the limitations of 
rhetoric.  The unflagging focus not on the nature of an ordered society but on the means to know or 
represent that society does not lend itself to a unilateral argument such as we find in A View. McCabe’s 
hermeneutic error is to cut the allegory of Book 5 down to the size of a political speech in favor of specific 
policies—for which end, selecting imagery without concern for anomaly, McCabe finds that Spenser’s epic 
richly obliges.  For this reason, he can see the bad beasts but not the good ones, the defense of moral 
compromise but not the question about the need for trustworthy intermediaries, willing messengers, and 
shared communicative means. The examples of Brigadore and Samient address this deficiency even as they 
complicate our understanding of the depth of Spenser’s allegory and intention.  They show the conditions 
of Artegall’s empowerment as an agent of justice are not simply the material means dispensed by a regal 
overlord or a perfect social order. 
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secret “blacke spot” in the shape of a horse-shoe inside the horse’s mouth—a “secret 
marke” that the horse will only allow Guyon to reveal when Guyon speaks the horse’s 
true name, “Brigadore” (5.3.32-34).102 True identity and reliable communication make for 
just resolution.  Brigadore’s case therefore offers a response to the foregoing problems of 
rhetoric and knowledge occasioned in the former case of the giant even though the animal 
and human agents have switched places.  It does not matter that the animal who models 
truth and honesty is a horse: rationality and animality or humanity are not the salient 
issues. So with Sanglier, the giant, and the giant’s followers, and then with Samient: 
persuasion and practical issues of communication are at stake in complex coordination 
with the identity of the creatures involved, human and otherwise. 
The issue of animality put in proper context, let us turn to Brigadore’s willful 
obedience to Guyon and the way it continues rather than simply resolves the problems of 
rhetoric and persuasion brought up by the giant.  Guyon and his horse have a shared but 
secret communicative link.  It is the kind of link we expect between a horse and a rider. 
Nonetheless, this link has large political ramifications, for it enables the demonstration of 
a case just like Solomon’s wisdom—a trick to resolve problems of fraud and to empower 
the good and true against the fraudulent.103  Rather than encouraging us to see identity 
and truth as secure, though, the story of Brigadore’s occult mark and true name 
challenges us to see the contingency of communication and rhetoric in understanding and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 The name Brigadore, A.C. Hamilton points out, means “bridle of gold” and connotes the golden mean, 
the Aristotelian ideal of ethical harmony (548n).  My point, however, is that Spenser has cleverly layered 
over that meaning with continuous attention to the links between communicative acts and the action of 
justice. 
 
103 The secret name and secret mark on the horse, I think, humorously foreshadow the story of Pastorella’s 
birthmark. 
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being. After all, the case has a hugely negative effect on Artegall, who so hotheadedly 
wishes to murder Trompart that Guyon must appropriately temper the knight of justice 
toward equity.  Why is Artegall enraged? As a human who learned how to administer 
justice to animals, he has been upstaged by an animal administering justice to humans, 
but this is merely the trimming of irony. More direly, as a rhetorician, Artegall has found 
himself ineffectual against lies unless enabled by a clever occult sign system of his 
own—one he has not apparently conceived despite his initial borrowing from Solomon.  
Just as pointedly, Artegall’s judgment is yet again powerless save in the administration of 
punishment or enforcement.  And even that punishment falls into the hands of Talus, a 
mere functionary adjunct of justice. The Brigadore episode thus complicates the 
questions of the relation between identity, language, law, and persuasion that it could 
resolve in the hands of a simpler author. 
Spenser does not let his readers rest idly in the supposition that, had Artegall been 
able to know of such occult marks, he would have been more empowered.  In the next 
canto, a treasure under dispute that can be “known by good markes” (5.4.15.8) suffers a 
transfer of ownership due to legal precedent, keeping the peace while dispossessing the 
more rightful parties.   In this case of Bracidas and Amidas, Artegall gains their consent 
and thus peaceful resolution.  Yet, as before, Spenser has made clear the point that 
Artegall is relatively powerless without such support.  In A View, Spenser’s Irenius may 
pander to the desire of humanists to have access to the “criminal cipher” of Irish 
language, as Richard McCabe has it.104  And, indeed, much of the material in Book 5, 
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104 Though I have isolated Hadfield and McCabe, others have come to argue like them that Spenser’s work 
rests upon an appeal to those hoping to exert such control of and through language whose problems he only 
recognizes inadvertently.  Brooke Stafford in “Englishing the Rogue,” for example, argues that Spenser’s 
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including the example of Bracidas and Amidas, relates to questions of Irish language, to 
legal language, and the need for the English to be in command of such matters.  
Nonetheless, the emphasis that Spenser places on Artegall’s disempowerment without the 
consent of the governed shapes an unmistakably conscious attempt to show the reader the 
limits of any “translation” of Irish or even secret, cabalistic terms into a form of 
empowerment for political authority. 
Artegall’s failures as a communicator lead to a crisis: his undoing by Radigund 
and his salvation from her illustrate problems of obedience, the will, and intermediary 
messengers as well.  Artegall’s decision to yield to Radigund announces precisely these 
terms: “So was he overcome, not overcome,/ But to her yeelded of his own accord;/ Yet 
was he justly damned by the doome/ Of his owne mouth, that spake so warelesse word,/ 
To be her thrall” (5.5.17.1-5).  His decision not to exert force here is preceded by ample 
cases in which his choice to use it was ineffectual in ways we have been asked to note.  
Thus it is significant that Talus does not save Artegall here because of Artegall’s own 
“doome”—a judgment that must be signaled by a “word.”  To emphasize the nearly 
independent character of the speech, Spenser has gone so far as to make the word itself 
incautious rather than the person who speaks it.  The link between justice and language is 
correspondingly clarified as the need for a conscious, rational, interpretive will guiding 
language and justice toward one another. After all, the unthinking obedience of Talus in 
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work in A View resembles the desire to control speech exhibited among English educators.  Moreover, like 
McCabe and Hadfield, she emphasizes that any recognition of the problems with such a project by Spenser 
is inadvertent.  She quotes Hadfield’s comment that Spenser’s whole argument turns toward ‘the troubling 
possibility  that one may not be able to distinguish the problem from the solution with any degree of 
confidence,’ causing Spenser to undermine his purpose despite himself” (330, italics mine).  Yet this cannot 
be the case: Spenser simply cannot be constructing these problems with Artegall as well as their links to 
Samient, the Blatant Beast, and questions of educational practice by accident. 
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this circumstance is his deficiency, the clear reason why Artegall fails.  Though described 
in canto two as “like a limehound” (5.2.25.3), he is unlike the good bitch, Samient, in that 
he is not really sentient.  Such consciousness is clearly necessary to giving words weight; 
it is structured by detectable intention unless you are a robot or, as we see in Book 6, a 
telepathic Salvage man.  In case we had missed this point, Spenser reminds us with a 
further case in canto five: Artegall’s salvation under Radigund is owed to the willful 
disobedience of a messenger, Clarinda.   It is not the case that the injustice of Radigund’s 
social order must be solved by the violence that Britomart in a much later canto employs 
despite her femininity.  That is, the episode of Artegall’s capture does not argue for the 
inherent justice of violence against unnatural social order.  Rather, it clearly argues 
against the vulnerability of any administration of justice that cannot garner the proper 
form of thinking, willed support for and from its enforcers.  It is possible, of course, to 
see the difference between Artegall and Talus as an advantage for the administration of 
justice.  Indeed, if we foolishly hope to see the case of Sanglier, the giant, and others as 
optimal for those moments when Talus executes brutal punishment, such would be the 
case.  Yet to choose that reading, we must imagine that Spenser feels the cause of the 
messenger to be distinctly lesser rather than inextricably joined to that of the forceful 
executor.  That is anathema to him and to us. Spenser states that in the fallen world the 
“mightie hands” of force are necessary, but in the very sentence in which he announces 
that approval he requires that the agent of justice “with righteous doome decide” (5.4.1.2-
3). In the same stroke he stresses the contingency for the use of force: “to maister wrong 
and puissant pride” (5.4.1.5).  Artegall proves flawed in his rhetoric and decision-making, 
while Talus, an emblem of force, proves subject to the message Artegall provides in the 
!   
! 316!
same measure that Artegall proves vulnerable for being unable to make decisions without 
adequate intelligence.  We have seen the problem of powerful pride in Sanglier, the first 
bad dog, and then in the giant, his followers, and even Trompart.  Yet we have seen the 
problems with decision-making and rhetoric paired with each of these instances even up 
to the point that we find Artegall captured by Radigund.   
 In light of all this evidence, it is safe to say that Samient is a minor character with 
enormous resonance for our understanding of Spenser’s deliberate evocations of a variety 
of doubts about words, language, law, justice, and the mind.  She represents a nuanced 
view of the limits of power and the relation of power to language, consent, and thought.  
My argument about her significance, however, in no way unseats the general case that 
Book 5 as a whole inveighs against an unwillingness to use force when necessary—a case 
complementary to the political argument of A View, and a case that Richard McCabe has 
abundantly illustrated.  Her animal-like properties do not unseat the insidious 
identification of the Irish as bestial and degraded that pervades English rhetoric against 
the Irish. But Samient as a willing dog preceded by an example of unwilling ones shows 
us that Spenser’s conception of language, communication, and identity is more flexible 
and broader for its part in an indictment of the deficiency in Artegall’s education. In 
corresponding terms, Samient shows us that Spenser’s view is broader than what we find 
in Irenius.  Spenser’s decision to return to questions of growth, change, education, 
identity, and speech in the opening of Book 6, rather than responding solely to the figure 
of the Blatant Beast, addresses the larger question of how to cultivate consenting loyalty 
in a speech that propagates and unites without undue force.  From his argument, it 
appears that Spenser thinks that methods of humanist education (like the methods of 
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Platonism and Neoplatonism he freely adjusts to his poetic purposes) need to change.  
The decision to cast Calidore’s nature and mind as problematic—as not “naturally” 
courteous—without detailing how they had been shaped to such good is thus just like 
Spenser’s decision to illustrate Calepine’s ignorance about how to “shape” a child’s 
mind: both decisions owe to doubts about humanist plans for education, especially the 
sort that will shape language habits as the Calepino lexicon does.  Spenser desires that his 
readership appreciate those doubts.  All this stands in the way of Hadfield’s stress on the 
colonial origins of Spenser’s view of language as we find it in Book 6.  Spenser’s qualms 
about language, orality, and even learning do not arise solely or necessarily primarily 
from his concern over a failure to suppress a slanderous Blatant Beast—that “neat link” 
to the rhetoric of those who delay against “hard-line” policies in Ireland. Rather, the 
Blatant Beast arises from a complex of social and intellectual failures to which the visibly 
lonely instance of Samient responds.  And so, definitively understood, Samient cannot 
represent the success of forceful policies of suppression any more than the Blatant Beast 
can represent the failure of the will to impose them. 
 
5. Conclusion: Understanding Both Spenser’s Linguistic Idealism and Didacticism 
My focus on issues of learning and language in this chapter was meant to show 
that the progress of Book 5 towards illustrating Artegall’s deficiencies or the 
incompleteness of his victory does not lead directly to the Blatant Beast.  Rather, it leads 
through a series of quandaries regarding language that, instead of justifying violence and 
force outright, illustrate the relation between the will and a popular support as well as the 
insufficiency of any occult system of communications to preserving or destroying order.  
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This conclusion is a great deal easier to appreciate when we know two further things, as I 
have argued in the two sections preceding my examination of Samient.  First, there is 
much evidence to suggest Spenser’s focus on educating towards the virtuous use of 
speech in Book 6 does not support a uniform humanist view of how that education 
transpires—not at least if we examine Kempe, Mulcaster, and Ascham as examples.  That 
evidence partly appears in the delicate handling of Calidore’s identity, the subtle mockery 
of Calepine’s ignorance about how to raise a child properly, and the general tilt of 
Spenser’s imagery toward the power of the muses and away from material ideas of the 
tongue as good.  Spenser’s idealism and preference for the mind over the tongue is not 
simply a humanist preference.  The tilt of his imagery especially fits with Spenser’s 
wholesale case against the Mirabellio lexicon and partial case against Calepino lexicons, 
and with the deeply spiritual idea of the relation between poetics and good speech that is 
encouraged in parts of Book 6 and in works like The Fowre Hymnes—as illustrated in my 
first and second chapters.  Second, Spenser’s much-relied upon assertions as Irenius in A 
View of the Present State of Ireland only imperfectly match the intent and nature of 
Spenser’s argument in Books 5 and 6.  Specifically, Irenius’s characterization of the 
relation between the tongue, mother’s milk, and the minds of infants should be seen as a 
direct appeal to the very humanists whom Spenser might otherwise question.  His 
pandering to a materialist view of language in A View illustrates part of that case.  
Spenser’s unwillingness to cede the role of poetry, though, reveals why his case in his 
epic and in his political dialogue differ: Spenser can bear to yield a point of principle 
about the nature of language, but he cannot bear to yield the centrality of the poet as a 
kind of Sidneian rhetorician.  He cannot bear to have the poet become party to the 
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materialist mission for he would, by that, risk having the “quick wit” of poets reduced to 
the negative influence that educators like Ascham would wish for. 
I have roughly summarized the whole of my argument thus far in this chapter, but 
I wish now to strengthen my hand in terms of showing why such a precise understanding 
is worthy. My approach, I mean to argue further, pays its highest dividends by improving 
the understanding of how Spenser’s work fits into the intellectual history of his period. 
Whatever his qualms about humanism Book 6, Spenser’s learned wit in The Faerie 
Queene is a product of a humanist educational system in which poetry was claimed but 
not necessarily honored.  For this reason, Spenser was for the most part allied to a figure 
like Kempe, and for this reason a wide range of influences on English education is 
relevant to my considerations in this chapter.  T.W. Baldwin in his compendious work on 
Shakespeare’s educational experience stresses how the ideas of William Kempe in his 
1588 The Education of Children set forth “a fully coordinated and philosophized scheme 
of the contemporary grammar school” (76).  More importantly for our interests, though, 
Baldwin notes that Kempe advocates “four stages of education before university," the 
first of which involves “preliminary training in the vernacular.”  At first blush this 
appears to give the vernacular an honored position, yet we know the vernacular was still 
subordinate to the classical language studies in this educational system. After all, 
Baldwin goes on to stress a key feature of the design of the educational system that 
Kempe advocates: “He who wishes to understand the principles upon which the 
sixteenth-century grammar school was founded in England would be very unwise to 
begin anywhere else than with Erasmus” (77).  The point here is not that Erasmus’s 
influence determined the entire fate of the English schooling system.  The point is that 
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Erasmus, who was no fan of the vernacular, provides a key point of reference for 
understanding conflicts between the use of classical languages and the use of vernacular 
in education. Naturally, Erasmus is long before Spenser’s time, and we cannot afford to 
tangle with the entirety of Erasmus’ humanism if we are to address Spenser’s humanism.  
Even so, to understand Spenser’s view of educational systems that taught the very 
principles of language he was to adhere to or deviate from, and to understand the 
complex didacticism inherent in Spenser’s poetry, we should conclude here with a 
consideration of just Erasmus thought about education and language to see how Spenser 
fits into the history of which he was a shaping influence.   
T.W. Baldwin details both the specifics of Erasmus' influence on English 
educational practices in particular (77-80).  However, Baldwin also must consider some 
of the specifics of Erasmus' beliefs about how good language and speaking abilities are 
acquired, as those are part and parcel of Erasmus’ dialogue with John Colet and others 
about how to teach and how students must learn.  As Erasmus’ correspondent on the 
founding of St. Paul’s school in London, Colet is concerned enough to assure Erasmus 
that the Greek and Latin poets be taught despite the objections of other religious 
authorities: “I hear that a bishop […] said that I had founded a useless and indeed a 
mischievous thing, […] a house of Idolatry.  I believe that he said this, because the Poets 
are read there.  Observations of this sort do not anger me, but make me laugh” (qtd. in 
Baldwin, 78).  We see in this comment an echo of the difference between the Calepino 
and Mirabellio lexicons—the former accepting “the Poets” and the latter disdaining them, 
the former carefully aligned with humanism and partially against scholasticism, the latter 
more conservative.  It is precisely this aspect of humanism that interests Spenser in his 
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project as a vernacular poet because it relates to the authority of his work with a humanist 
poetic vision of a vernacular language. Baldwin turns to Erasmus’ De Ratione Studii in 
order to flesh out the belief about how students were to learn from such Latin and Greek 
poetic models.  Predictably enough, there Erasmus stresses that language is an individual 
learner’s conduit to larger knowledge, and indeed such knowledge is surpassing and 
transcendent of any language in and of itself: “Erasmus believes in language as an 
imitative art acquired by habit from contact with the best rather than a science to be 
acquired by analysis” (80).  In such a scheme, the systematic treatment of language in a 
lexicon is inadequate to helping the learner.  Baldwin’s assessment continues to seem 
just, but there is a twist in the logic about language.  According to Anne Moss’s general 
argument about Erasmus from Renaissance Truth and The Latin Language Turn, it is his 
defense of such a non-systematic approach to the interconnections of ancient knowledge 
and thought as represented in language that prompts Erasmus’ to arrange his giant and 
lexicon-like Adagia.105 Thus, looked at objectively, Erasmus’ ideal teacher seems as 
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105 Ann Moss argues that key humanist figures like Erasmus were deeply implciated in debates begun and 
defined at the level of lexicography and pedagogy. She writes of Erasmus’ Latin and rhetoric that his idiom 
“negotiates meaning from proximate words freighted with a cultural history and bearing a signifying 
relation to the context in which they are uttered” (9).  Erasmus could assert this kind of linguistic authority, 
she shows us, as a consequence of the collective work of previous humanists, most notably figures like 
Lorenzo Valla, who in the mid to late fifteenth century was working feverishly to establish a new 
philological order.  According to Moss, “Valla’s approach […to Latin…] was grounded on a systematically 
argued attack on the late medieval Latin of lawyers, theologians, and philosophers” (36).  The attack 
brought with it a new linguistic education and, consequently, a new way of prescribing usage: 
Valla’s extraordinary undertaking was to make this [canonized Latin vocabulary and usage drawn 
from select authors] the common and customary language of intellectual discourse in fifteenth-
century western Europe and to ensure, concurrently, that the conceptual habits built into that 
language, together with the culture that was its context and its referent, should become the 
universe of thought inhabited  by his educated contemporaries.(42, emphasis mine) 
Under the pressure of Valla and his contemporaries, Latin as a whole came to be conceived in a new way.  
This new conceptualization valorized a greater, more natural form of fluency in the idiom of Latin because 
in that state the language itself could arbitrate questions of taste, propriety, even ideology.  “Elegance” 
became Valla’s core ideal, Moss notes, a property intrinsic to the language and compounded of other 
criteria like clarity and regular usage (41).  Thus the emphasis fell upon a form of imitation of the earlier 
style that could rise to emulation by retaining a “natural” process:  
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challenging indeed as the epic poetry of Vergil (and other Latin sources) that was to 
inform the education of the children.  Examining the teacher that draws on the copious 
work of antiquity De Ratione Studii, Baldwin describes him thus: “No mere plodding 
drillmaster is this ideal teacher of Erasmus, nor yet a walking encyclopedia of 
information.  He drills encyclopedic knowledge into himself that he may always be able 
to adapt information to the particular need of the individual student” (85).   
Like Erasmus’ ideal teacher, Spenser’s Faerie Queene depends on a didactic 
encyclopedism in its epic scope and concern with founding English-language poetics 
equal to the classical heritage.   While Erasmus’ encyclopedic cultural machine of the 
teacher dwells in the ideal Latin language and the ideally rational ancient culture, 
ironically, he has students who are prepared for his teaching by having basic instruction 
in the vernacular.  Erasmus’ program is bound to create a conflict if we begin to have any 
notion that languages are anything other than tools for discovering knowledge.  
Moreover, his program is bound for conflict in being promulgated in England and other 
nascent nations.  In his study of humanist educational practices, Woodward writes of 
Erasmus: “A universal language—Latin—a universal church, a uniform standard of 
culture, and a perpetual peace formed his social ideal” (113). Thus, continues Woodward, 
“Nationality he disliked, vernacular he despised, racial creeds and churches were utterly 
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Their [Erasmus’s and Valla’s] common sense of a seamless web of words, of the 
interconnectedness of language, and of the culture woven by it and into it, is apparent in all the 
works of compilation by which Erasmus transmitted Latin sayings, elegant expressions, and the 
reference points of classical culture: his collection of adages, similitudes, apophthegmata, his 
copia verborum ac rerum.  The order he adopts is generally a browsing order that leads the reader 
into paths natural to the language and the culture… (49) 
What Valla hoped for, and Erasmus tried to achieve in some measure through influence on education and 
through a disorganizational strategy, has a bearing on the kind of work that we find Spenser doing in The 
Faerie Queene.  Spenser tries to construct a didacticism that answers to the demands of Latin humanism, 
English national pride, and his own view of the poet’s centrality.  Such a view of the poet as rhetorician is 
relevant to Artegall’s failure as a rhetorician lawmaker. 
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abhorrent to him…” Spenser comes forward as an iconoclastic Protestant with an ardent 
nationalistic urge.  Even if Spenser’s view of the vernacular was of a degraded material to 
be improved exactly as Latin was improved, he has a strong incentive to propose a 
different set of relations between language, knowledge, poetry, and educational practice.  
Moreover, Spenser’s view of the physical tongue itself, and his decision to spend so 
much time crafting imagery of that in The Faerie Queene, answers to an equal focus on 
this precise image and term in Erasmus.  Erasmus’s dour text on the tongue, Lingua, 
could easily be a source of Spenser’s interest in such terms for engaging his educated 
audience.106 
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106 Erasmus composed his Lingua in 1525, a work whose preoccupation with the tongue as an instrument of 
evil, as his translator Elaine Fantham explains, testifies well to the tumultuous political and religious issues 
circumscribing him at the time and testifies poorly to any faith Erasmus might have had in the virtues of 
good speech (“Introductory Note,” 255).  The work is preponderatingly a catalogue of the possible evils of 
the tongue; only in its concluding ten pages of one hundred and fifty does he turn toward some sort of 
educational or ameliorative purpose.  Fantham reasons that the imbalance owes to Erasmus’ “recent 
experiences” and a desire to announce “his personal grievances against friars and theologians (naturally left 
unnamed) and his sensitivity to charges of intellectual dishonesty and heresy” (255). Yet there is clearly an 
additional reason.  Anyone who has surveyed Erasmus’ copious writing and activities amongst humanists 
knows that he had already been instrumental in coming up with systems of education and thought that 
channel the power of the tongue before writing this treatise.  Indeed, Erasmus was devoted to eloquence 
and to the teaching of an eloquence founded in rediscovered classical texts.  His long cataloguing diatribe 
against slander hardly needs to be balanced against a description of good speech since, after all, so many of 
his works have been devoted to them.  Describing the Lingua overall, Erasmus writes: 
Now no one can make proper use of anything without understanding its nature and capacity, just 
as in other circumstances most people learn to distinguish between healthy and harmful things 
only by trial and error, at great cost to themselves.  I would not like this to be your experience in 
dealing with the tongue, and so I will first reveal to you what terrible scourges in life are inflicted 
by an ill-governed tongue, and then describe the great benefits to us if it is given play only as God 
intended when he bestowed it upon us.  Finally, I will offer a sort of manual or method of 
controlling this part of the body. (264) 
Erasmus’ rather sanguine sense that he can offer a short manual for the tongue—a manual that will cover 
our understanding for proper use of speech in all cultures at all times—is founded on a humanist view of 
language that was not entirely accepted, and certainly could not have been fully accepted by Spenser as an 
advocate of the vernacular.  This attitude toward language could not have fared well in a century during 
which vernacular languages and a variety of cultural identities were coming into angry and proud 
competition among the European nations. Erasmus and his condemnation of abuses of the tongue thus put 
my discussion of language-learning and Spenser’s attitude toward language in general in proper 
perspective.   
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Erasmus’s influence on education, his engagement with issues of lexicography, 
his focus on the physical tongue, and his encyclopedism combined with an antipathy for 
the vernacular show well why Spenser’s work and Spenser’s lifelong arguments might 
have set him in competition with the sort of humanists following in the Erasmian 
tradition.  And what we find, when we look at reform-minded educators who call upon 
the legitimacy of poetry, is crucial for its reflection of what Spenser would have disputed 
in Erasmus. In the course of his argument, William  Kempe points out of the poets after 
Orpheus:  
Linus wrote much of natural Philosophie, as well touching celestiall as terrestriall 
creatures, and had two noble Schollers, Thamaras, who wrote three thousand 
verses of their Divinitie; and Hercules, who enterprised and achieved with 
incomparable exploytes for the common profite of mankind, that he was taken for 
a god on earth. (199) 
 
From this, we can see that poets and heroes are alike engaged in civilizing by heroic 
actions that produce “profit.” Kempe’s assertion of an equality between the poet 
Thamaras and the active hero, Hercules, should inform our reading of Spenser’s 
characterization of Artegall as a Hercules.107  While some lexicographers had likened 
themselves overtly to Hercules108 and to Tyrant-mollifying poets, in Spenser we find a 
poet crafting Hercules in a way that slyly suggests the language and reputation of the hero 
is as important as the actual deeds he commits on behalf of others.  Spenser controls the 
fate of a Hercules as he controls the fate of lexicographers or lawmakers. Kempe 
furnishes Homer as a primary example of what Spenser might have had in mind: 
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107 For extensive considerations of how Artegall invokes comparison to Hercules, see Jane Aptekar Icons of 
Justice: Iconography and Thematic Imagery in Book V of The Faerie Queene. (New York: Columbia UP 
1969). 
 
108 In Dictionaries in Early Modern Europe, John Considine points out that Erasmus characterizes himself 
as Herculean in his labors on the Adagia (22-3). 
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After all these, in the dayes of Elie, Homer the prince of all Poets wrote his 
excellent workes, by the which all good Schooles have been much furthered even 
unto this day.  For all those that excelled in learning, all those that were sage 
Lawmakers, discreet rulers, either at home or abroad, in peece or in warre, set 
their precepts and examples of instruction out of Homers workes.  His workes 
therefore made Lycurgus and Solon good lawmakers… (199-200) 
 
Kempe then furnishes further examples.  We see here a connection between poet and 
lawmaking hero like Artegall.  Just as importantly, though, we see in Kempe a profound 
respect for how Greek law was fashioned in accordance with Greek-language poetry that 
was “eloquent” in the tradition that ran before it.  The poet has made the deeds of the 
Godlike heroes logically available to those who would be taught, and from this the law 
has been fashioned.  This is a basis for Spenser’s widespread interest in legal language as 
Andrew Zurcher has found it—and it would depend, logically, upon a notion of language 
that was profoundly relational rather than simply referential.109 
 What does all this tell us?  It tells us that the problems of lawmaking raised by 
Book 5 for Spenser do not simply speak to the general educational project of his work, 
certainly not simply to a question of organizing a political state, but rather to an argument 
in favor of viewing a specific role for poetry and language in society as the means by 
which to identify and then make functional a social order.  The preoccupation in Book 6 
with questions of language and the court turns to the imagery of growth and gardens 
because Spenser recognized the complementarity of learning and language.  He did not 
recognize it as an advocate of standard imperial-minded humanism. He was instead an 
advocate of national interest, objecting to the practical limits of the Latin-language 
humanism and meeting the challenges of the vernacular humanism without sacrificing the 
spiritual and immaterial qualities of the mind. These were projects of establishing 
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109 See my notes on Andrew Zurcher in Chapter 3.  
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knowledge and techniques for acquiring knowledge dependent upon the sort of 
educational effort his epic would foster, yet not bound to what we today might call a 
naïve empiricism.  Thus, again, the allegory about language and learning in Book 6 
should not be read as a reflection of the iron-clad declarations about identity found in A 
View of the Present State of Ireland in which the question of how to impose order 
dominates and offsets any question of the relation between culture and law. 
 The intellectual history that Baldwin studies, that Erasmus fleshes out for the 
English, and that Kempe spikes with his treatise on education together make a case for 
seeing nuances in Spenser’s intentions for how poetry was to be educational. We should 
not understand all education or learning to be political, nor all his ideas about language to 
be servants to a naïve trust in English power.  Rather, we should see that Spenser’s poetry 
enables deeper critical thought about power, the individual, culture, language, and mind 
even when his political appeals did not.  My extended considerations of the faults in 
McCabe’s and Hadfield’s works have been justified by an interest in proving such a 
point, for it is a point easily lost. Whatever Spenser’s reservations about the Irish policy, 
whatever his humanity and compassions, we cannot sacrifice the complex of motivations 
that emerges from his work in its response to many sources.  To do so is to over-write the 
subtle and essential legacy of a good bitch with a popular and obvious tirade against a 
bad dog.   
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